The Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-recruitment of Combatants in the Kivus, Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Abstract

This thesis examines the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in war torn zones. With a case study of the Kivus in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has experienced one of the world's worst blood-shedding over the last two decades, the study uses a constructivist Grounded Theory approach to research in terms of both data collection and analysis. It focuses on the existing body of knowledge on conflict analyses with a particular reference to the absurdity of abundance theory, which singles out the endowment of natural resources and weak governance as the main fuelling-factors of the conflict in the DRC. Data collection was carried out using diverse methods including literature reviews, interviews and focus groups. In particular, the study aims to explore how the demilitarisation of the mining zones could contribute to enhancement of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and promote social cohesion, sustainable peace and security in the eastern DRC.

The analysis of the conflicts in the DRC and the acquaintance of belligerents with artisanal mining revealed the convoluted multi-layered nature of the conflicts in the country and their intricate causalities. The examination of the demilitarisation of the mining zones pertinent to the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants in the Kivus identified a few prerequisites in order to sever the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship that largely swivel around "bottom-up solutions".

The research contributes to knowledge in three broad areas; firstly, it contributes to ongoing academic debates on conflict analyses, the political economy of armed conflicts vis-à-vis mining sector as well as the mining sector and DDR of combatants in the DRC. Secondly, it offers empirical analysis and data on the combatants' recruitment and DDR process and the artisanal mining sector with regards to state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. Finally, it underlines the need to re-evaluate "the concept of community-based approach", a key approach to improving peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery in the eastern DRC.

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With Jesus I have everything, without him I have nothing…"My God, I am merely servant; I have done no more than is my duty" Luke 17:10.

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List of Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ADP	*Alliance Démocratiques des Peuples* [Democratic Alliance of Peoples]
AFDL	*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* [Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire]
ALIR	*Armée de Libération du Rwanda* [Army for the Liberation of Rwanda]
AMFI	American Mineral Fields Incorporated
ANR	*Agence Nationale de Renseignements* [National Intelligence Agency]
AU	African Union
BDK	Bundu dia Kongo
CBR	Community-Based-Reintegration
CCTV	Chinese Channel Television
CENCO	*Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo* [National Episcopal Conference of the Congo]
CI-DDR	*Commité Interdepartemental en Charge de Planification et Coordination de DDR* [Interdepartmental Committee in charge of Planning and Co-ordination of DDR]
CNDP	*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* [National Congress for the Defence of the People]
CNS	*Conférence Nationale Souveraine* [Sovereign National Conference]
CONADER	*Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion* [National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion]
CPGL	*Communauté des Pays de Grands Lacs* [Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries]
CT	Constructivist Grounded Theory
DCR	Community Disarmament and Reinsertion
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
DFID	Department for International Development
DGM	*Direction Générale des Migrations* [Directorate-General for Migration]
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSCRP	*Document de la Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté* [Document of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper]
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Ex FAR	*Forces Armées Rwandaises* [Former Rwandese Armed Forces]
FAC	*Forces Armées Congolaises* [Congolese Armed Forces]
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FAR	*Forces Armées Rwandaises* [Rwandese Armed Forces]
FARC	*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Revolutionary* [Armed Forces of Colombia]
FARDC	*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo]
FAZ	*Forces Armées Zaïroises* [Zairian Armed Forces]
FDD	*Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* [Forces for the Defence of Democracy]
FDLR	*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]
FGD	Focus group discussion
FRF	*Forces Républicaines Féderalistes* [Federalist Republican Forces]
FSC	Free State of Congo
GDP	Gross Domestic Profit
Gécamines	*Générale des Carrièrs et des Mines* [Metals and Mineral Trading Company]
GT	Constructivist Grounded Theory
GW	Global Wetness
IAC	International Association of the Congo
ICC	International Court for Criminals
ICCN	*Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature* [Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Environment]
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICGLR	International Conference on Great Lakes Region
ILO	International Labour Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INPP	*Institut National des Professions Pratiques* [National Institute for Professional Practices]
IPIS	International Peace Information Service
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
LED	Local Economy Development
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	*Mouvement du 23 Mars* [the March 23 Movement]
Magrivi	*Mutuelle des Agriculteurs et Eleveurs du Virunga* [Farmers and Livestock Raisers Cooperative of Virunga]
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MLC	*Mouvement de Libération Congolais* [Congolese Liberation Movement]
MONUC	*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* [United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo]
MONUSCO	*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la République Démocratique du Congo*[United Nations Organisation Mission for the Stabilisation of the DRC]
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho* [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODI	Overseas development institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUC	*Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo* [United Nations Organisation in the Congo]
PARECO	*Patriotes Résistant Congolais* [Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance]
PNDDR	*Programme Nationale pour le Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintegration* [National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration]
PTSD	Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

RCD	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* [Rally for Congolese Democracy]
RCD-Goma	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* [Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma]
RCD-ML	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération* [Rally for Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement]
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMI:	*Service Militaire pour L'Integration* [Military Integration Service]
SOMIGL	*Société Minière des Grands Lacs* [Mining Society of the Great Lakes]
TDRP	Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	*Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* [National Union for Total Liberation of Angola]
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force

Chapter One: Researching on the Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Reintegration of Ex- combatants in the Context of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

(IRIS 2013).

1.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a widespread optimism that the Cold War is over and consequently, African countries were expected to enter an era of peace and development. This optimism nonetheless ushered in recurrent local conflicts. Some fundamental factors, including identity and land access associated with economic exacerbations have been singled out as conflict triggering-factors. Most Sub-Saharan Africa countries, particularly the DRC, have been experiencing a turbulent period mainly caused by the presence of natural resources. These resources occur to be feeding local and regional insecurity, therefore keeping the region prone to protracted armed conflict.

Indeed a fairly cursory knowledge of the DRC's history proves that Congolese authorities' perspective of state – the DRC being a sovereign state, is far different from great powers and multinational corporations' – which view the DRC as an international space for trade purposes,[1] where economic and lucrative issues have priority over security and stability. It is an indisputable fact that from the reign of King Léopold II over the International Association of the Congo to the present Congo, the DRC has been a reservoir of natural resources destined for illegal exploitation.

The thesis' main argument that the conflict in the DRC is hybrid and multifaceted[2] sheds light on how the country is a 'text-book-state'[3] or a '*terra nullius*',[4] with a stateless

[1] See Chapters 4 and 5 for further details.
[2] See chapter 4 for more details.
[3] A text-book-state is a country which is totally evanescent on the issue of human security and social development of citizens at all social levels. In the context of this research, it refers to as an organised political community – territory, population and government, under one government, with the latter being powerless and careless in delivering basic needs for its people.

situation over its territory-mineral endowment. Possible interpretation includes that first and foremost, the country will need a proactive security system drawn from the thought that 'whosoever wants peace should prepare for war'.[5] In such a context, a problem-solving approach toward analysing and resolving conflict will need to primarily incorporate local vision.

Over the last 20 years or more, some individuals have been involved in the cycle of Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR) and Re-recruitment of ex-combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congo's war-torn territories. The last 20 years have also seen those who were recruited becoming recruiters themselves, because they have knowledge of who to liaise with – on issues regarding recruitment, where to find combatants and how to convince or compel individuals to join such armed movements.

Meanwhile, the presence of natural resources should not necessarily instigate militarisation, be it legal or illegal, such as those have happened or re-occurring in the eastern DRC. This process should be seen under a wider environment; national, local, regional or beyond the borders to vividly understand and explain the problem. Ndaywel (1998) and Elikia M'bokolo (2005) put forward that this is not the first time a category of individuals have been involved in the recruitment enterprise in the DRC. Between 1860 and 1870, they reiterate, the hunting of elephants proceeded roughly in the same manner. To them, probable interpretation could be that youth who were recruited in Namwezi around Tabora had to cross Tanganyika Lake either to the north or south to hunt for elephants. With time, these individuals began to recruit other young people to work with them. After about 35 years, these individuals resorted to infantile, young or adult workforce that involved socialisation procedure and the creation of new elite as well as new identity.

In the context of state failure and long-drawn-out armed movements, as the case in the DRC, the ex-combatants' DDR would barely succeed, due to a "top-down understanding" of the problem and the "top-down solutions" to the same issues that led to the conflict. In

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[4] The concept '*terra nullius'* is a Latin term which means *free man's land*, *land opened for all*. In the context of this study it designates *free land for exploitation*.

[5] This is the translation of a Latin adage; *Si vis pacemen para bellum* adapted from a statement found in Book three of Latin author Publius Flavius; Vegetius Renatus's tract De Re Militari – 4th or 5th century.

this case, arguably the ex-combatants will generally be in the prey of conflict entrepreneurs and likely to be re-recruited by armed movements. Probable interpretation could be that the ex-combatants' re-recruitment hence will happen either because there is a local, national or international conflict's network which enables recruiters and conflict entrepreneurs to perpetuate the cycle of recruitment or due to ineffectiveness of the institutional framework to sustain and promote peace, social, political and economic stability.

1.2 Setting the Context: the Democratic Republic of Congo

Leopold's colonial rule and the very first Congolese civil war some weeks after independence resulted in the breaking-up of two mining provinces thus, Katanga and Kasai in September 1960. These are the two main watersheds that could help understand the long way from colonial period to the current DRC as well as different rebellions that the country has still been experiencing. Located in the African Great Lakes Region, the DR Congo[6] is the 2nd largest country in Africa by area and the 11th in the world. With a population of about 75 million (UNDP 2014), it is also the 4th most populous African country, the 19th in the world and formally the most populous Francophone country. As seen in Figure 1, the country has nine neighbours including the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the north; Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania to the east; Zambia and Angola to the south and the Republic of Congo, the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Although the 2006 Constitution has provided a Unitarian state with 26 decentralised entities, up to date however it is still administratively split into 11 provinces including Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Equateur, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental, Katanga, Kinshasa, Maniema, the north Kivu and the south Kivu (Van Reybrouck 2014).

With a surface area of 2,345,000 km^2, the DRC is a country brimming with natural resource potentials. According to the National Statistic estimates, as quoted by CIA World Fact-book (2010), the DRC's population is scattered across the country, with only 40% living in

[6] Belgium-Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Zaire and Congo-Kinshasa will be used interchangeably.

urban areas. The country is endowed with extraordinary agricultural and mineral resources that potentially make it one of the richest countries in Africa and a driver for African growth. Since 2003, DRC is still improving from a cycle of crisis – which erupted in the 1990s, and from the upshots of a protracted economic and social morass – in which the country has been mired since the late 1970s. Although a slow recovery, the Congo still remains a fragile post-conflict state, characterised by little tax headroom and weak institutions that require enormous needs in terms of state-rebuilding and economic growth (World Bank 2010; UNDP 2012).

Over the past five years, the country has made some improvements through political and economic reforms. In contrast, per capita income and human development is ranked near the bottom of the world, at 176 out of 182, and one of the lowest in Africa, with many communities living from hand to mouth (UNDP 2012). From 2003 to 2010, the government in close cooperation with the World Bank embarked on a systematic restructuring process to enhance economic governance, particularly decentralisation, public finance management, public administration and transparency, and three other sectors; namely public enterprises, the mining sector and the security sector, with the latter including ex-combatants' DDR (World Bank 2010). Although considerable improvement in the implementation of these measures have been accomplished over the past two years, further efforts are still needed to entrench the principle of competitive awarding of mining, oil and forestry contracts.

Figure1.1: Geographical location of the DRC (Source: Congolese Geographic Institute 2013)

The country's mining activities are closely linked to conflicts and instability rather than contributing to the country's development or to the improvement of peoples' living standards (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Van Reybrouck 2014). There is a striking contrast between those in poverty and immense wealth, in terms of natural resources and other valuable commodities, in the DRC. The country's wealth is also believed to be one of the causes of the endless armed conflicts, riots and poverty (UNDP 2012). Transforming the 'absurdity of abundance' into a blessing is one of the main challenges facing the state following the second democratic elections held over decades ago.

Compared to other countries in the world, the DRC is characterised by the abundance and diversity of its natural resources. The particularity of Congo's minerals is that several minerals are concentrated in one place, for instance when digging for gold, two or three other kinds of minerals such as diamond, tin or coltan can also be found. Different natural resources are mainly concentrated in the following areas;

Katanga: large deposits of cobalt and copper along the Central African copper belt in the south. In this region, it is not uncommon to find other related-metals to copper and cobalt, such as zinc, silver, germanium, and even uranium in some fields.

Eastern Regions: in the provinces of the north Kivu, the south Kivu and Maniema, bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, there are deposits of gold, coltan (columbite tantalite), tin and tungsten.

Kasai Regions: in the eastern and western Kasai there are enormous diamond deposits.

Littoral Zone: there are oil and natural gas (offshore) but also in a narrow strip along the coast (onshore). However, compared to its neighbouring countries – Congo-Brazzaville and Angola that are already oil producers, the probability of finding the most important inland oil reservoirs is very limited.

Judged by its share of world reserves, suggest Berke *et al*. (2007), the main mineral resources of the DRC, in its current state are as follows; cobalt (36% of world reserves),

tantalum (25 - 65%), tin (7%), copper (6%) and diamond (25%), including explored and exploited economically as well as additional reserves estimated on the basis of available knowledge fields. The country is also covered by tropical rain forest (Congo basin), and is the 2nd largest forest reserve in the world after Brazil.

The present state or condition of the DRC is the result of a series of socio-political metamorphoses that hampered the country's economic development potentials. From the establishment of the International Association of the Congo by King Léopold II in 1879 to the current DRC, the country's government has been unstable. To date, it has had eight name changes (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Van Reybrouck 2014) reflecting its fragility and instability. The Table 1.1 summarises some of the different general changes the DRC underwent in its history.

Table1.1: The DRC's history of important governance changes

Year	State Name	Constitution	Political System
Pre-colonial Period 1879-1884	International Association of the Congo (IAC)	Royal Discretion	Private property of King Léopold II
1885-1908	Congo Free State (CFS)	Berlin General Act	*Terra Nullius* International Property under King Léopold II management
Colonial period[7] 1908-1960	Belgian Congo	Law on the Government of the Belgian Congo	Monarchy/ Personal Union with Belgium
1st Republic 1960-1964	Republic of Congo/ Congo Léopoldville	Fundamental Law	Unitarian and Federal State Parliamentarian Regime
1964-1966	Democratic Republic of Congo	Constitution of Luluabourg	Federal State Parliamentarian Regime

[7] This was arguably the longest – albeit coerced, period of tranquillity the country has experienced.

2nd Republic 1966-1971	Democratic Republic of Congo/ Congo-Kinshasa	Revolutionary Constitution	Unitarian State Parliamentarian Regime
1971-1997	Republic of Zaïre	Revolutionary Constitution (1971-1994) Constitutional Act of Transition (1994)	Unitarian State Presidential Regime
		Decree-law (1997)	Unitarian State Presidential Regime
3rd Republic 1997 to date	Democratic Republic of Congo/ Congo-Kinshasa	Constitutional Act of Transition (1998)	Unitarian State Presidential Regime
		Transitional Constitution (2003-06)	Unitarian State Presidential Regime (1+4)[8]
		Constitution of the Third Republic (2006-)	Semi-Presidential Regime

Source: Own composition

The history of natural resources exploitation and conflicts in the DRC goes side by side with the creation of the current DRC. The DRC's colonial history shows that resources exploitation began in the 1700s while armed conflicts started in the 1900s. In his research on memories of Africa, Elikia M'bokolo (2005) provides that during Leopold's colonial rule the King of Belgium amassed an immense individual wealth from ivory and rubber through Congolese slave labour, while about 10 million people died from forced labour and famine. This outright extermination and the inhuman[9] exploitation of the Congo have been

[8] The executive of the transitional period (2003-06) was made of one president and four vice-presidents.

[9]According to Genocide scholar Adam Jones (2006:42), "the result of rubber exploitation in the Congo Free State by Léopold II was one of the most brutal and all-encompassing *corvée* [forced labour] institutions the world has known… Male rubber tappers and porters were mercilessly exploited and driven to death". From Hochschild (1998) and Ewans' (2002) account on Belgian colonial atrocities in the Congo, it has been unveiled that Leopold's agents held the wives and children of these men hostage until they returned with their rubber quota. Those who refused or failed to supply enough rubber often had their villages burned down, children murdered, and their hands cut off.

believed to be the ultimate cause which prompted Belgium to take over administration of the Congo in 1908, which remained a colony until June 30, 1960. However, five days after independence – July 5, a military mutiny by Congolese soldiers against their European officers broke out in the capital and rampant looting began. On July 11, 1960 the mining province of Katanga seceded from the new republic while the diamond-rich province of Kasai broke away on August 8, 1960. Hence, newly independent Congo plunged into its first civil war in 1960 (Elikia M'bokolo 2005).

The overview of macro-level mining in the DRC suggests that mining generates a bigger share of economic activity than in other countries with remarkable direct economic impacts, especially in terms of producing foreign direct investment and export. The indirect impacts are potentially much greater (see Figure 1.2), but difficulty lies in impacts' measurement because of data constraints within the DRC (Oxford Institute of Management 2013).

Figure1.2: Overview of macro-level contributions of mining in DRC (Oxford Policy Management 2013:9)

Endowed with resources of vast potential wealth, the DRC's economy dropped considerably since the mid-1980s.[10] The United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, recently advised that the country's untapped mineral deposits are believed to be worth in excess of US$ 24 trillion, with an economy relying heavily on mining. However, despite being one of the world's richest countries in terms of natural resources, it has the world's 2nd lowest nominal Gross Domestic Profit – GDP, per capita (UNDP 2012).

1.3 Political Economy of Armed Groups vis-à-vis Mining Sector in the Kivus[11]

Following the end of the Cold War, arguably the outbreak of most of the conflicts in Africa had been linked to economic incentives, exacerbated by either ethnic identity or land dispute. For instance, suggestions from Gebrewold (2009) indicate that informal and unlawful high-profit economic activities such as arms sales, drug trafficking, illegal mining and trade of minerals including diamonds, gold, coltan etc., are believed to have developed and increased in territories under rebel control, as over time those involved in, or reliant on these activities lose all interests in peace. The history of rebellions in the DRC started immediately after the colonial period (Dean Pavlakis 2010; Onana 2013; Nashi 2013). From 1960 to 2013, Congo has experienced at least nine rebellions and an endless occurrence of local and external armed groups[12] (Onana 2013; Nashi 2013). With the exception of the 1960s rebellions which started in the south – Katanga, west – Bandundu and Kasai, and a part of the north – Kisangani,[13] the rest of rebellions erupted in the mining-rich territory of the country in the east – Kivus. The figures 1.3 and 1.4 below show the abundance of mineral deposits in the north and south Kivus that led to the rebellions' outbreak.

[10] Chapter 5 casts more lights on the DRC's conflict analysis.
[11] The DRC has two provinces of Kivu – north and south. In this study Kivus will be used when it refers to both provinces.
[12] See annex 1 and 2 for more details on different rebellions and armed conflicts that occurred in the DRC from 1960 to 2013.
[13] The Katanga and Kasai secessions were led respectively by Moise Tshombe and Albert Kalondji two months following the independence 1960. The Bandundu rebellion was headed by Pierre Mulele from 1966 to 1969. See Appendixes one and two for more details.

Figure1.3: Mineral deposits in the North Kivu (Source: www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php)

Figure1.4: Mineral deposits in the South Kivu (Source: www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php)

The two Congolese wars – 1996-1997 and 1998-2003, the proliferation of armed groups in the eastern DRC, the ambiguous phenomenon of combatants' recruitment cycle and the failed or unfolded nature of the reintegration process illustrate the intricate relationships between conflict and mineral resources, as well as the convergence of domestic and international financial interests in perpetuating conflict (Nest 2011; Kourra Owana 2012; Hilgert 2013). A set of papers on the cycle of crises in the DRC have found that natural resources offer incentives to conflicts in order to capture the resources and reduce the constraints in financing the war from outside (Kourra Owana 2012; Hilgert 2013; Nashi 2013; Onana 2013). From the first Congo war in 1998 to the outbreak of the M23 rebellion in 2012, the various players involved in rebellions derive profits from the conflict through "resource mining or war economies" (Bucyalimwe 2013:12). Illegal mining in East-Congo encourages and sustains the furtherance of conflict. For instance, Hilgert (2013) asserts that mining of mineral resources, be it legal or illegal, has blurred the discrepancies between economic and politico-military interests as politically unlikely but economically rational agreements are formed for money-spinning purposes. Subsequently, ending the war becomes less of a priority.

The course of the conflict from 1996 to 2012 depicts that natural resources were, and are still, fuelling conflicts in the eastern DRC. Since 2001 to the recent past, several reports from the United Nations – UN, have focused on the issue of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the East DRC, and a committee of experts on this particular issue has been created since 2002 (Onana 2013). Recently these experts have found that armed groups and members of the Congolese national army control the exploitation of gold, cassiterite, coltan, wolfram, timber and diamonds in a number of areas in the north and south Kivus (Enough Projects 2013). Global Witness (2013) released a report which supports the Enough Projects' evidence. According to this report, armed groups and members of the Congolese national army have become "informal owners" of mining concessions and are levying taxes on minerals trade. On the other side however, some will argue that in the absence of a strong response to the state of unemployment, the majority of youth and demobilised ex-combatants turn to artisanal mining as an alternative and lucrative activity. A set of papers on putting a stop to illegal logging and on conflict minerals in DRC suggest that in some territories in the eastern Congo, artisanal mining is

an alternative response to the jobless state for young people and ex-combatants because it yields hundreds of thousands of informal jobs and tens of millions of dollars per year (Jeroen 2010; EITI 2011).

The state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC has shown that the level and growth rate of revenue decrease the cost of organising rebellions and, to a limited extent, the government's ability to neutralise the rebellions (World Bank 2011). However, although local ethnic dominance in the eastern DRC is a basis for recruitment of civil wars, ethnic rivalry is also a stumbling block to extend these wars beyond the province of origin (Bucyalimwe Mararo 2013). The reliance of Congolese economy on natural resources[14] and on informal sector, to some extent, is a noteworthy determinant of the cycle of combatants' recruitment and the failure of the reintegration process in the Kivus. However, it is not reliance per se which motivates combatants' recruitment and the failure of the reintegration process, but rather the topographical concentration of natural resources and their imbalanced sharing. In such a context, the government's capability to thwart or eliminate unauthorised armed groups and demilitarise mining zones depends more on external support, rather than on the national army and government's economic ability.

With this context of mineral-based conflict as the background, this study examines the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the Kivus, DRC. The idea of this research broadly locates the impact of ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas[15] on combatants' recruitment and reintegration rather than looking at armed group dynamics and their political economy vis-à-vis the mining sector.

Combatants are linked to mineral deals in many ways. They could be involved in mining exploitation through a direct taxation whereby they mine natural resources using forced labour (GW 2013). For example, between January and December 2013, gold exports through accounts controlled by the rebels of the March 23 Movement (M23) totalled $500

[14] The elaboration of resource curse in Chapter 3 gives more details on the mineral-based conflict.

[15] According to the DRC's mining code, the army elements are prohibited from mining activities and all mining zones should be clear from armed elements.

million (The Enough Projects 2013). Combatants are also linked to minerals through looting, expropriation and the seizure of mineral resources or other forms of wealth (Kabemba 2012). From 1996 up to 2013, Rwandan and Ugandan contingents or troops have set a monopoly over the exploitation and commercialisation of mineral resources by forcing local entrepreneurs out of business while inundating the region with products imported from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (Nashi 2013; Onana 2013).

The 1998 and 2000 rebellions brought out another combatants' profile in terms of the artisanal mining-combatant relationship. This is based on the combatants levying tax in the mining territories administrated by rebels; this levy is both in-kind and direct taxation (The Enough Projects 2013; GW 2013). From 1996 to 2013, Rwanda and Uganda earn sizeable profits from the mining of natural resources in the DRC. Evidence from some reports depicts that the M23 combatants levied a tax of about 8 percent of total mineral exports by the *comptoirs* [mineral selling-point] in addition to a $ 15,000 annual license fee per *comptoir*. A portion of the taxes levied by the M23 were paid to Kigali and Kampala as payments for military support (De Koning 2011; 2012; The Enough Projects 2013; GW 2013, Onana 2013). The control of most artisanal mining by armed groups has connected combatants to some international financial institutions that have been accused of buying mineral from conflict zones. There is a claim that the two Congo wars and rebellions have also been financed by a network of financial institutions mainly established in Rwanda, Uganda and in Western countries (Bucyalimwe Maroro 2013; Onana 2013). It has been said that Rwandan banks were the principal suppliers of the funding expended to buy minerals from the Congolese territory controlled by rebels (GW 2013). Western banks are also believed to be involved in the trade of DRC's natural resources. The 2001 UN Panel report, quoted by Bucyalimwe Maroro (2013), for instance, found that *Banque Bruxelles Lambert* of Belgium has handled the financial operations of Aziza Kulsum – alias Madame Gulamali, a notorious arms and minerals trader and one-time general manager of the *Société Minière des Grands Lacs* [Mining Company of Great Lakes; SOMIGL], a mining company owned by pro-Rwanda rebels in the Kivus. Citibank of New York also has been found to have significant indirect financial networks and mining dealings with senior rebel leaders in the Kivus via their suppliers (De Koning 2012).

The 2001 UN Panel report, quoted by Onana (2013) found that Uganda's decision to enter the war in the DRC was motivated by three individuals who were keen to gain from the occupation of the mineral-rich eastern region of the DRC. In Rwanda however, the government's decision to support an incursion was motivated by the conviction – which still holds true, that resource looting would help offset the cost to the government of the invasion, which might have otherwise been prohibited. Once inside the Congolese territory, the Rwandan army adopted and showed well-disciplined procedures for mining the DRC's resources and utilising them to finance the military effort (Ibid.).

In the DRC, combatants are acquainted with mining exploitation through various schemes and techniques depending on the circumstances and the rank of the commander or senior officer involved in a specific business. In the mineral-rich eastern region of the DRC, weapons could be acquired through direct payments or exchange with a product; however prevalent in the DRC is a barter type of business between ores and weapons. The 2001 UN report on the DRC, quoted by Bucyalimwe Maroro (2013) for instance found that arms are offered to a party in return for mining concessions. Overall, the DRC's reliance on informal economy based on artisanal mining and mineral exports make the country prone to conflict because of resource appropriation and the struggle for the control of resources. However, the regional distribution of mineral resources could also be taken as one of mechanisms through which mineral resources cause conflict. Hence, the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus is particularly prone to the recurrence due to the regional concentration of mineral resources than its reliance on mineral resources. As discussed in the following sections, artisanal mining is one way which drives this link.

1.3.1 Artisanal Mining

This section explores how artisanal mining upholds the cycle of combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment in the mining-rich zones in the Kivus. This relationship is also part of greed or the economic functions of war hypotheses in the prevailing conflict analyses discussed in Chapter Two. However Chapter Four in respect of state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC has substantiated the complex environment which gave rise to conflicts at multiple stages and which still upholds some of them. By contextualising the system of artisanal mining in the eastern DRC and how it has changed

over time, this review seeks to identify the ways in which artisanal mining links to the recruitment of combatants and the failed or unfolded nature of the reintegration process in the eastern DRC.

There is a range of studies being conducted on the nexus between mineral resources and conflict in the Kivus. Since the establishment of a Panel of Experts by the UN in 2000,[16] research on the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC has prompted many other studies. The Panel research on the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC revealed the pervasive linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the second Congo War[17] (UNSC 2001a), the role played by private companies, their home countries and international financial institutions (Khan 2008). These reports prompted diplomatic pressure from some Western governments (Lasker 2008). It emerged from the panel reports that the primary reason which led to invasion of Congo by Rwanda and Uganda was not security reasons but the exploitation of natural resources (UNSC 2001b). During the second Congo War, the countries above established elite networks towards exploiting natural resource (Autesserre 2010; 2012; Onana 2012). While the reports point out 85 companies being in infringement of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development – OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and underscore the liability of the home governments (UNSC 2002b), the nexus between natural resources and conflict has been backed by the influential rational choice theory and the economic purposes of the war reviewed in Chapter Two.

From the International Peace Information Service – IPIS research (Raeymaekers 2002), it might be thought that there was a shift in the incentive for conflict from political to economic. The research employs the concept 'network war' to portray the privatised networks of army officers, armed groups and international companies, connecting local war economy and global economic networks in looting resources for personal enrichment and to fund the conflict. The political economy emerging from this network war indicates that

[16] The Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
[17] UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003b)

state borders, state sovereignty or the difference between lawful and unlawful economy are irrelevant. For Duffield (2001) this is an emerging complexes situation.

"Artisanal mining refers to the manual excavation of alluvial mineral deposits that requires minimal technology input" (De Koning 2009:1). According to the World Bank (Taka2011), 90 percent of the mineral production in the DRC comes from artisanal miners, who are estimated to number between 500,000 and 2,000,000. In thinking about the relationship between artisanal mining and livelihood in the DRC, it is unarguable that the artisanal mining sector caters for the livelihood for 14-16 percent of the total population (ibid.). Thus, drawing on the understanding of the World Bank's perspective, as contended by Taka (2011:158), artisanal mining sector in the DRC can be viewed as:

> "The largest segment of the DRC mining sector and the one that has the highest impact in terms of production, as well as persons involved in. This informal sector is dominated by a number of problem areas, including relations between artisans and large-scale miners; exploitation of vulnerable populations; extortion by government officials and criminal elements; lack of health, safety, and environment protection; and inadequate legal protection and government assistance for the miners".

The view that artisanal mining motivates combatants' recruitment and de-motivates their disbandment has been supported in particular by Non-Governmental Organisations – NGOs, which suggest action by private companies.[18] The business partnership between combatants and private companies – that facilitate the exploit, transport and market of coltan, gold and cassiterite from the DRC, is coined and described as 'combatant commercialism' in some studies.[19] Within this 'combatant commercialism', "upholding insecurity has been a primary source and strategy of enrichment" (Raeymaekers 2002: 9). Other researches, although concurring with the above view, underline issues that have been overlooked by the combatant commercialism paradigm, with the exclusive emphasis on the

[18] For example, Hayes and Burge (2003); Global Witness (2004); Enough (2009a).
[19] They include Dietrich (2000); Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a); Raeymaekers (2002); Amnesty International (2003).

nexus between coltan, gold and cassiterite exploitation and combatants' (re-) recruitment or the delay of the reintegration process.

Stearns *et al*.'s (2013) ethnographic approach to analysing the Obama Law shows that artisanal mining, particularly coltan, gold and cassiterite has become the most important means for local people to survive since the collapse of the formal economy in the 1980s. A Congolese NGO in Goma, the Pole Institute, has underlined the contribution of the above mentioned ores in the change of the livelihood of the people within the context of the state collapse and successive wars (Tegera *et al.* 2002; Autesserre 2010). Furthermore, by exploring the mining policy of the transitional government, the Pole Institute's analysis brought out two major concerns in line with the collapse of the DRC's economy. To this end, it highlights that the general structural problem of the DRC lies in the collapse of the state institutions and formal economy and the failure of the transitional government to tackle the struggles over mining ownership that emerged from conflicting legislation (Johnson and Tegera 2005). A more recent report from the Enough Project (2013) gives detailed analysis of the informal cross-border trade in the north Kivu. Like Pole Institute, the Enough Project has shed light on the existing commercial competition between different communities for survival (Tegera *et al.* 2002; Tegera and Johnson 2007; Enough Project 2013). While there is a set of papers focusing on the informal cross-border trade in the region,[20] in-depth studies on the linkages between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment and reintegration are limited.[21] As explained in Chapters Two and Four, a few studies look at governance and government, known as the nature of the state, including the 'predatory governance' (Rackley 2006) and warlord politics (Reno 1998; 2000).

More recently, studies on the conflict in the Kivus find that all belligerents and protagonists, including the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda; FDLR], the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* [National Congress for the Defence of the People; CNDP], the March 23 Movement

[20] See DFID (2007); INICA (2007a; 2007b); Garrett and Mitchell (2009a; 2009b).
[21] See MacGaffey *et al.* (1991); Kisangani (1998); Raeymaekers (2009a; 2009b).

– M23, the Mai-Mai or Mayi-Mayi[22] and the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo; FARDC], secure funding from mineral exploitation and taxations (Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; Global Witness 2013; UN Panel 2014). While the ongoing militarisation of mining zones and the involvement of combatants in natural resource exploitation in the eastern DRC could be regarded as a symptom of insecurity and governance failure and the complexities of war economies (de Koning 2009; Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; Garrett *et al.* 2009), an analysis of the conflict motivation applying qualitative geographical methodology revealed grievances and security as main motivations behind the conflict (Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; 2009b). Visibly, the above review illustrates really little analysis of the incentive for the conflicts. There is also a limited attempt to piece together the various issues regarding natural resource exploitation in order to attain more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the link between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle.

1.3.2 Security Provisions in Artisanal Mining in the Eastern DRC

As the fieldwork indicates, Congolese law acknowledges artisanal mining while at the same time prohibits security systems around its periphery.[23] The mining zones have been affected and militarised in different ways during the civil wars in the DRC. In the eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivus, many of the mining territories invaded by armed groups have been reverted to the control of the national army, the FARDC, since most armed movements that were part of the 2003 Sun City Agreement accepted the rehabilitation of their combatants into the FARDC thus through a rehabilitation process called 'intermingling' process (De Koning 2009; 2011).[24] Based on this process, combatants from different armed factions and those of the former national army had to be trained and redeployed away from their former positions. However, De Koning (2009) suggests that

[22] The term Mai-Mai or Mayi-Mayi refers to the local self-defence force in the Kivus. It will be used interchangeably in this research.

[23] Interviews conducted with a member of Congolese civil society and an academic in Kinshasa, September 2013.

[24] The Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations was signed on 2 April 2003 at Sun City, South Africa provided the DDR programme for ex-combatants.

most combatants who opted for integration into the FARDC rebuffed or delayed full integration in order to avoid the collapse of their units and the loss of the territories controlled during the conflict period. This is what was referred to as non-integrated FARDC soldiers.[25] Meanwhile, considerable number of ex-combatants had refused integration altogether. The CNDP and the *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* [Congolese Patriotic Resistance; PARECO] accepted the integration process of their combatants only in March 2009.[26] As a sideline to this, the FDLR was singled out and labelled as the most important 'unauthorised armed group' which operates in the country (Autesseree 2008).[27]

De Koning (2009:6) suggests:

> "whether completely rehabilitated or not, or whether previously belonging to an armed movement, ethnic militia or national army, soldiers in the DRC are often poorly paid and under limited command of the military leadership in Kinshasa and the provincial capitals".

To some extent, military leaders tolerate soldiers' involvement in artisanal mining since it helps soldiers to earn payment and provisions that they could not get from the government. The military justice system only detains periodically military leaders accused of regular plunder and extortion of local communities (Autesserre 2010). Although wartime combatants might have been dislodged from mining zones as an upshot of the intermingling process (de Koning 2011), newly rehabilitated military repeatedly replace them. Meanwhile, a number of state security services, including the National Police, the Mining Police, the *Agence Nationale de Renseignements* [National Intelligence Agency; ANR] and the *Direction Générale des Migrations* [Directorate-General for Migration; DGM] are involved in the provision of security inside and around mining sites (De Koning 2009; 2011, Autesserre 2012).

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[25] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 'Democratic Republic of Congo: priorities for children associated with armed forces and group'gives more details on this issue.

[26] International Crisis Group – ICG, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, ICG Africa Report no. 150 (IGC: Brussels, 11 May 2009).

[27] While the UN does not define the term 'illegal armed groups', UN reports use this term to refer to foreign-armed groups operating in the DRC as well as Congolese rebel groups that have not accepted army integration.

Beyond the official security system cited above, private and semi-private security companies protect mining concessions on behalf of mining companies. Finally, in remote mining areas where the state and companies cannot provide security, customary authorities could set control systems involving lightly armed recruits (De Koning 2009). In whole, it might be considered that the artisanal mining security issue is diverse and typically brings in an amalgamation of the aforementioned state and non-state security players. Although it has been said that these security actors could perform positive – in terms of regulatory functions, it should be however acknowledged that they more often threaten and do violence against civilians (Autesserre 2010). Moreover, considering the view that mining revenues could uphold fighting capacities and enrich belligerents menaces long-term stability, therefore, protagonists may be willing to resume war, dismiss proper reintegration or collude directly over control of resource deposits. The implication of combatants could also exacerbate non-violent local conflicts over rights and access to resources. The following subsections provide a brief overview of the current security issues associated with artisanal mining in the Kivus where combatants are directly linked to cassiterite, coltan and gold.

1.3.3 Cassiterite, Coltan and Gold in the Eastern DRC

Most of the productive artisanal mining sites for cassiterite, coltan, gold and a number of other valuable ores in the Kivus have been extremely militarised. Most commonly, the army elements and rebel factions control physically mining zones and access routes where they take taxes – due in money and in kind, on minerals and trade that go through the zone. However, the belligerents' involvement could also be more elaborated. Evidence from De Koning (2009) supported by a more recent report of the UN Panel of Experts (2014) shows that individual soldiers, combatants as well as their hierarchical leaders, 'own' mining pits and mining concessions, where to some extent they offer supplies to and secure artisanal miners, in return for part, generally half, of their production. In the analysis of the context of the Kalehe territory (ibid.), it has been acknowledged that the FDLR has set a credit system to help individual members take loan from the group's central treasury to put in all

sorts of economic activity.[28] It is worth noting that combatants network with independent traders and private trading companies to whom they usually sell ores. This is not to say that this bond is only limited to the mining zones controlled by belligerents. But the nexus between traders and combatants could be more intimate. For instance, it has been argued that combatants secure traders, whilst traders could get ores past official controls on behalf of combatants (UN Experts 2014).

While different belligerents earn revenues from artisanal mining, it would be unfair to assert that the protracted violent conflicts in the Kivus are a fight over resources. In lieu of prompting conflict, resource access protracts the violent conflict in two ways. Firstly, belligerents are able to avoid military defeat partially as a result of their access to mineral resources. Probable interpretation could be that the 2009 military operations by the FARDC against the FDLR, for instance, showed that mineral resources remain increasingly significant for the FDLR's military survival. Consequently, the FDLR was driven off the eastern borders of the DRC into remote forest regions inside the country, where the easy access to various relatively small resource deposits enables its combatants to hide out. Secondly, resources access postpones combatants' reintegration, due to combatants refusing to abandon profitable positions acquired unduly during the conflict period (De Koning 2009; 2011). The non-integrated 85th FARDC brigade, made up of ex-Mayi-Mayi combatants that had occupied Bisie in Walikale – the most significant cassiterite mine of the East, is the best picture of this case (Autesserre 2010; Enough Project 2009).

Possible explanations include that in early 2009, the 85th Brigade reached eventually an agreement on its full rehabilitation, allegedly due to the progression of a newly formed FARDC brigade towards the area, under the command of an ex-CNDP officer. The risk was that military takeover of the mining areas by this brigade would postpone the fragmentation of the CNDP combatants involved. Artisanal mining at Bisie and smaller FDLR-controlled mining sites in the Kivus are a perfect example of the complex linkages between combatants, resources and violent conflict in the eastern DRC. But parallel situations could

[28] See Action pour la Paix et la Concorde and Life and Peace Institute, Analysis of the context of the Kalehe territory Apr. 2009, http://www.life-peace.org/ p. 26.

be mentioned from all over the region where artisanal mining is set. In the town of Kongolo in the north Katanga, for instance, the FARDC elements rejected the full integration process because they do not want to lose the control of the many coltan and gold mines in the area (Enough Project 2009). It was the same case in Orientale province with the Mayi-Mayi combatants. They were supposed to integrate the FARDC in Kisangani but have instead been disbanded. In response, combatants that stayed behind opened hostilities against the FARDC from their resource-rich strongholds on the fringes of Maiko National Park (De Koning 2009; 2010). These cases illustrate how mineral resources pave the way for the recurrence of combatants' recruitment and impede the demobilisation and reintegration process.

1.4 Gaps in the Literature

The literature on the linkages between arms groups, access to mineral resources and prolongation of armed conflict has grown exponentially in the last several years. As discussed in this research, there have been some innovations, especially in the area of post-Cold War conflicts or civil war causes. For example, Collier and Hoeffler's civil war datasets concerning the political economy understanding of civil war has shifted from the sole economic consideration to others such as identity and land access. Despite innovations, less attention has been devoted to exploring the impact of ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on combatants' recruitment and unfolded DDR dynamics. Hence, what constitutes the link between combatant and artisanal mining and in what ways it could be severed continue to be a challenge for both academics and practitioners, because there is no universal formula which could be employed to each and every one of these post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding dilemmas. The nature and process of involvement of combatants in artisanal mining is context-specific, as understanding the relationship between artisanal mining and the combatants' (re-) recruitment and the failed nature of DDR is one of the most critical aspects towards breaking the link between armed groups and minerals in a post-conflict country. Furthermore how authorities envisage and see the impact of artisanal mining on the recurrence of combatants' recruitment and the unfolded nature of the DDR process might be different from community's perceptions towards the proliferation of combatants in the mining zones and the failure of the DDR process. While

some of these complexities are explored in the context of the implication of armed groups and the FARDC in the illegal exploitation of mineral resources, the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment, and how to break down such a link, as is the case in the Kivus, are still under-theorised largely. Consequently, there is limited empirical evidence from these kinds of involvement of combatants in illegal mining business during and after wartime, as in the context of the Kivus, where the militarisation of many of mining sites jeopardised post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. This phenomenon constitutes a research gap, and it is in this area where the research will aim to contribute to the field of peacebuilding and knowledge.

1.5 Research Design and Field Research Methodology

From the first Congo war in 1996, through the second in 1998, to the ongoing armed conflict in the Kivus, belligerents had created military wings and recruited combatants and members of various militias from within and outside of the DRC (Onana 2012). Once the peace agreements had been reached in 2003, management of ex-combatants was one of the front challenges, yet not clearly defined during the signing of the peace agreement. Management of former combatants seemed imperative for some reasons. Firstly, the eradication of armed movements from the eastern DRC would be crucial for the purpose of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Secondly, the ongoing conflict in the Kivus had involved many local and foreigner combatants for the purpose of accessing natural resources, therefore demilitarisation of the mining areas and the ex-combatants' rehabilitation and reintegration would augur the future of peacebuilding in the Kivus.

According to the peace agreement, recognising the need to demilitarise the mining zones and to deal with ex-combatants as a peacebuilding approach suggest that the government and the international community would develop a 'demilitarisation of mining areas' and a 'rehabilitation of ex-combatants' plan, with some ex-combatants integrating the national army and others reintegrating civilian life (De Koning 2009; 2011).

Given political ambitions and economic agendas of rebel leaders, many of the contentions and policy in respect to the management of ex-combatants focused on the combatant-army integration than reintegration into the community (De Koning 2011). However, over time, the government set various ranges of policies and processes for former combatants who were set to integrate into the national army. For instance, after the Pretoria agreement in 2003, the rehabilitation of ex-rebels into the national army was under an 'intermingling process', while the same rehabilitation was a 'mixing process' for the combatants of the CNDP in 2006 (De Koning 2009).

The ex-combatants' DDR in the Kivus consisted of several and confusing structures including a national programme – which incorporated another specific DDR programme for Ituri, programmes to disarm and repatriate non-national combatants and their dependants, processes for special needy groups, such as women, disabled ex-combatants and children and projects in line with the DDR of militia groups' members (World Bank 2010). There was not a standard policy to run all these different structures as each of them was implemented independently. According to the 2003 agreement and the national programme for DDR, a group of combatants had to be joining the national army while the others were meant to be disbanded (Marriage 2007). Combatants who integrated into the national army were largely underpaid and those who joined civilian lives were also disenchanted. Although they have been given some money as reintegration package, they did not go through a proper reintegration process, whereas at same time local economic and social grievances never changed on the ground (Baaz and Stern 2008). Owing to these various reintegration process disparities, the DDR of ex-combatants was a failed and unfolded process in the Kivus.

However, it should be acknowledged that the DDR programme in the Kivus was part of the peace agreement and was organised according to the United Nations DDR standards. The process nevertheless was neither viable nor safe, lacked development agendas and was not planned to keep ex-combatants from re-recruitment or away from the mining zones. It did not either assist them to address their grievances and build a livelihood without using violence (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). This is one of the complex situations, which makes our efforts to appreciate the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment,

reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the Kivus complicated. Demilitarising mining zones, delinking combatants from artisanal mining as well as a successful DDR of ex-combatants are pivotal for a successful peacebuilding in the Kivus. Although linkages between the above mentioned, the post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding are clearly established in a number of post-conflict countries (Knight and Özerdem 2004; McEvoy and Shirlow 2009). In the context of the Kivus, the nexus between artisanal mining, combatants' recruitment and unfolded or failed nature of DDR has been proved to be true but the demilitarisation of the mining zones is largely understudied. It is this gap that stimulated this research.

To live up to the expectations of this research, the aim is to establish and examine the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants, as well as investigate the likely impact of such a link on the armed conflict in the Kivus in the eastern DRC. In order to achieve this aim, the overall objectives of this study are to:

- Understand how countries are trapped into resource-based conflicts with specific reference to the mining sector.
- Explore the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants in relation to artisanal mining through a cross-cultural perspective.
- Investigate the political economy of the mining sector in the context of conflict reoccurrence in the DRC.
- Analyse the artisanal mining-combatant relationship based on the field research in the DRC.
- Develop an approach for the demilitarisation of mining sector in the DRC.

Against this backdrop, the demilitarisation of the mining sites in the Kivus constitutes the core theme of this research. On this note, the overarching research question that this research aims to address is;

How and in what ways could demilitarisation of mining zones consolidate peace in the Kivus?

Moreover, I aim to find responses to the following specific research questions:

1. To what extent can natural resources be characterising the trajectory of the unfolded nature of the combatants' DDR process in the Kivus, the state failure and protracted armed conflicts in the DRC?
2. How does the nexus between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants' recruitment and the reintegration impede the achievements of the DDR process and feed the cycle of the (ex-) combatants' (re-) recruitment in the Kivus?
3. How can the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage be broken down? What would the relevance of the new DDR process be to the demilitarisation process and the security of the demilitarised mining zones?
4. How can the process of severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link be strengthened in order to prevent and stop violence in the Kivus? What are the opportunities and challenges of breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus?

Demilitarising the mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage relate directly to the DDR process. Drawing on the reviews and based on the analysis of the fieldwork's findings, dimensions of severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage, the need for a new DDR process, the traceability of arms and finances and the development of internal and external geopolitics have been used to frame this thesis. Peacebuilding is based on the process of change and transformation happening at individual levels as well as at collective and relational levels (Luckham 2007). To understand the link between the demilitarisation of mining zones and peacebuilding, an exploration of how the above mentioned dimensions could or could not induce in the lives of ex-combatants, at individual levels as well as at collective/relational levels have been undertaken. Economically, the resource-based conflict with a focus on the 'absurdity of abundance' theory is examined. By analysing recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitments, the combatants' push and pull factors have been reviewed to link the combatants' recruitment to greed and grievance theories reviewed in resource curse theory. Similarly, this study has also explored the trajectory of state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC in order to piece together economic aspects with the social and political

ones that have crystallised around the current resource-based conflict. By looking into the nexus between artisanal mining and the combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment, the way combatants are recruited and the implementation of their DDR process have been explored. At this point, it has been indicated that the way in which the unfolded nature of the DDR programme turned into the combatants' re-recruitment is driven by the assumption that delinking ex-combatant from mineral exploitation is essential for a successful peacebuilding and post-conflict efforts following decades of armed conflict in the Kivus. Finally this thesis seeks to explore the mechanisms for demilitarising the mining sites as an upshot of not only combatants but also all belligerents' involvement in illegal exploitation and trade of minerals, which results in the failure of peacebuilding efforts.

1.5.1 Qualitative Research Paradigm and Social Constructivism

Since the overarching objective of this thesis is to explore the nexus between artisanal mining and the ex-combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the Kivus, the findings and analysis of this research are rooted in the experiences, narratives and opinions of participants and respondents – including army officers, ex-combatants, Kivus' notables, diplomats, Members of Parliament, government officials, political party leaders, Academics and analysts as well as civil society, international and local Non-Governmental Organisations representatives. Possible explanation of this could include the need for comparing information from different social clusters in order to have a cosmopolitan view of the case being studied. Mair (2008:171), for instance, suggests:

> "All social science research is invariably some form of comparison, whether it is between countries or cases information or cross-cultural perspectives, and knowledge is gained from the comparison of units".

Bechhofer and Patterson's (2000:2) statement concurs with Mair's. To them, a good research design should be able to manage the different problems of comparison and control. It is therefore important to ensure that the cross-cultural perspectives of the case are measured so that it allows generalisation from information gathered to similar cases. Mair (2008:179) underlines that a good cross-cultural perspective requires an understanding of what has been occurring to other cases against what is being looked at, what are the

'concepts' that are being looked at, and how will this be conducted. Concepts might be subject of disparity in their meaning. Research terms must be accurately defined so as to avoid misinterpretation of concepts in the peacebuilding and conflict settlements field.

Acknowledged as a concept, the term 'Peacebuilding' itself illustrates this contrast in that, it is one such term which also encompasses various interpretations and comprehension by diverse actors within this field. As a sideline to this, in deciding on the case study, it is important to delineate the concepts which are being studied in an explicit way. Exploring the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle is a subject that embraces a range of fields and disciplines. I am analysing issues of international relations, conflict theory, peacebuilding theory, political sociology, management theory, polemology, political economy of natural resources and sociology of organisations to name a few.

It would seem appropriate, in such circumstances, to build up a multi-lens approach to the research study (Druckman 2009:119), due to the intricate nature of the subjects being studied and the overlap between the various arenas. The multi-lens analysis likens to "triangulation" when an eclectic analytical approach is used to make possible verification and comparison between them (Della-Porta and Keating 2008a:34). This portends that there is more than one way of looking at a situation and possible plural explanations. Using more than one method of gathering data guarantees that results are not skewed from coming from a single data source (McCandless 2007:140). It might be assumed that the validity of the data and any consequential extrapolations can be cross-referenced.

Owing to the subjective nature of the research topic, the study is methodologically situated in the qualitative research paradigm. A paradigm is a sociological phenomenon which involves a set of thoughts, beliefs, methods and goals around common tools that guide our action, and is made of ontological, epistemological and methodological premises (Guba 1990; McCandless 2007; Della-Porta and Keating 2008b). Being subjective and interpretive in nature, qualitative research implies a rigorous process of interpretation as a method of analysis for the words rather than the numerical variables constitute these findings (Flick 2007; Della-Porta and Keating 2008b). In Merriam's (2009:5) words, with qualitative research:

> "Rather than determining cause and effects, predicting or describing the distribution of some attribute among a population, [qualitative researchers] might be interested in uncovering the meaning of a phenomenon of those involved [by] understanding how people interpret their experience, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences".

People's interpretation of peace is largely subjective, for what is regarded peaceful in one context might be different in other cases. Additionally, as the focus of this study is also on people's experiences and perceptions about the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage and how to delink this relationship, qualitative analysis would be a relevant technique to use in processing and interpreting the information provided by the informants and participants of this study.

The methodological philosophy of this research lies in social constructivism. In practice, Social Constructivism as the underpinning of qualitative methodology puts forward that: "there is neither objective reality nor objective truth…reality is constructed" (Sarantakos 2005:37). Social Constructivism is therefore a process through which a knower and the knowledge interact in order to understand a social reality (Gergen 1994). In peacebuilding as well as in post-conflict reconstruction field, practice is reflective. This entails that the significance of peace and the making of peace or the building of peace in these areas are developed from individuals' views, tales, knowledge and stories in line with how individuals intermingle with the construction of social phenomena (Lederach *et al*. 2007). Therefore, social constructivism as a philosophy is relevant to conduct research on peacebuilding-related activities such as the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle, which involves several players including ex-combatants, community, government, corporate world and other stakeholders and agents of change.

Furthermore, any social research departs from clarifying its ontological and epistemological locations. Noonan (2008) suggests that in the social sciences, ontology provides a theoretical study and a description of the nature of social reality. In order words, it studies the most general properties to be, such as the existence, possibility, time and fate. From a constructivist opinion, researcher refutes objective reality and its existence; rather such

realities are constructed in the social minds. Therefore, ontologically, we have to recognise that there is a balanced conclusion as to the fundamental nature of reality which is being investigated (Noonan 2008; Bakker 2010). Social reality is dynamic and subject to change across time and space. Understanding the dynamic nature of social reality would require getting familiar with how the reality is questioned and what processes are applied to appreciate it (Noonan 2008). The ontological stance in this research is that social reality under investigation – which is the nexus between artisanal mining and the combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in this study, is a dynamic phenomenon and it is possible to understand the phenomenon based on the interpretation of experiences of participants and respondents.

Epistemology guides methodologies about the nature of information under study, or "what counts as a fact and where knowledge is to be sought" (Sarantakos 2005:30). Miller and Brewer (2003) and Sarantakos (2005) indicate that an interpretive approach remains at the centre of constructivist epistemology which goes hand in gloves with constructivist ontology, as both are interested in the need for social construction of reality and interpretations of meanings underlying the reality.

1.5.2 Constructivist Grounded Theory Approach to Qualitative-Interpretative Research

According to Neuman (2003), methodologies are made up of a range of approaches to research that pursue particular ontological and epistemological practices. The qualitative research paradigm and details of the methodological processes and instruments used in this study are explained in the upcoming section. The Constructivist Grounded Theory – GT, approach is relevant to research in the collection and analysis of findings. The GT approach to research is an inductive procedure aimed to enable the development of a theory from findings or gathered information rather than hypothesis testing or forecasting approaches, as it occurs in many deductive methods of social research (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990).

The use of reviews in research which applies the GT approach remains controversial. As mentioned by Bryant and Charmaz (2007:19):

> "Ever since the publication of the Discovery of Grounded Theory by Glazer and Strauss (1967), there have been concerns in respect to how students and researchers should approach and use the existing literature pertinent to their research topic".

Although a review of the related literature previous to data collection is enviable in most research, suggestion from Glazer and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1998) informs that the literature review needs to be avoided in substantive area in the early stage of the research process. For them, without a review of literature in substantive area prior to the fieldwork would permit the researcher to start their fieldwork without predetermined problem statements, so that the categories stem logically from the fieldwork without the researcher's testing being influenced by the existing assumptions and frameworks gleaned from the literature (Glaser 1998; Holton 2007). Contrarily, Kools *et al*. (1996) are of the view that researchers rarely give up any previous substantive or methodological knowledge entirely in the search of the comprehension of a complex social phenomenon.

Various advantages of writing literature reviews prior to fieldwork are discussed in the literature. Coyne and Cowley (2006), for example, indicate that the literature could help to come up with a clear rationale and justification for an explicit research approach. An early review of literature could shed light on the existing gaps in knowledge (Hutchison 1993; Creswell 1998); on the other hand, it could guide when contextualising the investigation (MacCann and Clark 2003). An early review of literature could spare the researcher from conceptual and methodological pitfalls (MacGhee *et al*. 2007). Pragmatically, a review of literature is unavoidable, particularly for research students, since it is one of the prerequisites for students to plan on conducting the fieldwork. With acknowledgement of the arguments and counter-arguments discussed above, a few reasons however led me to review literature in the substantive area of the study prior to the fieldwork as it was important to ensure familiarisation with the key concepts of the area of investigation. It was also imperative to contextualise the research in the area of peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery in the Kivus. Following data gathering and analysis, literature reviewing was conducted further whereas writing the thesis; and these reviews were guided by the information gathered during the fieldwork. While the previous literature reviews done prior to the fieldwork were regarded as secondary data, the more recent reviews conducted

following the fieldwork serve to evaluate and contrast the empirical findings from the field with the existing published papers.

Meanwhile, the research setting of the study initially ought to be in the mining zones in the Kivus where ex-combatants and other artisanal miners are settled. However, due to the persistence of insecurity in the eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivus, the University prohibited me to travel to the eastern DRC. I had to mitigate this challenge by starting the fieldwork in Kinshasa. The choice of Kinshasa was due to the fact that it is the capital city, safe and home to several national and international institutions and representations. It was also easy to liaise with potential respondents and participants, including some ex-combatants rehabilitated into the army and those who chose Kinshasa as their new settlement. But most importantly was that conducting interviews from Kinshasa helped also to locate some Kivus' notables who assisted me in conducting remote interviews through email, telephone and skype with the Kivus' community leaders. With the initial round of interviews in Kinshasa, it was possible to locate and get hold of potential participants and respondents inside and outside of the country. Therefore, the first round of fieldwork started between July and September 2013. In this round, the field research was conducted in Kinshasa and by remote in Beni, Butembo, Goma and Masisi in the north Kivu, and Bukavu and Uvira in the south Kivu. It bears mentioning at this point that in the Kivus, interviews were mainly through email, telephone and Skype. However, a second round of the fieldwork was conducted between November and December 2013 in Brussels, London and Paris.

The socio-political landscape of the DRC is very dynamic and unpredictable. In the last few years, the context of conflict has drastically shifted. When the idea of this research was conceived in 2012, the government suspended the exploitation of mineral resources in the Kivus and was planning military operations against any illegal occupation of mining zones. At the same time, a Tutsi-led uprising M23 erupted in the Kivus and the Obama's Law in regard to the certification of minerals from war zones was in force. With regards to the context of ex-combatants, it was decided to explore the cycle of combatants recruitment in the mining zones. However, after the completion of the first round of the fieldwork in late September 2013, the context has completely changed. In November 2013, the government

defeated the M23 supported by Rwanda and Uganda and decided the rehabilitation and integration of the M23 ex-combatants into the national army and civilian life through a new DDR process. As a consequence, most ex-combatants have fled into Rwanda and Uganda and seem to be uncomfortable with joining civilian life in the Kivus. In these shifting contexts, whereas keeping the overall aims and objectives of the study the same, it was further considered to incorporate the experience of combatants without borders and the regulation of mining sector in the DRC. For the research process, the new context has provided a number of new opportunities particularly for not only the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship, but also the nexus between the demilitarisation of mining zones and peacebuilding in the Kivus. Subsequently, a second fieldwork was conducted in Brussels, London and Paris in order to be informed about the dynamics of the situation from some international stakeholders and individuals based in Europe but directly involved in the peacebuilding process in the DRC.

Recruiting Participants

As this research applied Grounded Theory approach for data collection and analysis, research participants were recruited primarily based on the sampling techniques employed in the Grounded Theory methodology. However, further respondents were recruited through a partial use of purposive sampling, due to the findings in the field being not incompatible with GT. As opposed to determining participants before data collection, sampling in Grounded Theory is carried through in tandem with data collection and analysis. It is a flexible strategy aiming to determine respondents on the basis of the emerging analysis (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). It is also known as “theoretical sampling” process (Glaser and Strauss 1967:45). This method gives opportunity to the researcher to decide who to interview and what to incorporate as interview questions on the basis of the rising concepts from the ongoing interviews and analysis.

Drawing on this method, the field research started with interviews conducted with some government officials and political party leaders in Kinshasa. At this stage of the study, selection of participants was pre-arranged as this was set as a starting and entry point for the fieldwork. Information collected from a literature review conducted previous to my

fieldwork was helpful in identifying potential respondents during this early stage of the field research project. The interviews further supported the process in assembling preliminary information on the whereabouts of participants and respondents in different areas. Hence, when the fieldwork was initiated the recruitment of research participants encompassed a component of purposing sampling. Purposing sampling is a selection method whereby the choice of respondents suits the needs of the researcher and the particular subject being studied. It is appropriate to research where the researcher previously has some clues and understanding on the population being studied (Brewer and Hunter 1990).

In the first round of the fieldwork, interviews with 30 individuals were conducted. Most of them were based in Kinshasa (18) and in the Kivus (12). In the second round of the fieldwork, interviews with 10 respondents based in Brussels (4), Coventry (1), London (1) and Paris (4) were undertaken. Apart from 4 ex-combatants and 3 military officers, most of interviews were conducted with civil society members, government officials, political party leaders, academics and national and international organisation representatives. Not only were they easily accessible, but have also been working in tandem with one another during the conflict period and had much information with regards to peace process in the Kivus. It is similarly important to compare and contrast the testimonies of the respondents above with additional information gathered from ex-combatants and even other opposing groups (Barrett 2011). To this effect, further in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with ex-combatants and some notables of the Kivus. In doing so, I was of the view that in order to have a plausible analysis of peace and conflict dynamics, it is important to listen to what the war participants themselves have to say (Graham 2007). The field research process received assistance from local, national and international facilitators in building a network of contacts and taking notes in the field as well as gathering information through the interviews.

Table1.2: Statistics of respondents for interviews[29]

	Category of respondents	First round of fieldwork	Second round of fieldwork	Total	%
1	Political parties	8	2	10	25
2	Academia and civil society	10	2	12	30
3	Mining and Private Sector	8	3	11	27.5
4	Ex-combatants and military officers	4	3	7	17.5
5	Total number	30	10	40	100

Source: Fieldwork 2013

In-depth Semi-Structure Interview

The in-depth interview or the key informant interview is a way of social and interpersonal interaction. It is a main data collection tool employed in this study. Semi-structured questions were employed in the in-depth interviews. Semi-structured interviewing involves questions that prompt discussion with the opportunity for the interviewer to investigate particular topics or answers and follow-up questions. It does not limit interviewees to a set of prearranged responses. Semi-structured questions are employed to understand how participation works and how it could be enhanced. In semi-structured questions, participants and respondents are allowed to discuss and raise issues that the researcher might not have considered in the beginning of the fieldwork (Neuman 2003). Furthermore, in-depth semi-structured interviews could be a suitable tool in different levels of data collection. In the beginning, the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee could help expand the researcher's knowledge and comprehension in order to categorise relevant issues about the theme being studied, whereas at the later level a semi-structured interview with selective participants might be applied either to analyse more issues raised during the interviews or to cross-verify data gathered during the preceding interview (Miller and Brewer 2003).

[29] See Appendix three for details on the categories of respondents and interviewees used in this study.

To inform the initial stage during the interview, open questions were prepared under three different themes. These open questions, however, were kept to a minimum in order to prevent the effect of predetermined evidence that would influence the interviews. Rather, semi-structured questions were posed in a way that would be in harmony with the situation so as to collect further information. The same questions were used for all respondents based on their knowledge on the theme.[30] For instance, at the beginning of the interviews with the respondents, there were open questions on their opinion about the involvement of belligerents in illegal exploitation of mining. Once the respondent answers this question, further related questions were posed such as; could you tell a bit about what happened in the mining zones controlled by armed groups as far as the recruitment of combatants are concerned? Can you explain how and why this relationship is recurrent after ex-combatants have been demobilised, disarmed and reintegrated? What is their opinion on the corollaries of this relationship, how could such a relationship be broken, and so on. The in-depth interviews with some ex-combatants were mainly used to glean information and cross-verify the answers collected from official institution representatives. Interviews were conducted in French and barely in vernacular language, and were later transcribed into English. The English translation is used when quoting. In some cases, terminologies in local language have been employed to emphasize the original understanding, though their translation in English was provided. The interviews ended when it was realised that no further new information and theoretical ideas were emerging from further interviews.

Focus Group Discussion

Focus group discussion – FGD, is another tool of data collection which was applied to this research. As opposed to the in-depth interview which involves a one-to-one exchange, a FGD is, according to Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2008:375), a 'collective conversation'. Although focus group method is often mistaken for a group interview or a focus group interviews (Liamputtong 2011), Fontana and Frey's (2000) suggestion, however, indicates that it is more formal than the group interviews. The formality criteria however could be a problematic concept since it is not often possible to establish distinction between formal

[30] See Appendix four for the open questions used in the fieldwork.

and informal interaction in FGDs (Morgan 1997). Certainly, it might be within the discretion of the researcher and the setting of an FGD. When an FGD is associated with in-depth interview, a dilemma as to which one has to go first arises. Drawing on Morgan's (1997:22-23) framework, the fieldwork began with in-depth interviews, which assisted to extend information and understanding about the research phenomena, which, in turn, gives more ideas in terms of choosing population group, setting, venue and time for the FDGs. Three FGDs have been conducted during the first round of the fieldwork – see the list of FGD in table 4.

Table1.3: Details of FGDs[31]

Source: Fieldwork 2013.

There is an ongoing debate (Morgan 1997; Liamputtong 2011) on whether FGD participants have to be homogenous or heterogeneous. In this research, homogenous groups of participants were selected. In doing so, the research concurred with Morgan's (1997) view that homogeneity could guarantee open and flowing discussions among participants. Furthermore, from in-depth interviews, it has been learned that respondents that are outside

[31] See Appendix three for details on the categories of Focus Groups' participants in this study.

the country and the representatives of international institutions were more open and free to interact with the researcher than other respondents from inside the DRC. The following points further detailed operation of the FGDs:

- Each FGD took one and half hours.
- The local facilitator backed organising the FGDs and the researcher was leading the discussion.
- Prior to the start of each FGD, participants were clearly briefed about the objectives of the discussion and the expectations by them.
- The FGDs were conducted in French.

Snowballing Technique

Snowballing technique is a process of finding research respondents or participants. It is about one participant providing the researcher the name of another respondent, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on (Vogt 1999). This approach is often considered as an alternative to solving issues associated with sampling concealed people, including criminal and isolated individuals (Faugier and Sargeant 1997). Often located within a broader set of link-tracing methodologies (Spreen 1992), snowballing technique aims to capitalise the social networks of identified participants who can give an ever-expanding set of potential contacts to a researcher (Thomson 1997). Based on the postulation that ties exist between the original sample and others in the same target people, it authorises a series of recommendations to be formulated within a circle of acquaintance (Berg 1988). Two primary purposes require the application of snowballing technique. Firstly, it is used very often to carry out qualitative research, mainly through interviews (Hendricks et al. 1992), as was this thesis. Secondly, snowballing technique could be used as a more formal methodology to infer about a group of individuals who have been difficult to enumerate through the use of descending methods such as household surveys (Snijders 1992; Faugier and Sergeant 1997). The technique involves some advantages, such as setting contact with formerly hidden populations, developing trust due to referrals being created by acquaintances and not by identification. This technique is also economical, efficient and effective in various studies. However, it has a number of limitations, including problems of

representativeness and sampling principles, discovering participants and setting chain referral off and engaging participants as informal research assistants.

In the first round of fieldwork, I visited two professional training centres in Kinshasa. These centres allegedly received some ex-combatants' instructors previously and the government was planning to send some more for the upcoming DDR programme. It was during those visits that I came across two ex-combatants and an ex-training instructor. The opportunity of conducting interviews with them arose and following the interviews, they were able to put me in touch with other potential individuals who have been of support in terms of remote interviews with the leaders of the Kivus' community. I equally, visited the Department of Peacebuilding of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo – MONUSCO. During this visit I met the Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, who I later interviewed. Similarly there were visits to the office of the Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW, and to the Department of Natural Resources of the National Episcopal Conference of Congo – CENCO, in Kinshasa. Finally a think-tank or research institutes at the University of Kinshasa was visited. I had the opportunity of conducting FGDs with policymakers, academics and analysts. Due to the sensitivity of the subject being studied and the current socio-political landscape of the DRC characterised by tensions between different political actors, snowballing technique helped me to develop trust with participants and respondents since referrals had been made by acquaintances. Through it, I was able to reach more research subjects particularly those that are living in the remote mining zones of the Kivus, but who were not known to me.

Data Analysis

The analysis of data in this research is based on the Grounded Theory method. More recently, the Grounded Theory approach has shifted into conflicting trajectory (Guba and Lincoln 1994). The fundamental dissimilarity between lots of versions of GT is their parallel approaches used in data analysis. This research has drawn from the constructivist Grounded Theory approach and its data analysis techniques (Charmaz 2000; 2006). Constructivist grounded theory research basically relies on the constructivist paradigm for the analysis of data (Charmaz 2000). This approach of analysis entails the understanding of

the meaning of the issue by the participants and is contextualised based on the sensitivities of a particular time, context, place and culture (Ghezeljeh and Emami 2009).

Contrary to most qualitative research methods, data analysis in Grounded theory is handled concomitantly with data gathering (Strauss and Crbin 1990; Ezzy 2002). Suggestions from Lofland (1971) and Ezzy (2002) indicate that blending data gathering with initial analysis, also known as an integrated research method, facilitates the researcher to shape emerging theoretical implication through regular exchanges with participants.

In the GT method, data coding is the first step toward analysis. Coding is a two-part component; line-by-line coding or open coding and focused coding (Charmaz 2006). Open coding is concerned with naming words as they facilitate the researcher to reflect about the meaning which could be associated to the data (Charmaz 2000). Focused coding comes after the researcher has identified selective codes and categorised them to identify more repeated concepts from the data (Charmaz 2006). Selective focused coding helps the researcher to pick out themes that are the groundwork of the analysis and theory which emerges directly from the analysis of the data.

Data gathering and analysis were conducted simultaneously following this coding approach. First, the data classifying the respondents were transcribed into three themes: Theme I – the relationship between mining and the recruitment of combatants, Theme II – demilitarisation of the mining zones, and Theme III – political economy of the DRC's mining sector. Then a special code number was given to each respondent in order to have a reference number for each interview. For instance, interview question numbers 1, 4, 6 and 8 conducted with theme I were coded or referenced as TI1, TI4, TI6 and TI8 respectively. A similar method was also applied to interview theme II and III. The transcriptions of data were carefully kept for each theme. Interview notes, comments, records and transcripts were read closely several times to single out key ideas; thus, 'open codes', from the interviews. Singling out open codes constitutes the first stage of analysis. Table 4 shows a specimen of how open codes were drawn from interviews. Similar processes were reiterated for all answers to different open questions from interviews and FGDs.

Table1.4: Example of Opening Code*:*

Guiding questions: recruitment of combatants and their involvement in artisanal mining

Ref	Interviews	Open coding
TI1	I was in Mwenga territory in the south Kivu, where I have visited the site of gold mining controlled by the FDLR armed group. The FDLR taxes and its members were going physically in the mining site, while others sent to the village to take money from the members of the community. At the same time, some FARDC soldiers are coming three times a week on a motorbike to collect the money from the miners. They are sent by their commanders and I saw them with my own eyes going into the mining sites and taxing people.	Link between artisanal mining and combatants Armed group operating in mining areas and techniques used to mine Security provision of mining site
TI2	I am fed up! My family's members have been raped. My field and crops were taken away. The government does not do anything to protect us, I am going to join armed group. My commander is always drunk and does not know exactly what to do while our position is always assaulted by the rebels. I'm going to the bush with other military mates and there we will organise ourselves against invaders. I was jobless and depended on mine's activities, but we were not safe in the mining sites. There were many taxes levied by combatants and the FARDC. I was not earning anything; it was looking like I was working for them. To be on a safe side, I decided to join the Mai-Mai for me to access easily resource.	Motivations behind combatants' recruitment Tactics used to recruitments Coalition between armed groups and militia in illegal exploitation of minerals
TII2	One of the things we campaign for is when a company is buying minerals from the Congo, it needs to do due diligence or supply chain of minerals in order to check whether minerals do not come from armed groups. The Congolese government has introduced a decree which requires all mining companies to use the due diligence process which helps to create a clean supply chain of minerals in the Congo. To my understanding, to demilitarise really mining zones, it will require a conjunction of several efforts and things at the same time. For instance, the reform of security sector, the application of Dodd Frank Law. It should be provided more than demilitarisation. For instance, people will need care, school…	Demilitarisation of mining zones, Delinking combatants from mining activities Government and stakeholders' responsibility Traceability of arms and minerals

Source: Fieldwork 2013

Following the selection of open codes, the most recurrent ideas/codes emerging from interviews were compared and contrasted. In Constructivist Grounded Theory, such codes are known as focused codes (Charmaz 2006). In this thesis, they are called 'concepts'. Concepts are broader prototypes drawn from the open codes. Concepts gave rise to some large subjects that have been labelled as 'themes' in this thesis. The analytical chapters of the thesis are built on the themes that fit together. Given the fact that themes are part of the bedrock of findings and analysis of this research, the analytical chapters are presented with the interpretation of main themes and concepts woven together. I also had a memo writing as a technique in the field. Memo writing is a tool that provides a researcher an opportunity to think and keep in mind question and analyses, and produces implication from the interaction that the researcher has made with participants in the field (Mills *et al*. 2006).

Field memo

Kinshasa,10 July 2013

Today I visited…in Kinshasa, in the…borough. This institution deals with….With regard to my research, the information that I have collected will help me in…, and I have been welcomed by…who met me at…. While I was waiting to encounter the respondent, I was given a tour in the Building and I observed work environment which gave me the first idea of the institution. People were.... During my tour I had a chat with…who updated me about....After a brief exchange with…; I have been offered opportunity to ask questions on the organisation of the institution. I observed that people…. Following the interview with the participant, I was given some technical reports on…in order to have more knowledge about what the institution is doing. Many of the technical reports that I was offered deal with… and helped me to have much more light on certain issues that I could not cover during the 30 or 45 minutes-interview.

Figure1.5: An example of a Memo from the Fieldwork. (Fieldwork 2013)

Memo writing helped me to identify the gaps or areas where the research needed more information so that other potential participants who could provide such information may be identified. It was also useful at the thesis writing stage as I was referring on it to cross-verify data with the observations.

Managing source of information

This research hinges around information gleaned from the literature as well as from interviews and focus groups conducted with different socio-political clusters, including the Kivus' national and provincial Members of Parliament; government officials; political party leaders; international organisation representatives; local and international Non-Governmental Organisations; academics and analysts; civil society representatives; the army officers and ex-combatants. The list of interviewees' names as referred to Appendix Three, with some of which being withheld and or given a pseudonym, illustrates the source of information which underpins the research being studied.

With reference to the source of information management, it might be pointed out that respondents or interviewees mostly with civil society and political backgrounds showed the vital significance of analysing peacebuilding process in the Kivus from the ground up, with upheld attention to the local community dynamic. The breadth of supporting evidence and the range of arresting insights are among their contributions. Academics mainly offered new perspective on how and why the DRC's post-conflict rebuilding and peacebuilding process, particularly the demilitarisation of mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-nexus, should evolve a thorough understanding of the local history, culture and customs of population. During the focus groups however, I found interesting that participants were well-reasoned reminders for all would-be the relevance of the processes of demilitarisation of mining zones, delinking (ex-) combatants from artisanal mining and from the organisations that stand behind them. Focus group discussions also put forward that such peacebuilding and post-conflict processes need to be undertaken with prudence and patience in both their prescription for peace and the way they go about trying to achieve processes, such as the combatants' Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), for which good intentions are not enough to be achieved.

Furthermore the management of source of information also elucidated that, talking to journalists gave the researcher a further insight in terms of understanding the current situation in the DRC. In the context of the research being studied, interviewing journalists was important as they work with a diverse array of international and non-governmental organisations involved in peacebuilding efforts in the Kivus. From journalists' information, I have been able to trace back to the routine practices, habits and narratives of the Kivus' peacebuilding process within the subculture of communities. However, to get into bottom of these key issues of artisanal mining, my interviews with mining sector's analysts and practitioners expertly showed how the artisanal mining-combatant links continue to be the case. Hence, how this relationship contributes to failure of peacebuilding efforts as well as socio-economic development, and why belligerents that should and do know better, seem to be gripping to illegal exploitation of minerals were a major contribution of mining sector and private actors. In showing how the artisanal mining-combatant-nexus is embedded into the culture of belligerents, acts and constructs on the local scale, a few ex-combatants, army officers and security experts lent a path-breaking contribution to understanding this relationship.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical approval for this research was endorsed by the Research Ethic Committee at Coventry University following the processing of proposed research.[32] For ethical reasons and on participants' request, respondent's names and, to some extent, direct quotations of what they may have said have been kept anonymous. Prior to each interview, each respondent was provided a briefing sheet[33] before obtaining interviewee's consent.[34] The researcher explained to each respondent and participant about the raison d'être of the research and what he expected from them though they were offered a briefing sheet. Interviewees were free to end an interview at any time they wished to do so for whatsoever reasons. Two respondents actually did so; one on health reasons, could not carry on with the interview, while the other for security reasons and the sensitivity of the issue felt

[32] See Appendix five for the approval of ethics process by Coventry University.
[33] See Appendix six for the interview briefing sheet used in the fieldwork for this study.
[34] See Appendix seven for the consent form used in the fieldwork for this study.

uncomfortable and had to cease responding. Following the end of an interview, each interviewee was granted opportunity to ask questions about the researcher and the research, or to ask for an elucidation of any issue/concern which might have occurred. The researcher ensured that all respondents were older than 18 years and any kind of discrimination was strictly avoided.

Reflections on the Fieldwork

In these lines, I would like to give a succinct account of my own experience and reflections as a researcher. Being a Congolese and having worked and lived in the DRC for some years, at the beginning I felt myself as an 'insider' in my research setting. However, when I went into the fieldwork, I came to understand that my identity was moving between 'insider' and 'outsider'. As a Congolese researcher, it is legitimate to consider myself as insider; however within the Congolese community the respondents regarded me as an outsider – somebody who has severed his roots with the Congolese Community. This entails that the insider versus outsider dilemma still exists even though I and the respondents share the same identity in terms of language and citizenship, especially in peace and conflict study like the one being studied. Such a dilemma is directly connected with power dynamics and relationships in the field. For example, in my case, I found barely respondents and participants who could easily agree that the purpose of the research was purely academic. It is worth noting at this point that many of the DRC's partners and the government's foes are not in agreement with the ruling party in its attempt of modifying the constitution in order to allow the current President to stand for the third term. There is a perceptible tension between those who are against any constitutional review – backed by the United States and the United Kingdom, and those who are determined to modify it. In this context, my position as a researcher – insider or outsider, became uncomfortable.

Most participants interviewed seemed to have considered me as a spy from the British NGOs who was pretending to conduct an academic research. They were demure and

reluctant toward me until I had to exhibit the official letter from the University[35] for some of them to believe that I have an academic purpose, though others still remained unconvinced. I came to understand that most Congolese officials and some representatives of international and national organisations were annoyed by some researchers who visited them previously and used information to criticise the government and other institutions instead of academic purposes. Moreover, government officials were also upset with researchers coming from the United Kingdom or the United States, since these countries laid several blames on the DRC's management of natural resources. Due to political sensitivity and security issues involved in dealing with the implication of belligerents in the illegal exploitation of mining and the reintegration of ex-combatants, I was mistaken for a Western agent who aimed at collecting information about the government mining-related activities in order to report to Western chancelleries in Kinshasa.

On the other side, I was considered as a government agent by the members of the *Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la République Démocratique du Congo* [the United Nations Organisation Mission for the stabilisation of the DRC; MONUSCO], since there was an ongoing argument between the latter and the government on the management of the DDR programmes and the involvement of the army in the human rights abuse. In such a situation, locating participants, winning their trust and sticking interview's schedule in time were an enormously challenging job. With my previous research backdrop in the field of peace and conflict in the DRC, I had some previous networks in Kinshasa, which was useful to identify respondents at the outset of the research and assisted in setting ball rolling. While conducting interviews, I spent some time with respondents, having an informal chat with them for a while prior to the formal interview. With this rapport-building, I was able to create an environment of trust whereby I could shed more light on the academic purpose behind the study.

Moreover, the management of participants' expectations and neutrality are two important things worth discussing. Following quite a few hours of discussions and interviews with the

[35] See appendix eight for the University letter used to convince participants about the academic purpose of the research.

respondents, rapport building was boosted. However, participants, particularly academics and civil society members had some expectations from me. For example, some suggested a decolonisation of my research methodology which implies a traditional mechanism that is acceptable to the people and not in compliance with Western lens. However, at the same time, there might be a danger of adhering emotionally to the participants' request, which in turn, would influence the neutrality of my analysis and interpretation. As a researcher, I have been continually attentive of my limitations and the academic rationale on the back of the fieldwork, which kept me from any emotional influences. The involvement of belligerents in the mining activities is a politically charged issue in the DRC. Even politicians and army seniors are highly involved in this issue. From my experience, unless a researcher shows a substantial level of political neutrality during their fieldwork, it would be difficult to collect authentic information from the interviews. Therefore, environmental sensitivity is at stake. In effect, I have learned several lessons from conducting the fieldwork for this thesis. Firstly, apolitical attitude and humility discipline by the researcher could be a means towards maintaining neutrality, which could further be helpful in reinforcing bonds between participants from different social and political backdrops and the researcher. During FGDs, I found that the facilitator or assistant identified had some implications to the discussions, mostly when the debate opposed the ruling party members and the opposition. In such context, participants had the tendency to be more open to the interviewer than to the facilitator. Therefore, I had to handle this issue with utmost care by selecting an assistant from the civil society. Although the Congolese civil society has been criticised for allying with the ruling party, this political inclination cannot be generalised for all its members. It was decided that a research assistant from a civil society background not only could be acceptable than any other individual from different background, but also could spare the researcher from favouring one party over the other during FGDs.

Lessons learned from the fieldwork also taught me that when conducting a fieldwork in politically and socially torn societies like the Kivus, there is a need for recruiting some participants from across diving lines. However, it is important to bear in mind that the recruitment of participants relies on the nature and objectives of a research topic. So, I am of the view that if participants are recruited, especially in peace and conflict study like being studied, from different socio-political organisations, tribal and religious associations,

it would be possible to glean suggestions and perspectives from across diving lines in a torn society. Although security concerns explained above did not allow me to enter the divided communities and mining zones in the Kivus, I used a sample diversification strategy to maintain challenges of biased answers and to be sensitive to the existing conflict dynamics in the field.

Limitations of the Study

Challenges concerning methodology have been discussed above. This section will shed light on other limitations. One such challenge relates to the accessibility of literature in connection with the issue being studied. This research focuses on a case which emerges from the dynamics of armed groups in ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in alleged demilitarised areas. As such, it should be pointed out that the research has also faced a certain limitation due to the nature of the phenomenon investigated. As the research topic is an ongoing occurrence, it is not possible to evaluate the results of the demilitarisation of mining zones as yet. Therefore, some of the research results are only as possible trajectories. Consequently, this means that firstly, the topic epitomises seriously the upshots of the new geography of resources and the principle of resource globalisation in weak or fragile states. Secondly, it requires an urgent response and solution for sustainable peace in the Kivus. Its findings might not be generalised for application in other contexts where peacebuilding processes arise from a military victory or international involvement. However, there are lessons to be learnt from each case.

The study has drawn from the resource curse review to elaborate and demonstrate how natural resources directly or indirectly link to armed conflicts. This approach also showed some limitations to establish whether greed hypothesis and grievances can link and trigger violence. Although the absurdity of abundance analysis touches slightly on factors that motivate rebels to fight, nevertheless it overlooked the fundamental issue in line with how rebel groups and combatants are linked to the exploitation of natural resources and the war economy. Furthermore, it focused more on economic agendas of the conflict and overlooked others such as ethnic identity and land access which have always been regarded as the apparent causes of armed conflicts – mostly in the Kivus, even though the latent causes remain economic. Although the trajectory and nature of the conflict in the DRC,

particularly in the Kivus depicts that the conflict is a multi-layered and hybrid conflict[36] which had officially turned into a mineral-based conflict in the 1998 Congo war, its resolution however involves a total and comprehensive approach. One of the recommendations to this regard was delinking armed groups from mineral resources. It is therefore the research's limitation to exclude this aspect from the study because the focus in this research is on the nexus between artisanal mining – cassiterite, coltan and gold, and the rising phenomenon of combatants (re-) recruitment cycle on the one hand; and how to break down such a relationship on the other. Therefore, it would make sense to focus only on artisanal mining, the (re-) recruitment, reintegration and recruitment of (ex-) combatants in the Kivus and on how to sever this nexus rather than including the DRC's mineral-based conflict in its all aspects. It bears stressing, at this point, that all mineral resources in the DRC's mining-rich provinces do not fall under mineral-based conflict, which also justifies the limitations of the study to artisanal mining in the Kivus.

1.6 Organization of the Thesis

This thesis consists of seven Chapters. Chapter One contextualised the framework of the study by undertaking a general literature review on the foundational concepts and processes in the context of artisanal mining and the ex-combatant reintegration nexus as well as presenting the research design and fieldwork methodology used in this study.

In Chapter Two, the study is contextualised in the dynamics of absurdity of abundance, providing an account of the economic motivations and opportunity created by abundance of natural resources and weak governance in fuelling armed conflict. It throws more light on the nexus between mineral resources and conflicts. It also discusses the occurrence of resource-related conflict, which is supported by two schools of thoughts, including greed and grievance hypotheses.

In Chapter Three, the research browses through the dynamics of the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants. Exploring push and pull factors of

[36] See Chapter 4 for more details.

recruitment, reintegration and the re-recruitment cycle of combatants emerged as an integral element of peacebuilding. The mechanisms and processes involve the understanding of this phenomenon as consequential to a compendium of mixed motivations.

Chapter Four focuses exclusively on the processes and nature of the protracted armed conflict and state failure in the DRC from the two Congo Wars up to 2012. It contextualises the all multi-layered conflict motivations that underline the protracted armed conflict in the eastern DRC. It also sets that the state failure and long-drawn-out armed conflict in DRC is the repercussion of an intersection of local, national and regional conflicts worsened by their interaction and by the presence of natural resources.

The nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment is investigated in Chapter Five. In particular, this chapter presents and analyses the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkages, which is presented as a consequence to informal economy, and which draws its roots from the 1980s economic meltdown. It also underlines the lack of an efficient legal system option to resolve litigations and contestations over mining ownerships, which gave rise to violence as an approach appeared to be an important mechanism of conflict resolution within an environment where the DDR process did not address properly the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Chapter Six examines some perspectives towards demilitarising the mining zones. Discussing the political economy of armed groups – including all belligerents, vis-à-vis mining sector, it is showed that the control of mining zones by belligerents gives the opportunity to conflict's entrepreneurs and their supporters to access minerals at a cheaper price. Demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus associated with socio-political solutions such as the participation of local communities, arms and finance traceability and an internal and the need of an external mining-development geopolitics that consolidate the mining sector have also been discussed.

A summary and conclusion of the key findings of this study are presented in Chapter Seven. This is done in light of the research questions posed at the onset of this thesis. The

analytical framework applied in this study is also revisited. It expounds and gives ideas for future research routes in line with conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the Kivus.

Chapter Two: Resource-based Conflicts in the Post-cold War Context

2.1 Introduction

Resource concerns have been construed to be subordinated to the political and ideological dimensions of the United States-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. With the end of the bipolar world, planning for securing access to vital economic assets or rather rare natural resources has reappeared to be at the central position of major powers in the world. Since 1999, the Global geo-economics strategy shifted significantly to the strategy of relocating conflict into states with resource endowment. Some strategic regions, comprising Sub-Saharan and Central Africa, Near and Middle East among others caught the most attention and became a major strategic prize owing to their huge reserves of natural resources; oil, natural gas, diamonds, gold, timber, copper, coltan – to name a few, thought to be in these regions.

The assumption of control over states with resource endowment would portend that these areas shall now on receive close attention from the people whose primary task is to watch and protect the flow of vital resources to major powers (Reyntjens 2009). This chapter reviews resource-related aspects of contemporary armed conflict and responds to the first research objective. This literature sheds light on the relationship between mineral resources and conflicts, repeatedly referred to as the paradox of plenty or resource curse hypothesis. The review highlights the occurrence of resource-related conflict, which is supported by two schools of thoughts, including ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ hypotheses. The three sections deal with armed conflicts, ‘absurdity of abundance’ and war economy to reassess the relevance of the studies to the analysis of resource-conflict links.

2.2 New Geography of Conflicts

The new prominence of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Great Lakes Region and its rich mineral resource reserves is but one sign of larger transformation of Western strategic

thinking. Contrary to the Cold War period where the areas of greatest concern to military planners focused on the collision between the United States – US, and the Soviet Blocs (Klare 2002; Kaldor 2007), since the end of Cold War though, these areas have been left behind and are of less strategic significance for the US, while other regions, as earlier noted, are receiving close attention from the Pentagon (Klare 2001). Behind this switch in strategic geography of conflicts lies the new geo-economics thought to be based on the protection of supplies of vital natural resources. The new geo-economics thought has become a crucial national concern for importing countries. In the same vein, Reyntjens (2009) contends that economic competition, having taken over Cold War ideological lines, drives current international relations. It is likely, therefore, that new geography of conflicts thinking draws from economic competition over natural resources, and links to the inability of unstable and resource-rich states to manage their territory whereby competition over access to vital economic assets is still soaring. It is to say that the complexities of the swiftly focus on ideological lines changed to soaring demand of natural resources and energy since the end of the Second World War. Accordingly, the concentration of some strategic natural resources in unstable developing states and the ascension of industrialised world triggered up competing claims over ownership of resources by bordering countries (Soeters 2005; Reyntjens 2009). All these support the idea that new geography conflicts represent a significant shift in strategic thinking over access to critical resources in post-Cold War era (Strange 1996; Cramer 2006b), also known as contemporary conflicts, post-modern wars, new or civil wars.

Post-Cold War conflicts embody war economy. Fighting over access to vital natural resources has become a national concern both to countries with resource endowment and those without resources, for economic competition and natural resources protection are increasing greater. In a similar vein, we might be tempted to believe that the recent collapse of the global economy, including the scarcity of petroleum, natural gas and strategic mineral resources prove that the world is unable to keep up both the demands of continued population growth and economic expansion (Reyntjens 2009). Probable explanation could be that beyond this doctrine, a major strategic thinking describes the new geography of conflict as the revival of scarce resources competition which fuels armed conflicts within unstable states. This doctrine suggests that a focus on the acquisition and protection of

natural resources is evident in the strategic and hegemonic thinking of powers as the competition for natural resources is getting greater. Therefore, it is worth bearing in mind that with more than half of the world's natural resource reserves laying in politically unstable regions (Reyntjens 2009), and with coltan, cassiterite, gold, diamond, timber wars already spanning throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, resource competition has easily and overtly turned into open war economy and competing interest. So far, fighting over resources has become a geo-economic requirement for governments. Hence, governments' new security requirement and policies seem to be concentrated on the acquisition and protection of natural resources, and they are ready to go into battle in order to protect the future of their natural resources. However, how do natural resources come to enticing war economy or modern armed conflicts? This query raises the need for understanding what civil war is, which the following lines try to deal with.

2.2.1 Defining Civil War

There is not always a clear-cut agreement on the definitions of civil war, neither is there any agreement on the number of civil wars (King 1997; Human Security Centre 2005; Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006). Although there are still stumbling-blocks to identify armed conflicts, a few developments based on operational definitions could help gather statistical datasets. It follows from these statistical datasets that civil war is a conflict over government or territory that has reached the threshold of at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, and 25 battle-related deaths per year for low-intensity internal armed conflict (Salehyan 2008). However, according to scholars (Cranner 2006a; Kaldor 2007; Salehyan 2008; Beswick and Jackson 2011), contemporary conflicts are viewed as internal conflicts that involve a myriad of transnational connections where the line between internal and external, between aggression – attacks from abroad, and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between local and global, is difficult to draw. The new wars, therefore, involve "a blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale violation of human rights" (Kaldor 2007: 2). This is a real and evident fact within many current armed conflicts. However, this is not to say that all wars will fall under Cramer (2006a), Kaldor (2007) and Salehyan's (2008) patterns.

From a holistic perspective, some will argue that the discourse on civil wars encapsulates a destructive force which works for the failure and collapse of modern states, and fed into the opinion that a Western-model state is the standard of state being (Beswick and Jackson 2011). This could entail possible interpretations such as defining a civil war possibly "becomes more an issue of political perceptions than objective realities" (1997:18). Nevertheless, Hanlon and Yanacopulos (2006) identify around 200 wars which have occurred since the end of the Second World War, and a spiralling number of violent conflicts occurred during the Cold War period. But the lack of appropriate definitions of civil war has given rise to a number of terms such as internal conflict, intrastate conflict, insurgencies, coups, revolutions, terrorism, small wars, limited wars and low-intensity conflicts. These terms are interchangeably used to describe armed conflicts, but no clear criteria are made available to draw the line between these terms or to help establish the start-point and concluding-points of unfolding conflicts (King 1997; Alley 2004). The reality is that most scholars encounter stumbling-blocks to confirm whether or not wars have a clear-cut starting or concluding point (King 1997; Alley 2004).

A better conflicts analyst and a better predictor of new wars in the new international system would define armed conflicts through the lens of long-drawn-out troubled period running through an average period of four years and five months (Alley 2004; Sambanis 2004). As for their end, it frequently happens depending on negotiated settlements, thereby tending to a failure, and often encouraging military victory to put a more conclusive end to these disruptive and unpredictable events (King 1997; Beswck and Jackson 2011). Cramer (2006a) and Salehyan (2008) suggest two key aspects in defining a civil war; firstly, the boundaries around the set of civil wars might be artificial, porous, or fuzzy. Secondly, there is a common ground between many civil wars and intrastate conflicts that have occurred after the post-Cold War period; these wars have global or regional networks (King 1997; Alley 2004; Salehyan 2008) and are based primarily on domestic origins. They are largely shaped by domestic elements in pursuit of political goals and usually have international dimensions (Alley 2004). This contrast is due to many negative externalities caused by such conflicts in terms of migratory flows, economic disturbances in bordering states and interventions by these neighbouring states, with the aim of influencing the outcome of civil wars according to their preferences (Salehyan 2008). As we can note, there is no overall

agreement on the definition of civil wars, but it would be much more informative to have a good understanding of what causes such conflicts.

Understanding contemporary wars entails a need for twigging both the end of the Cold War and the rising of globalisation. The end of the Cold War, according to Strange (1996), has been considered as the dawn of the new wars because of the collapse of the bipolar World order and totalitarian empires. At the same vein of thinking, the rising of the globalisation process in the late 1980s and early 1990s has accelerated global network in terms of political, economic, military and cultural links and also gnaw the state sovereignty, also known as the 'retreat of the state' (Strange 1996). The global interconnectedness and the rise of capitalism have significantly contributed to the decline of state revenues, the sprawling of organised crime, the emerging force of paramilitary groups and the decrease of political legitimacy (Kaldor 2007). New wars' supports emerge from a decentralised system, largely from a wide range of external resources, including looting, hostage-taking, the black market, remittances from the Diaspora, taxation, support from neighbouring countries and informal trade (Kaldor 2007; Beswick and Jackson 2011).

The mobilisation of combatants and their involvement in hostilities legitimise and sustain such a war economy. Combatants' enlistment sustains the linkage between new wars and the global economy (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine 2004; Salehyan 2008) and perpetuates the recurrence of new wars (Keen 1998; 2000; Dietrich 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Alley 2004; Studdard 2004) through fighting over potential vital resources' zones (Alley 2004). Klare (2001; 2002) highlights resources as roots of civil wars in contemporary conflicts in particular and points out the fears that the US made use to deter the ex-Soviet Union over its access to Middle Eastern oil and Africa's mineral resources.

New wars' concept is not a new form of conflict, neither has it been specifically coined to describe contemporary warfare (Le Billon 2004; Beswick and Jackson 2011). The concept shaped fairly ideological rivalry during the Cold War period, finally turned into becoming an economic competition over vital economic assets between areas and states that possess the world's known natural resource reserves and those without these assets (Klare 2001; 2002). Resource wars arise from the concerns to control and protect supplies of natural

resources, since the demand for these resources is recently getting greater than before in considerable proportions. For instance, Klare (2002) argues that the scarcity of critical natural resources is the root-cause of the conflicts and localised fighting over access to scarce natural resources will surely increase in the future. Renner's (2002: 6) research concurs with Klare's and indicates:

> "more or less a quarter of the nearly 50 wars and armed conflicts active in 2001 have a strong resource dimension – in the sense that legal or illegal resource exploitation helped trigger or exacerbated violent conflict or financed its ongoing".

However, Renner's resource scale over-emphasis encountered several criticisms because the study neglects other significant factors such as the geography of resources, which also has a crucial role in determining conflicts (Le Billon 2004; 2005; 2008; Sambanis 2004). Beyond these different considerations, three different frameworks and outcomes are drawn from different analysis of civil wars since the mid-1990s (Kalyvas 2007; 2009; Salehyan 2008; 2009). The most helpful work and approaches seem to be econometric methods from development economists, which aim to identify crucial factors that civil wars face, and came up with the impact and role of natural resources. Meanwhile international relations scholars agreed on ethnic antagonism, while comparative politics and sociology academics have pointed out the role of the state capacity in civil wars. However, how do natural resources link to a conflict? The upcoming section referring to the absurdity of abundance theory will try to address it.

2.3 Absurdity of Abundance Theory: Root Causes of Conflicts

Competing over valuable economic assets in contested resource zones has become a crucial feature in delineating root-causes of armed conflicts in countries with natural resources endowment. Possible elucidations include that as the global populations grow up and economic activity spreads out in many parts of the Globe (Reyntjens 2009), the hunger for critical resources swells more quickly than nature could accommodate. I would argue that a map of contested resource zones would locate concentrations of vital economic assets in the developing and unstable World. This map, surely, would also delineate areas where armed conflicts are devastating and, of course, those where they are most likely to break out in the

years after. In other words, the mere presence of valuable economic assets or natural resources in a particular area is a strong evidence of conflict eruption and would therefore portend that conflict outbreak links to valuable resource endowment. Of course this goes alongside other factors, including colonial history, countries stability, region geo-economics and geopolitics, and the history of relationships between states among others. However, does resource endowment imply conflict flare-up and poverty in natural resource producing countries? If so, how do valuable economic assets have adverse effects to resource-rich countries? And do all resource-rich countries crumble into armed conflicts? These enquiries shed more light on the absurdity of abundance theory regarded as being root-causes of conflicts in natural resource producing countries, and are developed in the following lines. The concept of 'absurdity of abundance theory' used in this research implies that 'amidst vast natural resource-endowment, there is starvation of nothing but hunger in the mist of plenty'. This is what most scholars refer to as the paradox of plenty, resource curse or the adverse effects of resource abundance.

It has been claimed that African countries that rely highly on oil and mineral exports are also exposed to a stagnant economic growth, lower living standards, and face more prevalent corruption and violence than countries without rich natural resources (Pegg 2003). Over the last two decades the World Bank support for liberalisation, privatisation and capacity building to develop a favourable environment for investment in resource-rich countries proved that all efforts undertaken in these countries failed to mitigate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa as expected (ibid.).[37] Possible interpretation could be that policy formulation towards poverty alleviation in these countries was not tailored to their economic, political and social settings. It bears stressing that the assessment of the absurdity of abundance theory in this section tries to test its validity and implications for policy formulation as it is used as a means of responding to conflict, even if the outcome in terms of resulting policy is still weak. Therefore, the review is helpful to us in grasping the assumptions made upon the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment in the Kivus – Chapter Five, and various plans envisioned to attend to the long-drawn-out conflicts in the eastern DRC – Chapter Six.

[37] Recent findings from Pegg's (2006) research shows that the World Bank Programme on the mining-led poverty alleviation failed to produce the expected objectives.

The absurdity of abundance has been considered to be a highly influential thesis of armed conflicts (Stevens 2003; Rosser 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). Resource-rich countries are likely to experience poor economic performance which Karl (1997) calls 'the paradox of plenty' and other scholars (Stevens 2003; Rosser 2006) address as 'resource curse' or 'the adverse effects of natural resource abundance'. The concept of paradox of plenty, referred to as the 'absurdity of abundance' in this research, was coined by Richard Auty in 1993 (Stevens 2003) and its significance is getting a widespread meaning. The hypothesis also implies that states get also liable to face low levels of democracy and governance and consequently civil war. The absurdity of abundance was seen to be rather radical until late 1980s. Before that, natural resource endowment was generally regarded as being advantageous to developing countries for economic growth and development (Rosser 2006). However, nowadays, natural resource abundance is widely considered as a curse for a country's economic, social and political development.

There are three broad sub-literatures on the resource curse hypothesis, dealing with: (1) the link between natural resource abundance and economic performance, (2) the link between natural resource abundance and political development and (3) the link between natural resource abundance and civil wars (Pegg 2003). But all of them have paid less regard to the social impact of natural resource abundance and the relationship between social and economic processes (Ross 2007); even if the sub-literature with regard to civil wars has recently emerged after the establishment of the hypothesis about the resource curse had been developed in the late 1990s (Rosser 2006).

The significant set of empirical analysis entails three crucial issues regarding natural resource curse, which are:

1. The approach used in theses empirical analyses is too reductionist, barely focusing on the task of establishing the link in question (Rosser 2006). This type of approach opens a leeway toward debate on some of the conceptual and technical issues raised by the empirical studies, and therefore failed to address sufficiently issues of causality and the various processes involved. Researches on natural resource and conflicts from Lederman and Maloney (2006) and Rosser (2006) show that measurement of resource abundance is source of major disagreement; for instance,

on the basis of the ratio of countries' natural resource exports to GDP, the ratio of countries' natural resource exports to total exports or resource rents. Again, these studies reveal that the databases related to different variables including civil war and types of natural resources are still issues of contention.

2. Some natural resource-rich countries have avoided the trap of resource curse, thus these findings cannot be conclusive enough. Stevens (2003) and Rosser (2006) dismiss this theory in the sense that it is limited and does not give clear explanation on the disparity in question. The results merely substantiate the presence of a recurring tendency rather than that of an iron law, failing therefore to describe any causal relationships between natural resources and negative outcomes or pathways (Stevens 2003; Lederman and Maloney 2006; Rosser 2006; Arellano-Yanguas 2008). Hence, there is no clear-cut consensus as to whether there is indeed such a thing as a resource curse (Lederman and Maloney 2006).

3. Arellano-Yanguas (2008) observes a serious lack of analysis of the detailed contexts that affect how natural resource abundance produces adverse results in each country in the first two crucial issues. From this point, a need for a more analytical engagement along with the broad range of social and political variables, as well as some of the external political economic environments that help shape development outcomes are crucial (Rosser 2006). Moreover, cross-cultural studies available to date, based on national statistical data, did not either succeed to consider critical social, economic and political contexts at a sub-national level as they comprise more and more important factors in the ongoing decentralisation processes occurring within developing countries (Arellano-Yanguas 2008). In addition, the extent to which informal economy in many African countries functions outside the visible official mechanisms (Heller 2006) would also help discredit some of the analyses that are more heavily reliant on official figures about GDP and exports, and would thus impede and obscure any real development outcomes.

Beyond this literature, a few key aspects characterise these econometric studies such as resource reliance, types of resource and civil war emergence and protraction. It can also be noted that a few critiques of those studies have looked at technical issues and, to a lesser extent, at their analytical limitations and weaknesses in explaining causation. The question then is that how has the prominent absurdity of abundance hypothesis impacted on the policy responses for resource-related conflicts and the implications of such policy instruments? The upcoming greed and grievance hypothesis subsections address this issue. However, considering our topic which focuses on the link between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the Kivus, there will be more emphasis on the greed aspect as this has been believed to be strongly linked to armed conflicts within countries with natural resources endowment.

2.3.1 Greed Hypothesis

The increasing commitment on the close correlation between natural resources and armed conflict prompted some interesting research and investigations in social sciences. Statistical study presented by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) has been used as a referral key which inspired numerous studies carried out with the aim of analysing any link between natural resources and civil war. Probable interpretations include the following main trends observed in conflict emerged from these studies: (1) civil wars depend on natural resource export rather than abundance of natural resources itself which is a factor connected to civil war, (2) natural resource wealth has an impact on the extent of civil war rather than its inception, (3) natural resources are geographically located and easily controllable and aim at prolonging civil war interval.

Researches on greed hypothesis have used several variables to analyse different linkages that exist between civil war onset, its length and its intensity, types of conflict such as secessionist or rebellion and types of commodity, as well as locations and productions of commodities (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Lederman and Maloney 2006). However, this could be taken as being mainly statistical in scope; hence these studies raised debates about some of the more technical questions as well as their analytical weaknesses in explaining issues of causality (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).

Civil War Incidence

Nowadays, Collier and Hoeffler's research on the link between natural resource abundance and civil war is still used as a referral pillar for analysis in developing better datasets. A measurement of natural resource abundance as the share of primary commodity exports in GDP in 98 selected countries, and a range of 27 civil war cases as subjects of analysis showed that increased natural resources intensify the propensity for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2000). These findings were acknowledged by additional analyses carried out with improved datasets, confirming a significant correlation between natural resource wealth and civil war flare-up (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 2004). Another study on resource-rich countries covering the period between 1960 and 1995 shows that reliance on primary commodity exports increases the probability of civil war by four times at least by comparison with the situation of countries with no primary commodity exports in GDP (Collier 2000). This is to say that an amalgamation of factors considerably boosts the propensity for civil war; these factors are: (1) the omnipresence of great primary goods exports, (2) a general low level of education among the population, (3) a society with larger proportions of younger men and (4) a situation of economic decline. Therefore, the factor of opportunity seems to have some explanatory power with regard to the occurrence of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Some researches argue that civil war onset depends on natural resource rather than natural resource wealth fuelling the outburst of civil war. However, there is no accurate literature on the link existing between the civil war flare-up and natural resource wealth in cases where natural resource abundance is measured as the piece of natural resource stock per capita (De Soysa 2000). Some other studies, that used modified and/or different measures to explore the relationship between natural resource abundance and civil wars, did not find a definite relationship between resource wealth and civil war. Again the correlation test on a rent-based measure of natural resource abundance was presented with a curvilinear relationship and concluded that the correlation in question was insignificant (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Likewise, it is still tricky to establish accurate links between a situation of natural resource reliance and the onset of civil war, even after running through a minor sampling frame (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005). However, this link may be validated by the high proportion of oil products among primary commodity exports, since

oil has a high influence on the possibility of civil war (Fearon 2005), even if it does not support the idea of a correlation between civil war and natural resources as generally categorised (Ross 2004a). Nevertheless, it concurs with the conclusion of a more recent study based on new data and concluding that the usage of a broad classification of natural resources does not explain strong evidence for any particular relation between those resources and the outbreak of civil war (De Soysa and Neumayer 2007).

Civil War Scope

Contrary to the weak relationship between natural resource wealth and the onset of civil war, various papers on statistical research depict a curvilinear correlation between natural resource wealth and civil wars inception (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Le Billon 2001b; 2005; Ross 2004a). Ross (2003b) links this rapport to lootable resource and puts forward that lootable resources are more likely to extend non-separatist conflicts while non-lootable resources are likely to reduce the incidence of non-separatist conflicts. This frequently happens with contraband resources such as opium, diamonds or coca that are generally and largely utilised to finance rebel groups and thereby protracting civil wars (Fearon 2004; Ross 2006). With regards to minerals such as diamonds, it has been ascertained that there are strong correlations between civil wars and diamonds (Ross 2004a); in particular, secondary diamonds or alluvial diamonds that are lootable as opposed to primary diamonds such as Kimberlite diamonds (Lujala *et al.* 2005). Nevertheless, civil war protraction is a field of contradictory view among scholars.

Overall, it emerges from the above that a group of natural resources are strongly linked to the lengthening of civil war. These natural resources are more lootable and contraband kind of resources, because they are easier for rebel groups to capture, appropriate and use to fuel and fund violence. This latter view, however, could still be questionable (Le Billon 2008). Interpretation that natural resource wealth serves to sustain civil war has triggered the idea that the accessibility of natural resource wealth enables the weaker side in a conflict to finance violence and sustain itself either through looting (Ballentine 2003; Ross 2004b; Le Billon 2005), or through selling future exploitation rights, called ‘booty futures’, that they want to capture and control (Ross 2004a; 2004b) whereas receiving “advance payments for” (Le Billon 2005: 44). In the case of separatist conflicts, according to the same thought,

governments are likely to forget about peace agreements that are meant to offer fiscal autonomy (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004b). Besides, combatants may not be motivated enough to adhere to peace agreements (Ballentine 2003; Fearon 2004), even if one study realised mixed results as evidence for such a view (Ross 2004b). Succinctly, it follows from the above that more than a few commentators highlight that a protracted conflict may have the aftereffect of changing initial motives, with financial rewards becoming gradually more important than political objectives (Le Billon 2005), thereby fuelling the development of 'war economies' (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; 2004; Studdard 2004), an issue to be discussed in a later section.

Fuelling Civil War

The relationship between natural resource abundance and civil war intensity caught less attention of most scholars. Although the established availability of natural resources to augment the number of blood shedding battles during civil wars – due to hostility over resource-rich territories amongst belligerents and cruel countermeasures by governments against any challenges, just slight evidence tries to support this claim (Ross 2004b). Study from Ballentine (2003) even depicted that natural resource wealth decreased the number of losses during civil war, at least in some cases. Ballentine's (2003) statement could be interpreted as followed; during battle-related deaths, collusion between combatants for resource exploitation could result in the low intensity of civil war (Keen 1998; Ballentine 2003; Ross 2004b), or a "comfortable settlement in which opposing parties might secure mutually beneficial deals to produce and market resources" (Le Billon 2005: 48). This often occurs especially when there is "the impossibility of any one side securing a full monopoly over lootable resources" (Ballentine 2003: 269).

Category of Armed Conflicts

There still exist various types of civil wars. Despite the statistical and codified 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, some studies have tried to draw a close relationship between types of civil war and secessionist or rebellion. There are two prominent data sets regarding categories of conflict. Firstly, separatist conflict is linked to non-lootable natural resources,

while rebellion is connected to lootable natural resources. The concept of lootability in this case is identified by "whether it can be easily appropriated by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers" (Ross 2003b: 47). Ross (2003b; 2008) finds negative implications in non-lootable resources for separatist conflicts. According to him, non-lootable resources last longer and they could be a source of grievance or a source of finance if they are obstructable (Ross 2003b). Again, there is a claim that resource-related separatist conflict has common aspects: (1) there exists a distinct identity prior to conflict, (2) a widespread awareness that the central government misuses the wealth and (3) the bearing by the local population of costs incurred by the extraction process (Ross 2003a). Lootable resources however, says Ross, do not impact on separatist conflicts as they generate fewer grievances, they rather pave the way for the incidence of non-separatist conflicts that are complex, and thus last longer because they carry "greater fragmentation and shifting alliances among the armies that control the resource" (Ross 2003b:67). Lootable resources, in the case of new wars, could be a financial source for non-separatist conflicts by using different mechanisms including direct looting and sale of resources, the sale of booty futures as well as extortion and abduction (Ross 2003a).

Secondly, 'point' resources and 'diffuse' resources, geographically located in remote areas from the central government or the capital, could be a disturbing factor, with the aim of triggering different types of conflicts (Le Billion 2001a; 2001b; 2005; Ross 2003a). The difference between point resources and diffuse resources is that point resources are extracted in concentrated areas by a small number of capital-intensive operators. Point resources are oil and deep-shaft mineral exploitation, and they generally benefit governments. Diffuse resources however are exploited over open geographical areas by many small-scale operators without using industrial modes of production. Diffuse resources are alluvial gems and minerals, timber and agricultural products, and they are accessed by various actors, which enables informal operations (Le Billion 2005). At the same time, in the words of Le billion (2005:35):

> "Distant resources are more difficult than proximate resources for the government to control, in part owing to their location in remote territories along porous borders, or within the territory of a political opposition group".

For that reason, it is worth noting a few contrasting features marking the geography of resources. This would mean that point resources, closely located to the capital, easily fall under the state control, while those that are geographically in remote from the capital, escape from the government control and are more likely to trigger separatist conflicts. Diffuse resources located in remote from the capital are generally linked to conflicts, and they are characterised by warlordism. However, those that are near to the capital are associated with rebellions and rioting (Le Billon 2001a; 2001b; 2005; Ross 2003a).

Landscape of Resources

Findings over how lootable resources happen to be associated with civil wars expand beyond studies that focus on the effect of resources on different types of conflict. However, Ross's (2003b) investigation on a set of 12 cases of civil wars and three cases of minor conflicts during the period between 1990 and 2000 could not find any major variations in the occurrence of civil war in connection with four main categories of natural resources after improving the data on income per capita; oil and gas, minerals, food crops and non-food crops. However, he found a noteworthy positive correlation between drugs and diamonds. This latter findings, hence, confirms the theory that lootable resources increase the likelihood of civil war rather than point resources do. On the contrary and while explaining the relationship between mineral resource abundance and civil war De Soysa (2000) and Le Billon (2001a; 2005) advise that point resources, as being opposed to diffuse resources, are easier to capture and appropriate due to their geographical concentration. This logic equally appears to hint at the lootability of these resources. In their research over mineral resource abundance and state's stability, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) contend that beyond the simple accessibility to lootable resources, other factors do play a role in the occurrence of civil war through influencing the capability of rulers to maintain political stability in lootable mineral resource-rich countries; they include the accessibility of non-lootable resources, the taxability of resources and prototypes or patterns of state spending. Available lootable or point resources are important but their mere presence is not sufficient enough for inferring directly an immediate link between their accessibility and the occurrence of civil war. There is a need for considering other factors, including the economic structure and its impact on social relations; such as a high degree of dependency

on agricultural production which may also be related to the incidence of civil war (Smith 2004; Humphreys 2005).

Conversely, numerous studies have robustly supported the correlation between oil and diamond abundance and civil war occurrence owing to diamond and oil attractiveness. However there is still many contrasting opinions about their role in civil wars (De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; Ross 2006; 2007; 2008; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). It has been observed, for instance, that the probability of civil war in oil-exporting countries seems to be double than other countries (De Soysa 2002). De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), however, warn about the relevance of the existing relationship and advise that the connection between oil wealth and civil war is relevant only for low-intensity conflicts that have 25 or fewer battle-related deaths per year rather than the common figure of 1,000 deaths per year. Some other studies, however, pointed out that oil abundance lessens the occurrence of civil war (Smith 2004) and that the parallelism between oil wealth and civil war tends to be fairly weak (Humphreys 2005).

Similarly, minor statistical studies revealed that diamond-producing countries are more likely to experience civil war than countries without (Humphreys 2005; Lujala *et al.* 2005). Lujala *et al*. (2005), for instance, contend that alluvial diamonds – whose extraction is easy and without using much skill or technology, are likely to trigger civil war, while Kimberlite diamonds – whose extraction involves considerable capital-intensive processes, are not. This point of view lacks evidence as other statistical studies did not find relationships between diamonds particularly and civil war outbreak (Ross 2006). Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) and Ross (2006), for example, contradict the view by Lujala *et al*. (2005). As for them alluvial diamonds are said to induce peace rather than conflict, and are poorly linked to civil war occurrence than Kimberlite diamonds.

Other studies suggest that the link between armed conflicts and diamonds cannot be established and the issue is still questionable (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005; Ross 2006; Le Billon 2008). It has been said that diamonds cannot be a conflict-fuelling factor; therefore the above mentioned findings reject any link between diamonds and conflicts. These contrasting views might result from the lack of reliable figures on the production and location of diamonds (Gilmore *et al.* 2005), the time change, the correlation's strength

today than that of the past (Lujala *et al.* 2005; Ross 2006) and the variety of diamond types considered. So far, the overall assessment on the issue depicts that a fairly narrow number of violent conflicts have occurred in diamonds-rich countries, a detail that should also render the statistical studies weak as it occurs to the oil's case (Ross 2006; Le Billon 2008).

These contrasting thoughts seem to emerge from different methods and data used in the studies in question (Ross 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). In the same vein, it appears that the measures used for oil resources were rejected, being weak and incomplete (Lujala *et al.* 2007). This brings out the importance of other elements that could influence the link. Ross (2006) and De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) are of the view that the time period is also an important factor which should be taken into account since the link would be more significant today than it would have been at earlier junctures. Some scholars, however, remain reluctant on the capacity of the state to avert conflict (Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005), as the abundance of some mineral such as cassiterite, coltan, diamond, gold and oil destabilises the capacity of states and leads to armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; Ross 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). This brings into light political results, also seen through the lens of grievance as part of the resource curse theory to be discussed further.

Cogency of the Link

Drawn from the above statistical studies, it might be postulated that some natural resources influence the incidence and lengthening of civil war occurrence. Empirical analysis has established a strong significant greed hypothesis, even if this has been utterly questioned for being both subjective and weak. The subjectivity and weaknesses can be attributed to contrasting views over the link between mineral resources and civil wars, and the lack of a robust analytical contribution over certain scientific issues raised by the theory – weakness which challenges the validity of the alleged correlation between mineral resources and conflicts, and which ends up flawing causations. Having said so, both data and proxies were dealt with adequately although technical issues were problematic.

Firstly, Ross (2006) notes that a rare number of civil war cases that raise the need of analytical concern over the validity of statistical analysis as it turns to be more sensitive to

the minor changes within the data. This issue raised a crucial concern about the development of statistical studies that aim at analysing the impacts of natural resources on civil wars from the post-Cold War period, on the one hand, and on the other, the impact that the availability of point resources, such as oil (Ross 2006) and diamonds (Lujala *et al*. 2005), tends to have on the expected possibility of a conflict inception seems to be evident in the post-Cold War by comparison with earlier periods. This view undermines the validity of the civil wars statistical studies and is not shared by the new wars paradigm which links resources to civil wars.

Secondly, some scholars have largely rejected the quality of the data used by these econometrical studies. Humphreys (2005) is of the view that the data on natural resource abundance are of low quality. This has resulted in further works with the aim of finding reliant data. Snyder (2006) has tried to frame more carefully designed qualitative and comparative studies, while Gilmore *et al*. (2005) have started improving datasets, more specifically on diamonds, and others on oil and on natural resource rents (De Soysa and Neumayer 2007; Lujala *et al*. 2007).

Several findings on civil wars are still problematic. The major concerns occur when it comes to codifying civil wars and identifying their beginning and ending. This major crucial issue is the result of the absence of an agreed definition of civil war as mentioned earlier. Collier and Hoeffler's civil war datasets were discarded for being "biased in a way that overstates the impact of primary commodities" (Ross 2004a:342), this criticism was supported by other findings that used different coding rules. Ross (2004a) and Sambanis (2004) did not find any necessary linkage between natural resource dependence and the onset of civil wars. Moreover, the agreed operational definition of civil war as a conflict over government or territory, which is based on the use of a threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, cannot apply to a well-defined concept of a civil war, neither does it represent it at all. Narrowing down civil war in a fenced definition, such as that above, fails to incorporate different forms and dynamics that fighting takes and which involves the exploitation and regulation of resources as well as the relationship with the broader context, including the mining sector role, the global trade chain and the peripheralisation of the extraction site (Le Billon 2008; Beswick and Jackson 2011). More importantly, the credibility of findings on the correlation between civil wars and mineral resource wealth is

severely dented owing to the fact that researchers rely on state's official statistics or datasets, generally available but barely accessible by researchers. Furthermore, due to their status of being post-conflict countries, the accessibility and availability of the database are serious drawbacks, something that undermines official statistics (Cramer 2002; MacGinty 2004). With regard to the extensive informal economy, generally developed within affected-conflict countries, the reliability of statistical issue has definitely to be addressed (Mwanasali 2000).

Finally, the use of proxies in carrying out this empirical testing raised some concerns not only about these proxies, but also on their efficiency of what they should be measuring. Cramer's (2002:1850) study, for instance, criticises these proxies and brings into light that the proxies used do not seem to be "conceptually or substantially equivalent to the thing they are meant to represent". Therefore, the use of proxies is inconsistent and they are conceptually and empirically fuzzy. Cramer indents this situation as:

> "An instance of the more general problem of the empirical weakness, arbitrary prioritisation of particular variables, and manipulation of technique over and above the search for truth in econometrics" (ibid: 1854).

Causality

Despite macro-quantitative studies' weaknesses picked out across different datasets, however, they are still helpful in identifying some general trends (Salehyan 2008), even if their resulting theories are problematic in many cases of exception. Mack (2002) believes them to have some value too. Salehyan (2008), though, warns that macro-quantitative does not aim at describing any causal relationships as part of the findings, which is a task requiring more detailed explanations that should be provided by empirical studies in order to complement the more probabilistic arguments. Statistical studies are still a set of causalities wooing to sustain the idea that civil wars are linked to resource, although these causalities were criticised for being not only essentially inconsistent and unconvincing (Cramer 2002; Cater 2003), but also overly reductionist (Cramer 2002; 2006b). The prominent fundamental theory that natural resources involve conflict was consistently opposed. Drawing on the same idea, Ross (2004b; 2006) puts forward one opposition and

argues as followed; the occurrence of civil wars flare-up in a country does not necessarily require the relocation of its non-extractive industries, such as manufacturing and services, into safer areas while the extractive industries remain owing to their specific nature. In this case, the proportion of primary commodity exports to GDP and a commonly used measure of resource wealth augment significantly. Accordingly, it might be concluded that the correlation in question was as a ramification of the reality of the conflict that forces the factor of resource reliance.

Although critics of existing work on causality have been formulated, the greed hypothesis – which supports the impact of availability of natural resources on the incidence of civil war with armed groups gaining from economic motivations and opportunity provided by the lootability of resources in question, remains the backbone of the prevalent causality thesis. However, bearing in mind the potential correlation between lootability and realistic actor perspectives (Rosser 2006), the motivation behind looting is alleged to be purely economic even if scholars do not explicitly mention it when they set to examine different factors explaining the complex dynamics at play in conflict situations and the various rationales for looting. MacGinty (2004:866-868) draws the line between economic looting and symbolic looting; *economic* looting is set to gain profit while *symbolic* looting is set to get non-material advantages. MacGinty further distinguishes *strategic* looting – which is part of a wider politico-military project, from *selective* looting for target selection. Other than MacGinty's looting specification, several scholars tend to rely heavily on the concept of lootability as narrowly defined in economic understanding without adequately investigating or clearly conceptualising it; thereby weakening the hypothesis put forward (ibid.).

Some scholars recommended a few other explanations to strengthen the weak argument of linear correlation between natural resources and conflict onset. On the front line is Ross (2004b) who rejects any correlation between resource wealth and incidence of civil war by a simple mechanism of coexistence, as another unpredictable factor may play the role of a third variable at stake (Ross 2004a) or even a diversity of mechanisms (Ross 2004b). Although Ross' (2004a; 2004b) argument sheds light on the new route to understanding the link between resources and civil war onset, the most important argument however has pointed out the role of governance as the most crucial variable in explaining the causal link between conflict and natural resource abundance (De Soysa 2000; Cater 2003; Fearon and

Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). This leading argument derives from a 'state-centric theory'. The state-centric theory argues that natural resource reliance paves the way for a weak and unaccountable government which, in turn, culminates in a set-up of particular conditions conducive for the incidence of civil war (De Soysa 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a; Fearon 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007).[38] One of these conditions includes the tendency for corruption to be found in patrimonial regimes (Le Billon 2003a), a stance previously approved by some studies. A political order could enable high-value lootable resources through ruling the institutions of extraction and exercising the degree of control over the resource revenues created by these institutions (Snyder 2006). Herbst (2000) tried to illustrate this view when he looked at how rebel leaders in sub-Saharan Africa recruit combatants by persuading them to join armed groups. He contends that most rebel leaders use economic incentives and political indoctrination, ethnic mobilisation and coercion as a recruitment method. Furthermore, Herbst (2000) links the viability, continuation and form of a rebel movement to the capacity of the state to respond to internal challenges that it may face.

[38] State-centric views contend that institutions of a fragile state, based on resource rents, have adverse impacts on economic development and democracy. Whilst how resource rents weaken state capacity can be explained by a combination of cognitive, historic-structuralist and institutional theories, the most predominant approach has been theories of rentier state (Ross 1999). Cognitive theories advise that in countries with natural resource endowment, the behaviour of political elites becomes altered in both rational and irrational ways, influencing the type of governance practiced in these regions, and the best known national behaviour feature of political elites is rent-seeking. It is to say that given resource rents being relatively easy to capture, they result in bribes, distortions in public policies and a shift of labour to public favour seeking (Leite and Weidmann 1999; Torvik 2002). Contrarily, a historic-structuralist perspective suggests that natural resource wealth adversely impacts on the level of democracy of a country because it hinders the social and cultural changes that help to cement democratisation, and focuses analytically on the role of social forces in shaping developmental outcomes. A number of scholars making use of the historic-structuralist perspective assume that natural resource wealth drives to a formation of the powerful business class and /or middle class with the aim of exercising power to influence government policies for its own interests (Ross 1999), and hampers a modernisation effect, whereby 'the failure of the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs renders them less likely to push for democracy (Ross 2001:357). As to rentier state theories, a rentier state is 'characterised by a high reliance on external rents produced by a few economic actors', and rents are 'typically generated from the exploitation of natural resources, not from production – labour, investment – interest, or management risk – profit. Rentier states culminate in becoming autonomous, because states with large natural resources endowment are 'more detached and less accountable thus they do not levy taxes' (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004:3). There are a number of scholars who support the rentier theories and explain the low levels of democracy or authoritarian regimes with the theories (Karl 1997; 2007; Ross 2001; Luong 2004; Alayli 2005). More details on rentier states are available in Mahdavy 1970; Garaibeh 1987; Luciani 1987; Caudhry 1994.

Another research on the causal mechanisms behind 13 recent civil war cases highlighted that more than one key mechanism seems to associate resource wealth with a subsequent outbreak of conflict; resource abundance may be a way-in or better a danger that a foreign country would use as reason to intervene on behalf of a nascent rebel movement (Ross 2004b). Ross (2008) also brings out a significant contrasting view on the correlation between mineral resources and civil wars. For him, the trap of mineral-based inequality as it is represented by armed conflict, primarily stems from the problem of mineral-based inequality and hampers investment to increase mineral resource dependence. Ross further pointed out poverty, mountainous terrains, peripheries, prior regional identities, political institutions and types of minerals in terms of their lootability as some of tractable structural factors that are supplementary issues and therefore lead to war. As for the effect of mineral abundance on vertical and horizontal disparity, Ross (2007) contended that it is difficult to specify the correlation between vertical disparity and mineral abundance owing to the dearth of data on income disparity within mineral-rich countries, although the effect of horizontal disparity on armed conflict, particularly on secessionist conflict, has been set.

Ross' findings raise the need for filling in the gap between vertical mineral wealth disparity and horizontal disparity on armed conflict. Therefore, there is a need for a micro-level analysis of conflict and violence,[39] which should look at the role played by various social forces broadly over ethnic and religious terms (Rosser 2006) and for the use of fine-grained information which goes behind the structural determinants of conflict alone. This opens a breach towards a more methodical approach to looking at a variety of other factors such as "the geographic spread of civil war, the variation in the incidence of civil war over time, and the characteristics of civil war violence" (Weinstein 2007:366). Lesson learned from this approach is that the nature and the availability of the resource endowments impact considerably on behavioural patterns showed by both individuals and movements. It is to say that armed groups that exploit natural resources with external support seem to use indiscriminate violence, while those that rely on social rather than economic endowments choose a more selective usage of violence and refer to civilians for their support. However,

[39]Justino (2007) postulates that whilst there is a new emerging body of work on micro-level analyses of rough violence, 'micro-level empirical evidence on the correlation between violent conflict and poverty has been scarce and at times contradictory', largely because of the absence of sufficient data.

would socio-economic and political disparities or discontents be a fuelling-conflict factor in a natural resource producing country? So, how are they connected to the armed conflicts? The upcoming grievance hypothesis' lines shed light on these issues.

2.3.2 Grievance Hypothesis

A set of papers from several researchers who have looked at this issue have tried to establish the correlation between civil war onset and grievance in terms of vertical disparity (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004). The most eminent pattern proxied grievance on the basis of a series of measurements, along with economic stagnation through a calculation of GDP growth before civil war, of repression through a measurement of political rights indices, of inequality through the use of the Gini coefficient and, last but not least, of ethnic tension measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index. And the outcomes of the measure of grievance produced by proxies are not enough at all to increase the risk of civil war (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). However, some scholars criticised these objective proxies of not being adequate tools (Mack 2002), while some other proxies, including the average levels of schooling for individual fighters as well as the general ratio of young men within the total population, utilised in the statistical studies to set the greed hypothesis have been claimed to be closer to grievance sources (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Cramer 2006a).

Some other authors reject any link between civil war and social disparity. Collier (2007), for instance, advises that grievance cannot be a source of civil war; neither can it lead to violence since it is a common feature shared by all societies. Collier's (2007) stance has been robustly criticised for being a long colonial tradition of 'dismissing rebellion as criminal' and illegitimate violent protest (Duffield 2001; Keen 2008). Ross (2007) however, draws away from Collier's view and contends that the lack of reliable data on income disparity undermines the assessment on the correlation between vertical disparity and mineral resource. For Ross, the lack of data on income disparity within mineral-rich countries constitutes stumbling-blocks to assess with any accuracy the linkages between vertical disparity and mineral wealth. Conversely, Luckham *et al.* (2001) are of the view that poverty and disparity bear the root of civil wars. This view is supported by Ross' (2004b; 2008) research on the disparity observed between mineral-rich and mineral-poor

areas, something that could lead to secessionist. Rosser (2006: 17) also endorses the view above by demonstrating:

> "Natural resource exploitation triggers various types of grievance such as insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities and labour migration".

These economic studies were criticised and the selection of proxies for grievance was found dubious (Keen 2008). Likewise, while some of the statistical studies strived to assess grievance by the means of objective proxies, they did not directly measure "the emotions … that may affect the propensity of people to resort to violence" (Mack 2002:522). Research on factors pushing individuals to join militia and fight (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008) reveals that issues related to the belligerents' various experiences and emotions may constitute a crucial source of violence through the critical impact they have on them, as they develop a "sense of having been *humiliated* " (Keen 2008:50). The concept of 'having been humiliated' spells the "important dynamics which deepens violence during civil war and the patterns of violence that emerge in the aftermath of a war" (ibid: 69).

Having authored the greed hypothesis, economists have criticised and rejected the grievance hypothesis for being politicised and lacking systematic analysis (Collier 2007). Nevertheless, the grievance hypothesis is still supported by a long-standing body of knowledge in political science, and its active role derived from relative deprivation fuels internal conflicts, whereby identity contributes to help group formulation to assume collective action (Cater 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). While Cater (2003) links the civil war to state failure owing to failing legitimacy and weak capacity of governments or a weakening of social contract[40] (Addison and Murshed 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007), grievance literature however is largely influenced by Stewart's (2000; 2003) concept

[40] Addison and Murshed (2006:137) define a social contract as "the set of rules, formal and informal that guide the behaviour of citizens, entrepreneurs and governments and allow conflict to be expressed and resolved peacefully rather than violently, and is not purely internal affairs, but can have strong international dimensions, both in cause and effect". In this argument, greed or grievance is limited to initiate such large-scale violence but a failure of social contract; which is "similar to the weak or fragile state capacity and by implication poor institutional quality" should be considered (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007:25).

of horizontal disparity developed during the last decade[41] (Cater 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007).

As stated by Stewart (2003:3), horizontal disparity means: "the existence of severe inequalities between culturally defined groups, which includes multidimensional effects; political, economic and social". By contrast, vertical inequality "lines individuals or households up vertically and measures inequality over the range of individuals", he said (ibid.). Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007) support this view and advise that despite rather scarce data, horizontal disparity is linked to the civil war onset in a cross-section of countries. However, these contrasting views impel to understand a couple of theoretical views on grievance with regard to concerns over 'deprivation' and 'polarisation' (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). In Murshed and Tadjoeddin's (ibid: 16-17) words:

> "Relative deprivation's view deals with perceptions based on "the disparity between aspirations and achievements suggested to constitute the micro-foundation for conflict, while polarisation emerges when two groups exhibit great inter-group heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity, overlapping with the concept of horizontal inequality".

So, what would motivate an armed movement to fight? The following section will look at this issue.

Following the above literature concerning resource curse, it might be postulated that the paradox of plenty is a conflict mineral based analysis, established to explain root-causes of new war economy. Bearing in mind that one of the key things that the research has set is to look at the bond between artisanal mining and combatants' (re-) recruitment and reintegration, after various approaches and following extensive analysis of current civil wars, it might be identified that policies based on adverse effects of resources are complex and weak to accurately address issues of mineral resource conflict-related. Even if they are important in showing why armed conflicts erupt over mineral resources, however, they did

[41] From an approach developed at the United Nations University WIDER, Helsinki, civil war outbreak correlates to horizontal disparity and a breakdown of social contract (Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006).

not live up to elaborate on how the process of civil war-mineral resources' link comes to taking place, and the gap is still in the literature. Therefore, there is still a lack of a clear and elaborated explanation on how greed and grievance link to conflict over mineral resources. This gap further suggests that the absurdity of abundance theory has narrowly focused on the grievance aspect while strongly relied on greed's, thereby overlooking to elaborate on how both aspects are interconnected to an armed conflict. Further to this and in the same perspective of thinking, it bears stressing that although horizontal disparity has been pointed out as main conflict-fuelling factor, vertical's, however, seems to catch less attention. Conversely, a very few studies have rooted their analysis over the motivation of rebels, and the literature on civil war-mineral resources has strayed from other factors such as colonial history and social, economic and politic aspect in which an armed conflict explodes.

2.4 Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflicts: War Economy

The analysis of the adverse effects of natural resource abundance in the previous sections brought into light one basic dichotomy based on greed and grievance, and founded the importance of these two hypotheses in the debate on armed conflict occurrence and its origins and causes. There is a claim that both hypotheses carry analytical weaknesses and are subject to much criticism. Again, their explanation about the motivation for war was oversimplified and has been widely contested (Cater 2003). In the same way, Cramer (2006a:166) clearly points out the problem of using grouping in scientific analysis and contends: "most classification systems impose artificial discontinuities onto a reality that is more of a continuum". The coding rules of civil wars, as detailed previously, epitomises this. Besides, most economic analysis pretends "to assume selfish behaviour" to be rational without examining what selfishness entails (Keen 2008:30). Concomitantly Keen (2008) believes that social issues and external factors were neglected.

Keen's (1998; 2000; 2008) studies recommend to start from such an oversimplified dichotomy on the role of greed and grievance in order to observe how they both work alongside or interact, and to understand how and why a civil war happens and how and why

it protracts. The economic purpose of violence[42] being fundamental in sustaining wars, as there is "more to war than winning", its "grievance in contemporary conflicts is a continually important factor" (Keen 2000:26). Therefore, grievance and political objectives of civil war, contends Keen (2008), cannot be cleaned out even after they are transformed or compromised to an extent as a war proceeds. Hence, clarifying both the meanings of war support and war causes becomes crucial. Cramer (2006b:195) draws the line between both meanings and argues: "[t]he means of paying for war should not be conflated with the causes of war as 'where there's a will there's a way". Capra (1997) also recommends considering the relationship between the roles that individual parts play as a whole and as systems thinking.

A set of papers on war economies and various debates over resource curse (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2004; Studdard 2004) have revealed that the flawed and insular greed and grievance hypotheses have also influenced a number of other findings made influence beyond greed and grievance, leading to the emphasis on the economic agendas or economic functions in civil war, or on war economies, generally viewed as new systems emerging from the process of civil war and that often persist even after formal settlements of conflict, and have a huge impact on post-conflict societies.

Conventional war economies, according to Kaldor (2007:95), are "a system which is centralised, totalising and autarchic' with '[t]he main aim of the war effort' being 'to maximise the use of force so as to engage and overcome the enemy in battle". Contrary to Kaldor's (2007) definition, Duffield (2000) and Kaldor (2007) define new war economies as a globalised system which tends to rely deeply on local assets control and external support rather than domestic production. From an eclectic view, war economy should include all economic activities happening during a violent conflict (Keen 2008). These profits can originate from different sources including looting, embezzlement, protection of money and ransoms as well as from attempts at controlling trade, exploiting labour market and gaining access to land or appropriating aid. From this perspective, it is acknowledged

[42]According to Keen (2000; 2008), Violence has three immediate functions: economic, security and psychology.

that the eclectic view has obscured the meaning of war economies, since wages, bribery and corrupt benefits happening to military personnel, as well as remittances received from allied Diaspora communities render new war economies a crucial feature to be understood (Duffield 2000; Keen 2000; 2008). New war economies are adaptive networked structures linked to global markets (Duffield 2000) and, as such, could switch over time (Duffield 2000; Cater 2003); they exercise violence that produces "different functions at different points throughout the duration of the conflict" said Cater (2003:28), thereby obscuring all analysis of these processes through the use of static models (Keen 1998).

New wars have emerged after the Cold War and they are characterised by an accelerating globalisation (Keen 2008), given the fact that the post-Cold War ended external support and sponsorships provided to armed groups. Warriors were compelled to seek their own financial resourcing (Dietrich 2000; Cramer 2006b) and they have set it through wider economic networks provided by globalisation (Duffield 2000). Duffield (2000) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) contend that market liberalisation in the globalised world has paved the way for all forms of trans-border activity, including informal and illicit activities; which is part of most of these war economies, with the realisation of local assets and of all forms of basic supplies relying on external markets. Consequently, war economies have become one of the international trade pillars, so well incorporated into the existing social networks, to an extent that their relationship and structures interact with those of more conventional global economies and of peace economies within the region concerned. However, are new wars or war economies different from 'old wars' – Cold-war's conflicts? To this question, Beswick and Jackson (2011:25) argue:

> "Old wars drew closely from the process of European state-building from the seventieth to the twentieth century, while new wars are seen as state-destruction, coined [by Jackson 2012] as 'state-unbuilding' or 'state-breaking'".

Based on a Programme on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars – EACW,[43] run between 2000 and 2004, Ballentine (2004:1) reports that motivations for civil war in resource-wealth

[43] The programme was chaired at the then International Peace Academy and is now based at the International Peace Institute. For more details, see www.ipinst.org/topic/1/14.html.

countries tend to include to varying degrees a combination of greed and grievance rather than any single set of causes.[44] The same study however dismissed the notion of resource wars and asserted that economic views are not associated with the primary cause behind most armed conflicts, even if it is not an easy task in research to draw the line between economic reasons and other factors. Possible understanding of this mainly includes methodological difficulties faced within the studies themselves, but also the nature of the subject itself, due to the "fluid nature of conflict dynamics over time" (Ballentine 2004:4). However, it might be suggested that a well-connected economic motivation with a range of other factors (Ross 2008), spanning from "socioeconomic and political grievances, on the one hand, interethnic disputes and security dilemmas on the other" (Ballentine 2003:260) seems to enable war outbreak. In practice however, it is worth noting that accessing and controlling economic wealth would constitute a source of an opportunity structure which financially sustains warfare and enables the lengthening, intensity and character of conflict (Le Billon 2004). It is, therefore, likely that economic aspects are "consequential to the character and protraction of civil war and complicate efforts at conflict resolution" (Ballentine 2004:4).

The role of resources on the dynamics of civil war has also been clearly shown by the study. Overall, it might be presumed that more lootable resources are likely to be linked to rebellions, most they contribute to encouraging violence and profit wider actors, thereby increasing the number of peace spoilers and the risk of secondary conflicts over wealth (Ballentine 2003; 2004; Kaldor 2007). However, they do not greatly alter the political objectives of the combatants, notwithstanding the fact that accessing and controlling lucrative lootable resources tend to culminate in resource predation and the concomitant risk of continuing more systematic forms of criminality (Ballentine 2003; Keen 2008; Ross 2008). Conversely, non-lootable resources are associated with conflicts of the separatist kind (Ballentine 2003). The EACW has also further underlined the bond between relying on primary commodity exports and the incidence of civil war. As most civil wars have their ground of predilection in developing countries, it follows from the study above that there is a number of variables that are conducive for prompting civil wars, including weak

[44] Balletine and Sherman (2003) The political Economy of Armed Conflict: beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

governance, military, economic and political weakness in states, corruption, prevalent informal and shadow economies, undeveloped manufacturing sectors, the nature of existing social and kinship bonds and the existence of regional allies (Ballentine 2003).

Concomitantly, the EACW's research has also suggested the location of war economies within the internal opportunity structure as aforementioned, as well as within the broader political economy, which also counts for "insufficient global regulation of commodity and fiscal markets" in liberalised international trade and commerce (Ballentine 2004:3). Following previous discussion on new geography of conflicts, it might be noted that due to war economies being overlapped by regional and global networks, drawing the line between intra-state and internal or civil war becomes challenging (King 1997; Alley 2004; Ballentine 2004; Salehyan 2008). It goes the same that war economies are also associated with numerous actors, including various war profiteers and peace spoilers, who contribute to transforming strife into protracted conflicts by multiplying the points of conflict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003). Therefore, a few regional economic dimensions have several linkages with negative externalities and interventions by neighbouring states (Salehyan 2008).

At this point, the development of conflict within regional settings becomes very crucial as it involves the availability of sanctuaries for the use of rebels, a view acknowledged by Salehyan (2008).[45] The state-centric theories have explained how the existence of internal opportunity structures induces civil war and war economies and how they extend. It emerged from these theories that internal opportunity structures are largely influenced by the effect of weak governance and state weakness (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 2004) or state failure, defined as "a declining state capacity or desire to provide public goods and an increasing erosion of legitimacy" (Cater 2003:41). A systematic dilapidation of state's economic resources enables patronage networks and ends up creating 'shadow state' (Reno 1998; 2000; Ballentine 2004), whereby rulers bound "potential rivals to them, in exchange for largesse, without the need for creating strong bureaucracies that they feared would heighten independent tendencies among elites" (Reno 1998:2), a much

[45] See the section on post-Cold War conflicts.

feared ramification. However, the end of financial supports after the Cold War and the dawn of liberalisation reform have curtailed the amount of resources available to rulers, something which gave rise to a new theory of fragmentation of shadow states and the emergence of warlords, clearly known as a favourable opportunity structure to the rising of armed conflict.

On the other hand, being presented as a reliable and strong approach by most scholars, the great emphasis laid on natural resource wealth within a given state at the expense of a more thorough examination of the effects left by both globalisation and market liberalisation has revealed the weak side of the state-centric approaches (Reno 1998; Keen 2000; Duffield 2000; Cater 2003), also known as 'the erosion of authority or retreat of the state' theory (Strange 1996). The state-centric approaches have provided some limitations in the systematic analysis of the role and effects of foreign states in a civil war (Reno 1998; Keen 2000; 2008; Duffield 2000).

2.5 Conclusions

This chapter investigated the literature on three key points that are relevant to the research subject, namely new geography of conflicts, the absurdity of abundance and war economy. The new geography of conflicts that shaped the post-Cold War period portrays different characteristics in terms of environment, scale, actors, methods of civil wars and finance. The end of superpowers' support following the halt of the Cold War as well as the rising of globalisation and market deregulation have weakened the state's monopoly of organised violence, dismissed the autonomy of state, and extended the regional and global networks that enhanced self-financing of the conflicts.

Amongst various perspectives on the contemporary conflicts, the adverse effects of resource abundance thesis has been highly influential in the analysis of resource-related conflicts despite being criticised for a number of analytical limitations including coding issues, an overly reductionist approach, cross-country analysis without micro- and regional-level analysis, and a lack of causal explanation. The greed hypothesis explains that economic motivations and opportunity created by abundance of natural resources – valuable, lootable, diffuse and distant resources in particular, and weak governance trigger

and uphold armed conflict, while dismissing grievance as the motivation of armed conflict. A more recent set of papers on the economic agendas of war economy explain the nature of the contemporary war economy as adaptive networked structures connected to the global market. The contemporary war economy is hence decentralised, situated in the internal opportunity structure and broader political economy, and well integrated into the existing economies. However, the resource curse theory showed its limitations when it came to clearly elaborating the process through which natural resources are directly or indirectly linked to armed conflicts. Neither did it demonstrate whether greed and grievance hypothesises could link each other and trigger violence. Therefore, the analysis over resource-related conflict has eluded to clearly explain motivations that entice combatants to fighting; neither did it hint at how rebel groups and combatants become involved in the exploitation of minerals and in war economy.

Having a controversial meaning, combatants play a central role in the composition of the armed forces though, even if their components seem to respond to different functions. However, it has been proved that in war-affected countries, the end of conflict releases a large number of returnees; most of them being unable to afford their livelihood. Accordingly, the resumption of armed conflict in a particular area seems to be the result of the paucity of an accurate understanding of ex-combatants' enlistment and the context in which the conflict came to erupt, which finally tends to culminate in the failure of the DDR of fighters. Conversely, failure to piece combatants' recruitment and the DDR programmes together, in order to tackle ex-combatants' social concerns, generally turns into jeopardising post-conflict security, at worst a continuation of armed groups. Therefore, the upcoming chapter brings into light how combatants' recruitment and management provide a unique benchmark of responding to the effectiveness of DDR in action.

Chapter Three: From Recruitment to Re-recruitment of Combatants: The Failure of Reintegration Process?

(Beswick and Jackson 2011:122).

3.1 Introduction

A clearer understanding of the dynamics of the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants is necessary for sustainable peacebuilding interventions and post-conflict reconstruction programmes. Reintegration, security sector reform and peacebuilding programmes need to refer back to recruitment and specifically to the structural conditions that feed individuals into recruitment pools. The (re-) recruitment of combatants, considered as products to be plundered along with natural resources and public funds, are an integral part of the conflict entrepreneurs.

The dynamics of combatants' enlistment and their participation in armed conflicts falls under the micro-level empirical approach to civil war (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; 2006; 2007). By responding to the second research objective, this chapter examines the factors that are believed to be the root-causes – push and pull factors, of recruitment, reintegration and the re-recruitment cycle of combatants. It considers this phenomenon as consequential to a compendium of mixed motivations, such as environment, structural violence, coercion, poverty, education and employment, family and friends, politics and ideology, culture and tradition (Kalyvas and Arjona 2007). These reasons, also known as 'push and pull' factors associated with the failure of reintegration enable the re-recruitment cycle, and need to be looked into both at the macro and micro level in order to ensure that the process of post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform follows the best possible course (Taylor, *et al*. 2006; Özerdem and Podder 2011). The chapter then suggests some paths towards a successful reintegration programme in its concluding part.

3.2 Resource-Conflict Nexus through Armed Groups Dynamic

The political economy approach to the 'greed' and 'grievance' debate (Collier 2000a; Collier 2000b; Collier and Hoeffler 2002) posits that the exportation of natural resources as

primary commodities entices the creation of armed organisations and, as a corollary, violent behaviour. In this context, it is assumed that mineral resources are also easily captured and that resources are often referred to as a 'honey pot' that provides incentives for profit-seeking groups to engage in violent actions (De Soysa 2000; Collier 2000b).

However, all resources do not result in the same conflict effect; lootable resources, for example, are thought to impact more on the behaviour of armed groups than non-lootable or obstructable resources do. It is important to segregate lootable resources – such as diamond, drug, timber etc. from 'obstructable' resources – oil and non-fuel minerals (Ross 2003). Collier (2000b) is of the view that the carriage of non-lootable resources might be easily prevented, while lootable resources could be captured and handled without problems. Collier's view simply implies that the exports of primary commodities are less complex and delicate. These commodities do not require complicated networks of information and transactions, as with non-lootable resources. Additionally, for an organised armed group or military force, it is easier to capture and tax lootable resources, by tracing closely these trade routes and market networks.

There is a spectacular proliferation and increasing trade of commodities like drugs, gemstones, agricultural products and timber by military organisations in most unstable resource-rich regions, such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. From this perspective, the likelihood of war is unavoidable. Collier (2002), for instance, claims that in capturing these lootable goods, fighters often socialise in a destructive way whereby violence and atrocity are committed against their own communities. Collier's (2002) view corroborates with the reality according to which trading these lootable goods turn into a source of conflict and predatory behaviour (Collier 2000b). Although trading in looted goods perpetuates and sustains military organisations, it is also believed to be one of the root-causes of broader socially destructive processes, having negative impacts on the wider population (Collier 2000a). Extant literature's view of civil wars in Africa is not significantly different. For example, the 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone revealed that the control of diamond-mining sectors as well as the diamond trade by both government and rebel forces determined strategies in the conflict (McCue and Haahr 2008; Keen 2005; Reno 2009).

As a starting point, the nature of the resources is not sufficient enough in explaining violence. The nexus between mining and violence might also be expounded by analysing the armed organisations and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants. In this context, it has been believed that steady accessibility of resources impacts negatively on the behaviour of combatants and rebel movements (Weinstein 2007; Reno 2009). Weinstein and Reno's stance draws the line between 'opportunistic' and 'activist' combatants and rebellions. Opportunistic combatants and rebellions arise from resource-rich environs, generally with support of external patrons, as is the case in the Kivus in the DRC, where conflict's entrepreneurs or patrons take advantage. These patrons hold all the profits and are prone to committing any violence against the local population. In contrast, activist rebellions occur in resource-poor environments where combatants' abuses are likely to be lesser while also violence is selectively and strategically used (Yusuf 2008). Chapter Four explains how both contexts occurred in the DRC and vice versa. It could be deduced from this view that the accessibility of resources would end up as 'absurdity of abundance', whereby the armed group is submerged with opportunistic actors and combatants, having harmful results for the affected population.

Weinstein's (2007) view on the recruitment of combatants points out that resource-rich rebel organisations recruit combatants by offering short-term rewards or payoffs as motivation. Conversely, resource-constrained rebel organisations recruit combatants based on promises about the selective benefits that combatants would obtain in the future. From Weinstein's view, one can infer that due to the presence of economic endowments or benefits, rebel groups attract and recruit opportunistic individuals or combatants who have a particularly temporary perception and whose main interest is their own enrichment. This is the starting point of mistrust between armed groups and community members. These opportunistic armed groups become detrimental to local communities and civilian populations, as combatants reconfigure the rebellion into destructive, violent and state-destroying rebel organizations (Weinstein 2007).

Weinstein attempts to elucidate how the recruitment of combatant and how their personal actions have a strong and direct link with the character of an armed group as a whole. So, the combatants' recruitment and the rest of their military life or civilian status – if they come to revert back home, rely on their individual incentives. In the same context, Keen

(2000) describes how violence in this situation could result from 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' activities. In a top-down approach, violence could be triggered by political leaders and entrepreneurs for both political and economic motives; while from a bottom-up fashion, it is seen as the result of those bottom-up ingenuities that combine military and civilian factors to use violence as a solution to their problems (Özerdem and Podder 2011). These might be both psychological and economic – whereby case violence turns into violent private accumulation (Özerdem and Podder 2012), with the latter potentially being a particularly striking incentive for joining a particular rebel group.

Based on their research carried out along the Congolese-Ugandan border between 2004 and 2009, Titeca and De Herdt (2010) establish the relationship between artisanal mining and the behaviour of armed groups. Their research concurs with Weinstein's (2007) view that armed movements operating in resource-rich areas – a 'honey pot', are opportunistic due to their easy access to resources and external support, and the use of violence against the population. However, as for the use of violence, it is not significantly the same as their views do not corroborate. The case of the *Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais* [the Armed Forces of the Congolese People; FAPC], for example, has shown a fairly different attitude towards the population. Weinstein's opinion diverges from Titeca's due to the fact the FAPC rebel group decided to cooperate with the local trading community and it engaged in disciplined behaviour within its centres of control (Titeca 2009; Titeca and De Herdt 2010). This behaviour is different from that of opportunistic armed groups, whose violent activities are expected in the area endowed with natural resources.

Increasingly, there have been efforts at disbanding ex-combatants after the period following an armed conflict. This process, also known as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), aims to demobilise, disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life to generate a new social hope. However, owing to military knowhow that they acquire in armed movements and the security sector, the ex-combatants still have skills which pave the way for further re-recruitment and make them important recruits for rebel groups. There is a need for DDR policy to tackle this weakness, if regional insecurity and the interconnectedness of modern conflicts are to be addressed (Özerdem and Podder 2011). The phenomenon of the combatant's re-recruitment cycle is well-documented in the Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa regions, and may hold true for the region of West

Africa – Mali and Niger, and African Great Lakes, particularly in the Kivus, the eastern DRC's mining-rich zones in its current protracted civil unrest.

The current greediness of states in response to the new geopolitics of the scarcity of strategic natural or mineral resources has unleashed a new mode of war economies, which have significant repercussions for DDR practice. There is no moral or ethics in the competition over resources, but interests' survival. In war economies, said a former Congolese diplomat:

> "The fundamental discourse is summarised through the following statement; economics matters more than society and ethics, even if armed groups are accused of brutalising communities".[46]

For this respondent, the prime objective of war economies is to demolish and reconfigure the existing structures of a state, a view which concurs with Beswick and Jackson's (2011:26) for whom new wars are "a threat to modernity and to the existence of the state itself". As mentioned earlier, this chapter attempts to understand a conceptual scoping of the nexus between artisanal mining and recruitment-reintegration and re-recruitment of (ex)-combatants in a war-torn territory. In this regard, the chapter provides that current DDR approaches are oblivious to the bond between reintegration results and re-recruitment into rebel groups or national military forces.

There have been some positive strides towards disbanding rebel groups and breaking their chains of command in most African, Asian and Latin American post-conflict countries, while regional security architecture still remains complex and volatile (Özerdem and Podder 2012). However, considered to pay mere lip service to the overwhelming challenge of security (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; 2007; Kalyvas and Arjona 2007), DDR is often taken as a set of good intentions rather than actions. The programme is impeded by several issues among others; the porosity of borders and the dearth of a reliable security system (Özerdem and Podder 2012) as well as the presence of certain mineral resources in

[46]Interview conducted with a Congolese former diplomat, Brussels, November 2013.

zones where war has raged for decades. The following section looks at some motivations that may prompt combatants' recruitments, reintegration and re-recruitment.

3.3 Skimming the Root-Causes of Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-recruitment

Becoming a combatant can be full of symbolic meaning, something which is often controversial. What motivates individuals to enlist for military service depends on both environmental circumstance and personal objectives. Individuals could join armed groups as volunteers to retaliate against some grievance they believe to have been a victim of in their community. They may also avenge on some grievance on the basis of someone whom they believe to have a family connection with. Likewise they might decide to join armed groups in order to secure their community against injustice, exclusion and any other kind of social inequality. Accordingly, individuals could also become combatants just because they want to support and feed their families, while some others unfortunately become so by force or coercion.

As their family's breadwinners and community's protectors, to some extent, combatants possess the symbolic power of the gun which legitimises them to use violence and to despise authority and the respect that have been built over the generations into the youth to perpetuate a gerontocratic hierarchy (Özerdem and Podder 2012). However, this social reconfiguration is very sweeping and easily challengeable to stand for a reason behind combatant's re/recruitment, especially in the case of a resource-based conflict or war economy (Verhey 2005; Knight 2008). In recent years, little academic and policy attention has been at the centre of long-drawn-out armed conflicts, and less attention has been paid on the potent relationship of the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants in a resource-based conflict country. This might be because of the changing economic interests in resource-based conflict zones due to a steady flow of mining interests (Mckay 2012).

3.3.1 Combatants' Recruitment

While a number of researches have looked at resource-conflict, very little systematic cross-national data on combatants have been collected. These data sets lightly show combatants'

status in armed groups. Combatants are members of the armed forces taking directly or indirectly part to the conflict (Gates and Nordås 2010). The concept "taking a direct part in hostilities" definitely encompasses attacking enemy combatants or military objectives. It may extend to some support activities but the clear-cut understanding of the concept remains controversial. An armed force consists of all organised armed forces, groups and units that are under a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates to a party to the conflict (Knight and Özerdem 2004; Gates 2011; Özerdem and Podder 2011). Each armed organisation is subject to an inner disciplinary system which enforces compliance with the law of armed conflict (Gates and Nordås 2010), and whose members, at least when deployed on military operations, wear uniform or combat gear which distinguishes them from the civilian population (Beber and Blattman 2010).

The composition of the armed forces is a matter for the State or faction concerned. Its components may be regular units, reservists, territorial defence units, citizens called up for part-time service or full-time soldiers as long as the conditions set out above are fulfilled (Achvarina and Reich 2006). Combatants have ranks in an armed organisation. The more senior ranks have power to give orders and exercise discipline over their subordinates. Violation of the law of armed conflict is dealt with the criterion of an internal disciplinary system, called punishment or penalty. In unusual circumstances where it is impossible to wear uniform or combat gear all the time, such as when operating in areas under adverse occupation, behind enemy lines or, in liberation conflicts, in areas controlled by government forces, combatants must, at the very least, carry their arms openly during military engagements or when visible to the enemy in military deployments preceding the launch of any attack (ibid.). When they surrender or are captured, combatants are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, though this could mean their internment until the close of active hostilities (Achvarina and Reich 2006).

The recruitment of combatants has become a key subject in discourse on armed conflict and is well documented in recent literature on resource-based conflicts (Mandel 2009; Sageman 2010). The recruitment phenomenon is a psycho-socio-political process which leads to violence or military action. Therefore, there is a need for understanding the root-causes leading to combatant's recruitment and re-recruitment by looking at the micro – individual and macro – societal/cultural, specific context (Veldhuis *et al*. 2009). Recruitment and re-

recruitment concepts sound conflated. The word 'recruitment' refers to the process through which an individual becomes a member of an armed group – combatant, be it voluntarily or forcibly. The recruitment root-causes or push-and-pull factors result from political, social or economic contexts with deep-seated thought that lead to militancy or military actions (Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012).

There is a significant set of papers on the recruitment of combatants; however the case of child soldiers serving rebel groups as an act of agency and volition has been neglected. Nonetheless, in some war-torn zones, serving either the rebel organisation or the government forces is the only possibility to survive, to escape torture, abuse and other politically instigated assassinations (Özerdem and Podder 2011). In some circumstances, community or family plays a significant role in encouraging its members to join military service as a cultural or social duty. In this context, as Özerdem and Podder (2012) highlight it, joining military activities is perceived as part of communal defence, and young people who fight for their community comply with their social and cultural duty, which in turn is an essential and natural part of their transition into adulthood. But the extent to which the latter is true for an abduction or forced recruitment remains questionable.

In some military strongholds over dominated by roaming and raiding soldiers, joining an armed faction might also help unify a disintegrated family (Blattman 2008). When I interviewed one of the Kivus' notables in Kinshasa, it was revealed that in some war-torn villages, such as in the Kivus in the DRC, carrying a weapon or wearing a military uniform in some circumstances has assisted in locating and rescuing family members, defending ethnic group and assuring access to the land and resources.[47] Therefore monitoring violence deployment is a fruitful asset in armed organisation for it is a means to having access to public resources and services when official facilities are on hold (Özerdem and Podder 2012), and to confirming one's citizenship therefore access to land as is the case in the Kivus.[48] Dealing with adolescent recruitment through the lens of a community approach brings about triggers. It is important to shed light on the fact that these factors are

[47] Interview conducted with a member of the Kivus' notability, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[48] Telephone interview conducted with a *Mwami* [*Mwami* is a Swahili term to name customary chief in the Kivus], Bukavu, August 2013.

crystallised around the nature of conflicts. Hence, in order to escape recruitment's phenomenon, adolescents need to learn the resilience and coping mechanisms while they have the development capacity (Maclay and Özerdem 2010).

Family and community have a determining role, to some extent, in the involvement of youth with armed groups. Recruitment into armed group may be voluntary or forced. However, some debate exists among contemporary scholars (Sageman 2004; Roy 2008; 2010; Blattman 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010) about the nature and extent of combatant's recruitment. Voluntary recruitment could be facilitated by a family member or a relative. Mediation or agency is the key mode of participation for combatants in communities with a Muslim back ground (Roy 2008; 2010). Looking at the traditional recruitment patterns, such as conscription or dedicated military service, there is no clear cut as to the organisational norms. For instance, Islamist militants explore new supporters, activists and members that they employ in active efforts; this pattern influences others to adopt their point of view (Sageman 2004).

Being involved with an armed group can be the result of being exposed to conflict, and lacking a strong family or community. The occurrence of this case often arises when combatants are directly or indirectly victims of violence, or they have witnessed the killing of family members in a lengthened war. All these greed and grievance amalgamated could trigger and fuel the likelihood on behalf of youth to join a military organisation. Chronic poverty and social marginality could lead individuals to militancy actions and culminates in getting involved in violence. In certain resource-rich countries where people live in chronic poverty and social marginality, recruiters could use ideology to entice young people by capitalising on perceptions and experiences of injustice (Crossett and Spitaletta 2010; Mazer and Lambert 2010); as is the case in armed conflicts occurring in the region of Africa of Great Lakes, particularly in the Kivus.

In fighting zones where the main characteristic of conflict is looting, greed and clientelism, the recruitment of combatants is directly and indirectly linked to benefits deriving from participating in an armed group. Many of the literature on the recruitment of combatants are both conceptual and empirical (Mazer and Lambert 2010). It bears stressing that the recruitment process per se is still a debatable issue and its pathways and mechanisms have a

different mode of operation. Further understanding of how armed groups interconnect and how the recruitment process works both around and within groups, would pave the way for developing sustainable and informed policies and practices that could curtail the spread of armed conflict. Several prominent theoretical and analytical frameworks drawn from social-movement theory, social psychology and conversion theory among others have been proposed to understand the recruitment process. These theories attempt to explain the root-causes leading to the recruitment into armed groups (Crossett and Spitaletta 2010), and operate at both the macro and micro levels (Özerdem and Podder 2012). From this point of view, it might be postulated that there is no voluntary enlistment. It seems to be that the difference between voluntary and forced recruitment is a meaningless discourse. In fact, although some individuals – adults, are recruited on a voluntary basis, it is a desperate attempt to survive which underlies the so-called voluntary recruitment. Ultimately it is up to the adult commanders to decide whether they would recruit children, and therefore they are liable to be held accountable for their acts. However, be it voluntary or forcible, recruitment would impact on the reintegration outcomes for former combatants if root-causes are not addressed.

3.3.2 Pull-and-Push Factors for Child Soldiering

Two types of individuals interest war entrepreneurs; individual children and adults. Rebel movements consider children as an economically efficient alternative to adult combatants (Özerdem and Podder 2011), while some studies on child soldiering have indicated that child recruitment is a straightforward process as children are easily brainwashed (Özerdem and Podder 2012). Children are also believed to be efficient combatants for they are assumed to be ignorant of the concept of death (Roos *et al*. 2011). However, both adults and children may forcibly or voluntarily become members of armed group. Forced recruitment occurs when an individual is compelled or abducted or even beaten into submitting to authority. Since the 1990s, this was well-known as the child soldiering archetype (Özerdem and Podder 2011; Roos *et al*. 2011). Nevertheless, abduction and coercion are not the sole methods that many armed groups use to compel combatants to join their movements. We can find other push and pull factors that result in individuals becoming engaged with armed movement.

There is a need for more in depth research, in order not to only respond to the phenomenon of recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle, but also for understanding the gaps and root-causes underlying incentives of combatants to join armed groups. It is claimed that poverty is an important conflict-fuelling factor, which motivates combatants to join armed forces and groups. Joining armed groups for some youngsters can be a way towards ensuring that they are fed and housed. Yet, discrimination also does not have anything short in motivating conflict. This attitude leads to marginalisation and engenders grievance.

The notion of discrimination associated with ethnic and religious identity is a potent conflict-motivating factor, which might mobilise whole communities and ignite conflict. This is the case in the Kivus with the Banyarwanda communities.[49] Watching the killing, humiliation of their parents and observing their sisters being raped might be a motivating-factor for youngsters to join armed groups in retaliation. Many other individuals become fighters to defend their communities against perceived injustices. The feeling of being aggrieved together with the religious or traditional belief can bring up the idea of martyrdom and heroic death, which often attracts boys and girls in Muslim community's background (Roy 2009; 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Rebel leaders, on their side, have some recruitment methods, based on incentives, rewards, money and ideology to name a few, which they use to entice individuals to join the movement. However, from a micro-economic view, material recruitment incentives that rebel leaders give or intend to offer to combatants are very weak as motivating factors (Brett *et al*. 2004; Rosen 2005). By way of comparison between youth and adult combatants, it might be put forward that young combatants request fewer incentives than adults. While adult combatants are concerned about their involvement in armed groups and the rewards of their engagement, child soldiers, however, do not care for getting a big share of the looted goods as they depend on senior officials for protection, patronage and support (Gates and Andvig 2006; Roos *et al*. 2011). Youngsters who belong to armed groups quickly and easily build their affiliation attachment with the movement. In return, the movement leadership flows essentially from the fact that the group brings the hope of protection feelings, security and non-pecuniary rewards. Contrary to the experience of child soldiers, adult combatants are concerned about

[49] See chapter 4 for more details on the Benyarwanda ethnic conflict in the Kivus.

issues related to honour and responsibility, vengeance and a sense of purpose (Brett *et al*. 2004; Honwana 2006; Olson 2008). This confirms the view that rebel groups with scarce or limited means forcibly enlist young adolescents or children, as they provide the ideal combination of efficient and ease retention (Blattman 2007; Roos *et al*. 2011).

Against the backdrop of what is believed to be the underlying variables of the recruitment of the combatant lies the understanding of the degree and scope of the nature of conflicts (high or low intensity, cross-border or internal), the enlistment patterns (voluntary or forced enlistment, family or community encouragement, abduction) and motivations(food seeking, security, job or seeking vengeance). It also gives meaning to individual experiences – being engaged in fighting activities, sexual slavery, having been valorised, or being shaped by experiences featuring abuse (Verhey 2005; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). Adolescents working for armed forces are also considered as a new pool of military labour. Therefore, their engagement to military service has thrown up concerns within the domain of labour economics as to how child abduction impacts on the labour market (Blattman 2007; Roos *et al*. 2011; Özerdem and Podder 2012). To what extent armed conflict zones attract recruits by drawing the line between direct experiences of military involvement and the over-arching risks needs to be looked at more closely. This combination of discrete risks encompasses attack and dislocation, and protracted risks, such as poverty and dearth of access to regular schooling and health care (Alastair *et al*. 2005). Kostelny (2006) suggests a risk accumulation model as a path towards mitigating these impacts linked to challenges facing combatants, particularly children in conflict and post-conflict situations. The paradigm comprises conflict's side-effects – emotional, social, spiritual and physical, that affect combatants. It also links to the levels of both risk and the side-effects of conflict at three noteworthy points, including the family, community and society.

From the family's side, combatants watch the killing of their siblings; they are sequestrated and isolated from family units. There are also issues related to the paucity of security on account of the exigencies of war-torn societies. From the community's side, forced recruitment – abduction and coercive, in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Uganda, among other cases, has illustrated the extent to which abducted combatants have been compelled to attack and terrify their fellow citizens; perpetuating atrocities against their own relatives and kin, disturbing social peace, breeding mistrust (Özerdem and Podder

2011; 2012), and in doing so, creating vast stumbling-blocks for them to reintegrate the community. From the societal side, lobbying through agency factors is crucial. The civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, among other cases, resulted partially from aggrieved and marginalised youth, patrimonialism and the plutocracy – power domination in the hands of a few important men. Social disparity, discrimination or inequality and lack of social flexibility stemmed from this exclusionism brought out dissension (Maclay and Özerdem 2010), which often has impacts on post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding process.

3.4 DDR as Peacebuilding Process

It can be argued that Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR, programmes are the main backbone for post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The United Nations – UN, has been at the forefront of DDR programmes across the World and draws the line between different components of the DDR as follows (UN 2006a:8):

> "Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons used by combatants and often also the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose – cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks. The second stage of demobilisation involves insertion, which is the support package provided to the demobilised. Reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance".

DDR happens in different post-conflict environments and its outcome is often different from a post-conflict society to another, owing to context-specific factors that contributed to

the eruption of the conflict. Generally there are two kinds of DDR; those that occur after a significant military success and whose focus is on demilitarisation, and those happening in war to peace transitions (Colletta *et al*. 1996a; Hazen 2010). The former arrangement emerges from a context where a conflict ended in a military win and focuses on demilitarisation, encompassing decreasing the number of military personnel as well as military expenses, and eradicating the belligerence culture, as was the case in Angola and Nigeria. The latter practice of DDR however occurs in an environment of hostility where there is no winner. In this context, DDR pans out as a negotiated and agreed plan, often clearly set in the documents of a negotiated peace process, as was the case in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC.

DDR stems from a political negotiation of peace process and is generally reflected in an agreement (Muggah 2010; Willemijn Verkoren *et al*. 2010). This implies that DDR is not only politically complex processes, though being a component of the agreement (Ball and Van de Goor 2006), but also runs the risk of being politicised during the implementation of the agreement (Pouligny 2004). In such a context, there is a high risk that policy makers would employ DDR either as a way to bargain peace agreement or as a yardstick to map out and gauge the implementation and achievement of the peace agreement, rather than regarding it as a component of peacebuilding. In a peace process which is the result of a political concession, as it did in the DRC, the involvement of transitional politics in the DDR process is evident. However, understanding the intricacies of the politics-DDR linkage and how this nexus may impact on further processes of peacebuilding is still an under-theorised aspect in peace research (Berdal and Ucko 2009). The nature and character of DDR is context specific depending on the environment of the peace process and the foregoing armed conflict. There is a give-and-take relationship between DDR and peacebuilding (Knight and Özerdem 2004). This implies that there is no DDR without a peacebuilding process for the latter lends an institutional framework, and viable and bureaucratic structures for DDR implementation. Reversely, DDR sustains structural change and reduces direct and basic violence through changing configurations of armed conflict such as military organisations of armed movements.

Since the first UN Security Council's endorsement of the Namibian DDR programme in 1989, 60 acknowledged programmes have been initiated by 2010 (Muggah 2009a; Beswick

and Jackson 2011). From all of these programmes, be it successful or unsuccessful, a number of insights have been drawn. In Beswick and Jackson's (2011) account on conflict, security and development for instance, it has been claimed that disarmament as a DDR component involves military effort and technical know-how, whereas reintegration, which is regarded as a key component of a DDR programme (UN 2010b), calls for the involvement from non-military development experts. Hence, DDR, in practice is believed to be a post-conflict social engineering process resulting from the blend of a rigorous coordination of military and development skills, involving a proliferation of numerous new and non-traditional players in its landscape, partially perhaps because of this complexity. Porto *et al* (2007), for example, suggest that such new players take in bi-lateral donor governments, non-governmental organisations – NGOs, civil society organisations and the private sector, and had to play a fairly limited role in earlier DDR programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. Likewise, there have been a number of noteworthy institutional programmes at the international level, including the Stockholm Initiatives in DDR (SIDDR 2006), the UN Integrated DDR Standards – IDDRS (UN 2006) and the Multi-Donor Reintegration Programme (MDRP 2003).[50] DDR's scholars (SIDDR 2006; Porto *et al*. 2007) are of the consensus that these initiatives came out with further insights that have helped expand the understanding mainly in line with improving the 'supply aspect' of DDR by proposing recommendations, such as the choice of apposite target groups for reintegration, better and effective coordination, and implementation mechanisms amongst players leading or supporting the process. Successful DDR relies on how its process acknowledges the task of different players at different programmatic levels. However, how some non-state players, such as civil society and the private sector, partake in the management of ex-combatants may be linked to the type of political and institutional framework of like-minded DDR to their roles and participation.

In second generation DDR however, UN representatives have sought to ensure that DDR programme is a national ownership whereby the government takes the front line responsibilities (UN 2010b). Such tasks comprise, but are not restricted to, deciding the time scale and extent of DDR, as well as setting selection standards and implementation

[50] See Muggah (2010) for further details on innovation in the DDR research and policy.

modalities for fighters (Harpviken 2008). This innovation responds to the main concern raised that dearth of national and local ownership in a DDR process renders it a 'supply-driven' initiative. Ownership should be understood at two dimensions; local and national. At the local level, contends Pouligny (2004:11), community participation is indispensable, not only to become familiar with local contexts, but also to boost local ownership. Analysing local and national ownership from countries like El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Afghanistan, Özerdem (2009:214) suggests that there is a need for drawing the line between "local ownership" and "local participation"; the former is broader concept than the latter. However, in practice, ownership in DDR programme is narrowed down to the national government and some rebel leaders, while other key stakeholders are often kept away (CICS 2006).

Apart from DDR, post-conflict peacebuilding includes broader agendas, ranging from security sector reform (SSR), and the rule of law to transitional justice. In this regard, researchers who have hand on this subject are of the consensus that DDR goes hand in glove with SSR (Bryden 2007; Lamb and Dye 2009; McFate 2010). At this point, DDR in fact is regarded as part of the wider SSR process if the peace negotiation in question has considered SSR as an agenda in the peace process. Integrating ex-combatants into the national security force, as what happened in Philippines (Hall, 2009), Timor Leste (ICG 2008), Burundi (Samii 2010), Nepal (Nayak 2009) and the DRC (Boshoff *et al*. 2008; Stearns *et al*. 2013), exemplify how SSR goes along with the management of ex-combatants in the post-conflict period. In the case of the DRC, it was the SSR rather than DDR that caught more attention in the discussions surrounding the management of all RCD's [*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*; Rally for Congolese Democracy] factions, MLC [*Mouvement de Libération Congolais*; Congolese Liberation Movement], CNDP [*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*; National Congress for the Defence of the People], M23 [*Mouvement du 23 Mars*; the March 23 Movement] and Mai-Mai combatants (Boshoff 2008; Boshoff *et al*. 2010; Stearns *et al*. 2013).

Finally, drawn from some African countries' experiences, it bears noting that there is the need for mapping out and effectively reorienting programmatic focus towards reintegration (Colletta *et al*. 1996b). Disarmament draws much attention both internally and externally, to the extent that when it happens to widen support to actually reintegrating ex-combatants,

the resources are either scarce or there is restricted long-term commitment by governments as well as external players who back up the peace process (Muggah 2010; Kilroy 2012). Following the collection of weapons, points out Özerdem (2009:208), the mission is often considered "accomplished". Therefore, when the real time to reintegrate ex-combatants emerges, the resources and commitments become scarce or unavailable.

3.4.1 Reintegration as a DDR Component

As a peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction process, reintegration of ex-combatants is one of the core components of DDR. Seen in the context of unfolded or failed reintegration processes as is the case in the Kivus, in this sub-section the study of reintegration will be situated within the field of political economy. From a political economy approach, the reintegration could best be understood as a process in which ex-combatants transform their identity from belligerent to civilian, and revise their conduct by stopping the use of violent means and escalating actions that are not authorised by the mainstream community (Torjesen 2013). Shifting in behaviour is perceptible in three stages; social, political and economic (de Vries and Wiegink 2011; Munive and Jakobsen 2012; Nussio 2012; Özerdem 2012; Podder 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Torjesen 2013). In social level, combatants break down their contact and dependence from the militia networks, rebuild and reinforce their relations with mainstream communities and family (Özerdem 2012; 2013). The political dimension is concerned with ending violence as means to attain political goals. As a substitute, combatants integrate normal politics at the local, regional or national level whether as individual voters or as political supporters or members of a larger group (Podder 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Torjesen 2013). In economic terms, reintegration means that the combatant should move away from the livelihood support mechanism related to the militia networks. In return, as element of economic reintegration, demobilised individuals should receive long-term productive employment – formal or informal, or they should be able to set off other genuine income-generating activities, such as agriculture, which permits them to support their household (de Vries and Wiegink 2011; Munive and Jakobsen 2012).

Reintegration process could repeatedly be one-sided, unfinished or reversible. However, its social, political and economic aspects illustrate the experiences that combatants come

across as they end their violent identity and activities, where challenges generally associated with experiences in social, political and economic spheres would need to be given prominence. Reintegration is a component and package of armed conflict that extend beyond the conflict aftermath. In reality, the social environment wherein reintegration process occurs is profoundly shaped by the trajectory of the conflict and developments afterwards (Torjesen 2013; 2014). The meaning of trajectory in this context refers to different movements that combatants go through as they leave an armed group (Munive and Jakobsen 2012). In so saying, the gap time between leaving and a full return to civilian life could change considerably and might be associated with complex patterns of movements. Each every combatant has a trajectory, despite whether or not the individual has opted for a formal reintegration process initiated by the government and international organisations. In the research setting of the study, it would be appropriate to look at the 'self-integrated' combatants since it is to explore those who embark on government- or internationally-run programmes (Nussio 2012; Torjesen 2014).

From a political reintegration perspective, it is believed that political reintegration is about achieving political goals through non-violent means. As such, combatants partake of the mainstream politics at all state's levels either as individual voters or as political advocates or representatives of a larger group. This change would not be an easy process (Berdal and Zaum 2013). Torjesen (2014:4), for instance, believes: "the breaking up of militia units has profound political implications, since many of the major war and post war power wielders are likely to be associated with these networks". Possible interpretation of Torjesen's statement could be that combatants as individuals might seek to bring to an end war while group possessions would need to be driven to a complex ground where a few players may hearten such a transition, whereas others would discourage it. In such a context, senior military leaders in armed groups or top/mid-level decision makers related to militia would have to step in a powerful game for position and prestige following the wartime, whereas facilitation of, or alternatively, the thwarting of low-level combatants' reintegration, is one important political bargaining chip (Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Özerdem 2013; Torjesen 2014). This strongly adumbrates the reintegration projection facing low-level combatants that needs to be factored in when researching on political reintegration.

Economic reintegration is the segregation between combatant and the livelihood support mechanisms associated with militia networks. As part of economic reintegration, combatants are entitled to long-term lucrative employment (formal or informal) or they have to be part of other legal income-generating activities, such as agriculture, which enables them to sustain their household. From a political economy view, however, it has been underlined that many of economic activities are acutely interweaved with politics and power, and vice versa, following the wartime situation (Berdal and Zaum 2013). The war entrepreneurs are likely keen to control, participate or enjoy the paybacks deriving from the war economy (Torjesen 2014). They are also likely to change and keep on controlling a range of economic sectors, particularly those with high return margins, in the years following conflict (Torjesen 2013). The growing models of domination, monopolisation or overt rivalry in the economy will affect low-level combatants as they desire to join mainstream economic activity (Berdal and Zaum 2013). There will be the need for factoring in these considerations altogether with formal economic assessments of growth, employment prospects and livelihood options when exploring economic reintegration.

The private sector is a significant partner in peacebuilding which can support reintegration through providing job opportunities to ex-combatants (International Alert 2006). In the SIDDR account on ex-combatants' reintegration, it is suggested that reintegration programmes could benefit from efforts to encourage home private sector and civil society, by such means as the diminution of obstructions to doing business, access to credit, technology and technical support (SIDDR 2006:29). However, following the war, the private sector has often been sceptic about offering jobs to ex-combatants with an appalling past. Dearth of trust between employer (the private sector) and employees – ex-combatants, could not only lead to apparent insecurity on behalf of the employers, but also might create friction in their professional relationship. To this regard, policy initiatives, wisely advises Specht (2010), need to be geared toward stimulating a trustworthy business environment and associating the private sector in planning and execution of reintegration, so as to build ownership and develop confidence in the process. Additionally, economic reintegration of ex-combatants relies on quite a few non-economic factors and conditions both at combatants and social levels. Therefore, it is significant to examine non-economic social factors from a social reintegration perspective.

Finally, social reintegration pulls combatants from armed group networks, in terms of reliance and contact, and interconnects them with mainstream communities and family. At this level, the political economy view is irrelevant. However, it could be that concepts drawn from other theoretical perceptions may prove useful (Torjesen 2014).

In peacebuilding jargon, social reintegration refers to finding ex-combatants' family or social roots so as to recondition bonds between them and their family and community (Knight and Özerdem 2004). Having switched from less attention to much focus of DDR programmes, social reintegration is regarded as an interactive and constructive role of social entities, including family, community kinship and social network. Social reintegration has evolved in the course of time and the concept is getting currency, to the extent that scholars and policy makers are in agreement with it being now a value in DDR and peacebuilding (Leff 2008; Özerdem 2012). However, although social reintegration's meaning has got broadened and includes what is needed to recondition post-conflict society – including building social support, upholding community participation and re-knitting the social fabric of often divided societies, to name a few (Annan and Cutter 2009:2), there is still not yet a clear-cut consensus as to how it can be achieved in a post-war complex social and political environment. Such complexities have sometimes proved to be deeper due to social reintegration being all about relationships that sustain both formal and informal processes, often not easy to study. Nevertheless, in DDR account on ex-combatants' reintegration, social reintegration is conceptualised with key entities such as family, community, social capital and reconciliation.

There is a range of theories that acknowledge the importance of family as a primary constituency in social reintegration. Although this role cannot be denied for a successful reintegration (Özerdem 2012), several issues however need to be considered. First, it is often difficult to trace the family link for anybody who became combatant for a significant part of their life, especially if this started during childhood. Furthermore, combatants who left their family at an early age become unenthusiastic to go back home (Dolan and Schafer 1997). It is also worth noting that the extra burden related to ex-combatants' return may drive some families to turn their backs to members who have been away for ages. Herein lays the idea that insertion as an economic safety-net for ex-combatants and their families would play a useful role as means of supporting social reintegration (Kostner 2001). Family

acceptance finally can also be embarrassed by a degree of disgrace stemming from how an ex-combatant is regarded by society at large. This partially applies to female-combatants (Sideris 2003:722) who, in the most of African communities, are meant for the traditional roles in the household economy. During the war, society may get metamorphosed, while female-fighters are often intended to return to their traditional roles following the wartime (Knight and Özerdem 2004). Therefore, this disparity between community hopes and women's new feature could upset the process of social reintegration. Eritrea presents a noteworthy example, at this effect, where owing to the *status quo* in women's gender roles after the wartime, a positive alternative was found to halt negative community hopes and high divorce rates (Kingma 2002).

The extent to which ex-combatants are welcomed in or are eager to join a family will also forecast how ex-combatants will be accepted in the community. As it is substantiated in Chapters Four and Five, in the Kivus, for instance, each community has its tribal militia[51] and traditional chiefs urge families to persuade their children to join armed movements in order to defend their lands against invaders, said an ex-combatant. Defending one's land against squatters is a bravery action in the eyes of the Kivus' communities. When members of family leave their community to join endogenous armed groups in the eastern DRC, in reality they are still in touch with their community, to the extent that their coming back home is not an issue for the rest of the community.[52] The Kivus' case could be likened to Ethiopia's, where the more ex-combatants partook of the community's activities the better the acceptance of the spouse and family (Colletta *et al*. 1996b). In Mozambique and Uganda, however, ex-combatants had to go through traditional ritual process in order to cleanse the war atrocities they committed (Kingma 2002). Overall, it might be suggested that the role of family in social reintegration is partially contingent upon the role of community which is another key constituency of social reintegration. Drawing on Bernard *et al*. (2003) and Stark's (2006) view on community reintegration, it could be asserted that community acceptance has a major significance in social reintegration. In the context of DDR and peacebuilding, as is the case in this thesis, community means a geographically-bounded physical and social location, as well as symbolically built space which enables

[51] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[52] Chapters 4 and 5 provide further details on armed groups and combatants' recruitment in the Kivus.

social activities and exchanges, and comprises official and non-official social organisations and institutions (Cohen 1985; Block 2009). Therefore, community in this case refers to people who do not belong to any group of former combatants – villagers, city dwellers…, rather includes conflict victims, security personnel retired from the government, business people, civil society and non-combatant members of the general public.

A host of factors can delineate community acceptance. Armed conflict, asserts Özerdem (2012:63), segments social structures by splitting people into an "us" versus "them" polarisation. Such polarisation had impacted negatively on ex-combatants' acceptance in the community in Liberia and Sierra Leone (ibid.). In a research on the process of ex-combatants' reintegration in Khmer Rouge, Veroren (2005) has demonstrated how a degree of suspicion and resentment between Khmer Rouge ex-combatants and people in the community affected negatively the acceptance of ex-combatants in Khmer Rouge society. The conception and perception of community about ex-combatants' identity has further implication on the acceptance of ex-fighters into community. Ex-combatants who return home as heroes of war, as ascertained by Özerdem (2012), would have a much easier social acceptance in a post-conflict environment than those who are regarded as troublemakers. However, it bears emphasising that the determination of social reintegration relies on the overall political context of war to peace evolution and the extent to which post-conflict society handles issues related to fear, vengeance and hatred (Duthie 2005).

Although literature has underscored social reintegration as a collective process at the community level, the issue of ex-combatants' agency during reintegration process and the roles they can play in their personal experience with social acceptance seem to be given less attention. There is a growing literature in peacebuilding on the linkages between social reintegration and social capital, but the concept still lacks a clear-cut definition. It is however worth noting that scholars are in agreement with social capital being built on social ties, relationships and networks (Granovetter 1973; Portes 1998; Narayan and Cassidy 2001). Social capital is a quality of social life (network, norms and trust) which facilitates participants to work together more efficiently in order to achieve shared objectives (Putnam 1995). In social capital, trust is the key measuring element as it is based on models of reciprocity and cooperation in network of civic engagement (Fukuyama 1995). Taken from the above definitions and for the purpose of this study, the concept of

social capital is used to refer to networks, relationships and trust between ex-fighters and members of community. Social capital can play both a positive and negative role. Its positive role gives information and resource access to members of a group, while its negative role can further marginalise individuals who are disqualified from group membership (Gilbert 2009; Micolta 2009). The negative role of social capital comes in when the line between 'bonding' (exclusive) and 'bridging' (inclusive) social capital is drawn (Putnam 2000). Bonding social capital, in Putnam's (ibid: 2000) words, is:

> "Inward looking [networks] that tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups, whereas bridging social capital consists of outward looking [networks] that encompass people across diverse social cleavages".

In light of Putnam's paradigm, it might be argued that social division is strengthened by bonding social capital whilst social cohesion is enabled by bridging social capital. Some scholars, which include; Colletta and Cullen (2000), Varshney (2003), Paffenholz and Purk (2006) and Cox (2009) are of the view that while a society with a high degree of social capital is more integrated, peacebuilding however aspires to encourage social capital in segmented and segregated post-conflict societies. The way that a community accepts ex-combatants and the degree of confidence, reciprocated relationships and networks that connect ex-fighters to the rest of community, contend Leff (2008) and Annam and Cutter (2009), relate to social capital. Armed conflict incited ex-combatants' networks, that Hazan (2007:1) coins as a "war family". War family can underpin connected social capital between ex-combatants, which in turn, can keep alive networks of the war-time and their structures in either way. In Gilbert's (2009) account on community acceptance of ex-combatants, it is indicated that bonded social capital carries the power to produce violence for violence and crime entrepreneurs tend to create close bonded relationships within their formal and informal networks. As a component of post-war peacebuilding, one of the aim of ex-combatants' reintegration is to bridge the nexuses that exist between ex-combatants, their families and communities in order to sustain bridging social capital for the improvement of social harmony.

How ex-combatants manage to earn their livelihoods and build social capital relies on their psychological health and the mechanisms of assistance that they are provided to recover

from war-related mental and physical health problems. In Autesserre's (2012) dangerous tales, it is disclosed that child soldiers and ex-combatants enlisted by warlords in the eastern DRC suffered from depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and general psychological difficulties. As a sideline to this, ex-combatants encountered several snags in reconnecting and rebuilding nexuses with their families and communities.

More recently, reconciliation has emerged as an element of reintegration process in post-war society. Broadly, it aims to thwart, once and for all, the use of the past to refuel the conflict. Seen under the lens of peacebuilding, Bloomfield *et al*. (2003:19) put forward that reconciliation is a process towards consolidating peace, severing the cycle of violence and cementing nexuses between victims and perpetrators of the preceding conflict. On the other hand, Ngoma (2004) claims that it has been proved undeniable that ex-combatants' reintegration is one of the several approaches that keep states and societies from falling back into volatility and war. From the above, it might be postulated that reintegration and reconciliation share the same objective, as both initiatives aim to prevent post-conflict societies to relapse into renewed conflict and instead they reinforce and restore new ties.

Based on the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreements, that are the pedigree of the DRC's peacebuilding process, DDR and reconciliation have been mentioned as integral components of peace process which is underway. In Central Africa Republic, however, reconciliation and DDR were clearly mentioned in the 2003 Bangui Agreements, and efforts were made to bring both processes together by drawing connecting lines between them (ecp 2008). It also stands true for Colombia and the post-Apartheid South Africa where reconciliation was cross-fertilised with reintegration in the peace process. There is a greater reciprocal nexus between reconciliation and reintegration when they are run simultaneously. Thus, scholars, such as Porto *et al* (2007), Annam and cutter (2009), and Kingma and Muggah (2009) advise that post-conflict reconciliation and transitional justice activities need to be handled alongside DDR. In other words, if reconciliation is undertaken in tandem with reintegration, its effects may have a great influence on the acceptance of combatants in communities. Yet this is barely the case in practice, and hence due to reintegration being often secluded and disengaged from the much needed reconciliation processes, contend Kingma and Muggah (2009).

In terms of social, economic and political capacities, post-conflict societies seem to be fragile to run and hold reconciliation processes. Reconciliation attempts in haste, which often culminates in transitional justice, may even drive protagonists with atrocious pasts off from the peace process. It goes the same that in the immediate repercussion of conflict, communities could be in a disagreement and thus, a number of war-affected social clusters might have opposing views of a peace process. Such contradictions could perceptibly hinder an individual's and community's ability to bear with someone who carries a brutal history. There is the need for transforming relationships, suggest Ramsbotham and Miall (2005), if the transformative levels of bridging differences and if restoring trust between hostile groups are envisioned. Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of heinous fighting, lots of post-conflict societies lack means to accommodate reconciliation, which often leads to a shared future between the erstwhile victim(s) and perpetrator(s), due to the dearth of such capacity. In such a context, a substantial time may be considered before they can embark on this idea under these hard conditions.

3.4.2 Reintegration: From Minimalist to Maximalist Perspective

Ex-combatants' reintegration into society is a dynamic process. Its ultimate purpose is to convert an ex-combatant into civilian life (Kingma 1997; Ginifer 2003; Hazan 2007). Such a conversion, however, is a continuing process, with transformations taking place both in the lives of individual ex-combatants and at the relational level between them and people in their society. As an element of peacebuilding, the objective of reintegration is to produce constructive transformation in the relationships between ex-combatants and individuals in the community (Kilroy 2012). Reintegration's main objective is identity change and the creation of a healthy civil society. Conversely, on the ground, reintegration processes are securitised, implying that ex-fighters are regarded simply as spoilers of peace processes set on the ground to terminate violent conflict. As a result, there is less interest in creating citizenry and in forming and factoring in the citizen-state interactions that would deal with ex-combatants in post-conflict period in a democratic structure (Muggah 2010).

In spite of a number of praiseworthy improvements in the field of DDR, results are still varied and the level-headedness of a successful reintegration experiences the dormant tensions between policy recommendations allocated and the desirable outcomes from below

(Muggah *et al*. 2009). Equally, reintegration's efficiency hinges upon significant issues ranging from challenges of setting pragmatic and realisable objectives, choosing suitable beneficiaries (UNDP 2005; Annan and Cutter 2009), to preventing the process from turning out to be a prisoner of political manipulation (Ojeleye 2010). In between time, interim and hasty arrangements, context-insensitive policy responses marred by scarce funding permanence and obstructed by the political surroundings are still producing exasperating outcomes in the field.

Emerging as part of the peacebuilding doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s, DDR programmes were highly securitised. Such securitisation was hinged on the idea that non-state rebel movements and their elements constitute security menaces both to the post-conflict state and to the whole region. Consequently, in terms of formal peace support operations, contend Colletta and Muggah (2009), DDR and SSR go along with post-conflict security promotion. In Muggah's (2005) provision on DDR, it is of note that the success of DDR was often measured according to the number of weapons gathered and disposed off, the number of ex-combatants processed, the number of vocational training courses afforded, the decreased reappearance of violence in which the ex-combatants were drawn in and so on. However over time, reintegration processes have evolved gradually from the narrow security-focused 'minimalist' agenda to a 'maximalist's', with the latter integrating socio-economic development agendas into the reintegration phase of DDR (Bryden 2007; Buxton 2008; Jennings 2008; Muggah 2010). Subsequently, in the second generation of DDR programmes, reintegration has tried bringing together security and development agendas, with community development agendas being included into DDR (Baare 2005; Jackson and Alberecht 2011). This switch from minimalist to maximalist agenda is outstanding in that, it positions combatants' reintegration within the discourse of post-conflict reconstruction and development (SIDDR 2006). Post-conflict reconstruction idea implies recreating and restoring the capacity of national institutions and community following a conflict (UNDP 2007). This idea has been often associated with the concept of transition from war to peace and is being thrived as a way of including relief and development in post-conflict peacebuilding (Bocco and Oesch 2009; Beswick and Jackson 2011).

In the discourse of post-conflict recovery, DDR programmes, particularly ex-combatants' reintegration, has been regarded as an instrument to stimulate human and socio-economic

development. This change results from a set of convergent views that human security[53] has a strong development dimension. In the aftermath of the Cold War, debate on human security has switched its attention from 'state-centric' approach to a 'community-centred' approach (MacLean *et al*. 2006; UNDP 1994). From the latter approach, it emerges that security is regarded as a dynamic product through a balance between 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' (ibid.). Therefore, DDR partakes not only in post-conflict economic recovery, but also in human security by speaking for both security and development. Here lies the necessity to recognise reintegration limitations in that it can only complement some complex which upholds both post-conflict recovery and development however cannot and should not substitute development (Ball and van de Goor 2006).

The controversy around identifying appropriate target group(s) has been another critical issue associated with reintegration process. Currently, post-conflict recovery's provision on DDR establishes at least two approaches; individual ex-combatant focused, and individual and community focused. Being minimalist in nature, individual ex-combatant focused reintegration caters economic opportunities solely for ex-fighters. The UNDP (2005) describes this support as including, but not limited to, encouraging employment in existing enterprises, encouraging micro and small business start-ups, the delivery of micro-grants or credit, the use of training as a reintegration tool, provision of technical advice, monitoring and supervision, public sector job creation and education and scholarships. A key critique of ex-combatant focused approach advises that if ex-combatants are given exceptional treatment and material inducements whereas other conflict victims, including unemployed youth, inside displaced individuals, war-widows, and war-victims – the families of those who were killed particularly if they were innocents, get markedly less attention, it may give

[53] Human Security emerged in the post-Cold War era and has been regarded as a way of bringing together various humanitarian, economic and social issues so as to improve human conditions and assure security. The concept was first popularised by the UNDP in the early 1990s and aims to address issues comprising, but not limited to, the following; organised crime and criminal violence, human rights and good governance, armed conflict and intervention, genocide and mass crimes, health and development, resources and environment. It focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace and ensuring sustainable continuous development. Human security also emphasises on supporting individuals by using a people-centred approach as a way to resolving inequalities that affect security. One of the major failings of Human Security, according to its critics, is that it is too all encompassing and that it often fails to achieve its ambitious goals to improving human condition (Ball 2010; Sedra 2010; Autesserre 2010; 2014).

rise to tensions between ex-combatants and host communities (Annan and Cutter 2009). However, a preferential system, opines Last (1999), can symbolise political objectives and meaning as settled during a peace process. Contrarily, in the instantaneous stabilisation phase, reply Kingma and Muggah (2009), targeting ex-combatants and their families for a direct support is valuable; however, reintegration should be planned as an element of a post-conflict recovery programme in order to speak for grievances of the wider community.

A maximalist approach to reintegration consists of extending the focus of reintegration programmes to both ex-combatants and communities. Individual and community focus approach is at the heart of reintegration process as it is proved that balancing the support between ex-combatants' specific need and the needs of the wider community will spare returnees from community resentment (UNDP 2005; UN 2010b). The main advantage of this approach is that it intends to empower and equip communities with the capacity to support the reintegration of ex-combatants. As such, reintegration is seen as part of greater recovery programmes, comprising the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced peoples (Gleichmann *et al*. 2004; Alden *et al*. 2007; Beswick and Jackson 2011). Moreover, when reintegration support is balanced between ex-combatants and the community, social cohesion in post-conflict societies will easily be promoted (Fearon *et al*. 2009).

Some challenges, however, need to be considered. It has been actually proved that combining reintegration with community development is not an easy task as the process requires a greater deal of coordination between several players, including DDR implementers, development actors and national and local governments. It entails incorporating reintegration into post-conflict development initiatives, something that may prove to be difficult for some reasons among others; dearth of continuity of funding and resources in the long-term, limited political will and paucity of an appropriate environment in which to embark on such long-term ambitious programmes. At this particular point, the key issue is no longer about the programme targeting a particular social group, rather when, to what extent and how to balance resources between particular and general needs of populations (CIDDR 2009). However, it should be warned that resources allocated for ex-combatants' reintegration should not serve as enticements to spoilers and rebel leaders; neither should the programme be misappropriated by strongmen – the local elites and

warlords, so as to handle the resources in ways that could jeopardise the future of the peace process.

3.5 Reintegration Outcomes and the Problem of Re-recruitment

Apart from the recruitment's root-causes or motivations, the successes and failures of combatant's reintegration would also have a serious brunt on their eventual re-recruitment into armed groups. Living in a group can be a powerful weapon to indoctrinate young people and get them to become fighters. Group socialisation has some bearing such as the challenges of regaining lost childhoods, family, loved ones, and norms of social behaviour, on returnees during their post-conflict civilian life. This case happened to the protracted Liberian and Sierra-Leonean conflicts where combatants who embarked on military service as children and demobilised as adults suffer from long-term in-group socialisation (Özerdem 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010). Özerdem and Podder (2012) are of the view that socialisation is crucial for post-war reintegration outcomes as it interferes with some key post-war behavioural indicators with regard to mental-health-related disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder – PTSD, disability and infertility. The same goes for the loss of education, a dearth of employable skills and the destruction of a stable family. It is evident that former fighters are severely challenged with several fallouts as the result of the time spent in an armed organisation.

Transition from civilian life to that of military is a breach between the normal and accepted life, as is reintegration a significant challenge for ex-combatants. In societies with rooted communal visions of death, there is a set of mechanisms that aim to deal with ritualistic cleansing and sacrifice, illness and healing and enable the environment of socially acceptable reintegration (Özerdem 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Traditional cleansing rituals, as those applied in Mozambique under the organic interventions, have proved to be dangerous for the start of reintegration programmes. By their nature, traditional cleansing rituals are set to psychologically reconcile well-being with the social world and wipe out killing or combatant bearings imbibed in the rebels' world (Utas 2003; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Approaches to re-socialising combatants from their combatant's identity have been

criticised for being incomplete, as they fail to incorporate into the operational system and the importance of the reintegration process, neither do they underline its social aspect (Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). It is challenging to re-familiarise with norms and values of the period preceding conflict in a society. This could end up jeopardising social reconciliation and mutual acceptance between community's members and those who are regarded as socially undesirable for their forfeit during war. Reintegration involves meticulous and sensitive work whereby combatants are held accountable for their belligerent offences – killing, amputation and other forms of horrific violence against their host community.

Lessons learned from the inversion theory of reintegration illustrate the proverb that 'what goes around comes around'. During reintegration, combatants may be treated in the same way that they behaved towards their community, given that the accepted behaviour of war time becomes reprehensible in peace time. Therefore, combatants are stripped off their combatant identity. Like good and bad civilians, the same applies to rebels, in some respects. An African proverb says 'mind asking the age of an individual who carries a weapon'. It is common to all communities to fear and distrust anyone who has handled fire arms, be it during or after war. Discarding rebel-like behaviour and changing one's mind to the reality, poverty, or incapacity of civilian living, cannot be achieved overnight. In the course of the socialisation period within armed organisation and during fighting life, violence becomes entrenched and second nature for combatants' lives while in reality they become victims of their past. Relying on violence to reinstate law and order remains a significant challenge in the identity transformation process. Although traditional cleansing ceremonies have limitations regarding reintegration process, they have played a considerable role in bringing together returnees and their families or communities. At the same time they can align returnees' well-being with spiritual beliefs of death and rebirth. Such a process could facilitate reintegration and hence increases community confidence in its own children, formerly regarded as spiritually contaminated by the exposure to the war behaviour – violence and death (Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). It is of note that particular attention should be paid to the component of successful social reintegration and re-acceptance by their families and communities in order to preclude further attempts to re-recruitment.

From more technical DDR efforts, it has been proved that child soldiers have traditionally been marginalised from DDR programmes and reintegration support in particular (Taylor *et al*. 2006; Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2011). However, in the efforts at stopgap programmes, those excluded have been prioritised in family reintegration, counselling, basic economic support – which includes short vocational training programmes, provision for shelter, food and tools. In the context of child soldier reintegration, it is suggested that community-based reintegration – BR, strategies attempted would be appropriate to deal with the need for equilibrium in targeting and downsizing antagonisms generated from exclusive focus on any particular caseload (Keen 2000; Themner 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2012). The re-recruitment of combatants would be curbed and discouraged if the preventive capacity of communities lies in ensuring community-located follow-up mechanisms and more effective use of donor and local resources (Themner 2008). This would deflect criticism formulated to CBR approaches as relegating responsibility for reintegration to impoverished and incapacitated communities (Özerdem and Podder 2012).

It is established that when the state and the central government support the communities through providing sufficient resources, and if communities are sufficiently empowered to categorise, gauge and prioritise needs locally, then the re-recruitment of combatants would be deterred, thus communities will be strong enough to deal with those needs more successfully (Themner 2008). In contrast, Beswick and Jackson (2011) are of the view that in conflicts with regional character, combatants receive assistance from more than one country, as is the case in Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, and tend to spoil the process. In both contexts, capacity building through credence is very important. Community members need to encourage returnees to restart their new life normally without any impediment, including going back to school or training and partaking in social stability. Community can positively maximise combatant reintegration by considering it as a rich pool of human resources for development. Failing to do so may lead to an increase of combatants' re-recruitment, as occurred in the eastern DRC. Well-reintegrated ex-combatants would be powerful agents of local economic development – LED. The participation of former combatants in the LED, the reintegration strategies plan, its impacts on individual action and trajectories of empowerment would be a very strong fence to the youth re-recruitment cycle.

As a bottom-up approach toward empowering local-based communities, local government, the private and non-profit sectors to work together to develop the local economy (Blakely and Leigh 2010), LED would work appropriately in post-conflict environment if combined with the social navigation approach. In essence, social navigation is defined as motion within a fluid space which requires individual agency in deciding on how to navigate the dangers and the possibilities, as well as an ability to locate and creatively traverse a difficult social space (Gates and Andvig 2006; Özerdem and Podder 2012). It might be argued that LED, social navigation and post-conflict control would be a significant yet little considered aspect in the reintegration routes of former fighters. In the same vein of thinking it would be desirable to seriously consider how the DDR's repercussions and reintegration outcomes would impact on the re-recruitment of former soldiers and on their involvement in armed groups.

Challenges facing ex-combatants in post-conflict societies range from lack of work or usable skills, disempowerment to marginalisation. However, what they are likely to encounter the most in their new life is the embarrassment of accepting past structures of traditional leadership, control and domination (Utas 2003; McMullin 2004). This raises the concern of how do former combatants handle the loss of education, a lack of employment, and the pejorative brand of killers that might challenge perspectives for a successful reintegration. In this regard, it is also reasonable to figure out the way reintegration process trickles down support in order to have a broad view on how the process can enable combatant's return to their wounded, destroyed and traumatised communities. Reintegration support can be directly given to ex-combatants, or the funding might be used to build educational infrastructures that will train returnees in the short-term and benefit the whole community in the long-term. In Sudan, for example, the reintegration process provided support to family and community so as to create and sustain a conducive and empowered environment for the reintegration of returnees (Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2012). From what has been discussed above, it might be argued that the successful reintegration of ex-combatants into society is not impossible but complex. Re-involvement of former combatants with armed groups in post-conflict war period is a result of a combination of factors, ranging from a certain loss of agency, discriminations and retaliation attacks to issues of physical and economic insecurity (Crossett and Spitaletta

2010). The feelings of being aggrieved and excluded or marginalised are thought to trigger motivations behind recruitment and may be extended to the re-recruitment cycle if not dealt with. Ex-combatants who do not rely on the local security system use their combatant skills to ensure their security. This would also be true for ex-combatants who are secluded and non-integrated. They generally tend to resolve their problems by using violence (Spear 2006).

Experiences from post-conflict countries such as Algeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone advise that although gerontocratic and corrupt societies can undermine social advancement in post-conflict contexts, post-war period can bring out opportunities to empower not only returnees but also all other marginalised groups (Abdullah 1998; Özerdem 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2012). After the conflict, demilitarised youth who are reintegrated into communities, whereby their political, economic and social rights are denied, become frustrated and are likely to face the same conditions that led them into joining armed groups. Many ex-fighters have found themselves as mercenaries in regional conflicts because of their reintegration into poverty and their exclusion from social, economic and politic activities (Mats Utas 2003; McMullin 2004). In this case, re-recruited combatants become more dangerous than they were before. Lessons learned from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Uganda show that on the order of their superiors, child soldiers assaulted their own homes, with the intention of breaking their bonds with family and the home environments, while others stormed their own villages, committing atrocities like looting food, mutilating people and even shooting their own siblings (Özerdem and Podder 2012).

Re-engagement of combatants into violence is a result of the instrumental and technical DDR which has limited the DDR process on numbers, caseloads, targets, partners, trauma, protection and rehabilitation (Sageman 2004; Mandel 2009). The instrumental and technical DDR would approach merely the question ‘why’ – cause of conflicts and not ‘how’ – root of conflicts. This means that DDR approaches will superficially tackle the fundamental causes of conflicts, resulting in a delay of successful reintegration. In Özerdem and Podder’s (2011:73) words:

> "DDR approaches remain mired in instrumentalism; the means and end results are instrumental and are geared towards keeping a certain caseload perceived as a "security threat" busy and engaged to prevent conflict relapse. Besides, there are significant negative impacts of DDR programmes for child soldiers. They can result in labelling, stigma, distrust and animosity at an intergroup level within rural communities".

During the period of peace, ex-combatants need to be taught values based on how they should get involved with leadership structure. This allows on-going involvement of young people in socio-political projects and yields positive results in terms of peace building processes (Sageman 2004; Mandel 2009). This critical emphasis of DDR policy would restrain possible remobilisation or re-recruitment. A DDR programme based on a successful economic, political and social reintegration would undermine command and structure of armed groups; impeding recruiters and re-recruits reengaging in violence. It has been established that the success of DDR programmes leads to new social relationships, whereby training and schooling stimulate returnees to give up arms and embark strategically on civilian livelihoods (Mandel 2009). Economic, political and social reintegration aspects bring out the necessity of addressing the root-causes (push and pull factors) that lie behind combatants' recruitment in the first place. In contrast, former fighters who are reintegrated into poverty and still face the same grievances they fought for are at risk of deciding to break the peace transition and reengage into violence.

Lessons learned from the relationship between combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment suggest that combatants' mobilisation – recruitment, is the result of social, political and economic grievances and greed, while the remobilisation – re-recruitment, stems from the instrumental and technical DDR which culminates in the failure of the reintegration programmes. However, it is attested that re-recruitment cycle is avoidable, if only there is a clear-cut policy on preventing remobilisation based on strengthening community-based support structures, operative border monitoring and the participation of youth to the political, economic and social leadership opportunities. The main policy on preventing re-recruitment should avoid the trap of excluding and re-marginalising even frustrating young people. It is common for post-conflict states to have locations for ex-combatants and their dependants. These camps are generally over populated and are a

potent re-recruitment target for warlords. Hence, such sites require a closely monitored system. In the context of a post-conflict country wherein there is a proliferation of armed groups, good governance associated with political and development actors would discourage any attempt towards the remobilisation of combatants.

3.6 Conclusions

Against the backdrop of the literature on combatant's push-and-pull factors, the specific question which can be raised is who needs to be reintegrated into what? After a thorough review of the DDR provisions, reintegration seems to be a straightforward task in theory, as it is directly linked to the existence of home and community. However, it sounds like these two latter components are relevant to undertake the DDR programmes but not enough for a successful reintegration. In practice though, reintegration has proved to be the most complex component of DDR (Beswick and Jackson 2011), due to difficulties to develop alternatives to "violence-based livelihoods" for ex-combatants (ibid: 124). This may partly justify why it often fails on the ground. Most reintegrated individuals – child soldiers and young people, have lost their formative years, having spent these years living in armed groups. Frequently, reverting back home is not an aspiration for somebody who spent his/her life into violence; it confirms a future of uncertainty. Unfortunately combatants' margin of manoeuvre to manage their life during the war aftermath is very limited. They have to go through difficult transitions from fighters to civilian status in a post-conflict environment mired with socio-economic and civilian challenges. As a consequence, the reintegration process becomes a token gesture or meaningless process welcoming home returnees with violent pasts, without rehabilitation to enable them to build their new life next to those they have aggrieved. Some reintegrated combatants have succeeded in building their lives while others have failed. It is however of note that ex-combatants' DDR occurs within a war-torn society, disabled by weak and unstable socio-economic and political structures. It is hardly surprising that combatants who failed to accommodate themselves with the new style of life will commit themselves to armed groups and criminal networks for re-recruitment.

Former combatants have been regarded as a legacy of conflict, one which threatens the security of a post-conflict society. From micro/macro-insecurity perspectives, it might be advised that remobilisation is one of the results of the failure of the reintegration process. As elaborated through push and pull factors throughout this chapter, combatants' recruitment-reintegration-(re-) recruitment – mobilisation-reintegration-remobilisation, cycle remains a cause and effect relationship. This portends that the same root-causes that motivated recruitment would apply for the re-recruitment as well. However, particular attention needs to be paid to the re-recruitment level, as at this stage, it is to deal with an 'ex-combatant' whom not only already possesses military skills, but also is a valuable instigator of violence. Owing to their skills and experience in battle and torture, former combatants become valuable commodities for conflict entrepreneurs and agency. This latter can jeopardise security through recruiting combatants for armed groups, fuelling conflict and organising violence.

The mobilisation-reintegration-remobilisation relationship is a cumulative interaction. This means that it would be important to consider not only what motivates re-recruitment – the failure of reintegration programmes, but also to seriously think about how reintegration failure can fuel the existing root-causes – push and pull factors that have led to recruitment in a particular society. The failure of reintegration outcomes and existing push and pull factors interact and lead to the re-recruitment cycle. This happens in post-conflict in the Kivus (DRC), Liberia, Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Central Africa among others where failed former combatants turn back on peace and reengage in violence. However, this is still questionable for the north and west Africa regions in relation to the impact of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – Libya, Algeria, Boko Haram – Nigeria, Cameroon, and Jihad in the west Africa – Mali, Niger, to name a few. Besides, believing that the success of reintegration will utterly thwart erstwhile combatants from reengaging in violent activities in the future would be simplistic.

In post-conflict society, grievance and greed would linger for a while if not dealt with and could be a fuelling-factor for individuals joining armed groups. Therefore, there is the need for reducing rebel groups' capacities to re-recruit former combatants. In this case, reintegration programmes should need to concentrate on the following aspects:

- Supporting community and families so as to speak to the major push and pull factors that motivate youth recruitment.
- Bearing in mind that reintegration should be more a political process which should be thought and materialised beyond employment and education opportunities.
- Reintegration needs to focus on the development of local economy so the post-conflict society is better able to address to the problem of poverty and unemployment which is a major concern for both ex-combatants and other unemployed community members.
- Ex-combatants need to be considered as potential political and social actors for the future of post-conflict environments.
- Re-recruitment is a structural issue and its root-causes need to be addressed from the broad picture of macro-level economics, politics and international relations.

Not only the review of literature in Chapters Two and Three delved into the broad scope of violent conflicts emerging from the Post-Cold War settings and the process of mobilisation, demobilisation, reintegration and remobilisation of combatants, but it allowed us to understand the political economy of the conflict vis-à-vis natural resources, as well as the link between natural resources and recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants. However, this review has merely touched upon how the interconnection of the abovementioned would trigger violence. Hence, an in-depth analysis of the conflict in the DRC would reveal a wealth of information as to how this nexus fuels the destabilisation of a weak resource-rich state. Therefore, it is important to approach the issue with two questions: ‘How and why’. This helps address the problem from the micro/macro-level structural dynamics, as is the case illustrated in the upcoming chapter.

Chapter Four: State Failure and Protracted Armed Conflict in the DRC

(Robin Geib 2009:128).

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the processes and nature of the protracted armed conflict and state failure in the DRC from the two Congo Wars (1996-97 and 1998-2003) to the continuation of conflicts up to 2012. The focus of this chapter is on the multi-level of conflict players due to their key position in supporting armed groups and illegal exploitation of minerals. In so doing, it expects to contextualise all multi-layered conflict motivations that underpin the unfolded nature of conflict in the eastern DRC. Broadly, the analysis indicates that the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC is the upshot of an intersection of local, national and regional security concerns – that involve several actors worsened by their interaction, and by the presence of natural resources (Cramer 2006a; Grignon 2006; Wake 2008). This 'intricate crossbreed conflict' (Carayannis 2003; Prunier 2009) occurred in a significant socio-economic environment decline – particularly since the early 1990s, and was characterised by the evanescence of state's authority and a loss of political legitimacy. The chapter also explores the embedded historical, social, economic, political and cultural bonds prior to the occurrence of the conflict that have significant meaning in the understanding of conflict before elaborating on the current artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment in the DRC.

Several researchers, with hand on this subject, are of the consensus that the two Congo wars have been a business enterprise, since the exploitation of natural resources and control over trade involve all belligerents. A set of papers on the conflict in the DRC (UN Experts 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014) indicated that the involvement of belligerents in the exploitation of minerals in this country means that the conflict is the low-intensity nature conflict, and involves a fragmentation of belligerent groups and criminal elements concerned with the cross-border networks of illegal trade. Although there is an ongoing debate on the armed conflict in the DRC, there is still a major challenge in explaining the complexity of violence nature of the conflict, due to the existing theoretical divide (Carayannis 2003; Hawkins

2008). This suggests that considering the DRC conflict under the lens of intrastate conflicts, the absurdity of abundance theory and post-Cold War conflicts (King 1997; Kaldor 2007; Klare 2001; 2002), as illustrated in the literature review, would be irrelevant if the analysis of the conflict focuses only on the state and the state actors as established by most of the international relations theories.

Along similar lines, the DRC conflict could not be understood as a rational choice approach based on resource abundance and weak governance, owing to the statistical analysis[54] limitations that do not adequately allow for causation. However, it should be acknowledged that both academia and policymakers have significantly increased research on violence in the DRC, with focus exclusively being on the political economies of armed groups vis-à-vis mineral resources and the economy of war. A few institutions such as the International Peace Academy,[55] the Overseas Development Institute – ODI,[56] the UN,[57] and the International Peace Information Service – IPIS,[58] have largely released publications in this regard. From these studies, it might be suggested that emphasising on the political economy of war or the functions of the war paradigm may hamper to mention belligerents' political grievances and local circumstances in which those grievances happened and turned into violence. A wide range of papers on the collapse and evanescence of the DRC state more recently emerged within the political science literature that the DRC state is a furtherance of greedy governance during Mobutu' s regime (Rackley 2006), or a failed state with prevalence of warlords (Young and Turner 1985; Lemarchand 1997; 2003; Reno 1998; McNulty 1999; 2000; Zeilig 2009). However, Sangmpam (1994) is in disagreement with these perspectives developed from weak governance paradigm as they are insufficient to explain the nature of governance in the DRC.

More recently a group of historians have come out with comprehensive analyses on the DRC conflict, emphasising both on the role of Rwanda (Prunier 2009) and the criticism of

[54] The most influential work has been provided by Collier (2000) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
[55] Berdal, M. and Malone, D. M. (eds.) (2000) *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Nest, M. W. with Grignon, F. and Kisangani, E. F. (2006) *The Democratic Republic of Congo: economic dimensions of war and peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
[56] Jackson (2003).
[57] UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b).
[58] Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a; 2002b); Raeymaekers (2002).

the rational choice approach (Turner 2007). One of these analyses suggests that a critical understanding of political grievances and context in the DRC requires considering local level, context-specific analyses and the view from the bottom (Mwanasali 2000). In the sight of Mwanasali's perception lays the importance of bringing into the analysis the crucial issue of ethnicity, citizenship and the informal cross-border trade, even if his analysis basically disregarded the DRC's economic analysis over the past decade (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007; Turner 2007; MacGaffey *et al.* 1991; Raeymaekers 2009).[59] It could be stressed that this chapter explores state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC since 1996, with the focus on the eastern-DRC. The particularity of the1990s armed conflicts in the DRC is that these conflicts are 'multifaceted hybrid wars involving intrastate and interstate war, as well as cross-border insurgencies deriving from external repercussions, particularly from the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Carayannis 2003).

There are ramifications of a violent regional socio-political history – particularly Burundian and Rwandan civil wars and genocides which arose as a repercussion of the extension of neighbouring countries' internal conflicts into the DRC. This chapter offers a succinct chronology of events between 1996 and 2012 as it occurred in the Kivus and Oriental provinces, with the interference of Rwanda and Uganda. The chapter also introduces a concise conflict analysis of the DRC before the two wars and presents various fundamental issues in this region; ethnicity, identity, migration and citizenship. This demonstrates how the above mentioned elements have tied in with other existing issues – such as access to local resources, land rights and security for the people in the region, to cause conflicts and how they have set a complex environment which could explain war in the DRC. Subsequently, the chapter looks at the 1996-1997 conflict – War of Liberation, the 1998-2003 conflict – Mineral-Based Conflict, and the ongoing conflict afterwards in the eastern DRC deriving from the failure of the peace process. From the pre-colonial period, through the colonial epoch to its independence, accounts on the DRC's history and events are rich

[59] There is a substantial study of the economy of the colonial period by Hochschild (1998) and of the Mobutu era by Young and Turner (1985). Some economic analyses are available from the policy community such as the international financial institutions, the UN and NGOs, as national statistics from the DRC state have been largely unavailable for more than a decade (Putzel *et al.* 2008).

in conflicts and litigations. This is the result of strong vested interests and various actors' dissimilar world views. The analysis of conflict in the eastern DRC as set out in this chapter sheds light on the overriding context at the local level, embedded in historical, social, economic, political and cultural relations in the region. Overall, the analysis in this chapter is based on interpreting events and viewpoints that underline the conflict rather than reconciling different stances.

4.2 From the Congo Free State to the Independence

The history of the DRC reveals that the country has been a colony of exploitation shaped by foreign interests and intrusion. Hochschild (1998) and Bate's (2004) researches on the DRC[60] provide that King Léopold II of Belgium applied a brutal rule in the Congo Free State. Some other studies (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014) have ascertained that after 1885, the exploitation of the Congo's natural resources particularly that of rubber, was made possible through forced labour on the indigenous population. In 1908, the Congo Free State or the King's personal property became Belgian colony after international pressure intensified against the King Léopold II unfolding atrocities (Hochschild 1998). Ten million people or half of the population in the colony were believed to have died as an upshot of the King Léopold's brutal administration (ibid.).

After King Léopold II, the administration of Belgian state in the Congo was characterised by an extremely discriminative system, based on race. The political administration of Belgium in the then Congo was based on the notorious *Trinité Coloniale* [Colonial Trinity] of the State, the Catholic Church – missionary, and private company interests or large corporations – predominantly the mining companies (Martelli 1962; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Scholars (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006; Ergo 2008; Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014) have referred to as 'paternalistic[61] domination'. From 1916 to 1921

[60] The Kingdom of Kongo (1400 - 1914), which at its peak was the largest state in western Central Africa, covered what are now northern Angola, part of the DRC and part of the Republic of Congo (BBC n.d.). See www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/10Chapter2.shtml.

[61] Paternalism is a socio-political system under which an authority undertakes to supply needs or regulate conduct of those under its control in matters affecting them as individuals as well as in their relations to authority and to each other.

after Germany's defeat in the First World War, Belgium respectively and progressively occupied Ruanda-Urundi – present Rwanda and Burundi, and then took over the administration of both countries of German East Africa via a League of Nations mandate (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). From then on, the Belgian administration ruled the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi together – known as *Le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi* [Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi], with a single army and a single governor-general based in Kinshasa. The above mentioned 'colonial trinity' was applied to colonial entities to seek and inflict colonial master's domination through paternalism, white supremacy and administratively enforced ethnic divisions among Africans, and thereby built the basis of ethnic identity politics in Rwanda and Burundi (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 217). Throughout the colonial period, indigenous people were subjected to 'peasantisation and peripheralisation' as lifestyle. To Sosne (1979), this process was meant to develop plantations in fertile areas without building infrastructures to connect the region to the rest of the country. There was a framework for exploitation of the peasants, with local traditional authorities as intermediaries for the colonial administration, profiting and becoming powerful (ibid.).

4.2.1 The Independent Congo

Following the rise of continent-wide anti-colonial movements, the DRC got its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. Few months before the independence, the country held its first parliamentary elections under Belgian supervision. However, it should be noted that during the colonial period, the colonial-master-power had mainly kept Congolese from administrative responsibilities; neither was it willing to develop a competent political class amongst the Congolese.[62] Additionally, based on the extremely discriminative system applied during the colonial epoch, Belgians did not prepare Congolese politicians to take over the country after independence. There were only nine Congolese individuals with University degrees at the time of independence. Contrarily to the ten years granted to Nigeria to prepare for its independence (Davidson 1984), the DRC

[62] For more details, see BBC (2010b) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/10449507.stm

was given six months.[63] Allegedly the DRC's independence was intentionally granted hurriedly to ensure the collapse of the recently self-governing country (Pare 2000). Out of 32 government members – Heads of different government Departments, of the newly formed government, with Joseph Kasavubu as the first President and Patrice Lumumba as the first Prime Minister, only three had University degrees (Pare 2000).

Following five days of independence, the country experienced the army revolt nationwide and the breakaway of Katanga and Kasai provinces. In July-August 1960, the Katangan and Kasaian secessions, respectively led by the secessionists Moise Tshombe and Albert Kalondji, constituted the first roots of the Congo Crisis. The new Congolese government immediately sought for the UN assistance to fight secessionists and re-establish the sovereign state. The UN intervened in the new state with a number of 20,000 deployed troops by the time of its removal in 1964 (ICG n.d.). It is important to mention that this situation happened in the context of the Cold War and within a mineral-rich country whose wealth and geopolitical importance was at the centre of bipolarity system. The fear of the Western block was that Lumumba would seek military support from the East (Young and Turner 1985; Pare 2000; Peck 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; ISS c2008; ICG n.d.), as he was thought to be communist although this has not been proved (Pare 2000; Peck 2000). As a result, Patrice Lumumba and some of his comrades were detained and slain by the army in 1961, purportedly with the implication of the CIA, Belgian soldiers and Moise Tshombe (Pare 2000; Peck 2000; ISSc2008). It was also during this crisis that the then UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, died in a plane crash while he was on his way to the DRC for peace negotiation.

[63] In Africa, the United Kingdom launched the process of decolonization in the early 1950s. French independence in Africa was introduced in phases. Most of the French colonies in Black Africa became independent in 1960.The immense Belgian Congo was one of the richest colonies in Africa. After bloody riots in 1959, the Belgian Government quickly yielded to demands for independence in 1960. Portuguese colonies in Africa gained their independence only after the "Carnation Revolution" which took place in Lisbon in April 1974.Spanish Guinea and Western Sahara gained their independence from Spain during the period 1956 to 1975.
For more details, seehttp://www.the-map-as-history.com/maps/11-decolonization_independence.php

4.2.2 Rise and Fall of Mobutu

Mobutu's role in the history of the Congo is quite controversial. He is believed to be a political creation of the United States. In McNulty's (1999: 58) word: "he was seen as a reliable client in a state which was key to Western Cold War strategy in Africa". Colonel Joseph Mobutu was the rare Congolese elite who enjoyed the USA, France and Belgium support during the 1960 crisis period. This proved to be true in November 1965 when he took advantage of the extreme instability in the country to initiate a successful coup, with the support of the same CIA agent involved in Lumumba's assassination (Young and Turner 1985; Pare 2000; Peck 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). In view of the above, it is important to underline that Mobutu's first coup d'état happened in 1960 – 14 September, when he overthrew the government and arrested Lumumba with U.S. and CIA support.

With the entry of Mobutu into power, the country was ruled by a centralised administration system underpinned by horizontal elite networks. Mobutu's reign decreased the power of local networks and traditional authorities which was strengthened during the colonial rule (Young and Turner 1985; Putzel *et al.* 2008). Throughout his own networks, he set representatives of ethnic groups and took advantage of those that were vulnerable due to their political and social status as minorities (Jackson 2007). In the case of the eastern DRC, the minority of the Congolese Tutsi had been chosen owing to its elite networks (ibid.). However, how Rwandan Tutsi became Congolese Tutsi? To what extent are they important in terms of ethnic minority group at the heart of the conflict in the DRC?

According to skype interviews I conducted in Beni, Butembo and Goma with some Kivus' local leaders and those conducted in Kinshasa with two Kivus' traditional authorities, *Nande* and *Unde*[64] Mwamis, it has been said:

> "In 1965, Mobutu rose into power in a context of two ideology-divided-country; Marxism-Communism – spearheaded by the defeated Lumumba government's

[64] *Nande* and *Hunde* are two ethnic groups from the Kivus. According to these Mwamis, in the DRC, particularly in the Kivus, there is no minority in terms of ethnic group, since the country is made up of more than 400 ethnic groups. To them, all ethnic groups are minority. The concept of minority or vulnerable ethnic group has been purposely coined by certain elites from within and without the country for geopolitical and politician ends.

members, exiled in Stanleyville, and capitalism – represented by Kasavubu, Mobutu and his allies, based in Kinshasa. Theoretically, the new independent Congo was torn into two; the Republic of Congo with Léopoldville – Kinshasa, as the capital and the Popular Republic of Congo with Stanleyville – Kisangani, as the capital. Christophe Gbenye – the first Home Office Minister of Lumumba's government in 1960, was the President of the Popular Republic of Congo, with Antoine Gizenga – the former Vice-Prime Minister of the Congolese first elected government, as Prime Minister. Mulele Pière – the first National Education Minister following the independence, allied with Gizenga's government to fight what they called 'capitalist government' of Kinshasa. In 1964, following his military training in China, Mulele Pière, Gaston Soumialot and other nationalist-Lumumbists launched a vast nationalist uprising against Kinshasa's government. Marxist-Lumumbist leaders found favourable response from some local leaders in Bukavu – South Kivu, and Kwilu – Bandundu. The country plunged into a total and generalised instability along with the already Katanga and Kasai secessions. It was within this context that Mobutu deposed Kasavubu and took over the state's office. However, Mobutu encountered a vehement resistance of Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion with Bukavu and Kwilu as their strongholds.[65] Keen to stifle the upheaval, Mobutu allied with an influent Kivus' local leader from Furute village, near to Lemera and appealed to colonel Mulamba, also known as 'man of Bukavu'[66] to lead the troops. In his strategy of dividing local communities in order to smother Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion, Mobutu had to network with Banyarwanda living in the Kivus. The Furute's local leader liaised with Murita Kigongo, a Rwandan-Tutsi leader from Mulenge hills to fight against Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion. Following the Marxist-Lumumbist insurgence's defeat, Mobutu suggested Tutsi leaders to be called "Benamulenge" – a misspelling immediately corrected to Banyamulenge by Mobutu's collaborator with Swahili origins, in exchange for victory. It can be stressed that the first attempt to identifying Tutsi from Mulenge hills as

[65] See Appendix Three for more details on the Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion.

[66] During the 1994 Marxist-Mulelist uprising, Colonel Mulamba was coined as 'man of Bukavu' due to victory over the rebellion. It has also been said that being aware of the influence of colonel Mulamba's tactics of battle, Mobutu saw in him a potential foe, therefore was afraid of him and murdered him, it was said.

> Banyamulenge came from Mobutu. Tutsi leaders rather requested Mobutu to hire Tutsi children into the government as a reward. This was the entry-point to the public administration of Zaïre by Rwandan-Tutsi, with individuals such as Bisengimana Rema, Pay-Pay to name a few.[67] These Tutsi elites have held high rank positions in Zairian public institutions. This could be a possible interpretation of how and why Tutsis are part of influential policy-makers in the country".[68]

Another essential detail which marked Mobutu's reign was the implementation of certain major reforms among which the 'Bakajika Law' passed in 1966, the authenticity campaign in 1971 and the '*Zairianisation*' in 1973. The Bakajika Law transferred the land ownership – including mineral rights, to the state and was supposed to come up with a solution on inherent conflicts between the colonial individual land ownership or colonial land law system, and the customary system of land tenure (Meditz and Merrill 1993). *Authenticité* [Authenticity] campaign was seen as the African nationalism. Through this ideology, the country was renamed Zaïre and his name changed into Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu wa Za Banga, which in his mother tongue 'Nbgwandi' means "the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake" (History.com n.d.). The aforementioned 1966 Bakajika law was also reinforced through nationalisation of land. It affected significantly customary law and decreased traditional influences over rural lands (Putzel *et al.* 2008: v).

The *Zairianisation* campaign was based on *radicalisation* [nationalisation] of all foreign-owned businesses. From this campaign, Mobutu and his political elite patrons unduly took control of the nationalised enterprises for their own benefit (Young and Turner 1985) given that the process personalised both private and public funds, resulting in a notorious kleptocracy (ISS c2008). A new land law – the General Property Law, was also enacted and

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[67] According to a former Mobutu's collaborator living in London, Mobutu had personal connivance with Rwandan-Tutsis which he did not disclose to the Congolese. It is still believed that he was still indebted to Tutsi who helped him overcome the 1964 rebellion.

[68] Interviews conducted with Nande and Hunde Mwamis, Kinshasa, Augut 2013.

Skype interviews conducted with members of civil society, Beni, Butembo and Goma, July; September 2013.

allowed the state to have an absolute control over all lands (Meditz and Merrill 1993).[69] The 1971 and 1973 laws, nevertheless, remained evasive on the abolishment of the indigenous customary law. In the case of the individual land rights, land ownership was acquired from the state or through the customary land rights, but the future status of the land ownership remained uncertain (ibid.). Mobutu used the 1973 *Zairianisation* and the land law as tools towards reinforcing his patronage system as they were a means through which he constantly converted economic resources into a reserve of political resources for distribution against political loyalty (Van Acker 2005: 88). In doing so, Mobutu made significant realisation in terms of public goods delivery, education and primary health care provision.

4.2.3 From Economic Reforms to Economic Breakdown

After the 1970s' reforms, Zaïre experienced an economic meltdown and went through a constant decline particularly after 1974, when the copper price which was the state's economic backbone, fell drastically (Young and Turner 1985; Putzel *et al.* 2008). Following the collapse of copper price, state income was affected directly through nationalised mining companies, which thereafter had severe impacts on socio-economic activities of the country (Nest 2006b). Zaïre defaulted on debt payments to the international financial institutions, something which left room to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to publish a report in 1981 in which widespread corruption was critically pointed out, with Mobutu being unable to draw the line between personal property and state's (Young and Turner 1985). As an upshot, foreign investors left the country. Since then, the country kept defaulting on debt payments therefore resulting in the decline of the economy (ISS c2008). As in other developing countries, Zaïre embarked on reforms using Structural Adjustment Programmes recommended by the IMF (Zeilig 2009) in order to overcome the budgets shortfalls. These reforms were partially implemented by cutting expenditure on non-productive sectors such as health and education (ibid.).

[69] Van Acker (2005) gives a detailed analysis on the impact of the 1973 Land Law in the eastern DRC, see also the section in line with Ethnicity, citizenship and land in this thesis, which shows how this law is associated with the issue of ethnicity and citizenship.

The effect of the economic meltdown was momentous (Zeilig 2009) to the point that it almost disintegrated the country's infrastructure and affected agricultural production (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The public servants and army were miserably and erratically paid. The country lost a large number of professionals and skilled workforces. Most of the qualified labourers immigrated into South Africa in search of better conditions of life. Concomitantly, inflation drastically decreased the value of the already insufficient wages of the population. Life conditions became extremely difficult for the population and hence forced them to live at subsistence level. As the economy declined, the informal sector expanded countrywide. Another upshot of the shrinking national budgets was that Mobutu could no longer keep his horizontal elite networks, but instead created 'vertical networks based on ethnic and regional affiliation' for his power survival (Putzel *et al.* 2008: vi). Here is the importance of highlighting the rise of regional 'strongmen' or 'warlords' resulting from Mobutu's shift in strategy. Seen under the lens of a growing informal economy, it might be argued that using their connection with Mobutu, strongmen took control of the national economy and made use of coercive forces for their personal interests (Reno 1998; Nest 2006b).

4.2.4 DRC after the End of the Cold War

From independence to the dusk of the Cold War, Mobutu gained support from France, Belgium and the USA as he was seen as a guarantor of stability within a region in prey of ideological conflict (McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). For more than two decades since the 1970s, French troops for instance strongly supported Zaïre against inner Marxist rebellions – the case of Moba I and II in 1977 and 1978 respectively.[70] Mobutu also received military support from the West when there was competition between the superpowers over the decolonisation of Angola, Mozambique, and when white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa reached its paroxysm (McNulty 1999). Mobutu became indispensable for his supporters as he was strategically using this backdrop (Young and Turner 1985; McNulty 1999). In the early 1990s, with major changes resulting from the end of the Cold War, the geopolitics of Africa changed and Mobutu started facing the

[70] See appendix two for further details on Moba I and II.

withdrawal of financial and diplomatic support of the superpowers. In this context, while France and Belgium switched their position and advised Mobutu to leave power, the USA however still believed in him as an indispensable pillar for national unity in Zaïre (McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).

The sudden and significant shift brought by the end of the Cold War in the world geopolitics, associated with growing demand for multi-party democracy from inside and outside the country via insurrections and remonstrations were enough for Mobutu to accept multi-party democracy in 1990 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). After a series of national consultations that resulted in the populations' blunt calls for the end of the Mobutu regime, a transitional period announcing the end of the second Republic and the beginning of a third one started on 24th April 1990. For this transitional period, Mobutu promised to restore a multi-party system with three parties including his own party, a separation of his party from the state, a transitional government for one year, the drafting of a new constitution and the renewal of the three-tiered custom laws – traditional authorities.[71] All these pledges were auguring forthcoming democratic elections at all levels.

However, democratic transition failed owing to the dispute of leadership in the opposition, political turmoil and crisis as well as the ability of Mobutu to manipulate and weaken the opposition (Zeilig 2009; Lanotte 2010). Based on Mobutu's manipulations, the USA urged the opposition to agree on power sharing with Mobutu and to facilitate the process for democratic elections through the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* [Sovereign National Conference; CNS] due to a belief by the Americans that Mobutu would be able to maintain national unity (McNulty 1999). Mobutu rationally used American support to sabotage the transition by further manipulating the existing divisions in the opposition united in the CNS (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Jackson 2007). Through his usual strategies of 'divide-and-rule', he was able to maintain significant powers, including control of the security systems and key Departments (Wrong 2001; Zeilig 2009). In doing so, he was able to suppress

[71] The structure of traditional authorities is explained in the section in line with Ethnicity, citizenship and land.

democratic protests with violent means, including the Lubumbashi and Christians' massacres respectively in 1990[72] and 1992.[73]

After some upheavals in August 1992, Étienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the cartel of opposition parties – kwon as *Union Sacrée* [Sacred Union], was elected the transitional Prime Minister and mandated to form and lead a transitional Government of National Unity (Zeilig 2009). After a few days Mobutu ejected the Tshisekedi government and appointed Kengo-wa-Dondo as the transitional Prime Minister (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). This decision was supported by the USA and France whereas Belgium attitudinally remained unenthusiastic (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The international community overlooked the CNS outcomes as sovereign and binding on all parties particularly when it came to appointing and evicting the transitional government (ibid: 1). The country went through a deeper crisis due to the loss of the momentum for democratic transition, the crisis of leadership, and the disorientation of the political class and social forces (Zeilig 2009). As a consequence, the eastern DRC's territories have been embroiled with an endless inter-community rivalries and poverty, as well as insecurity for the population ascended by 1996 (ibid.). It is within this context that the 1996-1997 military rebellion of Laurent Désiré Kabila – who was politically supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, came to pass (Lemarchand 1997). From this point, it should be noted that the beginning of ethnic conflict in the north Kivu was in 1993. This situation was worsened by the repercussion of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The review of this local conflict is essential as it depicts the context and events that have been the underlying factors behind the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. Before exploring the two Congo Wars, the upcoming section analyses the critical correlation between ethnicity, citizenship and land. This resulted in marginalisation, inequality and insecurity from which is drawn the unfolding conflict with its corollaries in the eastern DRC.

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[72] On 11 May 1990, a few students at the University of Lubumbashi, who were against the continuing dictatorship by Mobutu, were killed by security forces, and their bodies disappeared (Zeilig 2009). This triggered economic sanctions internationally and facilitated the economic decline of the Mobutu reign (Takeuchi 1997).

[73] On 16 February 1992, several hundred thousand of Christians in Kinshasa assembled and marched to demonstrate peacefully for the reopening of the National Conference. The manifestation was harshly repressed by the army, causing between 16 and 49 deaths depending on the source (de Dorlodot 1994; de Villers 1995: 230; de Villers and Omasombo 1997: 71-72; Kabamba and Kasusula 1992b: 147-149 bis; Malenge 1992: 109-125; Oyatambwe 1997: 127-133).

4.2.5 Divide to Reign Strategy: Ethnicity, Citizenship and Land

As noted previously, ethnicity has been one of Mobutu's ruling strategies. In the DRC, the concept of ethnicity closely related to citizenship. It was a civic terms and an aftermath of membership of the central state. However, in ethnic terms, it is a result of membership in the Native Authority (Mamdani 1998: 2-4).[74] Although there have been growth in literature on ethnicity as a root-cause of the conflict in the eastern DRC, it is crucial to understand how the Banyarwanda,[75] thus the Congolese with Rwandan origins, played a central role in the conflict owing to the deprivation of both their civic and ethnic citizenship (Mamdani 1998; Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 2008).[76] Furthermore, the understanding of the aforementioned concepts also implies to have a clear understanding of issues regarding access to land and citizenship. To this end, it is important to bear in mind that in the DRC, access to land is strongly attached to ethnicity and citizenship. It is a fact that in the densely populated areas in the eastern DRC, Land is still a fundamental source of livelihood (Sosne 1979; Van Acker 2005; Turner 2007). In Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers' (2005: 9) words: it is "the single most important local economic resource". The 1973 land law commoditised land and provoked a changing pattern of inequality and distortion of the existing patrimonial systems (Van Acker 2005). In the DRC, particularly, in the Kivus, ethnicity is strongly entrenched with issues such as migration, access to land, resources, entitlements and security, whereas ethnic citizenship has been intricately linked to shifting relationships under the Native Authority system, which deeply characterises the local socio-political environment (Mamdani 1998; 2001).

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[74] Mamdani (1998) has elaborated these parallel citizenships stemmed from the two legal regimes of the colonial period; racialised civic authority and ethnicised customary Native Authority. While the civic authority was de-racialised at independence, the Native Authority became further embedded within the ethnic context and remained as a means to control the majority of the rural population, even when the state was perceived to have collapsed. See also Mamdani (2001).

[75] The prefix, 'banya'means literally 'people from' (Clark 2008).

[76] Turner (2007) provides detailed accounts on local politics and identity in the eastern DRC. Clark (2008) illustrates a similar fate of refugees and migrants from Rwanda in Uganda. Their citizenship status was precarious and vulnerable, and influenced by political developments in Uganda. The attack on Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front – RPF, which resulted in the Rwandan civil war in 1990, was initially formed by the Rwandan refugees in Uganda and is considered to have been triggered by the passage of the 1990 land bill that prohibited land ownership by non-citizens, specifically by Rwandan refugees and their children.

According to Mamdani (1998: 9), the three-tiered Native Authority in the Kivus is based on "a chief of the locality at the lowest level, the *Chef de Groupement* [Chief of the local pool] and the Mwami of the *Collectivité* [collectivity] at the highest level". 'Non-indigenous' ethnic groups usually have only the chief of the locality from amongst their own ranks, but 'indigenous' ethnic groups are entitled to a *Chef de Groupement* and a Mwami of the *Collectivité* from their own ranks. This difference in the right to the Native Authority has been critical since only the *Chef de Groupement* and the Mwami of the *Collectivité* possess the customary authority in administration, therefore the only ones entitled to check ethnic belonging, issue identity cards, distribute customary land for livelihood and deliver customary justice. Likewise, in Rwanda and Burundi ethnicity has been an ideological discourse exploited intentionally to manipulate fear and support, as it always leads to violent conflict and refugee flows to neighbouring countries (Evans 1997; Mamdani 2001).[77] The political history of Rwanda and Burundi suggests that violent events are always associated with political development in these very small poor countries with some of the uppermost population densities in Africa. Different conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi have had side-effects in neighbouring countries, spanning from refugee flows through influencing political developments in host countries to causing a series of violent conflicts, associated with impunity (Evans 1997; Takeuchi 2006). The 'social revolution' of the Hutu, led by Grégoire Kayibanda in Rwanda between 1959 and 1962, the murder of Prince Rwagasore in Burundi in 1961, the genocide of the Hutu middle class in 1972 and the domination of Tutsi in Burundi, the purge of Tutsi following Juvénal Habyarimana's coup in Rwanda in 1973, and the brutal crushing of a Hutu revolt in Burundi in 1988 illustrate some turning points in this region (Evans 1997; Lemarchand 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). These events resulted in some 480,000 Rwandan Tutsi becoming refugees in neighbouring countries by the 1980s, and 240,000 Hutu having fled Burundi (Evans 1997). The settlement of these refugees in the host countries fuelled rumour, violence and reprisals (ibid.).

[77] Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu [the provincial capital of North Kivu and South Kivu respectively] suggested that Kivu Provinces in the eastern DRC is where losers in Rwanda traditionally end up, and it is from the Kivus that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001: 234).

The focus in this section is primarily on ethnic groups of Rwandan origin – Congolese nationals with Rwandan origins, owing to their role in the development of conflicts in the eastern DRC. Broadly, two groups of population compose the eastern DRC. These groups are the 'indigenous' or those who derive from groups which lie totally within the territorial domain of the current DRC and the Banyarwanda or Congolese nationals with Rwandan origins (Reed 1998: 143). According to Mamdani (2002: 494),[78] the Banyarwanda are "first and foremost a cultural identity, speakers of a common language, Kinyarwanda". In the DRC, the concept of nationality is taken as a sensitive issue. "Since independence, citizenship law, although theoretically 'national' and 'objective', was, in fact, completely political and driven by the need to deal with the Rwandophone population of the East", suggests Prunier (2009: 457). Owing to the sensitive nature of citizenship for the Banyarwanda and different identities that are socially created, accounts of the Banyarwanda's origins diverge depending on the source (Clark 2008). Although there have been consecutive flows of migrants in the region throughout history, there are not reliable statistic data on different migrant groups that remember, interpret and re-imagine their collective history in different ways (Vlassenroot 2002; Clark 2008).

In the DRC, the Banyarwanda are Rwandan migrants who settled into the DRC long before the independence period (Lemarchand 1997), those who belong to the DRC after colonial division (Mamdani 1998; 2001),[79] as work forces in the agricultural plantations and mining companies through colonial promotion (Lemarchand 1997; Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins *et al.* 2005),[80] and those who fled Rwanda to the DRC after the political violence in the early 1960s (Lemarchand 1997). The first Rwandophone settlers who arrived in the south Kivu in the end of the 19th century are believed to be some Rwandan pastoralists. Their arrival has been widely debated and controversially interpreted (Mamdani 2001;

[78] Kinyarwanda is the national language spoken in Rwanda and by the Banyarwanda tribe, and *exactly* the same whether spoken by Hutu or Tutsi (Prunier 2009: 368) and some scholars designate these people, who speak Kinyarwanda, Rwandophone. Mamdani (1998) states that although they were historically divided into three groups based on territories, the division between Hutu and Tusti was not essential until about 1996.

[79] Jackson (2007: 483 - 484) claims that the borders between the eastern DRC, Burundi and Rwanda are not as artificial as many other borders in Africa and "roughly follows what was once one amongst several "African frontiers". However, there was the westward expansion of Rwanda prior to colonial period though being partial and tentative.

[80] The colonial administration "was aware it risked upsetting the delicate intercommunity balance" by supplying labour from Rwanda and was, at the same time, reducing the demographic pressure in Rwanda (Jackson 2007: 484).

Vlassenroot 2002).[81] With permission from the colonial administration, the early pastoralist migrants settled in the high plains, then extended their occupation further in the south of the high plateau (Mamdani 2001). The colonial labour migrants however were living in urban areas and the refugees in refugee camps (ibid.). Based on their settlements, Banyarwanda were identified as the Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi in the north Kivu, and the Banyamulenge in the south Kivu (Mamdani 1998; 2001).

The Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi were mostly consisted of Hutus whereas the Banyamulenge were Tutsi. Furthermore, while the Hutu of Ruchuru were regarded as 'indigenous', therefore had their own Native Authority, the Hutus of Masisi were denied the indigenous status. This was also the case for the Tutsi of Mulenge who never had their own Native Authority (Mamdani 1998; 2001). Settled in Itombwe, the Banyamulenge were described as 'Pastoralists of Itombwe' or 'Tutsi of Itombwe' or 'Banyarwanda' during the colonial era (Jackson 2007). Around the 1960s and 1970s, 'Pastoralists of Itombwe' became 'Banyamulenge' – meaning inhabitants of Mulenge hills. Vlassenroot (2002) and Jackson (2007) see in this change of appellation a means of claiming indigenous status and qualifying for social and political entitlements by distinguishing themselves from Rwanda and the latecomers. However, the tactic of changing their identity from ethnicity (Rwandan) to the territory (the hill of Mulenge), hence making them natives, rebounded against them in their claim for nationality following the restricted citizenship law in 1981, mentioned later (Jackson 2007). Suspicions and perceptions rose within the aboriginal communities about the Banyamulenge that they tried hiding their true identity with a 'counterfeit one', making for distrustful nationality in the foreseeable future (Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007).

Throughout the eastern DRC, the majority of the population consists of aboriginals, except a few territories in the north Kivu, particularly Masisi. Although the Banyarwanda in Masisi seemed to be the majority, they were still bound to pay customary tribute to the Native Authority, the indigenous local chiefs (Reed 1998). This is what Huggins *et al.* (20005) consider as the cause of the first main rebellion against the indigenous chiefs at

[81] According to Jackson's (2007) claim, it was by the middle of the 19th century.

independence, the *Guerre des Kinyarwanda* [Kinyarwanda war] in the north Kivu, marking the beginning of local conflict. From this event, Banyarwanda citizenship became a sensitive issue although they were acknowledged as Congolese at independence,[82] neither was their status defined in the Fundamental Law[83] (Mamdani 1998). As explained in the following sections, during the Mobutu regime, three essential decrees on citizenship (in 1972, 1981 and 1991) were passed out. The aftermath of the 1972 Burundi massacres and purges of the Hutu middle class, Burundian refugees flooded into Zaïre and responded by threatening the existing Banyarwanda minority – composed of Tutsis, to avenge Hutus; which created fright amongst the indigenous Congolese (Mamdani 1998; 2001). This situation prompted Mobutu to enact a citizenship decree in 1972 to protect the status of the Banyarwanda minority.

Broadly all Banyarwanda population, even those who had come from Rwanda as refugees in 1959 and 1960 received the citizenship. Behind this decree, however, was Mobutu's desire to marginalise and weaken traditional authorities in order to strengthen the centralised horizontal networks of elites, including Tutsi Banyarwanda as the vulnerable minority (Putzel *et al.* 2008). As stated by Mamdani (1998: 2001):

> "However, the decree was considered to be signed under the influence of Bisengimana, a *Chef de Cabinet présidentiel* [Director of Presidential Office or chief of staff], one of the 1959 Rwandan Tutsi refugees. The decision was, therefore, perceived as representing a rise in power of the Tutsi Banyarwanda minority over the 'indigenous' Congolese and the other Banyarwanda population, who had arrived earlier than 1959 and were mainly Hutu, and this led to a division between Hutu and Tutsi in the Banyarwanda communities in the eastern Zaïre".

As mentioned earlier, the 1973 land law commoditised land. The removal of the existing customary ownership of land was replaced by individual land ownership as it allowed the purchase of any land that was not titled (Huggins *et al.* 2005). Notwithstanding the fact that

[82] The Banyarwanda were permitted to partake in the provincial and municipal elections both as voters and candidates in 1960, and this suggests that they were accepted as Congolese at independence (Mamdani 1998).
[83] The Fundamental Law states that "the Congolese people will themselves decide this issue" (Mamdani 1998: 5).

the state owned all the lands, previous customary land rights remained valid on the ground; and personal land rights could also be acquired through indigenous customary law though the future land tenure was not guaranteed (Meditz and Merrill 1993). Besides, registration of personally owned land was partial, which paved the way for land quarrels principally from uncertain land tenures (ibid.). To secure their lands against non-indigenous, aboriginals registered their plantations. Sosne (1979: 199), for instance, stated:

> "Following the endorsement of this law, 'indigenous' 'peasants hurried to register small family plots to secure their tenancy' through which the Native Authorities profited from customary duties".

However, having been denied equal access to land by the customary right, the Banyarwanda began purchasing land on the market (Mamdani 1998; Reed 1998; Huggins *et al.* 2005). In his analysis based on the effect of the 1973 land law in the eastern DRC, Van Acker (2005) is of the view that the application of this modern law annihilated the traditional patrimonial system, base of social cohesion and public goods hence destroyed the social structure to allow marginalisation and inequality.

The 1973 land law enabled the Banyarwanda to acquire large parts of former colonial estates, hence letting them become prominent in the local economy (Huggins *et al.* 2005; Van Acker 2005; Jackson 2007).[84] With Zaïrian citizenship acquired from the 1972 citizenship decree, they were rewarded with some positions in politics and the Zaïrian army, opine Huggins *et al.* (2005: 2). Although these were advantages, they kept paying customary tributes for the land they got to the local chiefs of the groups to which they did not belong neither were they entitled to have local chiefs of their own (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins *et al.* 2005). The Banyarwanda had acquired vast land. This alienation of land gave rise to the resentment of indigenous population against them (Jackson 2007). The Banyarwanda were invigorated by their new status and endeavoured to reach representation in both local and national politics. The indigenous population became afraid of the Banyarwanda minority groups soaring too powerful, and so contested citizenship for them

[84] The Benyarwanda acquired in "fertile highland areas of Masisi and Rutshuru [in North Kivu] more than 90 per cent of the colonial plantations and some of the biggest ranches", and this action provoked tensions leading to inter-ethnic conflict in Masisi and Rutshuru in 1993 (Van Acker 2005: 88).

(Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins *et al.* 2005). With the feeling of being rebutted by the indigenous, the Banyarwanda, particularly the Banyamulenge, linked with international human rights NGOs in the attempt of improving their status. However, for the indigenous population the Banyarwanda had expansionist ambitions, seeking to access the state institutions, especially in the security sector (Huggins *et al.* 2005; Vlassenroot 2002).

Owing to the rising prominence of the Banyarwanda, the indigenous majority Congolese became afraid of the Banyarwanda minority winning the 1977 legislative elections therefore gaining political power (Mamdani 1998; 2001). This period coincided with two major events in the country; firstly it was the time when state's economy had drastically collapsed. Secondly, it was the time when Mobutu switched his strategy from horizontal networks of elites to vertical networks of power, based on his divide-and-rule strategy (Putzel *et al*. 2008). In this shifting political environment, the 1977 elected parliament passed out a new exclusive citizenship law in 1981 (Mamdani 1998; 2001).

According to the 1981 citizenship law, individuals who would be able to prove the existence of their ancestors in Zaïre prior to the colonial division in 1885 would be entitled to be citizens of Zaïre. For all the Banyarwanda communities, the 1981 citizenship law was crucial. First, this decree considered the Banyarwanda as a single group regardless of the different time periods and circumstances of their arrival into Zaïre, partially due to the difficulty of finding proof of their heritage (Reed 1998). In reality, this law was promulgated to remove from the Banyarwanda the rights to vote and to purchase land (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). The Banyarwanda were entitled to vote during the provincial assembly elections in 1985, but could not run for office because of their confusing status (Mamdani 1998; 2001). Due to physical boycott of the Banyarwanda populations, particularly Tutsi, assemblies in the north and south Kivus were not elected (ibid.).

On the grounds of the 1981 citizenship law, an identification mission for Zaïrians living in the Kivus, authorised by Mobutu in 1989, was expedited. Following this mission, many of the Tutsi Banyarwanda populations' citizenship status were removed (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Vlassenroot 2002). These Banyamulenge have been reproached of having counterfeited their identity as members of the aboriginal population without proving so

(Jackson 2007). Having felt it as an affront, many young Tutsi Banyarwanda joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front – RPF, the Tutsi-dominated rebel group based in Uganda, when the RPF launched its attack against the Hutu-governed Rwanda during the Rwandan civil war in October 1990.[85] During the CNS in 1991, nationality had already been a tremendously controversial issue (Mamdani 1998). The Banyarwanda, nevertheless, were not permitted to attend the CNS and were experiencing probable further marginalisation as they were on the verge of losing their citizenship status. The Hutu Banyarwanda populations reacted to this conflict by creating organisations to counter marginalisation, for example, the Farmers and Livestock Raisers Cooperative of Virunga – Magrivi (Reed 1998). Magrivi reacted against their exclusion from the 1991 CNS by suspending to pay customary tributes to local chiefs. However, the CNS responded to the requests of the north and south Kivus delegates by reconsidering the citizenship issue through adopting a resolution which approved the 1981 citizenship law (Mamdani 1998).

The CNS resolution brought a significant polarisation between the indigenous majority and the non-indigenous Banyarwanda minority (ibid.). Nearly half of the north Kivu population of about 3.5 million were assumed to be the Banyarwanda in 1993, with the Hutu and Tutsi being 80 percent and 20 percent respectively (Lemarchand 2003). The growing number of non-indigenous Banyarwanda minority through successive flows of refugees became a source of threat for the indigenous majority. Similarly, the non-indigenous Banyarwanda became aware of their marginalisation by the indigenous majority (Mamdani 1998). In Mamdani's (ibid: 8) words:

> "The Tutsi Banyarwanda were increasingly regarded as one particular group amid the non-indigenous Banyarwanda minority, and the name 'Banyamulenge' was used as 'a generic one for all Congolese Tutsi'; which made the Tutsi Banyarwanda population aware of the similar situation for all Tutsi despite their different backdrops".

[85] The Rwandan civil war involved the Rwandan government led by a Hutu president, Habyarimana, and the rebel group, the RPF. It began on 1 October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Army – RPA, the military arm of the RPF, invaded Rwanda, and officially ended on 4 August 1993 when the Arusha Accords were signed. More details are provided by Prunier (1995) and Clark (2008).

Following Mobutu's shifting strategy, the Banyarwanda were first favoured and empowered, then marginalised through the manipulation of citizenship and commodification of land thereafter. This strategy characterised land issues in this extremely inhabited and land-scarce region – Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern DRC (Mamdani 1998). Under the 1973 land law regime, individuals had two options to become land tenant; "through a market deal [for individuals who could purchase] and through declaring one's customary rights as a member of a Native Authority" (ibid: 14). The latter was political but entitled the poor to have land. Mobutu's strategy triggered socio-political conflicts particularly in Masisi and Walikale, the north Kivu, in 1993. Initially the conflict was over land access between poor Hutu and rich Hutu, and then became an inter-ethnic war in the above mentioned territories. The conflict opposed those who were entitled to land through a customary authority – the indigenous Bahunde and Banyanga, to the non-indigenous Banyarwanda (Lemarchand 1997; 2003; Mamdani 1998; 2001; Reed 1998).[86] As a result, about 10,000 people were killed and some 250,000 fled within six months (Lemarchand 1997).[87] Mobutu's troops intervened to stop the violence (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Reed 1998).

It is within this context that in late 1993 flows of nearly 50,000 Burundian refugees flooded in the south Kivu during the aftermath of the Burundian Civil War and almost one million Hutu refugees arrived at the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the entrance of the Hutu refugees into the eastern DRC and the creation of the armed refugee camps in this zone considerably changed the nature of ethnic conflict in the eastern DRC. The arrival of the new waves of armed refugees divided Hutu and Tutsi amongst the Banyarwanda and fuelled the inter-ethnic conflict between the Banyarwanda and the indigenous population (Reed 1998). The following section underlines this development by analysing the impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

[86] As the Native Authorities were at the heart of the sale of land, they seem to have changed the focus of the conflict to ethnic discourse, in order to avoid blame for selling land to 'non-indigenous' population (Huggins *et al.* 2005).

[87] The estimates vary depending on the source. For example, Reed (1998) estimates between 14,000 and 40,000 deaths and the displacement of 350,000 in 1993 alone.

4.2.6 Impact of the Rwandan Genocide in the DRC Crisis

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 was the significant moment in the history of the region during the 1990s (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 216). It was a logical upshot of a socio-political ideology based on exclusion. The holocaust drew its root from earlier large-scale massacres and the flight of Rwandans with Tutsi origins into exile, and was anchored in the history of ethnic identity construction and mobilisation under colonial rule (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).[88] Having become useless after the Cold War and barely gripping to power, Mobutu used this opportunity to show his backers the strategic importance of Zaïre, especially France, where Mobutu had personal relationship with the Mitterrand family and which continued supporting him (McNulty 1999; ISS c2008). Subsequently, during the Rwandan civil war, French and Zaïrian troops were of a significant role in supporting the former Rwandan government led by Habyarimana, the Hutu president, to fight the RPF and to reinstate themselves in the eastern Zaïre through two interventions. The first intervention happened in 1990, when Mobutu sent the *Force Armée Zaïroise* [Zaïrian Armed Forces; FAZ] for the French-led intervention in Rwanda, *Opération Noroît* [Noroît Operation], in order to defend the Hutu-led government from the RPF attacks. However, the then Rwandan president Habyarimana requested the departure of Mobutu's troops because they were looting and raping Rwandan civilians rather than protecting them (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999).

France also provided troops to Rwanda, allegedly to train the Rwandan army, *Forces Armées Rwandaises* [Rwandan Armed Forces; FAR], and defend foreign nationals. Evidence on the ground however proved their direct involvement in the fighting as they were supporting the FAR (Reed 1998). During the 1994 '*Opération Turquoise'* [Turquoise Operation], French military intervention occurred in the almost completed genocide in Rwanda via the eastern Zaïre. Supported by the FAZ, French troops ostensibly intended to end the genocide, defend refugees and hand them over to the UN, following agreement with the French-drafted UN mandate (McNulty 1999). Notwithstanding the 1993 Arusha

[88] Some scholars, such as Lemarchand (1997) give a similar interpretation.

agreements[89] and a full arms embargo,[90] France kept equipping the FAR and the former Rwandan government (Reed 1998). The objective of France in this intervention was to prevent the RPF victory and force them to share power with the former Rwandan government; yet, France did not achieve its objective (McNulty 1999). As an alternative, France created a safe humanitarian zone and facilitated the displacement of the defeated FAR and *Interahamwe*,[91] known as the *Génocidaires*,[92] as well as portions of the Rwandese population into the protected area before helping them move into exile in the eastern Zaïre (Prunier 1995; McNutly 1999). Reed (1998) reported that through Zaïre, France purportedly also continued to help the exiled Rwandan government to preserve their well-equipped troops and key command structure through re-arming them in refugee camps if they had been disarmed. From this operation France lost trustworthiness for its interventions (McNulty 1999).

Following the 1994 Rwanda genocide, estimates of the number of Rwandans who moved into exile in the eastern Zaïre and settled ranged from 800,000 to 1.7 million (Reuters AlertNet n.d.; Prunier 1998). These figures vary depending on the source, partially because of the highly political nature of their presence (Lemarchand 1997). Over 500,000 refugees fled into Tanzania. Due to less influence of the former Rwandan government vis-à-vis Tanzania, Tanzanian authorities had more effective control of the camps (Reed 1998). It is arguably believed that the Rwandan refugees moved from Rwanda with nearly everything when they fled; the military capacity, skilled and educated human resources and even state-owned resources that were located both domestically and abroad (ibid.). The refugee camps in the eastern Zaïre were located along the border with Rwanda and Burundi and were well

[89] The Arusha Peace Agreement was meant to bring an end to the Rwandan civil war. It was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on 4 August 1993 by the Rwandan government, led by President Habyarimana, and the RPF, as a result of talks between 12 July 1992 and 24 June 1993, with the support of the USA, France and the Organization of African Unity. It included a set of five protocols. See UN Peacemaker (1993).

[90] UN Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) was applied to both the Rwandan government and the RPF. See UNSC (1994).

[91] The Rwandan government, led by president Habyarimana, described the youth movement of his single party, *Interahamwe*, as "[t]hose who work together" (Prunier 1995: 367-368). *Interahamwe* was "the first civilian militia, officially created for tasks of social interest", and was "later the main perpetrators of the genocide" (ibid.).

[92] The French word, *génocidaires*, was initially merely descriptive to mean "[t]hose who committed the genocide", but has attained political connotation to suggest "people who had not taken part in the genocide but who were considered hostile to the new regime" (Prunier 2009: xxi).

controlled by the former Rwandan authorities (Prunier 1998; Reed 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).

Within refugee camps, former Rwandan authorities continued to promote the *Génocidaires* ideology and planned cross-border attacks on Rwanda, with hope of re-conquering Rwanda and ensure continuity of the genocide (ibid; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Apart from the full state treasury and the full military power taken from Rwanda, they oversaw the movement of goods and services in the camps. They also had the complete control of information and humanitarian assistance. Under the command of political leaders, they recognised a military structure of about 50,000 elements by early 1995 (Reed 1998).

Aware of having lost his Cold War importance, the establishment of a small state of the former Rwandan government within the eastern Zaïre became a vital strategy for Mobutu (Reed 1998). Mobutu became indispensable for the international community in its attempts to speak for regional instability caused by the former Rwandan government in the eastern Zaïre. Anxious to stifle a strong opposition to the Zaïrian state and economic autonomy which rose from the eastern part of the country, Mobutu reinforced his influence through the long-established relationship with the government of Rwanda in exile. Zaïre came back to the forefront map through helping the defeated Rwandan authorities in its land, ensuring their safe movement inside and outside its territory, assuring their residence and permitting the settlement of military training camps (ibid.). Also, it reportedly helped the former Rwandan government with arms supply (Evans 1997; Reed 1998). Unpaid Zaïrian soldiers were fending for their own survival through arms trafficking, whereas Zaïre was accused of facilitating extensive arms traffics via an international network of traders from Britain, China and South Africa.

Zaïrian assistance allowed the defeated Rwandan authorities to pursue a plan of rebellion in Rwanda (Reed 1998). In October 1994, the armed Rwandan refugees launched their first cross-border attacks from their camps in the eastern Zaïre. These incursions escalated to several attacks inside Rwandan territory, including the capital, Kigali and the second largest city, Butare. The intention of the defeated Rwandan government to continue a full-scale assault of Rwanda was unveiled. From this point, the new Rwandan regime decided to combat against the armed Rwandan refugees in the eastern Zaïre (Evans 1997; Reed 1998).

After they realised that it was difficult to destabilise the newly formed Rwandan government, they shifted their strategy and secured their long-term presence in the eastern Zaïre, by connecting with other rebellions in the region[93] (Reed 1998). More essentially for the north Kivu, they also decided to capitalise the aforesaid 1993 existing local ethnic conflict between the indigenous Congolese population and the Banyarwanda. In association with the Hutu Banyarwanda, they started assaulting the Tutsi Banyarwanda instead of fighting the indigenous Congolese (ibid.). The violence also provoked a growing tension between the Tutsi Banyarwanda and other groups, who feared the armed Rwandan refugees' attacks (Reed 1998).

In the face of escalating tension, the Kivus' Native Authority began creating its own local militia, called Mai-Mai[94] (Mamdani 1998). By 1995, Attacks upon the Tutsi Banyarwanda exacerbated due to those local militias involving in violence and by the underpaid FAZ troops who colluded with the well-resourced former Rwandan authorities (Lemarchand 1997; Reed 1998; Lanotte 2010; ibid.). The armed Rwandan refugees eventually extended their raids into the south Kivu where they massacred the Banyamulenge; at the same time, local authorities appropriated land acquired by the Banyamulenge in the valley (Reed 1998; Mamdani 2001). Furthermore, the Parliament of Transition decided to expel the Banyamulenge and Hutu Banyarwanda as they were recent refugees (Mamdani 2001).

Following the aforesaid parliament decision, the tension reached its zenith between March and May 1996. The remaining Banyamulenge from Masisi and Ruchuru were identified and taken into refugee camps in Gisenyi, the border town in Rwanda (Mamdani 1998). Anti-Tutsi hatred grew progressively serious by the summer of 1996 when the FAZ, the *Interahamwe*, ex-FAR and local Hutu militia groups intensified attacks against Banyamulenge, provoking the movement of between 100,000 and 250,000 people inside

[93] For example, the Hutu militia in Burundi, Milton Obote and the northern rebel movements in Uganda, and the Sudanese government (Reed 1998).

[94] The name comes from the word "Maji – pronounced Mai or Mayi in the Kivus", and means water in Kiswahili, referring to "the powers claimed for ritually blessed water to render all those on whom it is sprinkled immune to the life-destroying effect of bullets"(Mamdani 2001: 340). The Mai Mai militia was considered to be based in Masisi and Walikale, consisting of the Bahunde and the Batembo, however, they became a generic term for all militias in the Kivus provinces linked to "indigenous Native Authorities" (ibid: 258).

Zaïre (Prunier 2009; Reed 1998). Many of these individuals moved back to Rwanda with more Banyamulenge joining the RPF, which supported the indigenous population's views that they were Rwandans (Mamdani 1998). Subsequently, by September 1996, the all Tutsi population had been evacuated from the north Kivu (Reed 1998). Similarly, the Banyamulenge were militarised and increasingly perpetrated retaliatory offensives (Prunier 2009).

Given that Zaïre was a collapsed state by that time, the international community, especially France and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – UNHCR, was responsible for disarming the Rwandan refugee camps in the Kivus and isolate the *génocidaires* from civilians (Mamdani 1998). The international community, however, did not have such policies neither did they have political willingness in this regard (Reed 1998).[95] The Tutsi population in the DRC were particularly disgruntled with France as the latter facilitated the settlement of the armed Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC (Sawada 1997). Subsequently, Zaïrian and Rwandan authorities agreed upon closing the refugee camps in the eastern Zaïre and unconditionally repatriate all Rwandan refugees to Rwanda (Reed 1998). In the face of the failure of the international community to act, the Rwandan transitional authorities however came to the point where they felt they had to deal or align themselves with the Hutu armed refugee camps in the eastern DRC (Prunier 2009). This decisive action eventually led to the attack of the refugee camps in October 1996, with the rising of Laurent Kabila as the spearhead of the first Congo War, as detailed in the upcoming section (Lemarchand 1997).

4.3 The Rise of Laurent Kabila and the AFDL: The 1996-1997 War of Liberation

In the socio-political context illustrated above, the War of Liberation led by Laurent Kabila in 1996 toppled Mobutu from power within six months. It should be stressed at this point that Zaïre was a collapsed state with declining legitimacy which emerged from unsuccessful democratic transition as well as the loss of international support and economic ruin (Raeymaekers 2007; Vlassenroot 2008). However, it is also vital to acknowledge that

[95] The international community's assistance to the armed Hutu refugee camps on humanitarian grounds was against the peace building policies (Shinoda 2006).

the persistence of the political system was the result of private supports from informal privatisation. If "the political system had persisted, it was filled by various non-state actors as state sovereignty had been undergoing a gradual process of informal privatisation since the 1980s, whereby a fend for yourself attitude served as social pact between state and society", said Vlassenroot (2008: 2-3) and where de-bureaucratised patrimonialism resulted in growing self-sufficiency of local strongmen (Reno 1998). Depending on the state's capacity to strengthen its system of control and distribution, those informal social and economic networks gradually governed the state (Vlassenroot 2008). This was the case particularly in the periphery including the Kivus, where the control of local resources and trade was in the hands of various actors who in turn could challenge the state (ibid.). The economic and institutional collapse had devastating impact on the population. The population suffering reached the peak level of poverty, particularly at the eastern borders where people's survival largely depended on an informal economy in which they played shifting roles (Raeymaekers 2009a).

Although there was paucity of data on the livelihood of the population during that time,[96] fieldwork in the eastern DRC highlighted the negative effect of the state's failure on the population (Sawada 1997). Findings from the fieldwork, for instance, suggest:

> "In the face of the economic meltdown and the hyperinflation, educators at schools faced non-payment but were supplied with small amounts of money and crops from the parents; medical care was only provided by some churches; and roads maintenance stopped in 1993 and many routes became accessible only by bicycles".[97]

For Prunier (2009), however, this situation exacerbated when poverty tied in with insecurity caused by the heightened tensions and violence from the citizenship and land issues since 1993. This was further worsened by the quick militarisation of the area with the presence of the armed Rwandan refugee camps in the eastern Zaïre in 1994, and the international community's inability to react. Besides, the 1996 Banyamulenge crisis and the Burundian

[96] Funao's (2006) research on the Pygmy in 1998 provides accounts on the life of the population in the eastern DRC.
[97] Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament from Kivu, Kinshasa, July 2013

factor in line with the killing of many Tutsi during the Burundi Civil War ignited tensions between Tutsi and Hutu in the region.[98]

4.3.1 Laurent Désiré Kabila and the AFDL

In September 1996, the south Kivu was attacked in response to the 1996 Banyamulenge crisis. Following these assaults, on 7 October 1996, South Kivu governor summoned all Tutsi to quit Zaïre within a week (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). On 13 October 1996, South Kivu fell under a full-scale attack. This was the beginning of the first Congo War led by the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo* [Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo; AFDL] (Reed 1998; Lemarchand 2003).

Created on 18 October 1996 in Lemera in the south Kivu, the AFDL was an amalgamate of some opportunist groups, including the Banyamulenge, the *Alliance Démocratique des Peuples* [Democratic Alliance of Peoples; ADP],[99] a coalition between Kabila and other opposition groups, the *Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Zaïre* [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Zaïre] and a Lumumbist rebel group in the eastern Zaïre, the *Conseil National de Résistance pour la Démocratie* [National Association of Resistance] (McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The Lumumbist-Marxist Laurent-Désiré Kabila from Shaba province – current Katanga, spearheaded the alliance (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Prior to the AFDL creation, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was smuggling minerals in Tanzania as his previous movement the Marxist People's Revolutionary Party became dormant after several unsuccessful attacks against Mobutu's regime (Reed 1998). Laurent-Désiré Kabila reportedly funded the war effort through gold from the eastern Zaïre and signed mining contacts with mining and resource corporations especially De Beers and American Mineral Fields (AMF) (Nest 2006b; Reed 1998; Onana 2012).

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[98] The Burundi Civil War was triggered by the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchoir Ndadaye, on 22 October 1993. The war prompted violence between Tutsi and Hutu, and continued until 2005.

[99] This group, created by some Banyamulenge who had returned to Rwanda after 1994, together with Tutsi from the North Kivu in Kigali, was headed by Déogratias Bugera and closely linked to the RPF (Vlassenroot 2002: 509).

Owing to the economic capacity of the mining contracts signed with the junior companies above, the rebellion should have been seen under the lens of a regional dynamism rather than the USA or France interventions (Takeuchi 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Based on these contracts with commercial corporations, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) is of the view that Laurent-Désiré Kabila acquired a label of a typical African warlord rather than a revolutionary guerrilla leader. Rapidly and violently, his movement dismantled the refugee camps, home to Hutu armed refugee. The AFDL attack enabled more than half a million refugees to return to Rwanda, whereas those who were considered as *génocidaires* or *interahamwe* fled further inside Zaïre (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). A quick collapse of the opportunist coalition between unpaid and unmanageable FAZ troops, the ex-FAR and the *Interahamwe* happened as the outcome of the dismantling of the refugee camps (McNulty 1999). The AFDL succeeded in improving the security conditions as looting perpetrated by the FAZ significantly declined in the eastern Zaïre. Thus the majority of the population welcomed and supported Laurent-Désiré Kabila's movement (Sawada 1997). On 17 May 1997, after having suddenly moved westwards, the AFDL entered Kinshasa without great resistance (Nest 2006b). Mobutu had fled just before to Gbwadolite before exiling in Morocco where he died in September (ibid.). Laurent Désiré-Kabila, the self-installed head of state renamed Zaïre as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Much of the population welcomed the AFDL to overthrow the dictator Mobutu because Laurent-Désiré Kabila's armed group described cleverly itself as a Congolese-led rebellion (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Mwanasali 2000), even if it was militarily and politically trained and supervised essentially by Rwanda (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The AFDL is the expression of Rwandan motivation to address the security menace engendered by the Hutu armed refugee camps. For Rwandan transitional authorities, their actions were reliable only with the Congolese patriotism and the regional common need to get rid of Mobutu (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Based on regional security imperatives and shared needs, the AFDL was supported by other countries (McNulty 1999). Uganda was the first to join the RPF and quickly sent its army; the Uganda People's Defence Force – UPDF, into Zaïre. Possible understanding of this is that Museveni was keen to finish with Mobutu as the latter endorsed Ugandan rebels' attacks on

the UPDF from Zaïrian territory. Some geopolitics and security analysts are in agreement with a few historians of the Great Lakes Region that Museveni wanted also to help his close allies, senior Rwandan leaders, who served in the UPDF while being in exile from Rwanda (Nest 2006b).

Secondly, the Angolan authorities had long been a foe of Mobutu, as the latter had been permitting the Angolan rebel group, *Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* [National Union for Total Liberation of Angola; UNITA], which was fighting against the ruling party in Angola, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho* [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; MPLA], to have operations bases in Zaïre (Nest 2006b). Kamina base in Katanga, for instance, functioned as a channel for weapons and diamonds and enabled the UNITA to sustain its battle against the Angolan government. The AFDL therefore was permitted to use Angolan territories to enter Zaïre and Angolan government sent its troops to support the AFDL (Reed 1998). Contrariwise, the UNITA ostensibly reinforced Mobutu in order to keep their bases and supply roads in Zaïre from the AFDL (McNulty 1999). In addition to the two countries above, Burundi sent its troops to secure its borders and avoid attacks from Zaïre (Reed 1998). While Zambia permitted the AFDL to enter Zaïre from its territories, Zimbabwe however provided military goods (ibid.).

The AFDL eventually got rid of the Mobutu regime that ruined the country (McNulty 1999). The Mobutu ethnical strategy based on ‘divide and rule’ backfired, as his scapegoats, the Banyamulenge, were militarily supported by neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda and Uganda (ibid.). Nevertheless, this foreign support, particularly the Rwandan, got a pivotal long-term impact, for two strategic motives. According to Mamdani (1998: 17):

> “Although the FDL was encouraged and considered as leading the War of Liberation to an extent, the Rwandan army turned into a force of occupation in the eyes of the Congolese population as Rwandan commanders filled senior positions in the Congolese national army”.

Secondly, Rwandan soldiers began intruding in Congolese matters regarding notably the Banyamulenge issue (Mamdani 1998).[100] Some could argue that in the eyes of the Congolese population, this reflected Rwandan hegemony and expansionism (McNulty 1999). The overwhelming presence of Rwandans in the Congolese territories and the exterminations of Hutu committed by the AFDL troops in the refugee camps in Zaïre reinforced the perception of the dependence on Rwanda (Reed 1998). However, it bears underlining that the Tutsi-led post-genocide Rwandan government had two objectives; the protection of all Tutsi and Tutsi power as a precondition for the Tutsi survival (Mamdani 2002).

The Banyamulenge accomplished their concerns regarding their citizenship entitlement and the protection of their community as they acquired strong military and political positions with the support of the RPF, though most of their elders were opposed to the enrolment of their young ones into the RPF (Vlassenroot 2002). However, further considerable repercussions and dilemmas related to the coalition between Banyamulenge and the FPR rose (ibid.). Possible explanations of this loath stance could include the following Catch-22; theoretically the citizenship recovering was based on Laurent-D Kabila's verbal promise during his visit to Bukavu in February 1998. Practically however, they needed to delink from the RPF to gain confidence amongst other Congolese for them to be recognised as full Congolese. But this was a dilemma for them due to the reliance on the RPF support for their security. Moreover, fundamental divergences on the objectives emerged between the Banyamulenge and the RPF. The latter had endeavoured to influence the former and all the Tutsis living in the DRC to return to Rwanda,[101] an idea rejected by the Banyamulenge. Concomitantly, the Banyamulenge were facing an increasing rejection and resentment from the rest of the population. This is to say that owing to their ties with the AFDL, the Tutsi were perceived as having expansionist ambitions as they had gained advantaged positions and the AFDL rebellion massacred Hutu, whereas indigenes that resisted them were

[100] The Banyamulenge, for example, had a separate Native Authority in South Kivu, and a Tutsi replaced the Hutu Native Authority in Ruchuru, in North Kivu (Mamdani 1998).

[101] The motivation behind this idea of migration is unclear, although, some explanations have been offered (Vlassenroot 2002): the idea possessed by the Tutsi refugees who had grown up in Uganda that Tutsi diasporas should return their homeland; ensuring security of the Tutsi by increasing their number in Rwanda; and increasing Rwandan control of the Kivus by sending the returned Banyamulenge back to the Kivus.

tortured or killed (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The resentment between the Tutsi and indigenes reformed the configuration of coalitions on the ground. Although the Mai-Mai allied with the AFDL in the first rebellion, their opinions however diverged when it came to power, as it became a Rwandese occupation (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The rift between the Banyamulenge and the rest of the population increased and led to further deterioration of ethnic situation in the Kivus.

4.4 The AFDL Collapse and the Breakout of the 1998 Congo War

The Laurent- D. Kabila regime inherited from the Mobutu era deteriorated socio-economic situation. These conditions got worse prior to the second Congo War, with drastic declines in GDP as a result of collapses in all sectors except mining (Nest 2006b; Putzel *et al.* 2008; Prunier 2009). Economic transactions were informal, concentrated around the borders and held totally by the regional strongmen, with the size of the informal economy appraised to be three times the value of the official GDP by the 1990s (Nest 2006b; Putzel *et al.* 2008).

After rising into power, Laurent-D Kabila's objectives were to reform political, social and economic configurations through the use of mining concessions as means to increase state revenues and rebuild its capacity. He did not succeed at all to consolidate his authority and increase his legitimacy over the territory as in the sight of many observers and Western media Laurent-D. Kabila was portrayed as another dictator, not much different from Mobutu (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel *et al.* 2008; Prunier 2009). Owing to the fact that Laurent-D Kabila came into power mostly with military support of the RPF, on which was laid the burden of the massacres of numerous Rwandan refugees and civilians in the eastern Zaïre, his regime was experiencing legitimacy dilemmas (Prunier 2009).[102] As Laurent-D Kabila had to clean himself from the accusations of crimes against humanity, he declared that his leadership did not include the military campaign, exposing his legitimacy. In the face of his illegitimacy growing higher, Laurent-D Kabila stopped carrying out the

[102] The UN investigation over the alleged human rights abuses, including massacres, during and after the first Congo War – ECOSOC 1999, was hampered by the DRC and Rwanda, and the international aid for the DRC was blocked (Prunier 2009). Takeuchi (1997) predicted such a measure would have made the country's economic recovery significantly difficult, as the economic sanctions following the massacre of students at the University of Lubumbashi in 1990 had led to the complete economic collapse for Mobutu's regime.

Rwandan agenda in arresting and disarming the *Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR, though they continued to attack Rwanda. Their crackdown by RPF resulted in clash with the indigenous populations hosting the *Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR and a development of Mayi-Mayi militias (Prunier 2009). Having progressively become autonomous, Laurent D. Kabila disobeyed Rwandan requirements with regards to security provision at the borders, something which greatly disillusioned his supporter, Rwanda (McNulty 1999; Nest 2006b).[103] Based on internal dissensions resulting from domestic opposition in Kinshasa against the overpowering presence of the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi in strategic positions within the military and political spheres of his regime, Laurent-D Kabila had to detach himself from Rwanda (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel *et al.* 2008; Prunier 2009).

In the Kivus, the aversion towards the Tutsi presence became even more compelling due to the Banyamulenge having been offered a separate Native Authority in the south Kivu and some indigenous authorities being substituted with Tutsi (Mamdani 1998). Additionally, several Tutsi pastoralists had also migrated into the Masisi-Walikale zone with their cattle (Prunier 2009). These Tutsi expansions provoked an escalation of vehement attacks on the Banyamulenge and a series of revolts against each other (ibid.). Isolated by his allies and confronted with both domestic and regional discontent, Laurent-D Kabila opted for a strategy based on gaining support within the country by manipulating and fuelling anti-Tutsi feelings (McNulty 1999; Lemarchand 2003; Reuters AlertNet n.d.). On 27 July 1998, Laurent-D Kabila asked Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops. On 28 July, the Rwandan troops left. This decision ultimately stimulated Laurent-D Kabila's former allies to aggress the DRC in order to oust Laurent-D Kabila from power (Vlassenroot 2002). Afraid of these attacks, the Banyamulenge sought security from the RPF although their frustration and dissatisfaction over the ascendancy of the RPF. On 2 August 1998, the RFP attempted a military incursion in Kinshasa, but the military operation was brutally crushed by people and the Congolese army abetted by Angolan and Zimbabwean troops. Confrontations between Tutsi and non-Tutsi in some neighbourhoods of Kinshasa and those of other cities of the DRC prompted a second armed conflict which spread from the eastern DRC across the country (Nest 2006b; ICG 1998). Quickly anti-

[103] He also enraged Uganda by accusing Ugandan officials of profit seeking in their intervention in the DRC (McNulty 1999).

government forces invaded towns in the East. Evidence from Vlassenroot (2002: 511) revealed that although the second war was displayed as the "second Banyamulenge revolt, its impetus came from Kigali". In retaliation, hundreds of Tutsi living in Kinshasa either fled or were murdered (Lemarchand 2003). On 16 August 1998, a pro-Rwandan armed movement *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* [Rally for Congolese Democracy; RCD] was officially created and proclaimed its uprising.

The RCD consisted mainly of Banyamulenge leaders and combatants. However, there was no consensus on the leadership amongst the Banyamulenge within their community and on the predicaments between achieving autonomy and receiving protection and support from the RPF (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Given a strong sense of mistrust rising between the Banyamulenge and Rwandans, some Banyamulenge refused being manipulated by Rwanda and turned back to Rwandan expansionism (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). In their search of support, including Burundi, they linked with other militias to create a movement, *Forces Républicaines Féderalistes* [Federalist Republican Forces; FRF][104] (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The Banyamulenge fragmentation resulted in some armed oppositions between the RCD and the RPA and illustrates the increasingly intricate nature of their politics (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Several towns were under rebel control in a short time. Conversely, the RCD advancement to Kinshasa on 26 August 1998 was repelled fiercely by the government supported by the Zimbabwe Defence Force – ZDF, and the Angolan army (Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009).

Laurent-D Kabila had a weak control over the army given that its army largely consisted of troops from his previous supporters. To overcome this situation, he formed a coalition with other ethno-regional groups including the Mai-Mai and the *Interahamwe*, and called upon foreign backers including Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Putzel *et al.* 2008; Prunier 2009). In late August 1998, the RPF and UPDF re-launched their offensive against the DRC government from the East and tried to progress towards the capital. In this way, the 1998 Congo War implicated numerous countries and several armed movements, some of

[104] The FRF was created in Uvira in January 2000, in reaction to the double threat faced by the Congolese Tutsi (Lemarchand 2003). They feared persecution by the government and instrumentalisation by Rwanda, and aspired to negotiate a peace agreement between the Congolese Tutsi and their neighbours (ibid.).

which were supported by their foreign allies. Fights were long-drawn-out and attained a military stalemate which obliged Laurent-D Kabila to finally agree to the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreements in August 1999 (Grignon 2006; Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). The protracted armed conflicts roughly split the country into two territories by the fissured frontline; the south-west was under the pro-government forces control and the north-east controlled by the anti-government forces (Grignon 2006).

The main support for the pro-government was composed of the countries backing the *Forces Armées Congolaises* [Congolese Armed Forces; FAC – formed by Laurent-D Kabila] which included Angola and Zimbabwe. It is of note that Angolan support to Laurent-D. Kabila was meant to demolish the UNITA's rear base in the DRC, particularly when it was allegedly revealed that the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and UNITA vice president Antonio Dembo met in Kigali and Kampala with regard to the establishment of a new military supply networks (Lemarchand 2003; Nest *et al*. 2006). The Rwandan attempt to overthrow Laurent-D Kabila by airlifting troops across the DRC in Angola's backyard[105] provides another dimension that prompted Angola to ally with Laurent-D Kabila. It worth noting that Rwandan military operation was conducted without prior consultations with the Angolan government (Nest *et al*. 2006). Rapprochement between Angola and the DRC was strategic due to the ease with which Luanda thought it could influence Laurent-D Kabila as the president of the DRC (Prunier 2009). Angola also allied with Zimbabwe in order to curb South Africa's supremacy in Southern Africa (Nest *et al*. 2006). Zimbabwe in turn was keen to impede South African supremacy with Angola and Namibia for the same strategic reason, but publicly sent its troops in the DRC in the context of a collective security Chapter of the Southern African Development Community – SADC (Lemarchand 2003; Nest *et al*. 2006; Prunier 2009). There was no Zimbabwean security or economic stakes in the DRC. Their intervention however sought to recover their loans to the DRC government by keeping Laurent-D Kabila as the Head of state (Lemarchand 2003). Namibia seemed to have linked with Angola in hampering the UNITA infiltration in its territory, on top of other collective strategic objectives (Nest 2006c; Prunier 2009). Sudan never acknowledged their presence in the DRC, though they fought beside the DRC on the

[105] Rwanda airlifted its troops to the military base of Kitona in Bas-Congo to attack Kinshasa.

basis of their confrontation with Uganda (Prunier 2009). Chad and Libya also allied with Laurent-D Kabila for a short period even if Libya never admitted its intervention in the DRC (ibid.).

Apart from those countries, numerous indigenous and non-indigenous militias, including the domestic Mayi-Mayi militias,[106] a Hutu rebel force from Burundi, the *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* [Forces for the Defence of Democracy; FDD][107] and the *Interahamwe* as well as ex-FAR thus; many of whom gathered into a rebel force named the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda; FDLR] in 2000,[108] allied with the FAC against the RPA and RCD. In 1999, Laurent-D Kabila decided to dissolve the AFDL (Lemarchand 2003). Lemarchand (2003: 31) provided for instance: "the only glue holding together this disparate group of counterinsurgents was their common hatred of the Rwandan occupying forces and their local allies". The indigenous population detested the RPA and RCD because of their tremendously brutal violence against civilians maybe due to stronger resistance these rebel movements encountered (Prunier 2009). The anti-government movement mainly incorporated three forces, with strong support from Rwanda.[109] The RCD was initially backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Rwanda also deployed its own troops on Congolese territory because of its allegedly imperative concern for Tutsi power survival (Nest 2006c).

[106] Various community-based, self-styled civil defence units became known as Mai-Mai collectively (IRIN 2007b). They initially aimed at protecting villages from the Rwandan invasion and became prominent during the second Congo War (ibid.). However, once they had gained a certain level of political and economic power, they became a threat rather than a source of protection to the local population (Vlassenroot 2008). Those individuals within the militias were also faced with poverty, unemployment and social exclusion (Nest 2006c).

[107] Burundi never admitted the presence of the FDD in the DRC (Prunier 2009).

[108] There are different accounts on the formation of the FDLR (see details in Prunier (2009) and ICG (2003)). It is, nonetheless, considered that a militant group of the *Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR in the eastern DRC, the *Armée de Libération du Rwanda* [the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; ALIR], also known by its political wing, the *Peuple Arméepour la Libération du Rwanda* [the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda; PALIR] merged with the Hutu resistance movement in Kinshasa to form the FDLR in September 2000.

[109] In addition to these major parties, there were also indirect connections with some other countries that did not clearly take sides (Prunier 2009). For example, some individuals in Zambia were supporting the UNITA, refugees and rebels in Tanzania, Burundi, the Republic of Congo and Central African Republic were recruited to fight in the DRC, and leading politicians from the former Rwandan government, who were accommodated in Kenya, influenced the Kenyan government's position (Prunier 2009).

Probable explanation of this concern could be that the Rwandan Tutsi-led government was concerned with thwarting the late 1997 ethnic-based killing's escalations and the infiltrations of the *Interahamwe* and ex-FAR from the DRC (Prunier 2009; Nest 2006c). In May 1999, the RCD split into two groups as the result of disagreement between Rwanda and Uganda on the movement leadership (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). The *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* [Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma; RCD-Goma] was pro-Rwandans and based in Goma.[110] The *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération* [Rally for Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement; RCD-ML] allied with Ugandans and was initially located in Kisangani and later moved into Bunia. A third armed movement, the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* [Congolese Liberation Movement; MLC] arose from the north-eastern DRC. The MLC was formed and spearheaded by a rich powerful businessman from the north, Jean-Pierre Bemba, in order to oppose government oppression, and allied with the UPDF. Some analysts concur with the view that Uganda was motivated to send its troops in the DRC not only based on its close relationships with the RPF, but to anticipate the possible disastrous effects resulting from the defeat of the RPA and the RCD on its borders (Nest 2006c). The focal motive, though, was its national security, since there was already a previous security conflict between Kampala and Khartoum. Hence, during the 1996 Congo War, Uganda was threatened by the presence of several Ugandan militant groups allied with Khartoum and operating in Sudan and the north-eastern DRC (Clark 2001).[111] Although Burundi never acknowledged openly its presence in the DRC, its national army joined the RPA and the UPDF. Prunier (2009: 198) suggests that Burundi moved into the Congo in a view that "it needed to mind its back door" preventing the Hutu rebel group, the FDD, to enter its territory.

Lessons learned from the fragmenting and shifting coalitions and alliances amongst militant movements and their backers in the DRC indicate the emergence of three principal revolutionary coalitions during the 1998 Congo War, which mainly controlled three border

[110] The UN Panel of Experts (UNSC 2001b: 23) states that the RCD-Goma was "the creation of the Rwandan State", and that it depended "financially, politically and militarily on Kigali".
[111] Sudan was supporting several Ugandan militant groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces – ADF, and Lord's Resistance Army – LRA, possibly to destabilise the region to spreadIslamic fundamentalism, using the territories in Sudan as well as in north-eastern DRC (Clark 2001).

zones (Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). The MLC with Ugandan support administered the north and north-western DRC, the RCD-ML with Ugandan support ruled over the north-western DRC and the RCD-Goma with Rwandan backing ran the central-eastern DRC. Keen to overthrow Laurent-D. Kabila, their common objectives shifted eventually to occupy strategic positions in the government as they encountered the strong military resistance of Laurent-D Kabila backers, something which resulted in a military deadlock (Nest 2006b). The consolidation of the belligerent blocks happened not only from the stalemate of the war, but also from the peace talks initiated during the development of the war, as discussed below.

4.4.1 Attempts to the Peace Settlement

After lengthy and hard discussions between belligerent groups, Laurent-D Kabila, the RCD and the MLC signed the Lusaka Peace Agreements in Zambia in 1999.[112] Overall this peace accord was signed in July 1999 and included the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda.[113] The MLC signed on 1 August 1999 and the RCD on 31 August 1999. The progress of negotiations leading to the aforementioned agreement was slow due to Laurent-D Kabila's strong reluctance for democratic transition (Prunier 2009). Also, the international community was divided between those who supported the view that the rebellion aimed to oust Laurent-D. Kabila and those who rather believed it was an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (ibid.). Peace process however moved forward because of the military stalemate (Grignon 2006; Prunier 2009).

Considered as a ceasefire agreement at the beginning, the Lusaka Peace Agreements became the groundwork of the peace process in the DRC. It agreed on the removal of foreign troops, the disbandment of negative forces, including the FDLR, ADF and FDD, and the establishment of a new political system resulting from an Inter-Congolese Dialogue – ICD. The UN committed to monitor the ceasefire and deployed the UN peacekeeping force, *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* [United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; MONUC]

[112] See ICG (1999) for details on the negotiations leading to the Lusaka Peace Agreement.
[113] Burundi attended as an observer since it was not recognised as a belligerent party.

by February 2000. Following the peace agreement, hostilities went on between government forces and rebel movements as well as between Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Uganda and Rwanda even had heavy fighting over diamond and gold in Kisangani in August 1999, and May and June 2000. The MONUC could not stop the fighting between the two foreign armies and belligerents due to its mere 5,537 troops and limited mandate (Reuters AlertNet n.d.).

Although the Lusaka Peace Agreements did not succeed in ending the war, it however, "immobilised the military frontline and permitted Laurent-D. Kabila to reorganise his army in front of the RPA menacing advance" (Grignon 2006: 71).[114] The signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreements was a victory for Laurent-D. Kabila, as it brought the much needed time to consolidate his military position. In contrast, Laurent-D Kabila saw these accords as a serious political defeat, for it compelled him to share political power with rebels, including the two RCD factions, MLC, non-armed opposition political parties and civil society representatives (Grignon 2006). Laurent-D Kabila was also required to accept that half of the territory of the country was out of his control (ICG 1999). In essence, the 1999 accords split the DR Congo into three micro-states. In the words of Grignon (2006: 71):

> "The 1999 Peace Agreement legalised the partition of the country into three distinct zones and enabled the rebels to legitimately claim that they both officially represented their part of the country and had the authority to administer and exploit their zone".

After the splitting of the RCD into two groups over a leadership struggle and before the Lusaka Agreements were signed, the tension between Rwanda and Uganda clearly surfaced (ICG 1999). This led to a breaking point in early August 1999 with the UPDF and the RPA fighting in Kisangani (ibid.) as noted above. Both parties accused each other of violating the ceasefire (Lemarchand 2003). The peace process was on hold when Rwanda and Uganda declined to partake unless it considered the *Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR concern. As a response, Angola and Zimbabwe refused to withdraw their troops from the DRC up

[114] The RPA launched a large offensive and advanced on Mbuji-Mayi, the diamond town, located between Lubumbashi in Katanga and Kinshasa (Grignon 2006).

until the Rwandans and Ugandans left. It followed more intense clashes, with an estimated death toll of 3.8 million people by 2004 as a repercussion of the conflict.

Given adverse political repercussions of the Lusaka Peace Agreements, Laurent-D Kabila changed his strategy into thwarting genuine power-sharing and any war bonus related to the economic dimensions of the conflict (ICG 2000; Lemarchand 2003; Grignon 2006). He refused sharing power with other protagonists through the ICD (Lemarchand 2003). Laurent-D Kabila opposed a major obstacle to the democratic transition and impeded the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreements, which only progressed after his murder in January 2001[115] (ICG 2000; Lemarchand 2003; Grignon 2006). Laurent-D Kabila's son, Joseph Kabila, succeeded his father as Head of state with less internal objections. Notwithstanding early scepticism about his capacity to spearhead the country in a challenging transition, he achieved significant progress (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b). He resumed the country's relations with international financial institutions and donor governments, enabled the application of the Lusaka Peace Agreements (Nest 2006b), and strategically stepped away from his father's old allies (Lemarchand 2003). Consequently, Uganda and Rwanda started removing their troops from the front line in February, and the organisation of the ICD culminated in the formation of a Government of National Unity, with the interstate fighting coming to its end.

Between February and April 2002, the former Botswanan president, Sir Ketumile Masire, facilitated the ICD which created a new political dispensation for the DRC in Sun City, South Africa. After the ICD organisation, the signing of the Sun City Agreement occurred on 19 April 2002 despite wrangling over the composition of the ICD delegations.[116] It set a unified multi-party government framework and a chronology for democratic elections. The agreement also confirmed Joseph Kabila as Head of state for the transitional period. He would share power with a Prime Minister from armed oppositions and three vice-presidents; one from the two main armed opposition movements, one from the former government and one from the unarmed political opposition. The Sun City agreement did

[115] Laurent D. Kabila was allegedly shot by his bodyguard Rashidi Kasereka, who was killed on the spot, on 16 January 2001. The exact reason for the assassination is unknown.
[116] See details in ICG (2002).

not include issues related to the unification of the army, something that adversely impacted on the future ex-combatants reintegration process and security sector reform. Furthermore, it was not signed by the RCD-Goma and some other unarmed political opposition parties. This refusal associated with divergences on the appointment of Vice-presidents and the Prime Minister, as well as on the composition of the government prompted the collapse of the agreement (Grignon 2006).

Rwanda and the DRC signed a security protocol called the Pretoria accord on 30 July 2002 in South Africa. This protocol provided a framework in regards to the withdrawal of 20,000 Rwandan soldiers from the DRC and the rounding up of the ex-FAR and dismantling of the *Interahamwe*. Uganda and the DRC also signed the Luanda Agreement on 6 September 2002. This formal deal focused on the removal of Ugandan soldiers from Bunia and the improvement of relations between both countries. Consequently, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers started leaving in late 2002 (ICG n.d.).

On 17 December 2002, the members of the ICD signed the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement on the transition in the DRC in Pretoria.[117] It was a power-sharing arrangement for the period of political transition. The country was run by Joseph Kabila as interim President and four Vice-presidents who represented the government; two from the MLC and the RCD, one from unarmed inner opposition and one from Joseph Kabila's party. The agreement laid down a two-year transitional period framework, including legislative and presidential elections. Even if the 2002 agreement marked the end of the war, it however overlooked the problematic political legitimacy of the former rebels who perpetrated grave offenses against the population and the ethnic and regional balance (Prunier 2009). This has been believed to be a snare against the sustainable peace in the DRC as it seemed to be purposely and meticulously concocted in order to delay the future demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration – DDR, of combatants and the reform of the DRC's security system.

[117] This Congolese process rejected external interference 'in the management of the transition and in the implementation of the agreement' (Grignon 2006).

As a sideline to this, several foreign soldiers had infiltrated into the FARDC, the country security and intelligence system was controlled by the RPF agents, combatants were blended with the FARDC instead of going through the formal DDR process and eventually 'combatants without borders'[118] emerged as process of perpetuating rebellions.[119] As a component of the ICD, a transitional constitution and a protocol on security sector reform were approved and endorsed in Sun City on 2 April 2003. The formation of a Government of National Unity and Transition – known as the transitional government, on 30 June 2003 marked an official end to hostilities and the commencement of the transitional period.

4.4.2 The Eastern DRC and the Ongoing Armed Movements

Following the power-sharing and the installation of the transitional government, the state made some democratic changes despite continued political struggles and sporadic conflicts. On 12 November 2004, transitional authorities adopted a new law on citizenship seen as a fundamental stride towards holding general elections (Jackson 2007). The new citizenship law appeared compulsory for excluding the Banyarwanda from the nationality was illegal under both international law and conventions. For instance, in the words of Jackson (2007:489):

> "The new citizenship law was regarded as necessary also on the normative grounds that the exclusion of the Banyarwanda from the citizenship was unlawful under both international customary law and the international conventions and on security grounds given that the Banyarwanda nationality question has acted as a prime incendiary igniting successive regional conflicts, including the outbreak of the second Congo War".

Clark's (2008: 6) view concurs with Jackson's. For Clark, the 2004 citizenship law bestows citizenship by origin or by acquirement to "all people and their descendants who were resident in the DRC on or before independence on 30 June 1960"; however it does not allow dual nationality.

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[118] See Chapter 5 for detailed information on combatants without borders.
[119] Interview conducted with an academic specialist of the Kivu's issues, Kinshasa, October 2013

Notwithstanding the Banyarwanda officially acquired nationality through this law, in the sight of indigenous Congolese however their status of non-indigenous did not change; neither were the tensions between them reduced (Clark 2008). More importantly, the 2004 citizenship law raised three key difficulties that Jackson (2007: 481) elaborates as follows; it was not clear on many ambiguities related to the national status of the Banyarwanda, its enforcement was not effective and it did not improve the political relationship between the individual and the state for the Banyamulenge. For Jackson, the nature of the political relationship, necessary in offering the sense of enjoying a full citizenship, covers "local rights and obligations between the individual and customary authority, it therefore implies land distribution and other vital rights; and the ethnically vital, lived sense of belonging and existential security for the individual within society as a whole" (ibid.). The Banyamulenge however seemed to be denied these advantages and the new law was not likely to change this situation (Jackson 2007). Following the endorsement of a new constitution by the parliament in May 2005, a semi-presidential regime[120] – with a two-term presidential limit,[121] was introduced. On 18th February 2006, the constitution was promulgated following the referendum of December 2005.

On 30 July 2006, Congolese people went to polls for the presidential and legislative elections through continued political struggle and with more than 17 million registered voters. None of the candidates won the majority in the first round vote. Joseph Kabila got 44.81 percent while his main foe and contender, Vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba, received around 20 percent. After allying with some of first round losers, Joseph Kabila won vote on 29 October 2006. His coalition also received a majority in national and provincial assemblies, making him to be the first democratically elected President of the DRC in forty years. Bemba contested the result and appealed to the Supreme Court to settle the litigations. The Supreme Court upheld Joseph Kabila. Following Joseph Kabila's swearing in as Head of state in December 2006, a new government was formed in February 2007. The RCD-Goma and the Congolese Tutsi communities could not secure sufficient political representation as their results of the elections were calamitous.

[120] Semi-presidential regime refers to power-sharing between the President and Prime Minister.
[121] For details of the elements of the constitution, see UNSC (2005a).

Evidence from the Human Rights Watch (2007) noted that some political leaders triggered anti-Tutsi feeling during electoral campaign. The anti-Tutsi feeling had a significant impact on the Tutsi presidential candidate, Azarias Ruberwa, leader of the RCD-Goma and one of the four Vice-presidents during the transitional period, who secured only 2 percent of the vote (Prunier 2009). His ex-rebel group won only 15 seats – 3 percent, in the legislative elections (ibid.). This was a penalty score for the Banyamulenge perceived as Rwandans and therefore disliked (Prunier 2009). These results determined the RCD-Goma political insignificance in the democratically elected government, regardless of the fact that its precursor the RCD was one of the four influential political forces in the transitional government (Human Rights Watch 2007). This marked the RCD-Goma political liquidation (ICG 2007b). Additionally, Minembwe is the largely Banyamulenge-inhabited territory which is not still recognised by the government. Consequently, the Banyamulenge were denied from having territorial administrative control, representatives in the Provincial and National Assemblies (Human Rights Watch 2007). The Banyamulenge perceived this decision as the government deliberate strategy to marginalise and alarm them (ibid.).

Although some achievements were attained during the transitional period, growing criticism both at national and international levels was laid on the Joseph Kabila's government (ICG n.d.). The new Congolese army, *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo; FARDC], created in July 2003, was relentlessly being indicted of perpetrating human rights abuses and being undisciplined.[122] Criticism also was on the dearth of transparency in resource management, corruption and paucity of infrastructure and basic services. Furthermore, there was an increasing level of political intolerance,[123] particularly against Bemba's followers and in the east and west regions. Despite the international community concerns regarding

[122] MONUC warned the government that it would withdraw from the joint operations in the East unless the FARDC ended human rights violations (Reuters AlertNet n.d.).

[123] The nature of the human rights abuses include unlawful killings in the Kivu provinces, violence against women, child soldiers, torture, persecution of human rights activists, political violence between Kabila and Bemba supporters as well as other factions and limited access to proper justice (Amnesty International 2006). MONUC (2006) also published a special report on the human rights situation. A brutal military crackdown on political-cultural movement Bundu dia Kongo – BDK, in Bas-Congo, which aimed at reviving the pre-colonial Kongo kingdom, was also reported in January 2007 (Reuters AlertNet n.d.). Human Rights Watch (2008) provides an analysis of the political violence between Kabila and Bemba supporters and against the BDK.

the weakness of the regime in the management of these problems, "brutal repression was increasingly used as a government method" (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 477). By trying to control strategic natural resources in the Kivus through privatised and brutal forms of governance, the government enabled 'a disparate and fragmented control' over the territories (ibid.). In 2007, the tension between Joseph Kabila and Bemba followers led the latter to exile into Portugal after seeking refuge in the South African Embassy in Kinshasa.

During the transitional period, the disbandment of armed forces and their integration into the army, as part of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement of 2002, was unsuccessful (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b). The process of integration of the former government soldiers – about 330,000, with the former rebel combatants into the FARDC and the disbandment of combatants not essential for the FARDC were considerably deferred to the point that the elections were held before the end of the process (Amnesty International 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007; Turner 2007). The aforementioned integration of the former troops into the national army was in fact a 'intermingling' and 'mixing' processes, which "required soldiers to be trained for 45 days and then to be deployed in a region other than the one in which they had previously fought" (Human Rights Watch 2007: 10). Combatants also had an alternative to be disbanded to join civilian life during the process (ibid.). This option was met with strong resistance by various armed forces, most notably from Banyarwanda officers as they feared for their security and the loss of their power base, but also from the Mai-Mai militias and the FDLR rebels caused by the fears of the militarisation of the Banyarwanda (Turner 2007; ICG 2007b). In reality, this resistance was the strategy of Tutsi-led Rwandan government to have an alibi which would justify the RPF future incursions in the East DRC.[124]

[124] See the section on contextualising the mining-combatant- recruitment cycle in the DRC and Chapter Five for more detailed.

4.5 DRC's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process

In the DRC, the DDR process in reality was what is referred to as the 'combatants' intermingling'[125] and 'mixing'[126] processes. These processes, contends an ex-combatant interviewed in Brussels,[127] were not transparent, in terms of combatants' identification and neither did they establish human rights standards nor any eligibility criterion (Turner 2007). According to the 2003 agreement and the national programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR, 130,000 combatants (the army and rebel elements altogether) were expected to be integrated into the FARDC and around 200,000 soldiers were intended to be demobilised (Marriage 2007). A set of papers on the implementation of the DDR in the DRC suggest that the process was not viable. It lacked security and development plans and was not planned to help the ex-combatants to speak to their grievances; neither was it meant to help returnees to build their livelihood without using violence (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008).

Combatants who had opted for military career into the FARDC were largely disgruntled with the wages of USD10 a month – if they were paid at all, and those who had opted for civilian life were also disenchanted by the paucity of reintegration process which would help them to join their new life, while local economic and social grievances never changed (Baaz and Stern 2008). The failure[128] of the DDR process partially was conceptual and structural. Conceptually, the mobilisation aspect was considered as a mere technical process without any budget for the implementation responsibilities. Structurally, the DDR implementation reflected the increasingly informal and predatory nature of political and economic life, institutionalisation of a methodical use of violence to attain and preserve power, and ongoing inter-related conflicts on the ground (Marriage 2007).

Dealing with the DDR in the DRC implies an understanding of the correlation of various aspects that entail all-inclusive responses to address them. There is a claim that the DDR

[125] After the 2003 agreement rebels were mixed and intermingled with the FARDC soldiers instead of the DDR process.
[126] The 2006 agreement had mixed the CNDP combatants into the FARDC instead of the DDR process.
[127] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Brussels, December 2013.
[128] Scholars have been using failure, unfolded, endless to assess the achievement of the ex-combatants' DDR programme in the DRC. This research will use these words interchangeably.

has its appointed time for being carried out and requires certain particular conditions particularly of political nature to ensure that it does not flop (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). The 2003 Pretoria agreement set that all armed groups ought to partake in the DDR process in order to address the needs of former combatants and reform the security sector. The signing of this agreement however failed to involve all armed groups (Wake 2008). The unfolded nature of the DRC's DDR has possibly been one of the most intricate programmes ever implemented in Africa. The DDR programme in the DRC consisted of, among other elements, a national programme which included specific DDR programme for Ituri, processes to disarm and repatriate non-national combatants and their dependants, those for special needy groups such as women, disabled ex-combatants and children and projects in line with the DDR of militia groups' members (World Bank 2010)

The process was mainly facilitated by the World Bank and the United Nations – UN, predominantly via the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) along with the DRC government (Lamb *et al*. 2012). It has been claimed that besides its multifaceted planning, two other supplementary developments complicated the process. Firstly Security Sector Reform – SSR, which was a requirement brought about by peace accords has never been a concern to various antagonists. On the grounds of the 2003 Pretoria agreement, SSR aimed to pave the way for the creation of a new national army whereby all combatants from most of the significant rebel groups would be integrated into the FARDC. SSR was also intended to diminish and possibly eradicate extreme accretion of small arms and light weapons from the hands of both combatants and civilians. Secondly, stabilisation initiatives, mainly those concerned with mining-armed groups relationship, as it has been established that several armed movements access mineral resources (Nzekani Zena 2013). Broadly, the DDR programme involves peace and reconciliation processes including the military and security reform. The broad idea behind this linkage is to address not only former combatants' needs but also the war-affected community. This links directly to the prospects towards reforming or transforming security sector following the conflict, and culminates, in the longer term, in human security or development (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). However, it bears stressing that neither of the DDR process or security sector reform has come to an end up to date.

4.5.1 DDR Institutional and Financial Considerations

The MDRP started in 2002 and was financed by various contributor governments and agencies. The programme geographically focused on the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, with the targeted countries being: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (Lamb 2011; Lamb *et al*. 2012). According to Nzekani Zena (2013), the MDRP demobilised, disarmed and reintegrated close to 300,000 ex-combatants in the above mentioned seven countries, and the processes came to its end in June 2009.

It has been claimed that 50 percent of the entire budget of the MDRP were spent for DDR-related projects in the DRC, which made this country the most noteworthy component of the MDRP (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013). Eriksson and Verweijen's view supports that of the MDRP. The MDRP's report on the DDR programme unveiled that the fund used for only the DRC section accounted for 36 percent of all demobilised beneficiaries; 41 percent and 22 percent of reinsertion and reintegration beneficiaries respectively, with four out of the five special projects for child soldiers being implemented in the DRC (Lamb *et al*. 2012). However, in 2003 the DRC's government created some institutions – such as the interdepartmental committee in charge of planning and co-ordination of DDR – CI-DDR, to supervise the National Programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – PNDDR; while the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion – CONADER, was dealing with the implementation of the PNDDR (Lamb 2011; Lamb *et al*. 2012). The PNDDR and CONADER established regrouping Centres to implement the disarmament targets, while Integration and Training Centres were created for reintegration purposes (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).

In response to issues associated with the implementation of the national DDR programme, an emergency initiative known as Community Disarmament and Reinsertion – DCR, was created. Lamb *et al*. (2012) and Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen (2013), for instance, suggest that the DCR aimed to disarm and pacify those armed groups that were not part of ceasefire or peace agreements but were believed to be substantial factors of insecurity or destabilising forces. The DCR's implementation focused on Ituri territory due to the complexity of armed groups' actions in this area. Although the DCR demobilised 15,811

combatants – with 4,525 children, its component regarding reintegration support however has been 'chaotic', 'half-hearted' and 'problematic' because of lengthy implementation postponements (Kölln 2011; Lamb *et al*. 2012; Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).

The focus of the DDR programme in the DRC was to reincorporate ex-combatants into civilian life through 'safety transition allowances' and reintegration support (Lamb 2011). Kölln (2011), for example, advises that various contributor governments catered for significant funding and technical support, with a total of US$ 272 million being offered for DDR processes through the MDRP. Ex-combatants who went through demobilisation process received an initial imbursement of US$ 110 – for transport, food and other expenses, and then a monthly stipend of US$ 25 for a year (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013). Along similar lines, some non-governmental organisations – NGOs, international organisations and the UN agencies including International Labour Office – ILO, the Food and Agricultural Organisation – FAO, and Caritas offered a range of socio-economic support to ex-combatants (Lamb *et al*. 2012). This support included targeted programmes for female ex-combatants and child soldiers, with ex-combatants' reintegration training being available in different fields, comprising, but not limited to, agriculture, fishing, sewing/tailoring, woodwork, bricklaying, driving, and metal work (Nzekani Zena 2013; Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).

4.5.2 DDR Outcomes

Following the end of the MDRP activities in the Great Lakes Region of Africa in 2009, at least 102,014 ex-combatants returned home and got both demobilisation and reinsertion support in the DRC, with 52,172 having received reintegration support (Lamb 2011). The World Bank implemented the Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme – TDRP, which was funded by the African Development Bank, a variety of contributor governments and whose aim was providing follow-up DDR assistance.

The 1925 UN Security Council Resolution of July 2010 extended the UN mandate in the DRC, changing MONUC label to the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC – MONUSCO. This resolution also endorsed the UN objective of DDR in regards to armed groups operating in the DRC and the DDRRR of non-national armed groups, mainly the FDLR,

Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda – ADF-NALU, the Lord's Resistance Army – LRA, and the National Forces of Liberation – FNL (Nzekanizena 2013). The MONUSCO, in collaboration with the FARDC, had successfully implemented its DDRRR processes within about 18 months despite the difficulties and remarkable likelihoods that challenged the programme, including poor governance, continuing violence and activities of armed groups in the eastern Provinces (ibid.). It is, however, of note that various reports and assessments had castigated the way the ex-combatants' DDR programme had been implemented. For example, Lamb (2012) argued that domestic political dynamics stymied further attainments. The most recent and notable evidence of this criticism however is that in December 2010 the UN Peacebuilding Fund funded the DDR of some 4,000 armed groups' members; yet this programme was put off by the DRC government and never occurred (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).

Overall, many reasons could justify the failure of the DDR programme. Three factors seem to be the most crucial (Lamb 2011); the first is the question of ownership. Various authors having assessed the ex-combatants' DDR in the DRC concurred that most of armed groups such as the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi – which are key armed movements targeted by the DDRRR process, were not parts of peace process and agreement signing, and these rebel groups continued to spoil the process. The second factor is that the DDR process had been preoccupied mainly with ending violence without addressing the crisis underlining such violence. In my research in Brussels, Kinshasa, London and Paris, it can be concluded that not only did the programme lack future capability, was poorly defined and was unable to communicate vision for the post-conflict community, but also public participation was overlooked.[129] It can be noted that the purported lack of capacity by both the MONUSCO and the government to uproot the fuelling-factors of the re/recruitment cycle of combatants culminated in the DDR programme being unfolded; therefore releasing more criminals into society than preventing security and social instability. This is what this research further refers to as 'top-down analysis' of the conflict which goes hand-in-hand with 'top-down solutions' to the conflict. The third factor relates to the institutions duplication and mismanagement of the DDR funding. When I interviewed a member of civil society in

[129] Fieldwork conducted by the author from July to December 2013 in the DRC, England, Belgium and France.

Kinshasa, it can be noted that the institutions duplication and mismanagement of the DDR funding had resulted in using the DDR's funds for other end such as the payment of national and international so-called experts than socially and economically reintegrating ex-combatants.[130] However, what lessons could be drawn from the failure of the DDR programme in the DRC? How can this feed the cycle of combatants' (re-) recruitment and the phenomenon of resources appropriation? The following lines will shed light on these questions.

4.5.3 The Kivus Unending Violence

Despite the expectations that the DDR programmes and consequential political engagements would stop the violence affecting civilians, several combatants did not surrender but have instead strengthened their influence and amplified armed conflict and violent assaults on civilians (Human Rights Watch 2007). Insecurity plagues the Kivu provinces since 2003. Following the 2006 presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections, the north Kivu's insecurity conditions degenerated into large-scale violence. Having lost political significance (ibid.), the Banyamulenge felt side-lined and endangered. Moreover, in terms of political positions, other indigenous groups in the community had acquired the economic privileges that the Banyamulenge had during the previous years (ICG 2007b).

Contrary to the government's belief that the combatants' intermingling and mixing processes – based on shuffling of commanders – Senior Officers, and of units, would pacify the East by incorporating all armed movements into the FARDC, it has rather had an unfavourable impact on the security situations in the Kivus (IRIN 2007; ICG 2007b). The combatants' intermingling process begrimed the state security system by integrating war criminals into the national army. According to intermingling process, a senior member from the *Force Armée Congolaise* [Congolese Armed Force; FAC or Kabila's troops] had to swap with the serving RCD commander, while the RCD maintained the north Kivu (ICG 2007b). In response, a great number of the RCD Tutsi officers, including Laurent Nkunda, refused to obey the government authority and to go through intermingling process, fearing

[130] Interview conducted with a member of civil society, Kinshasa, August 2013.

ethnic maltreatment and retaliation for their acts during the wars, and so created a network (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b; Prunier 2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). Evidence from Human Rights Watch (2007) indicates that some Tutsi soldiers were imprisoned, tortured even killed between 2004 and 2006. Nkunda also blamed the government of not doing its best to eliminate the FDLR (IRIN 2007).

In June 2004, a full-blown battle – emanating from an argument between commanders, has eventually culminated in a rebellious faction led by Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, backed by Laurent Nkunda. This uprising took control of Bukavu in the south Kivu for a while and was set down by the government after one week. In December 2005, some RCD-Goma's dissident soldiers fought off the FARDC in Kanyabayonga and seized numerous towns in the north Kivu. This action created tensions in the relationship between other leaders of the transitional government and the RCD-Goma leadership (Grignon 2006). In July 2006, during electoral period, Nkunda created a politico-military organisation, the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* [National Congress for the Defence of the People; CNDP], predominantly made of Congolese Tutsi from the RCD-Goma. Nkunda also lured a few leaders of ethnic communities and opponents that were not satisfied of democratisation process (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). According to Human Rights Watch (2007: 64):

> "Nkunda created the CNDP for the purpose of preventing the exclusion of Tutsi from national political life, assuring the security of Tutsi soldiers in the national army, eliminating the presence of the FDLR in the DRC and assuring the return of Congolese refugees now in Rwanda".

The CNDP repeatedly collided with the FARDC, protected their unrelenting autonomy and had never accepted its integration into the national army (Human Rights Watch 2007). By late November 2006, the CNDP rebelled again and assailed Goma, presumably to seize it and make their position advantageous in any future discussions with the government. This attitude, in the eyes of Kinshasa, constituted a serious threat to the government (Prunier 2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In order to thwart additional fights, Joseph Kabila and Kagame talked with Nkunda in December 2006 to integrate the CNDP soldiers into the FARDC through a 'mixing process' (Human Right Watch 2007; ICG 2007b;

Prunier 2009). In the process of 'combatants' mixing' and /or 'combatants' intermingling', several combatants serve in the same units without the initial units being disbanded and, allowing for concerns about security, soldiers were unwilling to any shift outside their province (Prunier 2009; ICG 2007b). During the talks, Nkunda required solutions to several political grievances, namely the homecoming of 45,000 Banyarwanda refugees from Rwanda, the release of political prisoners and military actions to dismantle the FDLR (ICG 2007a).

Following the negotiations, the CNDP's troops started integrating the FARDC through mixing process in February 2007. The mixing process profited Nkunda, as it augmented the number of troops under his order (Human Rights Watch 2007; Turner 2007; Prunier 2009). Having become stronger both politically and militarily, Nkunda deployed his units to crackdown on the FDLR in the north Kivu and also began enlisting widely from unemployed ex-combatants and idle Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi amongst others (Human Rights Watch 2007; Prunier 2009). After a while, the FARDC launched unsuccessful military operations against the FDLR causing the exodus of more of the civilian population. In reaction to these operations, the Mayi-Mayi created a movement called the *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* [Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance by the Mai-Mai; PARECO][131] (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). The military objectives of the APARECO were to dismantle Nkunda's rebellion and reinstate peace in the East. Similar to the Mai-Mai, which defies any authority and versatile in changing allies, APARECO's political objectives were vague (Prunier 2009; IRIN 2007).

The mixing process had consolidated the CNDP authority, which led to ethnic tensions in the Kivus, as it had "kick-started the FDLR back into life and reopened all the scores of the East" (Prunier 2009: 324). In order to demonstrate their importance to the government, a group of the FDLR, called 'Rastas', maximised the tensions through carrying out massacres in the south Kivu in May 2007 (ICG 2007b). In the words of Prunier (2009: 324): "the whole region experienced a sudden return to a state of tension previously forgotten" as a result. The situation had exacerbated as several uncontrolled militias, such as the Mai-Mai,

[131] PARECO also includes some Hutu CNDP deserters (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009).

warlords and the FDLR (Prunier 2009), and some armed movements, apparently allied with the government, including the CNDP and the FARDC, were all responsible for crimes that were not being investigated (Human Rights Watch 2007). In May 2007, some hardliners in both the FARDC and CNDP diverged on many views regarding military actions, which eventually led to the failure of the mixing process (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b).

Following the failure of the mixing deal, the government launched an attack against the CNDP. The crack-down involved heavy fighting between the CNDP and the FARDC in August 2007[132] but the government could not defeat the CNDP because of the weakness of the national army (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In November 2007, the Congolese and Rwandan governments reached the Nairobi Agreement to repatriate the FDLR. In January 2008, Goma hosted a meeting on Peace, Security and Development in the Kivus, also known as the 'Amani'[133] process. This conference resulted in an all-inclusive peace agreement or commitment procedure for a ceasefire and the signing of protocol on voluntary demobilisation and integration in the East on 23 January 2008.

Goma conference gathered members of the different Congolese armed groups;[134] government representatives, civil society leaders and international observers. The Amani process was welcomed as it was believed to tackle core issues (Prunier 2009). Its focus on a ceasefire and voluntary demobilisation however was in contradiction with the 2007 Nairobi Agreement which suggested forceful demobilisation of the FDLR (Boshoff 2008). After the Amani process, the security situation did not move forward as expected (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In August 2008, the FARDC allied with the FDLR and APARECO and resumed fighting against the CNDP. Owing to its military power, the CNDP conquered large zones of the north Kivu in October. Its advancement to inside a few kilometres of Goma – the provincial capital, put the FARDC in disarray. Consequently, the national army

[132] This was supposedly triggered by a failed negotiation for *brassage* [mixing] (Human Rights Watch 2007). The fighting also involved the FDLR and the Mai-Mai and displaced more than 170,000 people, in addition to 200,000 people internally displaced since the end of 2006 and 322,000 refugees hosted in neighbouring countries (Amnesty International 2008).

[133] 'Amani' literally means 'peace' in the Swahili language (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009).

[134] Twenty-two Congolese Kivu-based armed groups, including those who had ceased operations, were invited in order to ensure equal treatment (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009).

went on sprees of killing, raping and pillaging, leaving the FDLR and PARECO to fight with the CNDP. The new FARDC debacle spoiled the relationship between the DRC and Rwanda, with both laying blame on each other of backing insurgent forces; the FDLR and CNDP respectively.[135] The contradiction on the FDLR repatriation and the integration of the armed groups into the FARDC brought by the 2007 Nairobi and 2008 Goma agreements involved some international diplomatic efforts in an attempt to settle the conflict. Yet, the situation remained unstable and hostility continued.

4.5.4 DRC's Peacebuilding Failures

Two broad theories have been elaborated to explain the consecutive failures of the different peace agreements and the endless crisis in the eastern DRC. In essence, these peace accords were based on inclusive power-sharing agreements. They emerged from the 'consociational model'[136] according to which combatants' mixing and intermingling would be the key to conflict resolution, based on the belief that exclusion – as opposed to greed alone, has been the key fuelling factor of most African conflicts. The first theory portends that belligerents could have been dissatisfied of these inclusive power-sharing arrangements and could use their dissatisfaction as negative incentives to fuel mutinies in order to be included in the arrangements (Tull and Mehler 2005). Lemarchand (2006: 4) reiterates that the power-sharing agreements seem to be "co-option, directed by expediency" by the Western donors (Tull and Mehler 2005). This view is supported by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers' (2005: 476) for whom "a regular model of peace deal in the DRC involves the proliferation and fragmentation of armed groups as warlords are entitled to a portion of existing power arrangements". The proliferation of armed groups observed following the 2008 Amani process sheds light on this point (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 480). In light of this theory it might be argued that the Amani process had instituted the principle of violence into the peace process and acknowledged negative incentives to be armed in order to access resources.

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[135] These allegations were largely verified by the investigation by the UN Group of Experts (UNSC 2008a) that Rwanda discreetly supported the CNDP and FARDC officers extensively collaborated with the FDLR.
[136] The consociational model was formulated by Lijphart in 1970s and has been a predominant theory in thinking of democratic governance. See Lemarchand (2006: 1-2).

The second theory explains the failures of the peace agreements by a selective mechanism which does not involve some potential spoilers in the power-sharing agreements because of their economic and security interests (Grignon 2006). In the context of the DRC where the fluid nature of the fighters is not negligible, the non-implication of regional actors in the peace agreements might gain from continuing fighting (ibid.). According to Grignon (2006: 76):

> "The 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace arrangement illustrates the outcome of neglecting to add in potential spoilers as the ICD [based on the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreements] was frozen in a system of power relations hat has changed considerably over the course of the conflict".

This arrangement was selective by only including powerful domestic actors operating in the eastern DRC; the RCD-Goma and RCD-ML whereas the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi were disregarded in the transitional government. Only the formal international aspects of the crisis were tackled in both the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreements and the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, but other aspects of the war remained unaddressed (Grignon 2006).

A close look at self-seeking incentives and peace spoilers as mentioned above shows that these two aspects are only concerned with the outcomes rather than the root-causes and circumstances that produce this behaviour. Based on his empirical studies on trajectories of power sharing in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, Lemarchand (2006) argues that the outcomes of power-sharing arrangements depend on the socio-political context. The backdrop behind the disintegration of the rebel movements, especially the RCD, in terms of both intra- and inter-ethnic conflict, backs this view (ibid.). From this perspective, inclusive power-sharing agreements might have offered negative inducements to the warring groups that could otherwise secure significant political representation through peaceful means within the existing socio-political system. Lemarchand's standpoint on the nature of the DRC's socio-political system, in this case, is noteworthy.

On the grounds of the view above, it can be argued that inclusive power-sharing arrangements might be source of negative incentives to the antagonist movements that

could otherwise attain meaningful political representation through non-violent means within the existing socio-political system. This conclusion thus sheds light on the nature of the socio-political system in the DRC. Arguably, it could be postulated that behind failure state and protracted armed conflict in the DRC, while splitting a number of times (comprising the rise of the RCD, CNDP then the M23), is hidden the Banyarwanda weak position to accomplish political representation. This situation is further compounded by the fact that they are ethnic minority group challenged by the political manipulation of their citizenship and who largely sought Rwandan support than Congolese. Banyarwanda efforts to exhibit the symbols of the state, trademarks and their attachment to the Congolese government framework (Tull 2003), as well as to secure social control over local resources (Vlassenroot and Romkema 2002), has also been regarded as an attempt by them to increase political integrity and their presence.

The same socio-political system has been thought to be triggering some protagonists to 'spoil' the agreement since they were either overlooked or their agendas were not taken into account in the negotiated peace. Two protagonists that were not members of those peace agreements are the Mayi-Mayi and the FDLR. Following Mai-Mai militias fragmentation, it proved very difficult to understand their objectives. Having fought against the government and other rebellions (Prunier 2009), their attendance at peace agreements proved to be a genuine political issue (Grignon 2006). As for the FDLR, all the peace arrangements intend to neutralise and repatriate them to Rwanda. Yet, the FDLR are keen to return to power in Rwanda through a political dialogue with the Tutsi-led Rwandan government rather than fighting (Fessy and Doyle 2009). The FDLR leadership claims on its website that their objective is to "reinstate a regime based on universal principles, promote moral values, end wars and establish peace in Rwanda and in the region" (Chatham House 2009: 6). The refusal of the current Tutsi-led Rwandan regime to engage political talks with the FDLR and the assimilation of the FDLR members into communities after more than a decade of residence in the DRC would complicate their disbandment and repatriation (ibid. 2009).

Despite a few peace agreements regarding the FDLR demilitarisation and repatriation, they have succeeded to reassert their position in the Kivus as the government has been unable to dismantle them (ICG 2005; 2010). In this way, the government become a spoiler of the

negotiated peace (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009), partially due to a paucity of capacity. The growth of Rwandan influence in the Kivus has been thought to be a reaction to this unfulfilled accord (Grignon 2006). Rwanda has not only allied with rebellions to control the zone effectively, it also sent its troops through the eastern DRC (Grignon 2006: 79). Additionally, Hutu Banyarwanda leaders have been offered senior positions in the provincial administration by Rwanda to decrease their persuasion to adhere the FDLR (ibid.). Moreover, Rwandan actions reflect its economic interests to revive livestock ranching in the eastern DRC, whereas Rwandan economic agendas have never been part of those peace agreements (Grignon 2006). For instance, during the ICD, the concern of illegal exploitation of natural resources ascertained by the UN Panel of Experts investigations[137] was raised by civil society representatives, but the ICD did not sufficiently look into the political economy of the conflict and eluded to name any responsibility for the illicit exploitation of natural resources (Ballentine 2004; Grignon 2006).

It is proved that belligerents mined the mineral resources from the land they occupied and several disputes over control of the main mineral producing and trading towns erupted[138] (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). Rwanda and Uganda strongly refuted their economic incentives and implication in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources (Prunier 2009). Rwandan and Ugandan security imperatives as a justification to invade the DRC have been questionable as some analysts still believe that their presence has been motivated by their "long-standing interest in plundering the Congo's riches" in the power vacuum (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 215). Others however have advised that there was a shift in focus after these countries secured considerable profits from the pillage of natural resources during the 1996 Congo War (UNSC 2001a; Lemarchand 2003).

While the aforementioned economic agendas have been mostly regarded as patterns of greed, analysis of the political economy of armed groups proposes that economic interests have been a function of war. They aim to capitalise limited means and yield a necessary cash flow for their military campaigns, whereas others began to be aware of the economic opportunities accessible and pursued individual economic profit (Nest 2006c; Prunier 2009;

[137] See UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b).
[138] For example, the UPDF and the RPA clashed for control of Kisangani in August 1999 and May 2000.

Nest 2006c). Rebel movements hunted swift returns and minimum investment as a consequence of the economic collapse,[139] ruin of infrastructure, evident decline in agricultural outputs, variations in mining outputs, high costs of business operation, rising poverty and growth of informal economy in the DRC (Nest 2006c). They, for example, took control of points of access to collect levy on trade, reached favoured trade agreements with local merchants and secured local businesses (Nest 2006c; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005; Vlassenroot 2008). The economic agendas emerged crucial in mid-1999 when the different protagonists experienced the military stalemate (Nest 2006c) and, thus, the low-intensity conflict (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005). The function of war became vital for all the protagonists involved in the war (Nest 2006c: 38). Aside from the declining economy, the DRC government was amputated half of its territory together with commerce within it as well as one of the main and historically reliable sources of money for the state, foreign aid.[140] The Rwandan military campaign was reasonably self-funding as it was endeavouring to recoup from the entire damage left by the early 1990s civil war and genocide. Uganda also desired to subsidise the military campaigns as the donors pressurised on its outsized budget (Prunier 2009). Furthermore, the collapse of the DDR programme, which drastically mired progress towards the peace agreement, could be imputed partially to the socio-economic conditions in the DRC.

The paucity of achievable livelihoods as well as the poor DDR programme[141] implied that combatants could not be convinced to surrender. Possible explanations of this include the fact that the integrated fighters were earning insufficient and irregular salaries and frequently had to live from looting and plundering. Also, external actors have been manipulating the peace processes in pursuit of their economic survival, even if this has not been meticulously explored (Grignon 2006). Grignon, for instance, noticed that the economic interests of the official peacemakers, explicitly South Africa, menaced other countries in the region and thereby led them to jeopardise the engagements concluded.

[139] Per capita income decreased to 25 percent of 1970 levels by 2000 (Nest 2006c).
[140] The foreign aid for the DRC reached its lowest point in 1998 since Laurent Kabila appear to have created antagonism with the major donors by being "resentful at pressure to pay debts accumulated under Mobutu and increasingly bellicose in its diplomacy" (Nest 2006c: 38).
[141] The lack of financial means and agreement between the government and the armed groups is discussed by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2009).

Other external actors were marginalised during the progress of the peace accords because of the strong pressure of Belgium, France and the USA that have a close relationship with the Congolese government; which might spoil the process (ibid.). Explanations for the prolongation of conflict in the DRC, therefore, need to consider the local contexts. While both negative inducements and peace spoilers may be real and encumber the peace process, analyses on the socio-political context elucidate a range of economic and security imperatives for the belligerent groups and their supporters that have been kept blurred or addressed in the peace arrangements.

4.6 Understanding Current Conflict-Mining-Recruitment in Light of Conflict's Multi-layered Factors

After the end of the Cold War and the capitalism-socialism ideological conflict, the struggle for natural resource appropriation has set a new geopolitical landscape of the world; which established strong existing correlation between natural resources and armed groups (Blanco and Razzaque 2011; 2012; de Konong 2012). The background to the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the DRC draws its origin from 1996 civil war however many scholars recognised openly this conflict as a resource-based conflict and/or conflict-based resource in 1998 when the CNDP rebellion broke out (Dean Pavlakis 2010; Global Witness 2011).

Currently, at least 45 internal and external unauthorised armed groups are operating only in the eastern DRC (De Koning 2013). Two schools of thought have attempted to explain the phenomenon of rebellion's cycles in the Kivus, and combatant's pull and push factors for joining these militias. The argument of the incapacity of the state to secure these regions, and the fear of being dispossessed of land by non-national tribes supported by neighbouring countries, on the one side; and on the other, easy access to mineral resources by local and regional armed groups on the other (Mazalto 2009; IA 2010; Spittaels 2010) are seen as explanative root-causes of violence and insecurity cycles in the eastern DRC. Also, both schools acknowledge poverty, insecurity and the rights of defending one's communities and protecting one's identity and lands against invaders as conflict fuelling-factors (Burnley 2011; Lemarchand 2011). In summary, rebel and combatant recruitment in the DRC, as explained in Chapters Two and Three involves greed and grievance theories. This approach

focuses less on the 1884 Berlin General Act, also known as charter creating the DRC. According to this charter, the DRC is and should remain a protected space for great powers' interests and wherein any affirmation of sovereignty needs to be deterred by the menace of Balkanisation (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005). This is what this thesis coins as '*terra nullius* [common property] theory', which, in fact, according to a few scholars (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005; Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014), is the main origin of the 'top-down approach' or the pre-eminence of international and regional views over local approaches in solving the conflicts in the DRC. This view was fully supported by my fieldwork's findings.[142] Understanding '*terra nullius* theory' and 'top-down approach', however, would require us to review briefly some historical facts of the colonial period in the DRC.

4.6.1 Unveiling some Historical Facts of the Colonial Era in the DRC

From the International Association of the Congo (17 November 1879), through the Congo Free State (1885) and Belgian Colony (1908) to the current DRC (30 June 1960), the DRC's history suggests that the sovereignty of the state has always been in collision with the interests of Western powers. It has been postulated by a few historians and political scientists (Ndaywel1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005; Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014) that when the King of Belgium, Léopold II, started the conquest of the Congo Basin in the 1870s, he had encountered stiff resistance from the then European powers; France, Germany, Spain and Portugal. To these countries, the territory of the International Association of the Congo was brimming with abundant natural resources. So, they were unfavourable to see Léopold II administrate the rich basin of the Congo all alone (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014). According to Mbeko and Ngbanda (2014) and Van Reybrouck (2014), on 23 April 1884, the then European powers, including Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Norway, Span, Sweden and Russia as well as the United States of America signed the Berlin General Act, changing the status of

[142]General trend rising from the fieldwork's findings, Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 2013.

the International Association of the Congo[143] – created by Léopold II, to the Congo Free State. Here is the importance of recalling that these signatory powers like the current international community consider the 1884 Berlin General Act as the DRC's constitutional Act or Charter creating the Congo.[144] According to this Act, King Léopold II was acknowledged to be the owner of the Congo Free State (Van Reybrouck 2014), but this recognition was subject to a conditionality; the territory of the Congo Free State had to be and remain a '*terra nullius*', with free access to all (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014).[145] By implication, the territory covering the Congo-Zaïre belongs to nobody and all the signatory powers of the Berlin General Act had the right to enter and exercise their trade freely. Consequently, the DRC has been officially set as 'a colony of the international community' and 'a common property' of the signatory states of the Berlin General Act (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005). This stance also concurs with the general trend deriving from my fieldwork's findings.[146]

In 1908, the Congo Free State switched to the Belgian Colony following the atrocities of King Léopold II over indigenous populations. However, how can a Free State shift from autonomy status to a colony? To date, this question seems to be pending and unanswered. Neither the former colonial master nor the signatory powers of the General Berlin Act tried to address it. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that under terms of the General Act of the Berlin, guarantees related to free trade within the colony, scientific enterprises and no import duties for twenty years were the most advantages that the signatory states of the General Act of the Berlin were interested in (Ergo 2008). Contrary to his pledge regarding the protection of the advantages above, early in the mid-1880s Léopold II issued a range of decrees that finally violated the advantages of his partners (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014). On the other side, it has been ascertained that after acknowledging the

[143] Ndaywel (1998), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Elikia M'bokolo (2005) give detailed explanations on the historical process of state-building in the DRC.
[144] Ewans (2002) puts forward that in 1885 Leopold's efforts to establish Belgian influence in the Congo Basin were awarded with the *État Indépendant du Congo* [Congo Free State; EIC or CFS]. On the other side, by a resolution passed in the Belgian parliament, Leopold became *Roi-Souverain* [sovereign King] of the newly formed CFS, over which he enjoyed nearly absolute control.
[145] Ndaywel (1998), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Elikia M'bokolo (2005) offer further details on the internationalisation of the process of state-building in the DRC and various consequences thereof.
[146] General trend rising from the fieldwork's findings, Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 2013.

state's rights of proprietorship over all '*terres vacantes*' [vacant lands] throughout the Congo territory (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006; Ergos 2008), Léopold II further lessened the rights of the autochthons – Congolese, in their land to native villages and farms, essentially making nearly all of the Congo Free State the '*terres domaniales*' [crown lands or federal lands] (Jones Adam 2006), in which merchants limited their commercial activities in rubber to bartering with the natives (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014). Moreover, in 1892, after having divided the *terres vacantes* into a *domanial system* or federal system, he privatised extraction rights over rubber for the state in some private domains, allowing him to grant lucrative concessions to multinational corporations (Ewans 2002). As a sideline to this, the *domanial system* destroyed the traditional economy of the Congo basin and enforced a labour tax on Léopold's Congolese subjects, requiring local chiefs to supply men to collect rubber and other resources. Natives were essentially constrained to supply these products without payment (Jones Adam 2006).

Arguably, at the face of great powers, King Léopold II and the Belgian government were considered as mere managers of an international property. As discussed above, Belgian administration and its official attitude towards indigenes were 'paternalism' (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006). Based on this approach, Congolese had to be cared for and educated as if they were children. Moreover, indigenous people did not have any role in legislation, but customary rulers were applied as agents to levy taxes and enlist labour force; uncooperative rulers were deposed (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014). This 'parent-child relationship' between Europeans – represented by Léopold II or the Belgian government, and Congolese (Van Reybrouck 2014) still lasts until to date (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014). This policy, as claimed by a group of respondents, consisted of alienating indigenous culture and breaking the soul of a people. As a result, Congolese indigenes were kept out of management of their own lands and resources – this is 'resources appropriation' theory, also coined as 'globalisation' mentioned earlier in Chapters Two and Three. By implication, any conflicts arising from the management of the Congo had to request the great powers' advisory opinion before the settlement (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006;

Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014), a view supported by my fieldwork's findings.[147] This is the 'top-down theory' referred to above, which is further discussed in Chapter Five.

'Resources appropriation' and 'top-down theory' have been the bedrock of '*terra nullius* theory' mentioned earlier in this section. This view prevailed before colonial epoch like during colonial period (1908-1960), in the aftermath of the country's independence in 1960 this still continued till today. Equally, this could partially justify why Belgium did not prepare Congolese elites to take over after the colonial period (Davidson 1984). Concomitantly, evidence from the political history of the DRC (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005) shows that all Congolese nationalist leaders who dared to oppose the Berlin General Act by claiming the real sovereignty of the Congo were murdered – Simon Kimbangu, Lumumba, Laurent-D Kabila etc., or were curbed from accessing into power in order to prevent the country to be governed contrary to the Berlin General Act. This stance concurs with the view of Former Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre and with the one from a Civil Servant from the intelligence service of the Congo that I interviewed respectively in Paris and Kinshasa.[148] In the same vein – as disclosed by a focus group's participant, some days before his assassination on 16 January 2001, Laurent-D. Kabila, the then DRC's President, said:

> "I am aware of an assassination plot, organised and conducted by the Westerners, against me. A few individuals recruited from inside and outside the country are ready to murder me. Yes, I will die! Not because they have made you think and understand I am a despot, but because I am not a carrier of Western agendas and interests. They will kill me because I decided to lead the battle of intelligence against brute force, because I am the people's soldier and mostly because I want to use our resources to change our people's livelihood".[149]

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[147]General trend rising from the fieldwork's findings, Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 2013.

[148] Interview conducted with Former Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre, Paris, December 2013.

Interview conducted with a Civil Servant from the intelligence service of the DRC, Kinshasa, October 2013.

[149] The last speech of the late Laurent D. Kabila, President of the DRC (1997-2001), reproduced during a focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.

This might be the reason why a few days following the independence the country sunk into civil war and was once more set under the international protectorate of the UN, namely the *Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo* [United Nations organisation in the Congo; ONUC] from July 1960 to June 1964, the first ever UN Missions in the world (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014).

At the aftermath of the independence in1960, the Berlin General Act has been used through theories of 'chaos and lies'. These approaches gave rise to the emergence of strong men from inside and outside of the DRC, and dubious and corrupted elites and leaders from within the country. To this effect, reflecting the work of Beswick and Jackson (2011:20), it argues:

> "During Cold War, ruling elites in states considered by the superpowers to be of strategic value received military support, training and aid to build up forces to maintain their position, often against ideologically defined insurgent movements".

Based on the work of historians (Hochschild 1998; Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005; Ergo 2008; Van Reybrouck 2014), political scientists (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006) and drawing on findings from my fieldwork (2013),[150] it might be suggested that in the 1960s, the country went through different coups d'état, secessions and rebellions. From the 1970s to the 1990s, as indicated by a focus group discussion, there was a rising of puppet leaders all over the region (Habyarimana, Museveni, Kagame, etc.), with Mobutu being the main actor in carrying through the Berlin General Act vision.[151] In whole, it is evident that the chronology of the different protracted armed conflicts and various recourse to the international community in solving local and national problems (top-down approach) are nothing else than a denial of the Congo's independence (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M'bokolo 2005). According to a focus group discussion I conducted in Kinshasa, participants were of the view that the organised and planned looting of natural resources of the DRC falls under the theory of '*terra nullius*' as

[150] See appendix two for more details on different conflicts in the DRC.
[151] Focus groups, Kinshasa August, September and October 2013.

it is part of a well-organised programme emanating from the '1884 Berlin General Act', endorsed by the '1885 Berlin Conference'. To these individuals:

> "The protracted armed conflicts and fragile institutions that have rooted in the DRC are part of the well-considered strategy to weaken the structures of the Congolese state and to facilitate the looting of the state's resources. This may be the reason why chaos and looting are perpetrated with impunity in the DRC in the eyes of 20,000 UN indifferent peacekeepers".[152]

The *terra nullius* theory has been at the forefront of the ambiguity of the colonial dual land tenure system which had been corrected by the Bakajika law[153] in 1966. However, this does not negate the Lemera[154] Agreement, neither does it deny Article 9 of the current Congolese Constitution, as both reproduced the *terra nullius* principle in essence and still bear the scars of conflict, or litigation between multinational corporations and the Congolese state. In trying to understand the essence of Article 9 of the current Congolese constitution, it is worth underlining that the Article is nothing more than the reproduction of the 1884 Berlin General Act. This section therefore will succinctly endeavour to examine the Congolese Land Law, the Lemera Agreement and Article 9 of the 2006 Congolese Constitution in order to shed light on the existing correlation between mining and the cycle of combatant's re-recruitment and reintegration in the DRC. The current course of armed conflicts in the mineral-rich territory covering Goma and Kisangani helps understand the ideas behind the Lemera Agreement, and the principle of permanent sovereignty as stated in the 1884 Berlin General Act, reproduced by the Article 9 of the 2006 Constitution. Figure 4.1 shows the crown of wealth of the DRC concentrated in rebellions' stronghold.

[152]Focus groups, Kinshasa August, September and October 2013.
[153] Bakajiga Law was passed on May 27th 1966 and promulgated as ordinance-law on June 7th 1966. It is used to regulate the legal regime of land ownership as the constitution of 1 August 1964 in article 43, Paragraph 4.
[154] Lemera Hotel in South Kivu in the DRC where was signed the agreement creating the AFDL.



Figure 4.1: DRC and its crown of wealth (Source: Own Composition)

The link between armed conflicts – including combatants' recruitment, and the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC draws its origin from the military support that Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda brought to the AFDL in 1996-1997 (Gebrewold 2009). The AFDL was created by the 'Lemera Agreement' in 1996. The 2nd Article of the 'Lemera agreement' declares Congolese soil, whether customarily-held or not, exclusive and inalienable property of the AFDL. Concomitantly, the 4th Article states that preaching Pan-Africanism, the Alliance agrees to transfer 300 kilometres of the Congolese border, inside the country, to secure its neighbours; Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi against the rebel uprising (Nashi 2010; 2013; Onana 2013).

It follows from the articles above that the AFDL had the exclusive sovereignty over the Congolese lands; therefore, it had rights to alienate the soil, subsoil and the borders of the Congo. To this end, it seems crucial to underline that the land management system in the DRC is regulated by the 1966 Land Law, also known as the 'Bakajika Law'. This law declares Congolese soil, customarily-held or not, as exclusive and inalienable property of the state (Beck 2012). This means that the DRC has absolute sovereignty over its lands. The Bakajika law acknowledges an exclusive sovereignty of the state over its lands; forest including other natural resources. Concurrently, the 2nd Article of Lemera Agreement invested the same state power to the AFDL which was known as a rebel movement before 17 May 1997.

On the grounds of the Lemera Agreement, it could be argued that the AFDL was assigned the full sovereignty over the Congolese territory, effectively becoming the new lands' owner. This Agreement further established grounds from which the DRC's neighbours draw their legitimacy to overtly or covertly support rebellions inside the Congolese territory covering the space required in Lemera Agreement. However, the most important point that should be raised is that the AFDL – a rebel group, has created a no man land in the eastern DRC, and has allotted to itself the full power to lease mining contracts with countries and multinational corporations (Nzekanizena 2013). Question: how and why could a political movement – not yet in power, take ownership of the land of a sovereign state, and to some extent, modify the national border for neighbours' profit? This query prompts the importance of understanding the motivations that led to the creation of the AFDL and the assigned task in leading the 1996 armed conflict in the DRC.

4.6.2 AFDL: Foreign Interest in the DRC

Although the AFDL was a Congolese political movement under the Laurent-D Kabila leadership, basically it was a Rwandan initiative. The AFDL was in control of Rwanda, and it can be contended that Rwandans created this movement not necessarily because they needed to solve the issue of Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC, but because they had a sufficient and clear idea of controlling natural resources in the DRC (Gebrewold 2009; Onana 2013). "It was necessary that we respond and we had already identified Congolese who would fight Mobutu for us, with our support", said Rwandan President Paul Kagame (Jeune Afrique 2013). Onana (2012), for instance, reveals that Tutsi businessmen and elites who were exiled in the Congo in 1959 and came back home in 1994 have never hidden their yearning to control the resource-rich zones of the Kivus. Evidence from a few scholars further shows that when the AFDL occupied the city of Bukavu in 1996, Rwandan businessmen moved Kigali to Bukavu with an important quantity of money. They have physically slaughtered local inhabitants who attempted to thwart their business plans (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Gebrewold 2009). From Nzongola-Ntalaja and Gebrewold's stance, it might be postulated that the AFDL arrival in Bukavu had a clear economic and business agenda which has been materialised later with the creation of different business structures all over the zones under its administrative control.

The works of Gebrewold (2009), UN (2009; 2010; 2012; 2013), André-Dumont (2011) and Onana (2012) provide a useful interpretation of the ways in which the AFDL carried foreign interests in the DRC and how the security issue was an alibi which has hidden the main objective of the invasion of the DRC – illegal exploitation of mineral resources, by neighbouring countries. Beyond the business and economic agenda, some reports and evidence have ascertained that from Lubumbashi to Kinshasa, and across the country, the RPF had established a business bank for the reconstruction (UN 2009, Onana 2012). However, there is still concern as to the relevance of that bank, as it has never funded any reconstruction programme in the DRC since its creation. Gebrewold (2009), for example, attested that at the same time the AFDL was conquering Congolese territory under Mobutu control, some parts of Congolese industrial infrastructure were transplanted from Bukavu to Rwanda. The report of the 2012 UN Security Council on external support to the M23 also revealed that Rwanda and Uganda still support external and internal armed groups for

minerals exchange. Arguably, it could be put forward that Rwanda has essentially invaded the eastern DRC in order to secure its future in terms of mineral resources supply (UN 2009). A set of papers (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Gebrewold 2009; Onana 2012) indicated that when the AFDL started its initial battle to overthrow Mobutu from power, concomitantly Tutsi-led Rwandan government was establishing mining structures in the conquered territory under the AFDL administration. Based on his research regarding European censorship on crimes in the DRC, Onana (2012) clearly acknowledges that the conflict in the DRC is fundamentally economics', and Rwanda – with multinational corporations' approval, brought the AFDL in power not first for security issues but economics'.

Likewise, in my research in Kinshasa with former Adviser to the Presidency and in Paris with a free-lance journalist, it was noted that the first bilateral agreement between the DRC and Uganda was a commercial one. This agreement is normally quite specific and set the 'clause of the most favoured nation' on the side of Uganda.[155] This opinion also concurs with Gebrewold's (2009) for whom all agreements signed between Laurent-D and his allies carried seeds of future conflicts. From Koen (2008) and Onana's (2012) researches on the DRC's conflict, it is indicated that in September 1998, the then Rwandan President Bizimungu came to Kinshasa with an economical accord between Rwanda and the DRC, while Ugandan President Museveni was carrying a commercial one. According to former Adviser to the Presidency, the commercial agreement brought by the Ugandan President was written in English from Kampala that Congolese counterpart translated into French. The third article of the so-called agreement set the 'clause of the most favoured nation'; while the fourth article outlined the application of the third article, and stated that 'the clause of the most favoured nation' will apply to all business partners.[156]

On the grounds of multilateral agreements, the clause of the most favoured nation would mean that if a third party joins the agreement and is given any advantage – which was not initially included in the contract, automatically the advantage should apply the same to the main partner – the one who was the first to partake of the agreement (Battle and Moats 2013).

[155] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013.
Interview conducted with a free-lance Journalist, Paris, December 2013.
[156] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013.

The same article further highlights that if Uganda would give such an advantage to a third party, this advantage should not apply the same to the DRC – which is the Uganda's main partner in the contract. Virtually, possible interpretation of this includes that the 'clause of the most favoured nation' would only work for the DRC's case and not its partners. Because they – all DRC's partners, knew that the DRC has lots of partners, and would be offering lots of favours to all its partners alike on a grand scale, claimed a group of individuals.[157] As the focus group discussion indicates, visibly, Rwanda and Uganda were aware of this weakness and wanted to fully grab this opportunity to secure their future in mineral resource supply (Gebrewold 2009).

In my research in Kinshasa, when I interviewed former Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, he said:

> "In Kinshasa during the same visit of presidents Bizimungu and Museveni, Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan delegations met in the Red Lounge of Congolese Foreign Department. The gathering focused on the reconstruction programme of the DRC, and Rwandan partners showed their willingness to partake in the reconstruction of the DRC. What might sound interesting in the context of this study is that during these encounters, Rwandan partners have been interested in building roads connecting Gyseni, Goma and Walikale. What would be the interest of neighbouring Rwanda in building roads inside the DRC – because it is already beyond their borders, he said? For him, connecting Giseni to Goma, for example, would be comprehensible because both cities are located on either side of the border. But what could the reasons and interests be behind the project of connecting Giseni to Walikale? This concern might find the answer in the idea behind Rwandan project of building a railway connecting Kigali-Giseni-Goma-Walikale-Kisangani".[158]

Drawing on focus group discussions, most of the respondents adduced that the idea behind Rwandan reconstruction project could be gradually grasped by the presence of different armed groups in the eastern DRC's territory along the above-mentioned cities. One review of

[157] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[158] Interview conducted with former Head of the Department of Congolese Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, July 2013.

UN experts on the DRC (UN Experts 2014) indicated that until a recent past – 5 November 2013, the territory covering Goma-Walikale-Kisangani[159] was a rebellions stronghold where Rwanda and Uganda ignite and support the recruitment of militias among different local and external ethnic groups. This view is supported by several participants in focus groups' discussions, for whom Rwanda's economic survival relies on fuelling and supporting armed movements in the Kivus, something that it uses as a security alibi to invade the eastern DRC's resource-rich territories.[160] According to the UN (2012) and de Koning and Enough Projects (2013), these militias have been held responsible of illegal mining of mineral resources, and were militarily supplied by the above mentioned countries. From 1996 up to 2013, the AFDL metamorphosed under at least 3 official different rebel movements, the RCD, CNDP and M23. All these rebellions, in control of Rwandan background, have established their stranglehold within a space covering at least 300 Km inside the Congo – from Goma and Kisangani. It might be argued that, believed a Congolese academic, the AFDL has been shedding its nature and was an apparatus made and used to monitor and fulfil the plans of its initiators and mentors as they are set in the articles 2 and 4 of the Lemera Agreement.[161]

Although the M23 is defeated, the territory is still unsecured with about 45 armed groups controlling mining pits. This part of the country has the largest world reservoir of columbite tantalite – coltan, tin and tungsten, also called rare earths – as shown in the DRC's geological map coveted by multinational corporations. It is also rebellions and militias' throttlehold (IA 2010; GW 2011; Enough Projects 2013). All armed groups do operate in this space and are strongly installed in Walikale. It bears stressing that Walikale is also called 'safe-deposit box of the DRC', because this area abounds different resources that cause trouble in the East, and it is the area where the plundering of natural resources of the Congo is materialised (IA 2010; GW 2011). Walikale territory, according to a few participants in a focus group discussion, is one of the most mineral-rich areas in the eastern DR. Congo. However, there is no regulation in Walikale, neither is there any administrative structure.[162] It is a place where looting is

[159] See Figure 1.3 for more details.
[160] Focus groups, Kinshasa, July, August and September 2013.
[161] Interview conducted with a Congolese Academic, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[162] Focus group, Kinshasa, July 2013.

prolific, a territory where militiamen, soldiers, Rwandan and everyone collaborate in looting (IA 2010; GW 2011; Enough Projects 2013).

With the proliferation of rebellions as well as politico-military and economic-military elites increasingly involved in mining deals, it has been suggested by Onana (2013) that Rwanda was planning to remove the eastern DRC from the influence of Kinshasa. A Congolese academic I interviewed in Paris is of the view that Rwanda could have done so militarily but it wanted to achieve the Kivus' Balkanisation process more socially by creating a railway from Kigali to Kisangani.[163] This could be interpreted that this part of the DRC's territory was being annexed to Rwanda. Writings from de Koning and Enough Project (2013) indicated that under Rwandan and Ugandan leadership, business was developed in this part of the DRC. To them, from the 1990s to date Goma's agricultural and farming products are cut off from Kinshasa's control. The advantage that Rwanda could not get through agreements, contend Mbeko and Ngbanda (2014), it is getting so through supporting armed groups. Evidence from the fieldwork suggests that when the RCD, CNDP, M23 and other rebellions, for example, had started their movements, they have occupied the territory between Kisangani and Goma. According to a few focus groups' participants, in 1998, the RCD for instance extended its administration from Goma to Kisangani. From this point, as claimed by a few analysts, it seems to be clear that Rwanda has a plan of annexing the eastern DR Congo to its territory.[164] It attempted to implement this project through agreement with the Laurent-D. Kabila's government, but the project failed (Nashi 2007).

One comprehensive and highly critical report (ibid.) suggested that to keep its plan up-to-date, Rwanda has created rebellions throughout the natural resource-rich zones in the eastern DR Congo by manipulating some ethnic groups and chiefs in that area. As a ramification, to date, all rebel movements in the eastern DRC obey one dynamic, that is "each ethnic group defends its territorial identity against the other", contended a Congolese ethnologist.[165] At this point, "the struggle for identity and lands comes in and tries to hide resource interest", said

[163] Interview conducted with a Congolese academic, Paris, November 2013.
[164] Focus group, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[165] Interview conducted with an academic and ethnologist, Kinshasa, August 2013.
This dynamic is used as recruitment technique by different ethnic groups in eastern DRC. See Chapter 6 for more details.

the north Kivu's governor.[166] Summarily, it might be put forward that to Congolese politicians Rwanda has therefore fuelled and played the identity game hiding the struggle for economic interests. However, in the long run, poverty and misery becoming chronic, given that all these armed groups are created not primarily for identity needs but resources', so they have to control resources and territories to survive. Therefore, there comes in a perfect and clear understanding relationship between the artisanal mining of mineral resources and the phenomenon of strife, war and crises recurrence with all their side-effects; combatants' (re-) recruitment and the endless DDR programme. All these factors combined have resulted in the 'Somalisation'[167] of the eastern DR Congo.

In fact, Onana (2012; 2013) is of the view that Rwanda has been destroying the structure of the state in the DR Congo. Nothing can prevent all Rwandan actions towards creating and supporting armed groups that are responsible of illegal exploitation of mineral resources. Moreover, it seems to be that the project of neighbouring countries to keep the DRC in a state of failure and protracted armed conflict is run more comfortably in a stateless situation in this part of the DRC. Onana's view is supported by former Head of Department of Foreign Affairs. For him, Rwanda's external geopolitics is based on manipulating the eastern DR Congo's ethnic groups, while at the same time it is putting forward its own agents in the Congo in order to control mining zones and secure its future in resource supply.[168] From 1996 to date, Rwandan patriotic army, he said, is still financed from mining structures created during the period of the AFDL war. This seems to be the real purpose that led to the creation of the reconstruction bank alluded to above. So all Rwandan projects are made possible with multinational corporations' support (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Onana 2012). This is '*terra nullius theory*' said above.

4.6.3 The Geopolitical Stakes of the Multinational Corporations in the DRC

The AFDL is by far not the only source of conflict in the DRC. Different rebellions and the two Congo Wars (1990s and 2000s) were determined not only by Rwanda and Uganda, but

[166] Interview conducted with former Governor of the south Kivu, Kishasa, July 2013.
[167] The concept 'Somalisation' has been coined for the purpose of this study to highlight an anarchic and chaotic situation which is out of state's control.
[168] Interview conducted with former Head of Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, July 2013.

also by globalisation agendas and dynamics. On the basis of '*terra nullius* theory', the DRC ought to remain unstable and weak or even balkanised state. This implies that the DRC has to be an international settlement of exploitation, which is made possible through an alienation of some national, regional and international elites from within and without which allows super powers and multinational interests to feast on the DRC to the detriment of the indigenes. The examples of the proliferation of armed groups and rebellions in mineral-rich provinces of the Kivus, Katanga and oriental, and the failure of DDR and security sector reform are telling in this context. To this effect, it is worth noting that although a fairly stable core surrounds the western part of the country, large mineral-rich territories of the eastern Congo are out of control of the central government (Beswick and Jackson 2011:32), with armed conflicts being fundamentally and strongly driven by multinational corporations and regional powers whose major concerns and the interests remain strongly and increasingly on the strategic resources of the Congo.

With regards to multinational corporations' involvement, a body of researches established that from Lubumbashi, before the AFDL troops took over Kinshasa, new Congolese authorities have mistakenly signed lots of one-sided or unfair mining contracts with multinational corporations. With billions of American dollars, American Mineral Fields Incorporated – AMFI,[169] Anglo-American First Quantum Company, Lundin, Emaxon, Anvil and Kinross[170] financially supported the AFDL to reach Kinshasa without taking control of Mbunjimay[171] (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Caplan 2012; Onana 2012; 2013). So, why the AFDL took over Kinshasa – 2,000 miles away from Lubumbashi, and overlooked Mbujimayi just nearby – 500 miles? Herein lies the importance of noting that Mbujimayi is the World capital of diamonds, therefore Multinational Corporations' fear was that if the AFDL takes control of Mbujimayi's diamonds, it would not negotiate mining contracts in a weak position; therefore, they would not have any means to fulfil their project of Balkanisation, said a diplomat.[172] In contrast, on 2 August 1998, when the second rebellion erupted, Rwanda, Uganda and

[169] AFMI is at the lead of multinational corporations which are fuelling mineral conflict in the DRC since 1998.
[170] Anglo-American, Canadians, Australian and South African multinational corporations signed lots of one-sided mining contracts with AFDL from Lubumbashi a few days before Laurent D. Kabila took over Kinshasa in May 1997.
[171] Mbujimai is the Provincial capital of Kasai Oriental in the DRC. It is renowned as the World capital of diamonds and is home to Congolese diamonds extractive company MIBA.
[172] Interview conducted with a diplomat, Brussels, November 2013.

Burundi's troops under cover the RCD attacked Mbunjimayi to preclude Laurent-D Kabila from any access to diamonds.

In April 1997, Laurent-D Kabila and the AMFI agreed on a contract aimed to sell the *Générale des Carrièrs et des Mines* [Metals and Mineral Trading Company; Gécamines] to the AMFI. This agreement to sell the giant of the Congolese economy allowed the AMFI to rush the implementation of one of its objectives; 'the dismemberment and partition of ex-Zaïre into antagonist micro states, destitute of funds and economic infrastructure – kind of Balkanization (Onana 2012). Having not any reliable security system and army, these states plagued by insecurity, therefore would be put under the total dependence of the AMFI, which in turn shall take over their strategic sectors of the economy' (Caplan 2012; Onana 2012). The AMFI's plan was not carried out in accordance with its objectives explained above. According to Onana (2012), Laurent-D Kabila first violated agreements signed in September-October 1996, with his former allies Museveni, Kagame and Buyoya. These agreements obliged the DR Congo to pay for military assistance in the Liberation War, and the problem of security at the borders for four countries. This pact stated that the review of the delineation of borders in favour of Rwanda and Uganda should simultaneously satisfy these two countries, but also the geopolitical ambitions of the AMFI.

On the other side, Onana (2012) discloses that while Laurent-D. Kabila had turned down the AMFI's agreement; he was at the same time requesting the renegotiation of one-sided mining contracts signed with Anglo-American First Quantum Company which there was not deal. Unhappy of Laurent-D Kabila not respecting contract's terms, according to skype interviews conducted in Masisi and Uvira with a few mining experts and a member of Congolese civil society, Anglo-American First Quantum Company seized the UN and promised fight if its contract is renegotiated.[173] This view was supported by a diplomat I interviewed in Brussels. In his words:

[173] Skype interview conducted with members of the Kivus' civil society, Masisi and Uvira, August 2013.

> "The request for the renegotiation of $ 2 billion one-sided mining contract signed with Anglo-American First Quantum Company, and that of AMFI was the '*Casus Belli*'[174] between multinational corporations and the DRC".[175]

Therefore, resource war has been openly declared against the DRC, and was exacerbated by the bursting of the crisis when Laurent-D. Kabila abruptly decides to return Rwandan and Ugandan military contingent back home in July 1998 (Nashi 2013; Onana 2013).

The spark that set fire to the powder between multinational corporations whose proxies are Rwandans, Ugandans and to some extent Burundians and Kabila was the sale of one-sided contracts signed with the American-Canadian consortium – AMFI, to the ACC – a South African multinational corporation (Yomba Ngue 2013). According to a few scholars (Kourra Owona 2012; Nashi 2013; Onana 2013), another element which thwarted the AMFI's ambitious plan with regard to the dismantle of the DRC is the denunciation of the contract regarding the privatisation of the *Gécamines* that the AMFI had negotiated in April 1997 with the AFDL, while Anglo-American First Quantum Company excluded any attempt towards the revision of its mining contract (Hilgert 2013). The AMFI, allegedly, supported rebellion in terms of financial, logistic and military supports (Kourra Owona 2012; Nashi 2013; Onana 2013). However, it was still looking for a great turnover to develop mining business in the DR Congo, and therefore had to lead new Congolese authorities of the AFDL to sign one-sided mining contracts (Hilgert 2013); which held them hostages of ambiguous interests of multinational corporations, argue Onana (2012), Hilgert (2013) and Nashi (2013).

Baracyetse quoted by Onana (2012:92), for example, states:

> "Analysts doubt that the AMFI has the capabilities to exploit the mining concessions that it was granted. They believe that the AMFI could contract with larger and more specialised companies in order to get paid the risks already incurred".

[174] '*Casus belli*' is a Latin concept which means cause of war or cause of the conflict. It applies the same to this research.
[175] Interview conducted with a diplomat, Brussels, November 2013.

On 10 May 1997 – a week before Laurent-D Kabila took over Kinshasa, the AMFI invited American and Canadian financial groups to visit its new acquired facilities in Congo. This has been seen as a way of marketing business opportunities in the Congo-Zaïre, at the same time showing how the AFDL leaders or new Congolese authorities are opened to foreign investors. In regards to this point, it is important however to bear in mind that the redistribution of concessions and different mining sites to American, Canadian and South African companies aimed to help Laurent-D Kabila to raise money in order to pay his bills and daily expenses of his political-administrative apparatus (Onana 2012; Bagalwa Mapatano 2013). And Laurent-D Kabila was signing all these agreements based on Articles 2 and 4 of the Lemera Agreement.

In 1995, the AMFI was officially created, and yet all plans for the 'Balkanization' of the Zaïre were ready. Nowadays, history is repeating itself as there is a reoccurrence of rebellions and armed groups in the eastern DRC. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Onana (2012), Museveni and Kagame are fully aware of the true intentions of the AFMI over the DR Congo. They are aware of the intentions, the interests and aspirations of what the AFMI represents and the benefits of their respective countries and much of these have been attributed to Laurent-D Kabila to be fulfilled. There are convergent objectives between all multinational companies – MNCs, involved in the DRC's conflict. Onana (2012) suggests that the MNCs are in alliance with the governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to secure their resources' interest, something which is different from the interest of Congolese indigenes.

It is believed that the AMFI and the MNCs brought a decisive financial, military and logistical support to the AFDL. Currently, it has been proved that arms, ammunition, sophisticated military equipment that allowed the AFDL to defeat the Zaïrian armed forces in 1997, continue to be made available for rebellions and armed groups in the eastern DRC via Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda by the same company AMFI (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). So far, a set of writings on the DRC's armed conflicts depict that the geopolitical stakes of Multinational Corporations and the involvement of regional countries in the illegal exploitation of minerals, coupled with the government mismanagement in the DRC are the core matter explaining the cycle of armed groups and the unfolded nature of the combatants' DDR programme in this country (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).

A fairly cursory knowledge of the 1960s Marxist rebellions in the east of the DRC shows that Laurent Désiré Kabila was not a charismatic leader who could spearhead a popular insurrection (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). From skype interviews I conducted in Bukavu with some local notables, a retired general who fought with Laurent Désiré Kabila against Mobutu in the 1960s rebellion noted that on 24 April 1965, Ernesto Che Guevara and Cuban mercenaries arrived in Baraka Fizi to support Marxist rebellion led by Laurent Désiré Kabila. They were sent by Fidèle Castro, the then President of Cuba. After seven months spent in the bush, Che Guevara and his revolutionary companions came to understand that Kabila's rebellion could not defeat Mobutu, therefore they decided to go back to Cuba via Tanzania. In the words of this veteran: "Che saw in Kabila a disorganised rebel leader; a womaniser who enjoyed alcohol".[176] This view was supported by Museveni and Kagame for whom Kabila was not able to lead a revolution but they needed an individual of Congolese origin to head the movement in order to convince the international community that the AFDL was a Congolese rebellion.[177] On the grounds of the views above, one can argue that neighbouring military and political support to the AFDL, on the basis of regional insecurity imperatives, and Laurent-D Kabila's choice to spearhead the AFDL had nothing to do with Kabila's quality of Marxist-Lumumbist as mentioned earlier. Within the AFDL, there were several Congolese Nationalists, such as Kisase Ngandu, Kipulu Walulu, to name a few, who were much better than Kabila in terms of nationalism and leadership. Kabila's choice to spearhead the AFDL however, laid in his quality of 'gold dealer', something that will later prompt the signing of unfair mining contracts before the AFDL deposed Mobutu. This supports the Onana's (2012) view that all countries that allied with the AFDL have been partaking in the exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC during both wars and after the war. This epitomises the "*terra nullius*" theory said above.

On the contrary, reflecting on the level of societies and cultures, it could be argued that humanity is dynamic or changes in time. At the level of organisations however, individuals could be static or frozen in time even over period of years (Block 2009). With reference to Block's view, it reflects that Che Guevara, Museveni and Kagame's opinions on Laurent Désiré Kabila were based on the principle of circumstantial alliance – which involves static

[176] Skype interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Bukavu, August 2013.
[177] See Rwandan President's interview conducted with Jeune Afrique, www.jeuneafrique.com.

behaviour of individuals, and they neglected the dynamics of cultures and societies – something which is inherent to humanity. Similarly, by describing Laurent-D Kabila as a bungling leader, Museveni and Kagame indirectly challenge not only the capacity of the Congolese people to manage their country, but also they defy a lowliest and inept leadership incapable to get the country played the central role in the current shift of geopolitical and geo-economical configuration of the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Therefore, the use of this 'principle of double reference[178] by Rwandan and Ugandan leaders at this particular point speaks of leaders and people being unable to rule their country and to protect foreigner interests without the interference of external leaderships. Although Laurent Désiré Kabila was considered as a gold dealer and as somebody who was not able to lead a revolutionary movement, in the sight of the Congolese people however he is seen as a nationalist or martyr or hero; somebody who sacrificed his life for the total independence of his country. It follows from the foregoing that the evolution of societies and cultures goes hand in glove with the debate on the versatility of human behaviour, and to some extent leaves room to debating on what nationalism, martyrdom and heroism is, and how Africans, particularly Congolese people understand these concepts.

4.7 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the developments and nature of the conflict in the DRC between 1996 and 2012. It focused on the geopolitical relationship of the DRC with neighbouring countries and multinational corporations. The protracted armed conflict in the DRC, from the 1996-1997 War, through the 1998-2003 war, to the unfolded crisis, has been portrayed as a 'multipart hybrid conflict' (Carayannis 2003) or a 'many-sided' conflict (Prunier 2009). It was an amalgamation of conflicts that arose at several levels with different actors, roughly at local, national and regional levels (Cramer 2006a; Grignon 2006; Wake 2008), and that were exacerbated and obscured by their interconnections. It emerged from the analysis that the developments of the conflicts occurred in the context of a considerable economic collapse, a visible institutional slump and a waning of political legitimacy. The analysis has also

[178] In the context of the research being studied, the 'principle of double reference' refers to a metaphoric language whereby Kabila's picture presented by Kagame and Museveni is one of confusion until Kabila is recognised; then Kabila is properly focused and appears in his true perspective.

underlined the significance of the local context, previous to the occurrence of the conflicts, in which historical, social, economic, political and cultural nexuses in the region are entrenched. Seen under the local level, the roots of the conflicts derive from a long historical standing. The flooding of Rwandan immigrants and refugees into the densely inhabited the eastern DRC has been subject to political manoeuvring (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). Being ethnically non-indigenes, the Banyarwanda were largely deprived of customary rights and could not have access to land based on the traditional authority (Mamdani 1998; 2001). However, through Mobutu's strategy regarding horizontal elite networks, they were favoured and become prominent to govern the country (Putzel *et al*. 2008). Through the 1972 citizenship decree, they received Congolese nationality and obtained massive land following the 1973 land law (Huggins *et al*. 2005; Van Acker 2005; Jackson 2007). Following the acute economic downturn after 1974, Mobutu's patronage strategy based on the distribution of economic assets for political support was immobilised. The resentment of the Banyarwanda grew higher and they got withdrawn citizenship by the 1981 Citizenship Law. New vertical networks were created with indigenous actors being advantaged and taking over the preceding patronage system (Putzel *et al.* 2008) and becoming increasingly independent (Nest 2006b) through informal privatisation of the state (Vlassenroot 2008). The 1990s democratic transition overlooked the issue of citizenship for Banyarwanda and excluded them from the process, thus aggravating the tensions and militarising the Banyamulenge (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009).

The alteration of the customary patrimonial system (Tull 2003: 437; Van Acker 2005) and of the 1973 land law with regard to the commodification portended that the change of land from a social resource into a capital asset enhanced a growing socio-economic exclusion of large fragments of the population (Tull 2003: 437). The partial land restructuring had also enabled a parallel arrangement of land ownerships (Meditz and Merrill 1993) through traditional rights and the market (Mamdani 1998). All this had weighed on the Kivus, a densely populated region wherein land is the most critical local resource but scarce (Sosne 1979; Mamdani 1998; Van Acker 2005; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005; Turner 2007). Finally an ethnic conflict over the land erupted in 1993. After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the situation was worsened by the arrival of the Hutu refugees (Reed 1998) and the subsequent 1996 AFDL War. While the local conflict was believed to be an ethnic fight over land, it was

about ‘ethnicity and citizenship’ – something which determines the access to land (Mamdani 2002), and political exclusion (Lemarchand 1997).

During the 1996 AFDL War, Rwanda succeeded to reposition the Banyamulenge in the DRC’s socio-political system. However, the coalition between the Banyamulenge community and Rwanda brought out dilemmas for the latter, as the fissure between the Banyamulenge and the indigenous communities had amplified, and their independence had been assimilated in return to the protection granted by Rwanda (Vlassenroot 2002). Suspicion and antipathy against the Banyarwanda and Rwandans had grown based on the belief that the latter had used the former to aggress the DRC (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Owing to their coalition with Rwanda, the Banyamulenge were on the frontline of the second Congo War. Although they rose into power after the power-sharing transitional government in 2003, there were not much changes for the Banyamulenge in terms of marginalisation and treatment. This situation worsened with the loss of their political importance following defeat in the 2006 votes (Prunier 2009). Challenged by a majority-driven political system (Mamdani 2002), which disregarded the ethnic minorities, the Banyamulenge created the CNDP to defend their political representation, which culminated in intensifying crisis in the Kivus (Autesserre 2010).

Nationally, the conflict is seen as a fight against Mobutu’s despotism and for democratic transition. While the AFDL war was allegedly led for regional security interests and succeeded to depose Mobutu, it had failed to democratise the DRC’s socio-political system, partially because of internal divergences and the dearth of legitimacy of the new authorities due to their reliance on and alliance with Rwanda (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel *et al*. 2008; Prunier 2009), which turned to be an occupying force and had militarised, repositioned and strengthened the Banyamulenge community. Their attempt to get legitimacy by delinking from Rwanda had significantly changed the local and national aspects of the conflict to the regional dimension. Rwanda had grabbed an argument to return to deal with the FDLR elements – Rwanda’s security imperative, and to get rid of Laurent-D Kabila (Vlassenroot 2002), and it refuelled the Banyamulenge resentment (McNulty 1999; Lemarchand 2003; Reuters AlertNet n.d.). When it finally prompted the 1998 Congo War, the fight involved various regional actors owing to their own regional security concerns.

Although the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreements in 1999, Laurent-D Kabila remained reluctant to open a democratic space. The democratic transition was only moved forward by Joseph Kabila following the murder of Laurent-D Kabila in 2001. Following the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreements and the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, with the principle of power-sharing, the country remained fragmented and the local aspects of the conflicts in the eastern DRC unsolved. The 2003-2006 transition and the democratic elections instead deepened the conflict in the eastern DRC and cumulated in political repression by Joseph Kabila (Amnesty International 2006; MONUC 2006; Human Rights Watch 2008; Reuters AlertNet n.d.). The role of regional actors was significant in the DRC's crisis due to both civil wars involving external interferences. Regional security concerns were critical in the DRC as the latter became sanctuary for numerous foreign insurgent movements (Salehyan 2008) and several 'vectors of violence' camouflaged under refugees (Lemarchand 1997) from neighbouring countries.[179] This has been the case of Rwanda whose intervention in the DRC was to eradicate the menace from the FDLR, comprising the 1994 *génocidaires* and the militarised Hutu refugees in the Kivus, and to solve the political exclusion of Banyamulenge community in the eastern DRC, provoking a 'Kin country syndrome' (Lemarchand 1997).[180] Rwandan interferences seriously deteriorated the local conflicts in the eastern DRC as they raised the Tutsi resentments.

The aforementioned analysis of the complex nature of the conflict in the DRC has discovered the backdrop and fundamental root-causes of the protracted crisis in the eastern DRC. Firstly, the decline of political legitimacy of Mobutu's regime, institutional meltdown and economic downfall ended up to the informal privatisation in the 1980s. This informal governance based on socio-economic networks was anchored particularly in the Kivus and has been underpinned by armed conflicts and power-sharing agreement following the peace process. Secondly, the local environment in the Kivus was significantly shaped by ethnicity, citizenship and land concerns as fundamental causes fuelling the conflict, given these questions were rigged for political exclusion. Defining access to land was a solution for the

[179] Local settlement, as the preferred policy for refugees by the international community until the 1980s, did not bring about a desirable impact as some of those refugees had turned into armed rebels (Takeuchi 2006).
[180] According to Lemarchand (1997), where ethnic fault-line cut across national boundaries, conflict tends to spill-over from one area to the next, transforming kin solidarities into a powerful vector of transnational violence.

ethnic crisis in the Kivus, but the state legislation remains poor in governing land ownerships due to the existing customary authority and rebel influence in the zone (Mamdani 2002). Thirdly, the way the international community handled the waves of the 1994 Rwandan refugees following genocide considerably changed the episode and development of the conflict in the DRC. The French and Zaïrian decision to create refugee camps for *génocidaires* and armed Rwandan Hutus has thus militarised the eastern DRC and set an urgent security risk for Rwanda to take action. More importantly, the peace process has dealt with the symptoms of the conflict instead of root-causes. With regard to the analysis of the peace process in this chapter, the state-centric or inclusive power-sharing approach failed to solve the local socio-political environment wherein diverse economic and security concerns remain, and showed its limitations to speak to negative incentives and peace spoilers. So, informal socio-economic networks still govern the eastern DRC. They control the local assets and trade outside the state authority and linger militarised.

Within the context of the power-sharing arrangement, some actors like the FDLR were kept out of the process. The only option they are offered is to disband and repatriate. Owing to their economic and security interests, the FDLR resist firmly and require political talks with the Rwandan government. Likewise, the local community opposed a strong antagonism against the members of the RDC-Goma due to their close ties with Rwanda which continues arming them. Also, the peace rebuilding process during the transitional period was challenged by some of the weaknesses of the post-conflict reconstruction tools reviewed in Chapters Three and Four. The 2006 Constitution established the majority-driven political system which considerably marginalised the RCD-Goma as an ethnic minority and maintained the gap between the local community and the Tutsi. The Banyamulenge struggle against political exclusion culminated in the creation of the CNDP and reversion of the armed conflict (Hesselbein *et al*. 2006). Another key element is the mingling and mixing of rebels with the FARDC elements and the failure to demilitarise the conflict zone. As reviewed earlier, the DDR programme was poorly approached, disregarded, divergent and complex structures entrenched in the local environment and could not cater suitable support for ex-combatants, and neither could it secure both ex-combatants and integrated ones. This chapter has advised that the aforesaid unsettled issues should be considered as they are fundamental to end and prevent further conflict in the eastern DRC. The Chapter further indicates some limitations of

the analysis of civil wars using the absurdity of abundance theory in particular. The conflict in the DRC, for instance, epitomises a multi-layered and hybrid nature of conflict which does not fall under civil war and inter-state war category. In this case, the "*terra nullius*" theory categorically needs to reinforce the absurdity of abundance theory as it explains the root-causes of, and the top-down approach to, the conflict in the DRC. It also brings about the existence of a compelling convergence and nexus between the new geography of resources or resource appropriation, ethnic identity, land access and armed conflict in the DRC, as opposed to the only plenty in non-renewable natural resources being a sole factor, since defining access to land, resource appropriation and the role of multinational corporations seemed to be essential in understanding the local-level conflicts in the eastern DRC.

Chapter Five: Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the (Re-) Recruitment of Combatants

(Dunnebacke 2014).

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses data obtained from the field research undertaken between July and December 2013. The findings presented and analysed below represent 80 per cent of interviewees' responses, and were collected to illustrate the problems posed in Chapter One. In total, 40 interviews were conducted in four different interview clusters as well as 3 focus groups.[181] Two fundamental goals drove the collection of the findings; the first objective was to identify the relationship between artisanal mining and the cycle of the combatants' recruitment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the Kivus. The second objective was to explore possible ways of curtailing this destructive relationship. The findings presented in this chapter respond to the first objective and demonstrate the potential for merging theory and practice. Therefore, findings are presented in six sections that examine the results of the state-building and security sector reform processes in the DRC, the political economy of the DRC's mining, the nexus between mining and armed groups, the cycle of combatants' recruitment, the DDR programmes and the combatants' re-recruitment.

5.2 Autopsy of Stuttering Security Sector Reform and Fainting State-Building Processes

This research falls within the post-conflict settings which is complex in nature. Understanding the contextualisation of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage in the war-torn-zone will require a better knowledge of the processes of state-building and SSR in the DRC, since these two elements often determine the success or failure of the post-conflict society. As alluded to in Chapter One, from the pre-colonial through colonial, to post-colonial time, the history of the natural resources exploitation and combatants' (re-)

[181]See Chapter One and Appendix Three for further details on different clusters interviewed, the number of interviews allocated to each focus groups.

recruitment in the DRC has been repeating itself all over the time, taking different shapes for different purposes. These changes are a result of the metamorphosis of the state's institutions throughout these periods. In the face of a long history of break-up and conflict, characterised by state's incapacity and inability to project its authority, a highly disadvantageous political geography, enormous natural resource wealth and profoundly fragmented society, the nexus between artisanal mining and the (re-) recruitment of combatants, seen as an endogenous process enhanced by exogenous support of certain powers in pursuit of securing the future of their natural resources yonder their official boundaries, needs both macro and micro-analysis. Seen under macro-analysis lens, the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment bond has a direct implication on capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the DRC driven by state-society relations. In light of my fieldwork's findings however, it might be argued that process to analysing the resource-based conflict in the DRC would involve the understanding of reciprocal relations between the DR Congo as a weak state and social and political groups who constructively engage with the country. Possible interpretation of this includes that a better understanding of the link above necessarily requires a good knowledge of the process of state-building, peacebuilding and security sector reform – SSR, since the structure of the DRC as a state is the result of an underlying political arrangement; the forging of a common understanding between colonial master and the then international community on the one hand, and the Congolese elites and the current international actors whose interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power, on the other.[182]

Based on the findings from my fieldwork, one could note that as a dynamic process, the features of peacebuilding, SSR and state-building in the DR Congo and the dynamics of how the development of these processes spread out and interconnect rely to a great extent on economic, political and social development of the country. This would be construed that the perceptions of what is priority in the DRC, for instance, has been an issue of diverse interpretations based on the geopolitical or geo-economical even geo-strategic role of the country in the region and the actors concerned.[183] As a sideline to the above, concurred a few respondents and participants, understanding the DRC's SSR and state-building processes

[182] Findings from fieldwork conducted in Belgium, France, DRC and London, July-December 2013.
[183] Interviews conducted with security and military senior officers, France and DRC, September-November 2013.

therefore helps ponder on the conflict essence and existence beyond the link between artisanal mining and the (re-) recruitment of combatants, and will guide the research in terms of making decisions on how to best prioritise and sequence support to country-level peacebuilding and state-building efforts, particularly when it comes to addressing the issue of delinking combatants from artisanal mining, restructuring security services and rethinking the new combatants' DDR. It will also shed light in identifying the critical risks of instability and the most likely drivers of peace that may be explored as a useful way to addressing the security and development challenges in which the state has been trapped since a very long period.[184]

After the Sun City Agreements, reforming security services and restoring the state's authority have been regarded as an avoidable route to rebuilding the post-conflict DRC. Viewed purely under the DRC's post-conflict perspective, SSR and post-conflict reconstruction seem to be so bound up with the broader process of state-building, to the extent that the reforming of the Congolese security services emerges as armed wing of the DRC's state-building. As implied below, there exists a close nexus of a global project between restructuring security system and state-building process in the post-conflict DRC. This link could be both in peace time and in post-conflict environments, since both are also linked strongly with the idea of the 'liberal peace' (Jackson 2010). State-building and SSR, argues this section, could be exogenous – an activity undertaken by external actors, which often occurs during a post-conflict reconstruction context. It can also be an endogenous process – a national process driven by state-society relations, which frequently happens during peace time. Understood as an exogenous process, as is the case with the research settings being studied, sustained attention on supporting state-building has tended to be concerned with states repeatedly characterised by brutalised civilian populations, devastated economies, institutions, infrastructure and environments, widely accessible small arms, large numbers of disgruntled combatants to be demobilised and reintegrated and ethnically or religiously divided peoples. From an

[184] Interviews conducted with security and military Senior Officers, France and DRC, September-November 2013.

endogenous perspective however, according to Whaites (2008), state-building is nothing other than an indigenous and national process driven by state-society relations. This developmental view also tends to contend that state-building is primarily a political process rather than just a problem of technical capacity improvements and sees state-building as involving a threefold dynamic; political deals – usually elite, the prioritisation of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations (World Bank 2011). This, in my findings, constitutes the dichotomy between endogenous and exogenous view over the ongoing debate regarding state-building and SSR. However, be it endogenous or exogenous, building a state and reforming security services are time hungry, always involved different ideologies both from within and without, lengthy discussions and quarrels among different partners. Positive state-building development that involves reciprocal relations between a state – which delivers services for its people, and social and political groups – who constructively engage with their state, will largely depend on the improvement of the state-building process from within. This could be said otherwise that the more state-building process relies on an exogenous aid and ideology –as is the case with the research settings being studied, the less it delivers positive service to its citizens who less buy in to it.

In a very Hobbesian way (Jackson 2012), security is defined as the ability of the state to deliver a service to its citizens. From this perspective, a strong nexus between SSR, security sector governance and state-building emerges as a global project. Some will argue that state-building is the practical face of the security-development link. This is the alluded nexus above. Bryden*et al*. (2005), for instance, underline four core areas to keep in mind when assessing the moment for suitable intervention of SSR; environment – politics and socio-economic position of the population, political will and commitment of international actors, local authorship and ownership and tension with external interventions, as well as integrated and coherent sequencing. However, the particularity of each post-conflict environment would mean that state-building and SSR interventions will also be context-specific. It is likely that there are various methodologies or timings and these four will change with each intervention. Possible explanation of this includes that any international intervention should essentially be political in terms of deciding on the suitable moment to intervene, intervening in a delicate and diplomatic way and factoring into domestic political sensitivities within a heightened political condition. On the ground however, noted Albrecht and Jackson (2005), it has tended

to occur that most of the interventions have been essentially technically emphasised rather than politically responsive. There has also been a tendency to implement the 'easier' technical tasks of training police and military while the more problematic governance aspects are neglected. It arises from this perspective that overlooking the political environment in which the intervention takes place is too easy, something which could be a serious obstacle to SSR progressing effectively. In a post-conflict environment, as is the case with the DRC, SSR should always take into account the legacy of the past, which often involves a lengthy dictatorial regime. In such cases both the governance structure and the institutional framework have to be restructured. Moreover, political considerations come into play because of the involvement of different actors in post-conflict restructuring and governance processes. These actors may be international agencies, international militaries, private sectors and non-statutory security actors, comprising parties such as insurgent groups, religious transnational actors and warlords, as well as civil society and government itself.

Seen through the lens of my findings, it may be suggested that following the Sun City Agreements, the process of state-building and SSR in the DRC caught the attention of much international assistance, in practice however different tries at achieving their objectives have been in a bind. The fundamental reason for this is the hidden agendas of different protagonists and their supporters, as well as the approach of state-building and SSR adopted both by the international community and former belligerents.[185] As argued in this Chapter, the DRC, in its current configuration, has been subject to contemporary state-building approaches and is the result of interventions that focus very much on technical issues, particularly effectiveness and functionality of the state, rather than on the idea of what the Congo as a state actually is and should deliver to the Congolese. Be it theoretically or practically, argue some scholars, there is a clear cut difference between constructing a state apparatus and building a state that delivers rights to its citizens, including the right to live free from harm, not least in separating the technical process of what a state does from the political processes involved in what state actually is (Jackson 2012). Purely from a perspective of the

[185] Interviews conducted with the UN and EU representatives, Brussels and Kinshasa, August-November 2013.

sociology of conflict, it argues that after each post-conflict period in the DRC, the international community always endeavours to build in the Congo what Jackson (ibid: 256) coins as "a Western-style state armed with an entire range of neoliberal theories that view the institutions of the state as being technocratic and separate from politics". As a sideline to this thinking, the international community has dismantled the Congolese original – traditional, or existing state and began all over again, constructing a new set of ahistorical institutions alien to the indigenous communities; a process, in state-building and SSR's readings, labelled as a 'McDonaldisation approach' to state-building and SSR by Fischer and Schmelzle (2009), or the 'top-down approach' to conflict-analysis and conflict-resolution discussed in Chapter Four and cited in Chapter Six. Similarly, the 'top-down approach' used by the international community to the conflict in the DRC raises the issue in line with the limitations of an externally led UN approach that incorporated foreigner technocrats and local elites but side-lined local communities. This effectively resulted in creating an ahistorical state which exists legally and is managed by a dubious elite, but is still hollow because it is severed from local political processes or representation, hence lacks legitimacy yonder the ruling elite and the United Nations (Lemay-Hebert 2011). The picture above illustrates that externally led, top-down approach or technocratic solutions do not automatically end to a successful state-building (Woodward 2009).

According to Skype interviews I have conducted in Bukavu and Goma, participants have been of the view that following the 2003 Sun City Agreements, state-building process was dominated by the development of exit strategies for different belligerents and other internal intervening parties, including civil society and non-armed opposition. To them, these Agreements also designated a transitional period and 'democratic elections' as the end point.[186] However, the experience has shown that after the 2006 and 2011 general elections, the DRC did not yet reach a successful conclusion of state development, even though some technocrats (Jackson 2012) could contend that elections are the possible way to making and enhancing democracies. It might be concurred with the view above that to date, the post-

[186] Interviews conducted with civil society representatives, Bukavu and Goma, August-September 2013.

conflict political landscape in the country is shaped by a multiparty democracy, but there is still a fundamental lack of understanding of what the development of state and that of a state-building actually means in practice. The dearth of a good understanding of the project of state and state-building by state's leaders has important implications for security governance, because security institutions are an essential component of the state and are frequently seen by underprivileged individuals as a major menace to their security. In the current shift of global geopolitics and geo-economics, characterised by the hunger of natural resources by states, building security institutions that are representative is therefore critical to the stability and the survival of the DRC's sovereignty and the human security of its population.

Much has been written on state-building (Fukuyama 2004; Hippler2005; Berger 2007; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Jackson 2010; 2012), but it appears useful to review representative illustrations of some main approaches. Fukuyama's (2004) approach on completely ahistorical and technocratic states, for instance, points out the lack of institutional memory about state-building within policy bodies such as the United Nations. Fukuyama's stance corroborates with the view that state-building is time consuming – constructing a state is a long-term commitment and involves sustained investment in time and resources (Jackson 2012). Other analysts add to the ideas above, but many of their views remain generic or generalised comments and do not actually offer an all-inclusive theoretical framework for state-building. Hippler (2005), for example, highlights a plan based on three points including improving living conditions, structural reform of ministries and integration of the political system. It is worth specifying at this point that Hippler's three-point plan looks like a depoliticised account of reality that drives the politics off state-building. Furthermore, such interventions are often put through by bureaucrats, or in the case of security governance by military officers from the international community who are primarily concerned with technical rather than political issues (Jackson 2012). Pragmatically, what does this actually stand for? Into which framework is the political system being integrated? If the political system is being integrated into the international order, as is usually the case, then how do grassroots partake in this process? Who authors and owns it? Are local people benefitting the process, or does it profit stakeholders – international states, depending on the state system on the ground? A substantial silence in Hippler's analysis is that the role of a functioning

security sector, capable for maintaining a safe environment in which state-building can actually flourish, has been neglected.

Although many of the analysts of the conflict in the DRC virtually accept that there are problems with the nation-state in the way that the country has been failing (Prunier 2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009), however they still tend to support the scenario of the technocratic structures of state-building as laid out by Fukuyama. This displays the DRC as the norm in international relations, disregarding the expansion and extending of security at international and sub-national levels, mostly the intra-state nature of conflict, international conflict actors as well as the role of the DRC itself as an actor in non-state conflict. "If we can develop the right mixture of policies, then we can create a healthy nation-state that can exist in the international order", says an assumption, quoted by Jackson (2012:258). Reconstructing the post-conflict DRC on the Agreements does not mean that the state exists on the ground. Like all states, the DRC needs to rely on people to make it work. This means that the country needs to hinge around political structures and institutional bodies. This further implies that people need to buy in to the state at some level.

Viewed under the lens of legitimacy, the state as an institution needs some level of support that epitomises something its populace recognise as a state. This is what is referred to as multiparty democracy in a liberal sense, but in practice this model of democratic structure has failed to provide representation in the DRC post-conflict environment, partially due to nascent democratic institutions need sufficient time to bed down (Jackson 2012). The DRC is the archetypal fragile or weak state which pieces together the state's history and the problem of contemporary international relations, particularly the universalisation of one model of the nation-state (Wolfgang Heinrich and Manfred Kulessa 2005). Based on Skype and email interviews conducted with a few representatives of some international organisations in Beni, Bukavu, Butembo and Goma, it could be interpreted that UN-sponsored external state-building following the Sun City Agreements is another core element of a failure to embed legitimacy within a hybrid government beyond local elites.[187] From another point of view, but closer to the former, different stances of a few senior security and military officers I have

[187] Skype and email interviews conducted with a few representatives of international organisations, Beni, Bukavu, Butembo and Goma, July-September 2013.

interviewed converge to the assumption that the current DRC, seen as the emanation of the 2003 Sun City Agreements, tells that the sharing of power between leaders who are alien to their populace but still have ties with external powers can have dire consequences for the population more generally.[188] This view is closest to those of Jackson (2011) and Lemay-Hebert's (2011) in that it raises the second point in connexion with the construction of a new DRC, something which requires a significant cultural change in the sense that how people are close to the new state and how they conduct their everyday business, corroborated a group of Congolese historians and anthropologists.[189]

Some political analysts acquainted with the political history of the DRC argued:

> "Attempts by King Léopold II to build a Western state in the Congo, and Mobutu's initial emphasis on deconstructing post-colonial state and political parties, effectively superimposed an artificial state over sub-national political systems".

To these analysts, if the Congo-Belgian as a state existed as an extension of Belgium, Zaïre as a state however existed solely because of external support to Mobutu, and not because there was an underlying belief in Zairian society. They further supported the view that the current DRC exists because of resistance of a people who believe in the unity, who are against foreign or neighbouring interference in the development of their state and who are opposed against all attempts to the Balkanisation of their territory.[190] On the grounds of this view, the risk now is that following the decolonisation and after the departure of Mobutu the new Congolese state has effectively become another faction rather than an oversight mechanism for controlling warring factions at sub-national level.

Thirdly, state-building is extremely 'time consuming and capacity hungry'. From interviews and focus groups I have conducted in Kinshasa, it has been disclosed that following the 2003 Agreements, the DRC received a lot of technical support for the security institutions from international community. However this support focused on the protection of transitional

[188] Interviews conducted with security and military Senior Officers, France and DRC, September-November 2013.
[189] Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[190] Interviews conducted with academics, Kinshasa University September 2013.

institutions leaders, the security of the elections and did not allocate resources to building the corresponding political support for the DRC post-transitional period – mainly because it has been believed to be difficult to secure. The technical support offered resulted in many EU and UN officials taking decisions because those from the 1+4 transitional government lacked the capacity to do so.[191] Since the days of the Sun City Agreements – more than a decade now, SSR in the DRC is still a piecemeal. This, in my findings, constituted a hobbling management system of the state security, as experience from my fieldwork shows that the process still struggles to create both a developed security force and an effective intelligence. This leaves room to security analysts to make a point arguing that the DRC's security system is still without the culture of civil oversight to control it and the civil power is still unable to oversight the military power.[192]

Fourthly, reconstructing modern state in the DRC is so resource intensive and the process relies on the funds from external donors. Evidence from my fieldwork depicts that due to the external degree of financial investment on a political level, the process has become externally dependent and driven. Herein lays significant problems regarding funding and funding priorities, particularly when it has to do with 'bottom-up approach' – also referred to as grassroots-up approach or local authorship and ownership in the context of research being studied, or dearth of it and, most recently, the more limited availability of funds from external donors, trapped by the current credit crunch.[193] A view closest to that of a Senior Security Officer for whom the unavailability of funds from main external donors still raises serious issues regarding the long-term sustainability of reforming security sector in the DRC, and also the relative balance between different activities; for example, should external partners fund the military more than development activities? This is still a fundamental predicament of international involvement.[194] The shifting meanings of insecurity over time within the DRC, cited in Chapter Four, illustrates that the balance of donor intervention also needs to switch over time to factor in changes in the security situation, however embedded interests

[191] Interviews conducted with civil society representative, Kinshasa, September 2013.
Focus groups, Kinshasa, August-September 2013.
[192] Focus groups, Kinshasa, July-August 2013.
[193] Ibid, September 2013.
[194] Interview conducted with a Congolese Senior Security Officer, Kinshasa, August 2013.

and the inflexibility of donor planning systems have effectively locked up the state into set trajectories for some time (Albrecht and Jackson 2009).

Fifthly, in the Congo-Zaïre the formation of effective state institutions has been very uneven. Findings from my fieldwork have shown that even where state has had a functioning core institution before, during or after conflict, this core hardly reaches the rural zones,[195] something which supports Jackson's view (2007) in terms of inadequacy and maladjustment of security system in most of states emerging from Post-Cold War period. Consequently, the DRC remains alien to the Congolese citizens simply because the state is incapable to deliver services directly to many people. In the area of justice provision, particularly in remote territories and mineral-rich areas, most of the people receive justice from customary authorities such as chiefs or village headmen.[196] These local leaders are legitimised because they control land and local security by using the local police, they are also controlling militias or 'vigilantes' (Baker 2008), since the general tendency of each ethnic group in the eastern DRC is to have its self-defence force.[197] At best this has created an effective governance system in which local communities have both a say and a choice in terms of accessing services, including security. As a repercussion of such hybrid systems depending on both traditional approaches and modern systems of governance, local elites and leaders have become strongmen, they use their position to reinforce their authorities and to shore up the kleptocratic tendencies of neo-patrimonial rule to the detriment of powerless communities,[198] which view concurs with Jackson's (2003) on the consequence of the mixture of traditional and modern systems of governance in a weak state. Lastly, yawning discrepancies are in the DRC between state-building, security and development.

Readings from Jackson (2012:260) state:

> "Human security can be best served by creating a functioning state that will, it is theorised, provide security as a public good. Then, it is conjectured, development will provide benefits to the general population".

[195] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[196] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[197] Findings from fieldwork conducted in Belgium, France, DRC and London, July-December 2013.
[198] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.

However, how do exactly diverse individuals fit into this picture? A close look to the history of institutional development within the DRC shows that the country has still had wounds and scars for Congolese people in terms of guaranteeing their security. From remote interviews I conducted in Beni, Butembo and Kalele, some local leaders were of the view that access to security has a sad tendency to remain uneven between state, groups and individuals.[199] This concurs with Jackson's (2012: 260) view that "human security, or 'freedom from fear', which involves an entitlement to protection by the state in which they are citizens", is still elusive for many Congolese. In view of this, states' – and by extension the international community's, responsibility to protect citizens remains a text-book principle, or something yet to be realised all over the country. This sets up a vicious cycle that legitimises the MONUSCO's presence in the country, even where there has not been conflict.

5.2.1 State-building, SSR and Security Governance in the DRC: A "One-Size-Fits-All" Approach?

The development of SSR in the DRC is closely intertwined with the evolution of state-building as a set of activities that coalesced. Drawing on the results of my fieldwork, it could be contended that from the 2003-2006 transitional period to date, building the capacity of civil servants to provide oversight of defence departments has been more entwined with the growth of civil service reform programmes as a whole, whereas security in general remains at the heart of the entire state-building approach from the point of view of both individual citizens and the international community, however that may be defined. It goes the same that considering the fact that SSR is viewed as a fundamental part of the international community's approach to conflict management, rebuilding and reforming security institutions following conflict have become central components of international intervention.[200] This view is bolstered by the view that "relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule of law reform etc. can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding" (Jackson 2012: 260). Reforming security sector involves improving the performance and

[199] Skype and phone interviews conducted with a few community's leaders, Beni, Butembo and Kalele, August 2013.
[200] Fieldwork's results, July-December 2013.

accountability of police, military and intelligence organisations, with the aim of upgrading the basic components of security for people.

As a process, contends Jackson (ibid: 260-261):

> "SSR should ideally move far beyond narrow technical definitions of setting up functioning security institutions and follow a more ambitious agenda of reconstructing or strengthening a state's ability to govern the security sector in a way that serves the population as a whole rather than the narrow political elite".

Possible interpretation of Jackson's stand implies a radical transformation of values and cultures within habitually secretive and insular institutions that are not accessible to particular sub-groups within the population, particularly women and youth. Jackson's opinion further concurs with my findings due to focus groups' participants uttering that within the DRC, the general population are mistrustful of security services and hostile to the intelligence service which is regarded as a wing of the ruling party, hence direct threat to their individual security as well as to the democracy.[201] It is worth emphasising that reforming such a security system would require including an ambitious set of approaches that will contribute to restoring trust between the state and the people, or the social contract. Despite obvious difficulties resulting from the political nature of these interventions, many international actors however are currently involved in SSR programmes in the DRC, including the Angola, Belgium, France, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations and European Union. According to the information gleaned from focus groups in Kinshasa, the programmes they deliver are based on the use of an array of approaches and involve a complex mixture of international organisations, governments, non-state actors and private companies. To these participants, although there are significant differences in carrying out SSR as the result of different approaches employed by the actors above, there is however a family resemblance in terms of the general approaches adopted; 'one-size-fits-all approach'.[202]

[201] Focus groups, Kinshasa, July-September 2013.
[202] Ibid.

There has been much written about SSR, even though this has been subject to what Peake *et al*. (2007) refer to as 'benign analytical neglect'. This negligence has arisen nonetheless from the concept having been thrived partially from an academic pre-history of civil-military relations (Jackson 2012). However, much of what has been written on SSR casts more light on practical policy-related analysis rather than being entrenched in conceptual or theoretical approaches (Fukuyama 2004; Hippler 2005; Berger 2007). Particular activities caught more attention rather than analysing wider interventions as an expression of and in relation to broader social and economic reform (Bryden and Hänggi 2005), therefore making the process of SSR to be seen as gateway into discussions surrounding security without really thinking of broader implications, as is the case in the DRC.

5.2.2 Governance, Development and Security: A Blank Slate in the DRC?

Drawing on Hettne's (2010) work on the macro-history of the security-development nexus, three possible futures of state-building are postulated, including neo-Westphalian, neo-medieval and post-national. According to the neo-Westphalian model, the current system would effectively continue to function through a state-based structure – with gaps, greatly enhanced by stronger multinational organisations with greater and more securitised powers. Such a structure could be multipolar, and might involve the inputs of the BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as active security hegemons in their respective regions. Such a system may be violent, and create revolution and reaction within non-core areas of the global economy. In a Neo-medievalism scenario, state represents a less violent option in terms of scale, but offers no solution for those areas that are outside organised nation-states. With neo-medievalism there is a loosening of the state to allow smaller units based on primitive accumulation or warlord economics in the short term, leaving those who live in localised pockets of violence to suffer that violence. Lastly, Hettne puts forward the idea of a post-national future based on global development, which in turn is built on the inter-regional approach proposed by the European Union, among others.

Hettne's pattern singles out regional governments as wagons or pipelines that promote human rights, democracy and conflict prevention, and such provisions are – at least in theory, cooperative and voluntary. However, none of these posits a pragmatic solution to the creation of a security-development nexus that guarantees freedom from fear. Visibly the first two

scenarios are connected, with the first being both more aggressive and possibly evasive to keep people from violence. In the first scenario individuals could be subject to international violence, and in the second to localised 'low-scale' violence – of course, it is not low scale to those suffering the violence. The third scenario involves innovation by providing some way forward, but there is a real concern with an EU-inspired solution, namely that EU decisions are made on the basis of arrangements between effective states that share a great deal of common ground, including the collective experience of a European war that no one wishes to repeat. This does not apply to the countries of Africa of Great Lakes, for instance, where the regional organisations still carry woeful experience, partly because the states that are part of regional agreements have repeatedly been the first to disregard them.

Prospects for the development of comprehensive regional actors remain bleak specifically in regions with high recurrence of conflict (Hentz 2009). Regional approaches have proved to be useful in terms of renegotiating the colonial frontiers that have led to conflict – in the Horn of Africa, clearly in Sudan and currently between DRC and Rwanda, but the fundamental issue in this precise case remains the nature of the state and the close bonds between the state, the regime and the individual at the head of the regime (Trutz von Trotha 2009), which regional approaches struggle to address. This consideration actually depicts the characteristics of state in the DRC. State failure and drown-out-conflict in the DRC includes varied political orders, with some being more legitimate than others. State in the DRC typically lacks a monopoly of force and is powerless to extend its authority across its entire sovereign territory. The government also suffers from a paucity of legitimacy, is fragmented by alternative sources of power and faces continual threats to its authority. Since "Mobutu's divide and reign strategy", cited in Chapter Four, 'traditional' and state functions coexist, but created avenues that gave leeway to political power which the existing regime is concerned about.[203]

More than fifty years on, the DRC has experienced different regimes that have a tendency to creeping authoritarianism, with them trying to construct alternative sources of security – paramilitaries rather than militaries, and using the security services to protect regimes rather

[203] Fieldwork's results, July-December 2013.

than protecting the state or the population. The scenarios alluded above lend diverse sets of challenges and lay out unfavourable environment for SSR approaches if they are to address development and security issues in a post-conflict DRC. In this context, if SSR has to work, it should arise from the political structures and history of the Congolese nation. Donor documentation often acknowledged this but not carried out on the ground. In order words, I argue that failure to understand the root-causes of the conflict in a 'bottom-up' or 'grassroots-up' perspective, or engaging directly with the population – as opposed to receptive elites or 'top-down' approach, has resulted in a non-representative state in the DRC and has provided security for the elite/regime and marginalisation for the population. This view supports Lemay-Hebert's (2011) on the disparity of security system in weak state. As a ramification, the long-standing existence of the state is at least partially reliant on the international community. It follows from the problems set above that at least in the short term, the state in the DRC has become the simple building block of any international approach to security and development; hence the international community has become the main means of delivering both security and development to national populations. As implied above, I argue that a development approach – more nuanced, patient and flexible, to building state in the DRC should be therefore envisioned. As outlined below and this in light of Luckham's (2009) view, it needs to involve:

Firstly, a proper recognition of security as a political entitlement of citizens, hence as part of a social contract with the state. It is a must for the DRC's government to provide security for its citizens, not to protect individuals in power (personal regimes). To this end, it should be acknowledged that the state's security services as well as individual security actors who are acting as trouble makers and who have become agents of insecurity themselves will require substantial change.

Secondly, processes and interventions of SSR and state-building should be engrained in the specific cultural-historical-political situation of the DRC as a nation, and not just emerged from the external experience of donors or non-governmental organisations. The process of state-building and SSR in the DRC has become problematic partly because the process is a top-down result of the conflict analysis and resolution which has not considered the specific settings of its application. Rather, it emphasised more on national and multiparty elections as an indicator of the legitimacy of state and as an exit point for donors; a mistake which has

become dangerous, since it spoiled peace, worsened civil conflict and ingrained it for long. This concurs with Savon and Tirone's (2011).

Thirdly, local communities' voice needs to be taken into account since they are all the time subject to violence. At the same time, support access to justice for victims of the state and other forms of violence needs to be provided. It is worth noting that although the DRC brimmed with natural resources, poverty has however locked up most individuals in situations of extreme vulnerability, as do the social and economic roles allotted to idle individuals. Development, understood as functioning delivery of justice, would make sense only if it is associated with access to income-generating opportunities, since they both pave the way for emancipation for those locked up in vulnerable situations. There is a rift between the state's security services and the people.

Fourthly, security should be grounded from the bottom or grassroots as an evidence rather than idealism or ideology. This means that the 'off-the-shelf' interventions of some development agents and the highly romanticised view of some grassroots organisations have to be pieced together. In the eastern DRC, particularly in the mining conflict-affected areas, warlords have been providing a degree of governance, but only so far as it benefits them and only to the limits of state power. In other remote national territories, traditional authorities and chiefdom systems are cheap and easily understood and accessible by the people, but these systems usually discriminate against some loser groups at a local level. At the local level not everything is positive or enjoys universal support. This supports Jackson's (2007) reflexion on the importance of decentralised administration in terms of rapprochement between governors and the people. Congolese government makes people more insecure, through employing security services or militias to repress people directly, using violent organisations to impose political power and patronage, or through links between criminal gangs and state security organisations such as the youth of the ruling party.

In short, it should be envisaged 'smarter' and more targeted interventions, above all, a far deeper knowledge of the political economy of intervention over and above the technical expertise required to plan an SSR intervention. More generally, security is essential part of governance, and the provision of security falls within legitimacy attribute. The majority of Congolese people are subject to poverty and identify security as a key need. In essence, the

line drawn between development and security by the academic debate does not matter: what matters is how to have beneficiaries of development at the lowliest levels – local communities, and how to recognise security as a core need for any human development. However, to what extent state-building and SSR processes could have side-effects on the development of political economy of the mining sector in the country? The following section seems to cast more insight on this issue.

5.3 Political Economy of the DRC's Mining Sector

The section above has helped us understand state-building and SSR in the context of the DRC. A look at the organisation of the mining sector however would be crucial in the appreciation of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in the context of weak state and protracted armed conflict, since some scholars arguably believe that the nexus above would be the upshot of the decay of the Congolese state and its inability to reform the security system. Since the decline of the DRC's economy in the 1980s, foreign investments have become reluctant to invest in the DRC's mining sector although they have been critical to the sector's growth. Issues such as political instability, the cost of doing business and the fiscal regime have been the main stumbling-blocks that still deter investors to buy into this sector (De Koning 2009). The political economy of the mining sector in the DRC should be seen under the lens of 'strong investment potential in theory'. Theoretically, changing the DRC's potential into wealth and development that profit people would require political willingness and visionary leadership underpinned by the rule of law. The Oxford Policy Management (2013:4) puts forward: "80% of investors would invest in mining in the DRC if the country followed international best practice in terms of its regulatory environment, taxation and other factors". To date, however, the monopoly of investments in the mining sector is held by few multinational corporations that accept high levels of risk will, thereby restraining the competition between investors for the country's mineral resources. According to Fraser Institute (2013), the Congolese National Episcopal Conference – CENCO, and the Congolese civil society,[204] the DRC's mining code is disincentive to investing in the country's mining sector. Due to political instability and security concerns, the DRC has

[204] See CENCO and Congolese Civil Society's recommendations on the revision of the mining code.

become an unappealing investment environment regardless of its attractive natural resources, and it ranks 5th from bottom in the World Bank's Doing Business (The Oxford Policy Management 2013). Overall, it can be argued that the decline and dysfunction of the mining sector result from the fact that this sector has always been the prerogative of a certain elite in power.

According to former adviser at the Presidency, a Congolese academic and a member of the Congolese civil society I interviewed in Kinshasa:

> "From Mobutu to Joseph Kabila, the mining sector in the Congo-Zaïre has been governed by one rule; that is controlled by the Presidency and to some extent the ruling party. This rule is drawn from the colonial model of mining exploitation based on the principle that every mining production should profit the colonial master. This pattern was reproduced by the AFDL administration which was mainly composed of the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian elites and military during the arrival of Laurent-D Kabila into power in 1997. These non-Congolese military and civil personnel were representing the interests of their respective countries. They were fully aware of the geo-economy of the mining sector in the DR Congo and the kind of security that such a sector required during time of peace or disturbance".[205]

5.3.1 Security Provisions of Mining Sector

The concept of 'security' has undergone an era of theoretical turmoil with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the limitation of strategic arms and the reduction of threat of major power war. Seen under the lens of conflict dynamics, security concept derives from the supposed 'peace dividend' drawn from peacebuilding and peacekeeping that unleashed a broader debate over whether to widen the security concept farther (Mathews 1989; Sorenson 1990; Brezinski 1992; Clare 1992). As alluded to above, it might be provided that the perspective of individual nations and the idea of common security need to be enlarged to a global perception of security whereby every socio-economic aspect should be accounted for a potential hazard

[205] Interviews conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, a member of the Congolese civil society and an academic, Kinshasa, July-August 2013.

(Dixon 1991, Chen 1995). More recently, researchers' efforts have shifted to the mining security, with focus on the mining-cantered aspect (Dixon 1991; Chen 1995; De Koning 2009). In the security literature, the argument of mining security involves that the attention of security studies should switch from the state to the mining sites, with military and non-military threats going hand in glove (Clare 1992; Chen 1995).

The development of security is the result of the acknowledgement of unexpected patterns of change in different apparatuses of development, technological and political changes brought by globalisation. Possible repercussion has been the rise of the concept of mining security. As indicated by De Koning (2009), this term ordinarily entails 'protection of zones endowed with natural resources or mining sites'. In parallel to the debate over human security, a range of scholars (Mathews 1989; Sorenson 1990; Brezinski 1992; Clare 1992) have been debating on the significance of the 'mining security.' In modern and sovereign states, the traditional meaning of security has been the application of the military force to protect the territorial integrity (Clare 1992; Chen 1995). However, security studies and the security systems have long been emphasised on defence policy or mechanisms – be it local, national or international, towards deterring, avoiding, preventing, and to some extent, winning inter-state/intra-state armed conflicts (Baldwin 1995; Chen 1995; Del Rosso 1995). The idea behind the concept of security includes two basic elements; an orientation to forthcoming risks and an attention on risks of falling beneath some critical threshold of deficiency (Clare 1992; Baldwin 1995; Chen 1995; Del Rosso 1995). In mining sector, however, security is not synonymous with the average level of upcoming welfare; it means the risks of being severely disadvantaged (Baldwin 1995; Del Rosso 1995; De Koning 2009). The security of the mining sector in a country today, for instance, is not only a function of its well-being today, but it is also projections for its future resource protection in terms of avoiding states of great resources deprivation.

Following wartime, the DRC's security system has been subject to various multilateral and bilateral reform programmes, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement by the MONUC, security sector reform programme of assistance and bilateral training programmes of the national army and police (De Koning 2009). Despite these multilateral and bilateral assistances, the dynamic of the privatisation of security in the country increased and is still an issue out of the state's control. In the DRC, the national army and police are widely involved

in insuring private interests. This situation results from the appalling conditions of security forces, corruption and maladministration (Stearns*et al*. 2013). State security forces are no longer public security provider, rather insecurity and threat supplier.

In pursuit of a decent income and in search of filling their pockets, the police and army elements are more involved in a series of privatised uses of state assets, ranging from the defence of the commercial interests of the political elite, the participation of police and army in trafficking to the use of police as guards at residences, shops or companies (De Koning 2009; Stearns*et al*. 2013). This suggests that in a context whereby the national security system is run as privatised rather than public forces, there is risk of creating a rift between people and security forces due to the latter predating on the former. Autresserre (2012: 19) however, is of the following view:

> "Extending the authority of a predatory state merely results in replacing one group of perpetrators with another – state authorities and state security forces, furthermore it sometimes actually worsens living conditions for the population".

The history and sociology of the DRC's security system from the independence to date suggests that there is a lack of trust between the security system and the people (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002) to the extent that the people cannot rely on the state's security system – Army and Police, due to its unprofessionalism and the lack of protection capacity. This situation unfortunately led the people to turn to private security. Similarly, it has been proved that the DRC's state of failure and the lack of service delivery have commoditised security in the country (Zeilig 2009; Lanotte 2010). As a result, security has become accessible only to those who can afford it, whereas those who cannot are often on prey of the public security elements. It is in this environment that the private mining security could be situated in the DRC.

In the mining sector's jargon, the concept of security encompasses several understandings depending on different scales of mining activities, mining environment and different policies applied to the mining activities. In my research in Kinshasa, when I interviewed a mining lawyer, she particularised that mining security can stand for the way in which mineral activities are carried out in accordance to the required rules and conditions in order to avoid

accidents and landslides. It also refers to some protected areas where mining activities are prohibited. These zones include sites of uranium or other sensitive minerals in general. Mining security further indicates the security of some mining areas that are still under state control, and not yet open to the public for mining activities. These two latter zones are secured by the state mining police.[206]

The police allocated to mining are an organised institution which only deals with the security of mining areas that are not yet granted to third parties. According to Congolese law and mining policy (Mining Code 2011), no mining activities can be carried out except with prior authorisation by the government. Hence, any potential mining operator needs a required authorisation. According to a mining expert interviewed in Kinshasa, the mining code provides three types of permits towards mining activities:[207]

- Research permit that bestows an authorisation to carry out research on the kind of minerals.
- Operating permit which is lent on the basis of knowledge of an existing mineral substance in a given mining area – the kind of mining substance is already known and well located then needs to be exploited.
- A mining operator who already holds the operating license but cannot meet required conditions related to mining operations can contract with a third party either to exploit or to search. If they agree on the exploitation, then the agreement is called option contract. However, if the agreement is on research activities, then it is a lease contract.

These three contracts outline the mining activities in general.

Apart from these three contracts, there is what the state has created and that the mining code calls artisanal mining zones. These areas are declared by the state to be opened to artisanal mining activities. Artisanal miners are therefore listed in order to run artisanal mining under the supervision of cooperative groups (*Proposition d'Amendements sur le Code Minier* 2012). Beyond these contexts, any other mining-led activities are unlawful (Congolese Mining Code 2011). On the grounds of the abovementioned principle, no mining activities

[206] Interview conducted with a lawyer of an Anglo-American mining corporation – Tenkefungurume, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[207] Interview conducted with a member of private mining sector representatives, Kinshasa, August 2013.

can be carried out without prior authorisation because mineral resources are part of the state's sovereignty, contended some respondents.[208]

From the other point of view, it is said that the state, through the mining police, needs to ensure that no mining activities are conducted in the mining-prohibited zones. Herein lays the role of the police of mining which is to ensure that the mining of minerals and the traffic thereof have respected the principle established in the mining code.[209] Therefore, it is up to the police of mining to secure the mining sites which are prohibited for any mining activities due to sensitive minerals and those which are not yet given to third parties (Congolese Mining Code 2011). This leaves room to a private sector's mining expert to claim that all mining operators holding either of the aforementioned permits are expected to ensure the security of their mining concession.[210] However, it is important to bear in mind that mining activities draw from the general principle that the soil and the subsoil belongs to the state – Bakajika Law. It means that the DRC which is the owner of the land (Congolese Mining Code 2011), said an expert on mining, declares illegal any exploitation carried out in the area that is not temporarily conceded to third parties for mining activities.[211]

So far, the system of security provisions in the mining sector involves National Police, the Mining Police, the National Intelligence Agency and the Directorate-General for Migration (De Koning 2009; 2011, Autesserre 2012). Additionally to these services, private and semiprivate security companies protect mining concessions on behalf of mining companies, while in remote mining areas where the state and companies cannot provide security, customary authorities could set control systems involving lightly armed recruits (De Koning 2009). As discussed in Chapter One, the issue of artisanal mining security is diverse and typically involves state and non-state security players.

[208] Interviews conducted with a member of political representatives, policymakers and a journalist, Kinshasa, July-August 2013.
[209] Interview conducted with a member of the Department of Mining, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[210] Interview conducted with a member of private mining sector representatives, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[211] Interview conducted with an academic and mining lawyer, Kinshasa, August 2013.

5.3.2 The DRC's Land Rights: Bakajika Law

The Bakajika law[212] is the state's land rights and therefore regulates mining activities in the DRC. According to this law and the DRC constitution (2006), suggest a few mining experts, the state is the owner of the soil and subsoil.[213] This stands true for the natural resources, and implies that natural resources belong to the state. Hence, it is up to the state to release, for a period of time, the authorisation to carry mining activities in a given site. However, this permit only gives the right to use the land, but does not grant ownership (DRC Mining Code 2011). This view is supported by a mining lawyer and expert who said that the land ownership is only possible for the right to use the fruits of the land – minerals, but the transfer of the land ownership can never be made to a third party. This is a peculiarity of the Congolese law and policy in line with properties. In general all minerals and other resources across the country are and remain the property of the state.[214]

The Bakajika law draws the line between the extracted minerals that belong to the licensee and the land that is and remains the state's property (DRC Mining Code 2011; Proposition to the mining code amendments 2012). In practice, this statement could be interpreted as followed; when a mining company mines diamonds, it owns diamonds in terms of the right of exploitation. This view is supported by a number of lawyers in the DRC and oversees due to them saying that the Bakajika Law is the dissociation between the property right – which belongs to the state and the usufruct – *Usus fructus abusus* [full ownership] – which belongs to the license holder. For these scholars, through this law the Congolese state distinguishes the acquisition of fruit and its usage – belonging to the companies, from the land ownership which is its full right – belonging to it. In my interviews conducted in Brussels, Kinshasa and Paris, respondents further claimed that the Bakajika law is the right of disposal – for the state, and the right of the use of fruit – for mining companies. This means that if a mining company

[212] Chapter 4 provides more details on Land Rights and Bakajika Law and its implication in the conflict in the Kivus.
[213] Interviews conducted with a member of political representatives, policymakers and a journalist, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[214] Interview conducted with a mining lawyer working for Tenkefungurume, Kinshasa, August 2013.

sells its operating license, in reality it sells the right of usage and not the land ownership; however, when it sells minerals, it sells its ownership right on these minerals.[215]

From the above, it is clear that the DRC's natural resources cannot be expropriated because they belong to the state. Any mining operator, be it state or company, is just a user and not owner. The state which exercises full sovereignty over its land may require its lands back from any leaser at any time, if it wants to dispose it otherwise (DRC constitution 2006). On the back of the aforementioned statement, a few Congolese scholars and journalists are of the view that Mobutu was deposed because he did not amend the Bakajika law, which in fact has hindered the globalisation of the DRC's natural resources, to date however this law is believed to be weakened by article 9 of the 2006 Constitution; which is the backbone of the Congolese mining code.[216] This means that Article 9 has switched the state's power from an absolute sovereignty to the permanent's, with the result being the setback of the state to the colonial era.[217]

5.3.3 Mining Code

The current mining code in the DRC is a hybrid legislation which emanates from two different legal systems – Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Saxon. It brings together a structured legislation, with issues clearly defined. However, it bears some stumbling blocks related to some concepts copied from Anglo-Saxon law that are not clearly defined (Oxford Policy Management 2013). This problem results from different origins. According to the Tenkefungurume's mining lawyer and a few mining policy-makers, problems and difficulties encountered in the Mining Code result both from World Bank's initiatives and Anglo-Saxon law as well as its interpretation. To these experts, the mining code is a copy of Anglo-Saxon law of which ramifications have been translated into French verbatim, whilst in practice its

[215] Interviews conducted with a number of mining lawyers and a member of private mining sector representatives, Brussels, Kinshasa and Paris, October, November, December 2013.
[216] Focus groups, Kinshasa, July-August-September 2013.
Interview conducted with the *Jeune Afrique* editor, Paris, December 2013.
[217] Interview conducted with a member of academic representatives and a Journalist, Kinshasa, August 2013.

implementation brings several problems. It is, in reality, two different legal systems superposed.[218]

The mining code, for instance, states that a research permit holder cannot develop the mining concession, but may contract with a third party to fund research works. Once the research is completed and the exploitation license issued, the third party who funded the research becomes a partner – also known as option agreement (Mining Code 2011). According to the telephone interview conducted in Goma with a member of civil society, it was claimed that this option contract or unilateral promise of sale is made between the permit holder and a third party. For these experts, it seems to be that the state which is the land owner is not involved, therefore loses its due taxes.[219] Based on the view of a few academics and mining law experts, the weakness of the mining code includes the fact that it draws from an Anglo-Saxon system while the state uses the Romano-Germanic legal system. For them, the mining code struggles not only to interpret the law but also to apply it. It enables different permits to be exchanged from one third party to another without clearly defining the transfer of the taxes due to the state.[220] Furthermore, some mining activities are only accessible to Congolese and not foreigners (De Koning 2009). For example, according to the law, to be an artisanal miner one must be Congolese. Also, operating licenses for small-scale mining is grantable to Congolese or to a group of investors predominantly Congolese (De Koning 2009; Mining Code 2011). Nevertheless, due to lack of infrastructure, most of the mining activities are semi-industrial, led by foreign companies that supersede Congolese.[221] With regards to the taxes and tax regime, the mining code sets a cumbersome tax regime not clearly explained. Foreign mining companies only pay the deposit but the mining code is silent on any direct or indirect transfer of the operating license (Oxford Policy Management 2013). Additionally, investors are less informed about the presence of a variety of tax charges that the administration applies beyond the mining code (Bokondu 2012).

[218] Interviews conducted with the Tenkefungurume mining lawyer and policy makers, Kinshasa, September-October 2013.
[219] Telephone interview conducted with a member of the north Kivu's civil society, Goma, August 2013.
[220] Interview conducted with a panel of Academic experts in mining law, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[221] Interview conducted with an academic in Paris, November 2013.

The Oxford Policy Management Institute's research on the impact of mining in the DRC (2013) found that the mining code's weaknesses lie in both the non-application of its general principles and the presence of an administration that strikes instead of accompanying investors. Either the Mining Code or the Code of investment, it should be noted that there are several businesses in the Congo that Congolese individuals cannot fulfil. For the Oxford Policy Management Institute, the Mining Code weaknesses are both due to its implementation and its rigour. The Code has an attractive shape but its application poses problem (ibid). Furthermore, it is crucial to mention that there is also a structural problem based on the law juxtaposition – importation of Anglo-Saxon laws, which is beyond the Congolese legal system; which need precision (Oxford Policy Management 2013). In addition, mining activities are more artisanal (De Koning 2009), nevertheless there are no control mechanisms on artisanal mining, and neither are there sanctions.[222] Artisanal mining in general is still a big issue to be addressed in the mining code. The dearth of control mechanisms in this sector paves the way for unlawful exploitation, which in turn leads to mineral-based conflicts (De Koning 2009; Bokondu 2011).

5.3.4 Organisation of Mining Sector

The mining code has undergone changes and these changes are directly connected to the context in which different mining contracts have been agreed. The first mining contracts, under the current mining code, have been signed during the transitional period of 2003-2006 led by a President assisted by four Deputy Presidents – also known as 1+4 government (IPIS 2012; Stearns *et al*. 2013). During that period, the state was characterised by a severe paucity of money. Therefore, it could not negotiate effectively. As it was claimed by former adviser of the Prime Minister, the state was in a position of weakness – lack of resources and expertise, and was undermined by the issue of upstream and downstream institutionalised corruption – upstream corruption with multinational corporations being aware of the DRC's weaknesses in terms of lack of control mechanisms that presented a lot of challenges for the country.[223]

[222] Interview conducted with an academic in Paris, November 2013.
[223] Interview conducted with former Premier Minister Adviser in Kinshasa, August 2013.

As a result, all mining contracts draw from unfair agreements and the DRC has found itself in a situation totally out of its control; lack of expertise worsened by the corruption of political elite (Verbruggen *et al*. 2011). Verbruggen's (2011) view concurs with Bokungu's (2012) for whom the development of the post-conflict mining sector in the DRC unveils that a lot of mining contracts have been signed on the sly without profiting the country. A number of analysts of the DRC's mining sector make a point to concurring with this view, due to them saying that mining activities neither create employment nor facilitate development. For these individuals, mining companies are not required to process minerals in the country; neither are they required to transfer technology; nor do they have a duty to fulfil ecologic planning.[224] Congolese economy is based, and relies on the mining sector while the contribution of the latter to the state's income has been insignificant (Oxford Policy Management 2013). In the previous researches, De Koning (2009); Bokungu (2011) and Verbruggen (2013) concurred that in the early 1960s and 1970s the DRC's mining sector was made of less than ten mining industries, but it was the leading provider sector in terms of national income. During my fieldwork however interviewees did not agree with the opinion above on the basis that, to date despite hundreds of mining companies the mining sector is still not the state's leading provider sector in terms of state income.[225]

From the fieldwork findings, it has been further indicated that the state has not integrated mining contracts into general planning for global development and particularly agricultural development. As an upshot, mining contracts have created a state of reliance on mining on the one hand; and on the other there is not a long-term policy of a diversified economy, neither is there any plan on the local content or corporate social responsibility. Along similar lines, Congolese people are concerned with the issue of transparency (ITIE 2012) in mining contracts. However, a number of individuals are of the view that transparency is required by foreign institutions rather than the Congolese elite.[226] Alternatively, one of the interviewees posited that there are several mining contracts but each of them has been agreed on a different mining policy.[227] Furthermore, previous researches on the DRC's mining sector depict that

[224] Focus groups, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[225] Focus groups, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[226] Interview conducted with former Premier Minister Adviser, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[227] Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, July 2013.

the policy with regard to the signing of mining contracts in the DRC – Zaïre, was a standard rule regulated by the Presidency and the Department of Mining (De Koning 2009; 2010; Bokungu 2012). But during the fieldwork people were of a different view due to the rivalry issue existing between multinational corporations, and the problem of money laundering. According to a telephone interview conducted in Bukavu with a Member of the Provincial Parliament, it was unveiled that some mining agreements have been signed but not yet developed; while their value on the stock exchange is appraised 20 times higher than the initial cost.[228] This provides an opportunity to supporting the view that natural resources have a preponderant role in the DRC's instability.

5.4 Mineral-based Conflict: The Cycle of Combatants' Recruitment and DDR

Before establishing any link between mining and combatants' enlistment, the chapter will attempt to put into context how the phenomenon is developing, and to first identify the link, if any, between armed groups and the mining of natural resources because without armed organisations it is absurd to make reference to combatants. Figure 4.2 summarises the nexus between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants.

[228]Telephone interview conducted with a Member of Provincial Parliament, Bukavu, July 2013.



Figure 5.2: Nexus between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants (Own composition)

5.4.1 Nexus between Mining and Armed Movements

A set of researchers interested in the issue of civil wars are of the consensus that valuable minerals have been among the main causes fuelling armed conflicts (Collier 2000a; Collier 2000b; De Soysa 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Keen 2005; McCue and Haahr 2008; Reno 2009). So far, regardless of the large body of literature speaking for this topic, the confirmation is still varied (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011). Based on the most popular Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) political economy theory of post-Cold Wars, it has been indicated that countries relying on larger shares of primary product exports are more likely exposed to civil wars. However, a few shortcomings of Collier and Hoeffler's theory have been underlined. First, primary commodities – such as agricultural produce, are not identical all the time. Specialists of the field advise to draw the line between diffuse resources – such as agricultural production, and point resources – as is the case for mineral resources, with the latter being thought to be more conflictive and incentive for armed groups (Maystadt

et al. 2013). On theoretical grounds, point resources – as opposed to diffuse resources, inveigle war entrepreneurs for whom the objective of fighting remains the control of the rents (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011). Identifying the particularities of mineral resources that push individuals to become combatants and join armed groups is crucial as this would be of a positive role in delinking armed groups and combatants from mineral resources.

From a series of papers seeking to recognise the explicit effect of mineral resources on the recruitment of combatants and conflicts entrepreneurs (Besley and Persson 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011), the initial result based on cross-country analyses showed the unquestionable role played by mineral resources in both fuelling and sustaining armed conflicts (McCue and Haahr 2008; Reno 2009; Lujala 2010; Maystadt *et al*. 2013). Second, the link between mineral resources and combatants' enlistment and/or conflict remains potentially endogenous. Maystadt's (2013) study on artisanal mining and conflicts in the Kivus, for example, found that the state reliance on mineral resource is a direct result of current or to some point, expected armed conflict. In the same way, it has been established that the confusing role of institutions, coupled with the role of oil revenues in weakening state capacity, is another source of endogeneity (De Soysa 2000; Keen 2005; GW 2013). Besley and Persson's (2010) research on mineral-based conflicts elaborate this argument by theorising a pattern of endogenous state capacity configuration. This model indicates that natural resource-rich countries that under-invest in state capacity building would be more prone to the incidence of armed conflicts. Third, the cross-country nature of the above contributions to this discussion overlooks the impacts of within-country unfair sharing of resources. Likewise, this level of aggregation could disregard unobserved heterogeneity. In Maystadt's (2013:2) words: "more recent studies adopted a micro-founded approach by exploiting within country variations". Working with sub-national units of analysis helps establish more precise underlying implication. In the same line of thinking, a range of writers (Buhaug and Rod 2006; Angrist and Kugler 2008; Dube and Vargas 2008) find a positive nexus between natural resources and the occurrence of civil wars, whereas Buhaug and Rod (2006) find the likelihood of civil war due to the effect of oil and diamonds presence by utilising geo-referenced data used at the 100 square kilometre grid. Following the above

contributions to the artisanal mining in the Kivus, DRC, the fieldwork's experience seems to be somehow different due to specialists on the grounds expressing fairly different opinions.

According to the fieldwork, few conflict analysts indicated that the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC started in 1996 with the AFDL's war against Mobutu. For these individuals, the AFDL's leader, Laurent-D Kabila, came into power with a large support of Anglo-Saxon mining companies. These mining companies signed unfair agreements on most of the DRC's mining concessions while Laurent-D Kabila was still a rebel, whilst others were concluded when he was President. According to them, in 1998, after the beginning of the anti-Kabila war, the objective of rebel groups including the RCD-Goma, MLC and RCD-KML aimed to retake power. However, rebel groups could not survive long without the economic support needed to hire and sustain combatants. Therefore, minerals were mined in exchange for external military support. From this point, the first nexus between artisanal mining and armed groups was established.[229] This stance was supported by a similar opinion from an email interview I conducted in Bukavu with a mining operator. In his words:

> "Illegal mining of natural resources in the DRC, particularly in the Kivus should be traced back from the 1996 and 1998 armed conflicts. In 1996, the presence of the AFDL and its allies in the prosperous mining zones was motivated by the struggle toward driving Mobutu off the power. The AFDL signed several mining contracts with multinational corporations and its allies. When Laurent-D Kabila rose into power, his government, supported by foreigner armies, secured mining zones and enabled all his supporters to have access to resources in the state's mining-rich territories. However, following the burst of the 1998 conflict, the RCD and its allies overtly occupied several mineral-rich territories in the East in order to fund their war, not with the intention to overthrow Laurent-D Kabila from the power but to preclude the mineral-rich territories of the East from his government. From this point onwards,

[229] Interview conducted with a former Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, August 2013. Interview conducted with a member of Congolese civil society, Kinshasa, September 2013.

> the recurrence of armed groups and (ex-) combatants' recruitment – mostly with roots in neighbouring countries, in mining zones has become a real fact".[230]

This view differs from Besley and Persson (2010) and Van der Ploeg's (2011) ones. For them, the conflict's initial cause is not mineral resources; rather it is security concerns and the need for getting rid of dictator regime even if the signing of mining contracts seems to step in the course of events. However, it bears stressing that following the AFDL rebellion the issue of mineral resources had proved to be real and played unquestionable role (Lujala 2010; Maystadt *et al*. 2013); first with the signing of unfair mining contracts between the AFDL leader and multinational corporations; second with the illegal exploitation and trade of minerals in the 1998 war.

The Enough Project (2013) and a more recent report of the UN Experts on the DRC (2014) raised the issue of illegal exploitation and trade of mineral resources by armed groups in the eastern DRC. This evidence is supported by the field research findings based on the confirmation of people expressing that the issue of illegal exploitation of minerals arose mainly with the appearance of several rebel groups in the eastern DRC between 1998 and 2003. According to the findings, armed movements could not survive without any economic support from the exchange between minerals and arms. However, the fact which established a clear link between minerals and armed groups is the use of violence by these armed groups to either extract minerals or to impound minerals from artisanal miners. This violence resulted in sexual assault, human rights abuses and forced displacement of people.[231] Summarily, two arguments emerge from the nexus between armed groups and mining of natural resources. The first argument suggests that conflict in the DRC is not primarily about resources but identity between ethnic groups – namely Banyamulenge, Hutu, Hema and Lendu, even if the 1998 war was mainly a mineral-based conflict. This view concurs with the theory of land access and ethnic identity substantiated in Chapter Four and helps understand the recurrence of armed conflict in the Kivus.

[230] Email interview conducted with a mining operator, Bukavu, August, 2013.
[231] Focus groups, Kinshasa, August 2013.

The second argument, however, supports the idea that the protracted armed conflict and the cycle of combatants' recruitment in the eastern DRC are due to the presence of minerals in the eastern part of the country. The origin of the conflict may be alien to the presence of mineral resources in this part of the country, but the recurrence of conflicts directly links to the easy access to mineral resources by belligerents.[232] This view supports the Collier and Hoeffler's theory (2004) but goes beyond their shortcomings by suggesting an analysis of conflicts in the Kivus in its totality and comprehensiveness. Herein lays the necessity to point out that in social sciences, facts are not only all-inclusive, but also context specific, and the aetiological analysis cannot be done from a single factor. Therefore, Collier and Hoeffler's theory does not apply fully and is not sufficient to explain the case of the Kivus given that all multi-layered factors playing the role in the DRC's conflict need to be accounted for. Minerals are one of the causes but not necessarily the main one.

In their papers on the new geography of conflict, Klare (2001) and Reyntjens (2009) predicted the shift of contemporary armed conflicts to regions with high concentration of vital resources. Like Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Klare and Reyntjens understand the post-Cold War's increased competitions over access to vital resources as a reconfigured geography, or a new cartography of conflict, in which resource flows rather than political and ideological divisions. Drawn from Klare (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Reyntjens' (2009) ideas, it bears arguing that the concentration of rare minerals including coltan, cassiterite, gold in the Kivus is a target for multinational corporations and neighbouring countries that provide military support to armed groups for minerals exchange. The geography and history of the DRC has demonstrated that in zones with copper and diamonds endowment there is not conflict but mineral fraud and corruption. Nevertheless, armed conflicts have become the norm in areas where coltan, cassiterite, gold and tin abound. In a similar way, looking closely at the sociology of conflict in the DRC, they further argued that 90 per cent of Congolese rebellions occur in the eastern part of the country. For them, all armed conflicts that arise from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda expand in the eastern DRC,

[232] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.

while those occurring from Zambia, Sudan, Angola and the Congo-Brazzaville do not cross Congolese border.[233]

Likewise, an ex-combatant and a few local leaders interviewed by remote in Butembo, Beni and Masisi claimed that close examination of mining activities and mining traceability reveal that mining activities in the eastern regions involve rebel groups, the national army and their allies. For him, the mining business in this part of the country is run without any state supervision. This situation is artificially created by both armed groups and the Congolese administration because military officers as well as armed groups seniors in this territory are involved in mining activities.[234] The new map of conflict in the DRC depicts that illegal exploitation of mineral resources has become a business which involves a set of different actors, including multinational corporations (Onana 2012), neighbouring countries, armed groups (UN Experts 2014), the national army officers and political elites (Stearns*et al*. 2013). This finding is supported by the fieldwork's results. Following an interview with two Hutu individuals from Maiko village in the north Kivu, it has been revealed that the FDLR rebels has set a credit system for individual members to borrow money from the group's central treasury in order to invest in all kinds of economic activity.[235] This view was supported by one expert, due to her saying that in remote forest region of Maiko National Park in the province of the north Kivu, the FDLR members have largely funded activities in newly discovered artisanal cassiterite and coltan mines.[236]

Evidence from a Kivus' Mwami suggests that the Congolese army – FARDC, and foreign armies like those from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have been using the mines either to fund themselves or to buy arms that allow them to continue fighting. In light of suggestion above, it should be stressed that armed groups fight to control minerals they mine or for

[233] Interviews conducted with a member of academic representatives in Kinshasa, July 2013.
Interview conducted with a member of the National Episcopal Conference of the DRC, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[234] Skype and telephone interviews conducted with communities' leaders, Beni, Butembo and Masisi, August 2013.
Interview conducted with a member of Congolese civil society, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[235] Telephone interviews conducted with two members of Hutu community – also known as Benyarwanda, Maiko, August 2013.
[236] Interview conducted with a member of Global Witness working in artisanal mining areas in the Kivus, London, November 2013.

mineral trading groups. In this way, there are two key issues at the moment; the fight over the control of assets if one likes to generate the money and the other one is to perpetuate the existence of armed groups. In the Kivus, although things are changing, but it has been noticed however that the presence of Rwandan troops in the mining areas and the significant influence of Rwanda by *personnes interposées* [proxies or intermediaries] are still a major concern. Some years ago, it was easy to see Rwandan troops but now they have intermediaries.[237] This is the above mentioned shift.

The view above is supported by an expert on artisanal mining from Global Witness. For her, in March 2013 in the south Kivu, the situation in mining site was very different compared to other mining sites in the north Kivu. For example, in Mwenga territory in the south Kivu, the site of gold mining is controlled by the FDLR who tax the miners $ 100 every month. The FDLR went physically in the mining site while others are sent to the village to collect the money. However, as of January 2013, there was a new development. The Raisa Mutomoki armed group also tax the miners $ 300 every two weeks and then the FARDC elements sent by seniors based in Bukavu will come 3 times a week on a motorbike to collect the money from miners. She said:

> "I saw them with my own eyes going to mining area, taxing people and they were charging $ 2.50 per person per pit and those miners who use motor-pumps were paying $ 5; this tax was levied every Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, I was there and saw them".[238]

To this expert, in the situation in the south Kivu, armed groups are not physically present in mining sites but they will be controlling the civilian miners. Further down the road to Mwenga centre, the local community belongs to Raisa Mutomboki armed group. These communities have decided to be to the mine both to earn the money for themselves and to protect the mine against the FDLR, because they see the mine as their local asset. In this mine, the dynamic is very different as the minerals that go to the Raisa Mutomboki rebel group pass through the community. In the north Kivu, however, in Lubaya territory, there are

[237] Interview conducted with a Mwami of North Kivu, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[238] Interview conducted with a member of Global Witness working in artisanal mining areas in the Kivus, London, November 2013.

the members of the Niatura armed group who have been unofficially integrated in the national army. This militia was physically in the mining site. For example, they will make the local population fix the road between the mining side and the village, and then they could take the minerals more easily for themselves. In Walikale, on the right bank of Loso river, there is the Simba armed group taking every mines for itself, and on the left bank of the river, there is a Belgian guy protected by the army who is making a lot of money through using a mechanised system of mining exploitation totally different from what the local people are using and he is directly linked to Kinshasa. In the army, there is a mining network which facilitates seniors to steal the mines that are stocked at the custom offices. Colonels Chaka and Fikiri, for example, stole minerals stocked at the custom office, loaded them into trucks and sent them to Goma to be sold.[239]

There is also a strange and circumstantial alliance between armed groups and the Congolese army in Walikale.[240] Walikale is a mineral-rich zone in the eastern DRC. Due to the presence of several armed groups along the way, it is inaccessible by road. The only way through is by private jets which fly over the Congolese territory without any permission (Autesserre 2012; Stearns*et al*. 2013; UN Experts 2014). In this zone, Congolese soldiers and the FDLR combatants work together towards extracting minerals instead of fighting each other (UN Experts 2014). Evidence from an ex-combatant revealed that in some mining zones, the FDLR, Mayi-Mayi and other local and external non-authorised armed movements operating in conflict-torn zones are all involved in illegal mining activities. For this ex-combatant, Congolese and non-Congolese elites are also involved in illegal dealing of minerals.[241] This evidence is backed by a more recent report of the UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (2014) which mentions the involvement of the elements of the DRC's national army – FARDC, and armed groups in illegal exploitation of mineral resources. For these experts, the national army like rebels have entrenched economic interests in mining.

De Koning (2013) however drives the point in claiming that mining plunder in the DRC has been involving negotiated arrangements whereby the army and armed groups sometimes

[239] Interview conducted with a member of Global Witness working in artisanal mining areas in the Kivus, London, November 2013.
[240] Focus groups, Kinshasa, July; August; September 2013.
[241] Interview conducted with a Congolese ex-combatant, Paris, December 20013.

connive in order to protect particular interests in return for a share of the profits. For him, the FARDC and rebels' involvement in unlawful mining exploitation and trade has been a stumbling-block for the process towards demilitarising mining zones. This has been the outcome of the presence of several armed movements in the eastern DRC and the result of the intermingling and mixing processes of the different armed factions into the national army (De Koning 2013; Stearns*et al*. 2013) since the official end of the conflict in 2003.

From another similar view, it has been unveiled that in Ituri, for example, civilians, militiamen and foreigners mine gold, which they sell in neighbouring countries. This view was supported by a member of civil society, due to him uttering that armed groups regularly trade minerals via independent brokers and private trading companies. This informs that the network between traders and rebels has become closer in the sense that combatants protect buyers, while the latter could get ores cross official borders on behalf of combatants. Evidence from Kahuzi-Biega National Park supports the view above and depicts that the FDLR employ civilian intermediaries to convey ores to Lulingu airstrip to be sold to traders.[242]

Within the zones they control, combatants as well as the national army elements have also established small trading businesses in connection with artisanal mining. Based on the evidence gleaned from a military officer, it is noted that the FARDC soldiers forced the local population from the Kayebe coltan mining to sell to an unlicensed trading company while fending off other traders.[243] As alluded to above, like combatants, military also are involved in organising and ensuring the transport of minerals in addition to actively associated with mining traders (De Koning 2009). Evidence from the United Nations experts illustrates that the FARDC requisitioned an aircraft in February 2009 from a private air cargo company to transport military goods into the mineral-rich Walikale territory in the north Kivu (De Koning 2009), and fly back to Goma with cassiterite and coltan.[244]

[242] Interviews conducted with a member of Global Witness, London, November 2013 and with an ex-combatant, Brussels, December 2013.
[243] Telephone interview conducted with a Senior Member of the FRDC, Kayebe – Katanga Province, September 2013.
[244] Interviews conducted with members of the EU Commission, Brussels, December 2013.

Alternatively, it has been claimed that fraud and corruption in the copper and diamond sector have not fuelled conflicts as it happens in the eastern DRC with coltan, wolframite, gold and cassiterite. Hence, all Congolese minerals are not conflict minerals.[245] In the pursuit of their mining business, a subjective alliance between armed movements and Congolese soldiers has been set and has been central in recruiting young people. This leaves room to some recidivist ex-combatants to say that young people who join armed movements are enlisted under the order of both Congolese Army officers and rebel movement seniors. These individuals are used as labourers in mining pits. After peace agreements, most of them are marginalised for having colluded with rebels, therefore rejected by their community's members. As a sideline to this, they become the prey of recruiters mostly when they are idle and do not have access to livelihoods. They are easily drawn into military or rebel life hoping to gain access to the mining resources. This also holds true for the re-recruitment of demobilised fighters.[246] However, what induces individuals to be at the mercy of armed groups? The following section looks into the mechanisms that war entrepreneurs use to recruit combatants.

5.5 Combatants' Recruitment

Conflict entrepreneurs recruit combatants through agencies based inside and outside the DRC. The complicity between the army and armed groups in the mining zones (De Koning 2013; UN Experts 2014) suggests that both the national army and armed movements supervise the recruitment of combatants for the share of the mineral profits. In this perspective, the combatant's recruitment first becomes a business issue as opposed to the self-defence's one for rebel leaders and conflict entrepreneurs. Secondly, joining armed group for young people is perceived as an opportunity to access resources within an environment with scarcity of jobs.

Rebel leaders are based in the city, while combatants are recruited in the bush. What links combatants to their leaders is the means the latter use to convince the former to adhere the fighting ideology. However, it is crucial to mention that beyond ideological conviction, war entrepreneurs may use agencies and families to persuade individuals to join armed

[245] Interview conducted with a member of civil society, Kinshasa, December 2013.
[246] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.

movements. The Kivus are a high recruitment zone, as there are few employment opportunities, other than to join the rebels. However, it is also important to mention that all armed groups that are operating in the Kivus have their representatives in Kinshasa either in the army or in the parliament or in the government (Stearns*et al*. 2013). According to a military officer, all rebel movements, including the FDLR, RCD, CNDP, MLC and M23 had forcibly enrolled people, sometimes with the national army assistance to increase the number of combatants. In the Kivus, the recruitment of combatants is carried out by abduction or force. Apart from ethnic bases and street children, generally co-opted by armed groups, voluntary recruitment is very rare (Autesserre 2012). Evidence from a FARDC senior officer and an ex-child soldier however suggests that there is a strong tribal lobbying with aim being to bribe families in order to convince their children to join military actions.[247] In other words, there exist recruitment agencies that network with communities to enrol young people into armed groups.

From Özerdem and Podder's (2011) theory on push and pull factors in recruitment of youth into conflict, it might be argued that motivations such as avenging against some grievance, the duty of securing community against injustice, exclusion and any other kind of social inequality and the feeling of supporting and feeding families may lead individuals to join armed groups. However, some others unfortunately may become combatants as volunteers or by force or coercion. From the fieldwork' findings however, it seems to be different due to combatant's recruitment process responding to the ethnic ideology and socio-economic interests. Contrary to combatants' push and pull factors as elaborated by Özerdem and Podder's (2011), things on the ground in the Kivus however seem to be different. The pattern of combatants' mobilisation in this part of the DRC argues against the view above, since it goes beyond greed and grievance aspect to fall victim to there being a fight of 'indigenous interest against non-indigenous'. From the workshop on the Kivus' communities held in Kinshasa on 5 July 2013, Julien Paluku – the Governor of the north Kivu, made a point which clearly argues against the theory of combatants' push and pull factors above, and revealed two phases towards recruiting rebellion members. The first phase consists of recruiting rebel leaders and the second phase relates to enlistment of combatants. For Paluku, leaders are

[247] Interviews conducted with a Senior Member of the FDRC and an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, October 2013.

recruited by Rwanda and Uganda on the basis of ethnic ideology. As leaders, they are enlisted not as individuals, but as the bearers of the interests of their ethnic groups. Paluku's evidence further underlined that the financial background and the individual links influence institution of a leader. This means that participation in politics in order to partake in the defence of one ethnic group interests becomes a key motivational factor of the recruitment process. Along similar way, once a leader, one is made to recruit combatant to serve the interests of the community. It is crucial to mention at this point that these combatants are enlisted from the Tutsi ethnic group either from within the Congolese territory or from neighbouring countries with the same ideology.[248]

Drawing on Paluku's evidence, the ethnic ideology and socio-economic interests towards recruiting combatants gave rise to the phenomenon of 'combatants without borders'[249] in the region. These soldiers use issues such as racial domination, ethnic identity, ethnic cleansing, security of the neighbouring states and good governance as a recruitment ideology to hide economic interests of their countries of origin – Rwanda and Uganda (Autesserre 2012; Stearns *et al*. 2013; UN Experts 2014). As forcibly combatant's recruitment is the case in other armed groups (Mandel 2009; Sageman 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012 Mckay 2012), so is coercion also used as combatant's recruitment tactic in the Kivus, due to recruiters and armed groups being rejected by local people (Lemarchand 1997; Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins *et al*. 2005; Autesserre 2012).

According to the fieldwork, some national and international experts were of the view that the FDLR recruits its members among its community made of Hutu Rwandans with the hope of returning home. The motivation used to recruit combatants is the possibility of the collapse of the RPA, Tutsi ruling party. Mayi-Mayi rebel groups and other local militias recruit combatants among their communities to defend their lands against Hutu and Tutsi in which they believe to be foreign invaders. These combatants are recruited from their immediate

[248] Report on the Kivus' workshop, Kinshasa, 5July 213.
Interview conducted with a member of the Kivus' notability, Kinshasa, July 2013.

[249] Combatants without borders are combatants recruited from Rwanda and Uganda that the Congolese coin soldiers without borders. These combatants have served more than three armies in the region and were mostly trained in Rwanda and Uganda. Soldiers without borders are in reality mercenaries reintegrated in the national army while severed from Congolese local customs.

environs with the aim of defending their land against foreign invaders. Alain Maykani[250] – an ex-combatant turned journalist for the CCTV in Kinshasa, contends that in Ituri particularly, the Thomas Lubanga's armed movement called *Union des Patriotes Congolais* [Union of the Congolese Patriots; UPC], was asking each family to send one or two of its members to join the tribal militia in order to fight and defend its tribe during the Hema and Lendu conflict. This wave of clandestine recruitments, emphasised by Maykani, was carried out under the supervision of chief Kawa – the traditional chief of Lendu tribe. As community's chief, Kawa was de facto the chief of the militia. Therefore, all recruiters had to liaise with him on every issue concerning combatants' enlistment.[251] The RCD, CNDP, M23 and other armed groups however have been forcibly recruiting young people in their local communities in the Kivus. Therefore, the local people consider them to be foreign armed groups.[252] Following different recruitment tactics used by different armed groups, it bears arguing that the recruitment modus operandi responds to ethnic ideology for the RCD, CNDP, M23 and Mai-Mai and land protection and identity recovery for the Hutus and FDLR. In addition, they all have been using friendship as a recruitment technique. Maykani, for instance, asserts:

> "I was abducted and became a soldier while I was coming home from school. A friend of mine asked for my help to carry his elder brother's parcels to the forest. The parcels turn out to be weapons and I later realised that my friend's brother was a rebel leader. Since that day I never came back home and I found myself in Mandro at 2 miles away from Bunia for my military training and initiation".[253]

However, for the RCD, CNDP and M23, the recruitment pattern responds not only to ethnic ideology but also and mostly to the socio-economic interests and coercion. Overall, factors such as insecurity, poverty, access to land and resources, citizenship recovery, foreign interest, etc. motivated individuals to join armed groups. An FDLR member, for example,

[250] Alain Maykani is working for CCTV as a journalist in Kinshasa. He is an ex-combatant and was one of the body guards of Thomas Lubanga – the leader of UPC, currently jailed at the International Criminal Court.
[251] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant turned into Journalist in Kinshasa, September 2013.
[252] Interviews conducted with an ex-combatant in Paris, November 2013.
Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Brussels, December 2013.
[253] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant turned into Journalist in Kinshasa, September 2013.

said "I am fed up! My family members have been raped, my field and crops were taken away, the government does not do anything to protect us, I am going to join armed group".[254]

The rivalry between different armed groups and militias in the eastern DRC has revealed that each ethnic group has its militia and fighting ideology (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 2008).[255] This stand is supported by Mulungulu Elias.[256] In the Kivus, each ethnic group has the duty to hinder the triumph of another, said this former Governor of the south Kivu.[257] Mulungulu's view is supported by a few local leaders. For these notables:

> "As the Tutsi ethnic group becomes powerful, all anti-Tutsi ethnic groups must stop the rise of the Tutsi and inhibit the community from becoming stronger than others. In that case, when there is a social concern, the government settles it with all ethnic groups. However, in the case of Hutu and Tutsi militia, the government exercises preferential treatment trying to settle it by ignoring other ethnic groups", they contended.[258]

From a different point of view, some individuals acquainted with the conflict in the Kivus indicated that the recruiters enlist youth by promising them a future promotion to head political and military positions if they come to power. These recruiters use the theory of 'disorder as reorganisation project and the quest of a new socio-political order from the rebellion'[259] as recruiting ideology.[260] According to some members of diplomatic representatives and academics, this ideology is often used by Congolese politicians in mining zones where the evanescence of the state seems to justify the main reason for recruiting fighters – as was the case of Mbusa Namwisi with the RCD – Movement for Liberation or

[254] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[255] See Chapter 4 for more details.
[256] Mulungulu Elias was the governor of Kivu during the transitional period – 2003-2006, and is considered today as one of the influential leaders of Kivu.
[257] Interview conducted with an ex- governor of Kivu province, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[258] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[259] The theory on 'disorder as reorganisation project and the quest of a new socio-political order from rebellion' means that from a disorder can be organised an order and from an order disorder can be organised in order to access public institutions and resources.
[260] Interview conducted with an academic and expert on Kivu issues, Kinshasa, August, 2013.

RCD-KML.[261] However, non-national armed groups recruit on the basis of false promises, family threat, blackmail abduction etc.[262] Overall, it seems to be that the only rebel movement that voluntarily enticed young people and children was the AFDL due to a general resentment of Mobutu's dictatorship.[263]

From a general observation however, three trends emerge from the recruitment tactics used by recruiters. First, children are forcibly recruited while others join rebel groups on the basis of ethnicity. Second, some combatants are recruited by the army leaders of neighbouring countries. This is the case of 'combatants without borders' who have fought for at least three different national armies in the region. Third, in the case of economic hardship and political instability, recruiters recruit youth by offering them luxuries as done by Tutsi in forming the CNDP and M23 armed groups.[264] In whole, reasons why youth join such groups can be summarised as to avenge the rape of a family member, confiscation of property, lack of education, unemployment, national army disorganisation, insecurity and the incapacity of the army to defend state (Mandel 2009; Sageman 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012; Mckay 2012). There are also patriotic or sentimental reasons. Political and economic reasons (DDR programme in the DRC 2012) are entirely different, but they all converge to socio-economic concerns (Özerdem 2012; 2013). There is not one-side-fixed technique to recruit combatants; it depends on where the individual is and which kind of armed group is operating in that area. Broadly, there is a range of reasons that lead to the recruitment of combatants.

All armed groups have been reportedly accused of being involved illegally in mining activities (UN Experts 2014), though for junior fighters, it seems difficult to establish a clear relationship between minerals and the combatants.[265] Some ex-combatants and civil society members I interviewed in my fieldwork specified that in the structure of a rebel movement, combatants are under the commandment of their senior officers. Based on the military principle of subordination or loyalty to senior officer, the nexus between mining and combatants holds true. In reality, the junior combatant is not directly involved in mining

[261] Interview conducted with some diplomats and academics, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Focus groups, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[264] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[265] Interview conducted with a member of Global Witness, London, June 2013.

activity. Rather, senior officers are involved in the mining business and junior combatants are often assigned the role of protecting mining areas. However, it is important to mention that there is always a legacy between different armed groups. For example, it has been observed that the RCD, CNDP and M23 have thrived in mining zones with their seniors highly involved in mining smuggling. A report from global Witness on Congolese minerals in the balance depicts that Bosco Ntaganda, a former CNDP and M23 leader, currently in judgment at the International Court of Criminals – ICC, was earning $ 15,000 a year minimum, because he was smuggling through Rwanda.

So far, at this level, we can see three different things; civilians taking arm themselves to protect minerals against armed groups, armed groups taxing miners and controlling mines at the distance with vulnerable civilians being attacked if they do not pay, and armed groups or military stealing the mines and making the money from it.[266] Overall, combatants and the military can be involved in mining activities in five cases:

- In the case, whereby they control a mining pit. For example, a senior combatant can protect individuals working in mining pits, or combatants themselves can mine minerals if they know how to do so or combatants can simply lead a group of individuals to execute mining activities whose they are paid for.
- In the case whereby they ally with some civilians they use as proxies.
- In the case whereby they confiscate individuals' minerals.
- In the case whereby they take minerals taxes from the *comptoirs* [counters or mineral selling point].
- In the case whereby they collaborate with multinational counters.

Basically, combatants control either mining concession or mining counters. They play a downstream role through leading all mining activities from the pits. The field research findings overall have shown that Mayi-Mayi rebel groups, for example, sustain their movement with contributions from their community members. This portends that when they control mining pits they extract minerals and sell them. However, who do they sell them to? There is a great blurring around this trade. Similarly, some military officers are involved in

[266] Interviews conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, September 2013.

mining extraction and trade. General Amisi Tango, an ex-senior member of rebel group – RCD, integrated into the national army as general officer through the security sector reform and DDR process has been accused of illegal mining business. Along similar line, from an interview conducted in Brussels with and ex-combatant, it was indicated that some Congolese indigenous people have witnessed how minerals were crossing the border to Rwanda from the mining zones controlled by rebel groups.[267] Therefore, it could be seen that there is a clear link between minerals and combatants.

5.6 Combatants' DDR in the Kivus: Towards a Problem-solving or a Plight?

As noted in other African countries, the DDR programme in the DRC encountered a few challenges in line with the lack of capacity, inefficiency, mismanagement, institutional rivalries and alleged corruption (Lamb *et al*. 2012; Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013). Report from the UN Security Council (2011), for instance, suggests that the MONUC in the DRC played a key role in the DDR programme. However this role was barely limited to the implementation of the national programme, with a focus almost exclusively on demobilisation of combatants. However, Kölln (2011) having assessed the effectiveness of the DDR programme in the DRC found that the main focus of the MONUC's assistance towards implementing the DDR programme in the DRC was the dismantlement and disarmament of non-national armed groups, mainly the FDLR. In addition, Kölln's findings unveiled that the DDR process was carried out via the UN Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement – DDRRR, programme. This programme comprised armed peacekeepers whose the assignment was to protect and secure combatants who were willingly seeking to abscond from armed groups, due to they may be aggressively assailed or executed by their fellow fighters once their efforts to give up the armed movements turned unsuccessful (Kölln 2011).

Drawn from Nest's (2006) account on the political economy of the Congo war, it is indicated that based on the spirit of the Lusaka Peace Agreements, the MONUC was in charge of transforming the DDRRR into joint operational plan. In terms of chapter nine of the above

[267] Interview conducted with a member of the Global Witness, London, June 2013.
Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Brussels, December 2013.

accord, the MONUC was mandated to design the programme. However, it is noted that the programme designed by the MONUC contained several flaws, mainly in regards to its task of disarming non-national fighters. It is crucial to underline at this point that as a result of the Lusaka talks, the MONUC was commissioned to identify, screen, demobilise and repatriate fighters, but did not have any responsibility in disarmament. However, lessons learned from the post-conflict recovery establish that the implementation of the DDR programme relies on combatants' disarmament (Muggah 2010; Lamb 2012; Lamb and Alusala *et al*. 2012). As the MONUC was not associated to combatants' disbarment in the eastern DRC, thus the implementation of the DDRRR by the MONUC was inconsistent due to it being kept away from disarmament process. As a ramification, the MONUC's activities strengthened local power imbalances because some armed groups voluntarily disarmed but others did not. This situation is the effect of the Lusaka Agreements that were unable to address the aspect of economic interests of warring parties and the MONUC which also failed to address the issues of economic interests of the post-conflict community (Nest 2006). Yet these interests determine not only the willingness of fighters to disarm, but also have an impact on the post-conflict recovery in general and particularly on the DDR-related processes such as state-building, SSR and the transitional justice system.

In post-conflict situations, two strategies have been used as inducements for warring parties to voluntarily disarm; programmes that trade agricultural implements for weapons, and cash buy-backs of weapons. The success of these programmes entails the setting of clear time limit, followed by relocation and reintegration of ex-combatants by offering them possible alternative livelihoods. The latter has to do with the economy of the communities that are meant to welcome ex-combatants. The Ethiopian model is informative in this effect. In 1991, following the fall of Mengistu regime, ex-fighters who were reintegrated into uplands crop farming obtained coffee plants, those reintegrated into lowland wheat cultivation draft acquired draft animals and those reintegrated into urban areas obtained apprenticeships, small business management and microcredit facilities (Nest 2006; Lamb and Dye 2009; Muggah 2010; Willemij verkoren *et al*. 2010). Unfortunately, the MONUC's DDRRR programmes in the eastern DRC have fallen victim to there being no clear timescales, as is the case in the Lusaka Agreements.

Following surrender to the MONUSCO, non-national ex-combatants were settled into the transit centres in Uvira, Bukavu, Beni, Dungu and Goma where they received basic assistance before getting repatriated into their countries of origin for reinsertion and reintegration support (Nzekani Zena 2013). In 2004, another programme known as the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* [Military Structure for Integration; SMI] was established and linked to the DDR programme through national legislation. The SMI aimed to give to combatants the option of either integrating the FARDC or undergoing the DDR process (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013). The initial idea behind the creation of the SMI was to assemble all combatants at the FARDC-run centres and integrate them into the new national army. It was also established to demobilise ex-combatants who opted to re-join civilian life (Stearns*et al*. 2013; Verweijen 2013).

As alluded to above, since the official end of conflict in the DRC in 2003, the DRC's government created a national DDR programme for the reintegration of the Congolese ex-combatants (Onana 2013). However, this programme has not been run properly due to a lack of a national DDR plan, a poor implementation, the mismanagement and depletion of resources allocated to the programme (Onana 2012; De Koning 2013; Stearns*et al*. 2013). This inopportune situation got exacerbated by a temporary suspension of donor funds (Stearns*et al*. 2013). Furthermore, the already ambitious SMI programme has also proved slow and difficult to implement (De Koning 2013; Verweijen 2013). Unless these programmes have made significant progress, security in the DRC will still depend on a national army comprised of businessmen and a mix of badly trained government forces and militias, with some of them being kept in their previous units with the same old command structures being largely intact. Contrary to the above mentioned government's efforts, a more recent finding from Onana (2012) shows that although a DDR programme has been implemented after a long-drawn-out period of armed conflict, this process however is still on-going up until now and had not yet yielded the hoped for results. This finding is supported by De Koning (2013) and Verweijen's (2013) for whom authorities and local war-affected communities have come to the point where the DDR programme is believed to be a process that aims to further weaken the already failed state. For them, the DDR process is pointed out as a process which releases more criminals into society. It produces new recruiters and

combatants for armed groups instead of reintegrating them into their prospective communities (De Koning 2013; Verweijen 2013).

The fieldwork's findings concur with Onana (2013), De Koning (2013) and Verweijen's (2013) views due to the people believing that to restore the political economy of DDR, would involve the reestablishment of state authority, the empowerment of veterans and the promotion of human and institutional security, which create a humanitarian system of government. For these people, the particularity of the DDR programme in the DRC is that it was intended to relocate and to reposition ex-combatants without identifying how demobilised individuals could usefully fit into their society. The DDR programme was poorly planned and its approach was not holistic, neither was it able to tackle the core issues of the post-conflict state.[268] Based on a recent exchange with a member of the UNDP in Kinshasa on the security sector reform, it has been revealed that the UNDP has just understood the problem of DDR in the DRC, and would change their approach. This individual further acknowledged that available resources allocated for ex-combatants were derisory and could not enable them to have a decent and sustainable life.[269]

As disclosed in the document on the assessment of ex-combatants in the Kivus and the report on the reintegration and disintegration of ex-combatants in the DRC, between 2002 and mid-2011, the DDRRR section of the UN mission in the DRC repatriated more than 25,000 non-national ex-fighters – 58 percent of total repatriated, and their dependants, with 1,435 arms and 46,006 rounds of ammunition destroyed. Rwanda was the endpoint of 80 percent of the total repatriated ex-rebels. To date, it is believed that strategic success in repatriating non-national combatants was the facilitation of the demobilisation and repatriation of some foreign combatant officers, comprising their liaison officers from the north and south Kivus, which allegedly interrupted the recruitment of combatants, logistical support and unlawful trading by the armed movements (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013; Lamb *et al*. 2013). However, over time, the composition of national and non-national armed group members – in terms of gender and size, varied. Despite several attempts with regards to the combatants'

[268] Focus groups, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[269] Interview conducted with former Presidency Adviser in Kinshasa, August 2013.

DDR programme, there is still the need to question why the DDR process has been and continues to be a stumbling block in the re-establishment of peace in the DRC.

A study on the security sector reform in the DRC suggests that the DDR programmes in the country have failed to give sustainable inducements to combatants and to address basic insecurity because of the lack of understanding of certain processes such as the in-formalisation of politics and economy, the exercise of power through violence, the multiple crises people are facing in the society (Marriage 2007) and of course different perceptions for the security sector between donors' objectives and domestic needs (Boshoff *et al*. 2010; Roue and Willems 2010). DDR failure has been attributed to be a result of a 'top-down understanding' of, and 'top-down solutions' to the Kivu's conflict, the dearth of strategy corporation and delivery mechanisms for change, the marginalisation of local communities,[270] the lack of follow-up, broken promises of assistance and the incapacity of the national security forces to deal with the continuing insecurity (Roue and Willems 2010). Although it could be acknowledged some attempts towards demobilising and disarming former combatants, it should be noted that the process has been partially implemented and ex-combatants have never been fully reintegrated into civilian life in the Kivus (De Koning 2009).

Drawing on the Kivus' experience, it might be argued that DDR did not take into account the repatriation of foreign militias; neither did it properly plan the combatant reinsertion phase. In the current state of insecurity in the eastern DRC, whereby combatants have become the prey of war entrepreneurs, 'combatants' intermingling and combatant's mixing processes' should be banished. These processes need to be revised and replaced by a traditional process of the combatant's reintegration in order to convert veterans into undertaking collective works such as agriculture, fishing, farming etc., and to create community development structures that would assist ex-combatants to embrace a more stable life. It is to say that ex-combatants should be able to work and partake in the development of their new social environment (DDR programme in the DRC 2012).

[270]Fieldwork conducted by the author from July to December 2013 in the DRC, Belgium, England and France.

However, it is important to note that apart from the *Institut National des Professions Pratiques* [National Institute for Professional Practices; INPP], a professional centre specialised in training young people based in Kinshasa, there are no other professional training centres in the countryside, though the DDR programmes are conducted in the provinces – countryside. In addition, due to the fact that the market of employment structure is not organised in the country, it is hard to estimate the general level of unemployment in the DRC. Therefore, it is not possible to employ individuals who have been trained in professional jobs. Although the state is of an agricultural vocation, due to having the second world largest tropical rain forest potential,[271] agricultural activities are still underdeveloped. However, some ex-combatants underwent agricultural training and are expected to be employed in agricultural sector. Evidence from an ex-fighter, nonetheless, showed that after the DDR process, ex-combatants have received social assistance which would help them reintegrate either into agricultural life, formal or informal education. However, it is not an easy matter to convince young people who were used to handling easy money from artisanal mining and illegal actions like theft to join agriculture in a society where peasant life is the main form of livelihood, hence rejected in preference to earning easier money.[272] Ex-combatants are aware that with a weapon they can make money, therefore they choose not to opt for seek jobs in agriculture that produces nothing in unstable and unsafe zones. In this instance, controlling mining pits is quick and lucrative. In addition, there are also psychological reasons for maintaining a combatant lifestyle,[273] since bearing arms may be seen as validating and offers a sense of power (Özerdem and Podder 2011; Özerdem 2012; 2013).

A close look at how the DDR process has been handled in the DRC, it might be argued that the programme has not achieved its objectives because of the cyclical nature of the process, with rebels being reintegrated without fundamental motivation. This situation also happened with the reform of the security system. For this latter, it is reported that different elements of armed factions, including those from non-national armed groups, were intermingled with the

[271] Report from the Congolese Institute of Geography, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[272] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013. Interview conducted with an academic, Paris, December 2013.
[273]Telephone interviews conducted with members of the CONADER, Beni, Kinshasa and Masisi, July 2013.

elements of the FARDC instead of being integrated (De Koning 2009). According to a human rights reporter, a demobilised combatant is either reinserted or monitored or jailed due to criminal acts. For this activist, most Congolese rebel leaders were junior fighters fighting on behalf of Uganda and Rwanda. However, on the basis of a total discretion of Rwanda and Uganda, they have become recruiters and senior officers of armed groups in the DRC. They are unstable as their life is an 'in and out rebellion'. Therefore, they have been several times reintegrated into national army with different high ranks. As a result, there is an eternal cycle of reintegration and desertion.[274] A Kivu's ethnologist explains the recurrence of this attitude by the fact that these unstable fighters or 'combatants without borders'[275] cannot join civilian life in the Congo because there is no clear rational for why they fight. Therefore, they prefer being mingled with the national army in order to secure and keep alive their mentor's objectives. Their integration into the army is to preserve benefits they have had during the rebellion time or those they were promised during peace negotiation.[276]

The continuation of the DDR programme in the DRC is also linked to the fact that the programme was designed and financed from outside, with no consideration for the unique and specific needs of the Congo (Muggah 2010). Concomitantly, a set of civil society members and the DDR experts in the DRC are of the consensus that the UNDP handled the DDR programme before specialised agencies took over. For these people, the DDR management was calamitous.[277] Flabbergasting evidence from a former adviser at the office of the Prime Minister, for instance, depicts that 20 demobilised individuals got to be repatriated in the province of Equateur, Katanga and Kasai at 800 miles away from the Kivus. The DDR managers rented a forty-seat-plane for $ 125,000 from Caribbean islands to board 20 individuals, whereas each demobilised combatant received $ 100 for their social reintegration. The aircraft's cost is 62.5 times higher than $ 100 given to ex-combatants as the reinsertion social package. There is already the irrationality on the use of the funds allocated to the DDR programme. How the DDR managers can rent a forty-seat-plane for 20

[274] Interview conducted with a member of the Human Right Watch, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[275] These Tutsi combatants have served at least three national armies in the region and are currently leading rebellions in the eastern DRC. Most of them have been integrated into the FARDC as Senior Officers are used to going into exile in Rwanda and Uganda – their original countries, in case of rebellion defeat.
[276] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[277] Focus groups, Kinshasa, August 2013.

people, while it was possible to give $ 1,000 to each ex-combatant and get them boarded a fifty-dollar bus? It would be much less expensive than renting a $ 125,000 aircraft. The audit on the mismanagement of $ 360 million allocated for the DDR programme has been initiated, yet no one has been found guilty up till to date. It has been reported that money benefited both the DDR managers and CONADER's executive officers, while half of the money was used for other thing such as payment of foreign partners and expertise.[278]

In their research on how to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants, Bowd and Özerdem (2013:3) advise:

> "The way in which the reintegration of ex-combatants is viewed depends to a great degree, on the philosophy underpinning the DDR programme and this will, to some extent, influence the way in which they are designed as well as the perceived success of such programmes".

From the perspective of an ex-combatant working for a private security company in Kinshasa, it has been said that the endless nature of the DDR programmes is also due to the incapacity of the government to offer a socio-economic and politic alternative to returnees on the one hand, and on the other because the state reintegrate doubtful individuals or combatants without borders into the national army. For this former combatant, the state has not provided any economic and social reintegration structure for people who were used to accessing resources and had some power,[279] whereas the DDR and reintegration programmes to date have been commonly appraised according to economic reintegration with focus being on levels of employments or registration on training course (Özerdem 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013). According to former Adviser at the Presidency, however, this seems to not be the case as after the DDR programme, ex-combatants were meant to spend their new life in an environment where there are neither economic infrastructure nor employment opportunities.[280]

[278] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[279] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[280] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013.

After laying down their arms, ex-combatants received $ 100 for their social reintegration. Being confronted with social issues beyond their control, they are unenthusiastic to be reintegrated into poverty and unemployment as they still need means to come over the same initial problems they have fought for. Indeed, ex-combatants re-join unauthorised armed groups not only because they need to access resources in either way, but also because the state is becoming less involved.[281] Very often, ex-fighters join armed groups because they feel to be closer to rebel group's politics than the government's one (Porto *et al*. 2007). In this context, as it has been claimed by a few specialists of the DRC's conflict, there is a resignation of the state which in the case under question has favoured the 'cult of uniform'[282] in the country. As a sideline to this, in the villages, anybody who takes arms is fully respected, therefore has access to resources and life's facilities. Weapon gives individuals 'lord's status' (Muggah 2009; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011) and confers them the right to do anything they want – sexual violence, robbery, assault etc. As weapon handlers, these people can either control mining pits or abuse miners in the mining areas.[283]

The recurrence of the DDR of ex-combatants also has roots in the precariousness of social life. Based on his paper on a re-conceptualisation of ex-combatants reintegration, Özerdem (2013) suggests a community-centred reintegration approach as a mechanism towards speaking for the needs of the wider community in a post-conflict society with deep and wide societal divisions. From the fieldwork's findings, it might be proposed that the lack of employment, for example, has led ex-combatants to be tempted by any kind of job. Evidence from a former rebel indicated that when ex-combatants are in the bush, they are trained in illegal mining trades and once reintegrated into civilian life or national army, they still bear in their mind the scars of undue advantages they had in the rebellion such as extortions, access to minerals etc. Therefore, doing a job that does not respond to ex-combatants' aspirations would not dissuade them from using force and military skills to survive. For this ex-combatant, it would be more advantageous for ex-combatants to act as gangsters in a state

[281]The cult of uniform is the fact that anyone who wears military uniform, no matter his or her social rank, is always considered as superior to other citizens that they call 'basendji' [less civilized] or civil – less man. These people can go out and abuse, yet they are not answerable before the court law.
[282] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[283] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.

where impunity has become a norm and where violence is used to voice one's concerns.[284] In whole, from the fieldwork's results, it might be argued that the DDR programme lacked real blueprint of the future capability. The programme was hobbled to define and communicate vision, while its organisation failed to change its culture. Additionally, local communities were not involved in it implementation and the engagement of stakeholders was very limited.[285]

The ex-combatant's reintegration process would be expecting to encounter issues with regards to trust and confidence between receiving communities and ex-combatants due to atrocities that ex-combatants committed against their communities. The lack of trust and confidence from both parties could present challenges that could undermine social reintegration (Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem 2013). From the research findings, it appears the DDR programme dealt with people who want to be Congolese but at the same time work for their origin country. This leaves room to a military expert to say that the issue with the DDR programme is that combatants without borders have never identified themselves as Congolese but as Rwandan or Ugandan which they are working for, and the DDR programmes have never drawn the difference between local and foreign armed groups. For this analyst, the process has rather been integrated into the national army combatants without borders and soldiers from foreign armies.[286]

From a more recent meeting of the Great Lakes countries Community – CPGL, it has been revealed that foreign ministers of CPGL members complained about Rwandans and Ugandans supporting the M23 rebel movement although the fact that they are signatories of the Addis-Baba Peace Agreement on the eradication of rebel groups in the eastern DRC signed in March 2013.[287] For the association of the Kivus' elders and leaders, the DDR programmes look like an atypical process which has sustained insecurity for long. Insecurity in the eastern DRC is self-financing and the DDR programme will be complicated as long as ex-combatants still have opportunity to access minerals that enable them to rearm. For them, DDR would be far from solving combatants' concern unless widespread poverty, military

[284] Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Paris, December 2013.
[285] Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[286] Interview conducted with an expert on military and security issues, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[287] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.

insignificant and irregular salary, chaotic situation, mafia groups and total impunity are tackled down. If these issues are not well addressed rebel groups will still be motivated to criminalising economy, re-enlisting discontent and idle ex-combatants.[288] Therefore, it might be argued that as far as the Kivus' conflict continues to be approached from a top-down perspective – which ignores local communities' view and which results in top-down solutions, the DDR programme would still fail to address what it is meant to, and will be perceived like a programme which aims to change communities' culture rather than impacting positively on post-conflict communities.

5.7 Combatants' Re-recruitment: The Phenomenon of Combatants without Borders

From a set of previous papers on the roots of armed conflicts in the DRC, the state weakness, the interference of the neighbour Rwandan and Ugandan, endogenous conflicts – especially access to the land, and the pursuit of natural resources plundering have been underlined as theories to explain the causes of armed conflicts in the DRC (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 2008). In a more recent Usalama survey on the roots of conflict persistence in the DRC however, Stearns *et al*. (2013) highlight four more conflict-fuelling-factors beyond the early contributions to the DRC's conflict explanation. For him, owing to the present political environment in the DRC, violence constitutes an efficient means to access power and control resources.

The militarised nature of the policy of power which emerges from the current political environment is the result of the 2003-2006 transitional period following the second Congo war (1998-2003). Peace process was based on the principle of power sharing; former belligerents joined the Congolese state institutions and their armed wings were integrated into the new national army. The idea behind this approach which was based on granting political rights to the insurgents in order to stifle their insurrections still continues today, thus encouraging elites to mobilise armed groups. Another cause of military mobilisation lays in difficulties associated with military policies. By integrating constantly armed groups into the FARDC, the government has not only prompted the launch of a future and new uprising, but

[288] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.

also one could even say it has 'endorsed' impunity. The abuses of the army have led many groups to take up arms and conferred legitimacy to claims of self-defence harboured constantly by rebels. In addition, the army sometimes is in an accomplice in mobilising combatants for armed groups, with officers offering support to armed groups or getting involved in the arms trade.

With regard to how the ex-combatant's reintegration has been conducted, it might be postulated that the continuation of the DDR programmes in the DRC seems to be the ramification of the failure of a proper reinsertion of ex-combatants into economic environment, but most importantly is that the DDR process was instrumental and technical, and the process was limited on numbers, targets, partners, trauma, protection and rehabilitation (Sageman 2004; Mandel 2009). This gives room to former Adviser at the Presidency to claim that the paucity of economic component in the DDR planning has paved the way for returnees becoming easy prey for re-recruitment by armed groups that operate in the mining territories such as Walikale. For him, ex-combatants re-recruitment results from a total impunity which characterises the state's institutions in general and the army in particular. Consequently, the army would not be able to subdue rebellions because it conspires with rebel groups to mine illegally minerals.[289]

Two reasons can justify the involvement of armed groups and combatants in the mining activities (De Koning 2009; 2010; UN Experts 2014); first, they have to feed themselves and all this requires money. Second, they have to buy weapons. In the same vein, it is important to mention that the traffic of small arms and light weapons is a flourishing trade in the eastern DRC – from Ituri to the south Kivu via Uganda. As noted by a member of the Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW, from 1998 to 2013 more than 400 or 500 weapons enter the eastern DRC per day from neighbouring countries and one gun costs about $ 600 to 700. This view supports that of Beswick and Jackson's (2011) for whom DDR processes that take place after a regional conflict culminate in the flows of weapons over borders, since combatants tend to keep their bonds with neighbouring countries. Although there is an arms embargo, weapons are still trafficked easily in this part of the country because armed groups control the

[289] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013.

border and customs are corrupted. Preventing the re-recruitment of demobilised people by this mafia system, opines the SARW's member, becomes difficult because of the easy access to mining business, weapons traffic, the lack of traceability, the intermingling of different elements of armed fractions and the permanent presence of 'combatants without borders' in the national army.[290] Who are these combatants without borders? A portion of the answer can be drawn from the profile of Bosco Ntaganda, an ex-combatant who is currently behind the ICC bare (Le Palmares 2013).

Rwandan rebel in 1990s and RPF combatant, Ntaganda entered the Congo as Rwandan soldier then became senior officer of the Congolese army and joined RCD/Goma during the 1998 anti-Kabila war. In June 2000, he fought as a Ugandan soldier against Rwandan army during the memorable six-day-war in Kisangani.[291] After a while, he became again Congolese army's general officer, and then later joined again the M23 rebellion in 2012 before fleeing into exile in Rwanda, where he was officially born from Rwandan parents. At the age of 40, he has served three national armies – Rwanda, Uganda and DRC (Le Palmares 2013).

Herein is the importance to draw the line between mercenaries, also known as soldiers of fortune, and combatants without borders. Mercenaries are soldiers or combatants whose purpose is to fight in foreign conflicts for financial gain. These soldiers for hire get involved in a conflict because they have been paid to do so. Their common feature remains the search of other forms of self-enrichment along the way (Beswick and Jackson 2011:102). The focus on mercenary activities in Africa dated from national liberation movements during the early post-colonial Africa period. One review of peacekeeping, security and development in developing countries (ibid.) suggested that as at now, mercenaries are still widespread not only in various civil wars, but also in contemporary peacekeeping missions. Their modus operandi has changed to the extent that some operate illegally as private security companies, even though their activities are banned by the UN and African Union – AU, Conventions (Vaux, Seiple *et al*. 2010). Combatants without borders or eternal reintegrated combatants however are soldiers who fight in foreign conflicts for the interest of their country of origin.

[290] Interviews conducted with a member of the Southern Africa Resource Watch, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[291] The six-day war in Kisangani was a battle on the control of diamonds traffic between Rwanda and Uganda in the Congolese territory.

According to a Western diplomat based in Kinshasa, these individuals identify themselves as nationals of foreign countries they are fighting in. They are also characterised by an unstable behaviour and are prone to either creating a rebel group or re-joining another with intent to return with a higher position during the new reintegration.[292] This, in Stearns*et al.*'s (2013) findings, is pointed out as the illustration of the 2003-2006 transition period with the so-called government 1+4.

It is of note that after the abovementioned transitional period, rebels became Members of Parliament, ministers and some held high positions in public institutions. However, following the 2006 elections, those who failed went back to the bush and restarted rebellions. For a member of the SARW, the cycle of the (ex-) combatants' (re-) recruitment is the result of the DDR programme which rehabilitated into the national army individuals from various armed groups without any selection criteria. This further suggests how the cycle of recruitment and reintegration is primarily linked to the weakness of the state and that the DDR has further weakened the state due to unexpected reintegration.[293]

Overall, from the field research findings, it emerges that all analysts and observers concerned with the DDR process are of the consensus that the programme has integrated ex-combatants in the army without inventorying who is who but on the basis of neighbouring countries' so-called concerns. It can be noted that the issues of work ethics and training were not taken into account. Most demobilised people were using minerals to get money, once integrated into the army, they do no longer have financial opportunity they had in mining zones controlled by rebels, and hence when any rebellion opportunity arises they yield. In the same vein but from an academic sociologist's perspective, these armed movements have struggled to entice local young people to join them because their ideology is not about consolidating the idea of national cohesion and the unity of the state.[294]

In light of Stearns *et al.*'s (2013) survey on the national army and armed groups in the eastern DRC, it has been found that the DRC's government's policies towards armed groups have been erratic and various political and military mechanisms regarding the reform of national

[292] Interview conducted with a diplomat, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[293] Interview conducted with a member of the Southern Africa Resource Watch, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[294] Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013.

security have been barely used in a coordinated way. Within the FARDC, for example, the reintegration of deserter soldiers into the national security system has become a key factor to mobilise the army, say Stearns *et al* (2013). Along similar line, it is proved to be that the national army is made of homogeneous units from former rebels integrated into the FARDC without adequate training, who refuse to be deployed outside the eastern DRC and who have been promoted without any merit (De Koning 2009; Stearns *et al*. 2013). Stearns *et al*.'s view is supported by a general officer of the FARDC for whom the lack of homogeneity and the presence of foreigner soldiers within the national army respond to the strategy of 'trapped solution', which is based on infiltrating strategic military positions in order to prepare future violence.[295] Possible interpretation of this view includes that the rising of combatants without borders also epitomises the failure of reforming security sector.

From the contributions above, it emerges that having been recruited from outside of the Congo, 'combatants without borders' are in reality severed from local beliefs and communities. During the DDR programmes, they prefer integrating the Congolese Army than civilian life because in fact they are professional recruiters and are meant to fulfil the Balkanisation process. In this context, recruitment of combatants should respond to the vision of mineral exploitation. This vision should be set as a business interest for their original countries. Therefore, the international community should hold Uganda and Rwanda responsible for handling the fate of 'combatants without borders'. The great powers should not shirk either because most of these fighters were trained under the military cooperation between Washington, London, Kampala and Kigali. Moreover, the wars they conducted in the Congo enormously enriched multinationals, including electronic and arms companies (Le Palmares 2013).

5.8 Conclusions

The relationship between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment has fragmented the national army and thwarted the original intention of the DDR programmes (De Koning 2009; 2010). It is important to remember that a great number of ex-combatants prefer getting

[295] Interview conducted with a Senior Member of the FARDC, Kinshasa, October 2013.

integrated into military life than opting for civilian one. 'Combatants without borders', for instance, have understood the fact that the Congolese national army is not organised and that national territory and national security have always been a challenging issue for the government (Stearns *et al*. 2013) to the extent that state's authorities prefer external military assistance (De Koning 2011), rather than reforming the national security system. Therefore, rehabilitation into the army gives opportunity to mutiny and to join a rebel group any time. It can be arguing that the involvement of combatants and the army in illegal mineral business and the failure of the DDR process are the result of the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the army in order to enable war entrepreneurs to get access to resources and keep their position of representatives of different armed groups in national institutions.[296] Overall, it is worth noting that the failure of combatants' DDR is associated with five factors; firstly, the programme did not have real blueprint of the future capability. Secondly, it poorly defined and communicated vision. Thirdly, its organisation failed to change its culture. Fourthly, local communities did not own it, nor did they author different policies regarding the implementation of the programme, with the latter being 'top-down solutions' to a 'top-down understanding' of the conflict. And fifthly, the engagement of stakeholders was insufficient.

The nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' (re-) recruitment has resulted in an ongoing insecurity which illicitly enriches certain elites involved both in mining activities and arms traffic (Stearns *at al*. 2013). Insecurity creates jobs as it paves the way for illegal trades of minerals, which helps maintain the economy criminalisation while impunity created by the state of lawlessness hampers the state to exercise its sovereign powers (De Koning 2011). In the long-term, as it has been claimed by former Adviser of the Prime Minister, there is a moral consequence based on the reliance of the state's economy on the mining; which in turn downgrades every attempt towards anticipating a sustainable development. At the same time, there is a creation of the 'economy of picking' or the economy of a 'cash cow'[297] which results in the underdevelopment, with worse effects on human development and security.[298]

[296] Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[297] Picking economy or cash cow economy and economy of rent are interchangeably used.
[298] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013.

Basically, there is a fivefold repercussion to the link between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants' re-recruitment:[299]

- First of all, the state is trapped in the cycle of instability, the recruitment of children, incessant conflict between ethnic groups and the problem of access to land.[300]
- Secondly, armed conflicts in the east give the opportunity to a category of individuals – political elites and high ranking officers, to grab some mining concessions for individual purposes.
- Thirdly, some individuals have become richer and stronger than the state i.e. they cease being law-abiding citizens.
- Fourthly, the state weakness is not a direct consequence of this relationship, but it is the relationship as a result of the proliferation of armed groups.
- Fifthly, the state has resigned its duties and charges, therefore has become a 'text-book-state' that does not exist in practice and whose the vacuum profits no-authorised movements.

All these ramifications can be wrapped up into three main issues, including the 'culture of violence[301] and the rise of the 'strong men',[302] the emergence of 'far west'[303] and the installation of rentier economy[304] in the country.

In whole, the presentation of data in this chapter was in line with the nexus between artisanal mining and the re-recruitment of combatants in the DRC. The chapter has presented the findings collected from interviews conducted on the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the

[299] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[300] Congolese are attached to their land and lands belong to Congo tribes. Mining activities give rise to the land appropriation which leads to conflict.
[301] The culture of violence is part of human psychology. It is primarily a psychological theory before being social theory. According to this theory every human being has a portion of natural violence that needs to be shaped by the mechanism of socialisation.
[302] The concept of the strong men was coined from military coups d'état of the1970s. This theory epitomises violence as a way toward voicing concern. The cult of the strong man means that extreme violence cannot be justified. As such, anyone can do anything, and violence becomes more credible by the fact that it produces money.
[303] The far west in the case of the Congo is explained by the geography and concentration of some wealth in the country. Congolese wealth gets enriched some people at the expense of others. Therefore mineral-rich territories have become strongholds or no man land for self-enrichment and rebel activities.
[304] A rentier economy is a process through which a state only profits from natural resources and cannot diversify and develop other sectors of its economy.

DRC. The main argument in this chapter is that continuation of violence and the cycle of combatants' enlistment in the east DRC is a battle over territorial ambitions for neighbouring countries and a fight on resource survival for multinational corporations and great powers.

Furthermore, it presented the results of the political economy of the mining sector in the DRC. It gave the picture of the mining security system, the mining code and the organisation of the mining sector in the DRC. The chapter also dealt with the cycle of combatants' re-recruitment and the DDR programme. It drew the link between the cycle of re-recruitment, the continuity of the DDR programmes and the geography of natural resources in the eastern DRC. Through these discussions, in this chapter, it has been indicated that one of the major causes fuelling war in the DRC, therefore sustaining and underpinning the mining-combatant-remobilisation nexus seems to be the fact that belligerents have easy access to minerals. Overall data showed that the presence of natural resources entices military and rebellion presence around mining areas; while insecurity, violence and armed groups are a lucrative business for multinational firms, regional governments and national dignitaries. Armed groups exchange minerals for the financial and military supports with different actors from both inside and outside the country. These are reasons why rebels, national as well as foreigner military officers are involved in illegal mining deal, and delay any efforts towards ending war. As a result, the country incurs a vicious cycle of endless DDR programmes, the security sector reform is low and the economy of rent has crystallised.

The nexus between artisanal mining and combatants' recruitment and DDR has been established and two debates emerged from this relationship. The first posits that the fundamental debate on the DRC is based on the issue of governance. That is to say which model of governance does the DRC need to avoid resource-based wars and to turn its resources into blessing? The second debate however regards the sub-regional cooperation. The research departs from the premise that no state can develop without direct synergy with its immediate environment. So, all the DRC's neighbours would have been working in synergy to promote endogenous development for the region in order to escape resource curse and the cycle of combatants' (re-) recruitment and DDR. This debate paves the way for the forthcoming chapter on the demilitarisation of the mining zones.

Chapter Six: Demilitarisation of Mining Zones

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> *(De Koning 2010:3).*

6.1 Introduction

The DRC is fully endowed with rare, rich and strategic natural resources that the country has not been able to maximise for economic development. In most of the DRC's mining zones, the economic exploitation and trade of mineral resources are made possible from illegal exploitation, robbery at gunpoint, illicit fees and levies, coercive business arrangements as well as coercive governance. Illegal business has become a plague to the country. Mining areas have become a magnet to war entrepreneurs, discontent ex-combatants and unemployed people to the point that the linkage between (ex-) combatants and minerals, and how the said link could be severed continue to be a real challenge for the state. This chapter explores possible approaches towards breaking the recurrence of this relationship via demilitarising mining zones.

The main argument of this chapter is that the mining sector in the DRC should be a locomotive of social development and poor communities' livelihood improvement that gives opportunity for communities to build a local and national society which, not only lives up to people's aspirations, but also where mining of natural resources encourages local content and keeps individuals from joining armed movements. Contrary to what the mining sector is supposed to be and do as set above, the political economy of military forces vis-à-vis mineral resources, however, is characterised by the unlawful economic exploitation of mineral resources. There is a continual militarisation of mining areas which is impeding the combatant's demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration – DDR programme, with the latter including the security sector reform – SSR. It also de-motivates the mining sector from contributing to the post-conflict rebuilding efforts. On the overall, it would be difficult to envisage the establishment of sustainable peace in the DRC without tackling the challenges of militarisation of mining areas in the Kivus.

In this chapter, the analysis of findings presented in four sections explores the importance of breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship, and suggests possible solutions with regards to escaping the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. It also presents and analyses, like in Chapter Five, data obtained from the field research undertaken between July and December 2013. Likewise, it responds to the second objective in connection with exploring possible ways of curtailing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus. In whole, it might be put forward that demilitarising mining zones will require a conjunction of several efforts and motives at the same time. For instance, local ownership of the process of the demilitarisation programme, local authorship of the different policy control, a bottom-up understanding of the Kivus' conflict and bottom-up solutions, the reform of security sector and the application of Dodd Frank Law should be provided for an effective and efficient demilitarisation process. This research uses the concept 'local ownership' to refer to the mechanism through which policies are made and implemented, while 'local authorship' is regarded as the daily harnessing of the local involvement in the process of achieving results from set objectives.[305]

6.2 Towards Solving the Artisanal Mining-Combatant Nexus

Different studies on post-Cold War (Dagne 2011; Kitenge N'Gambwa 2011; Jensen and Lonergan 2012) suggest established linkages between armed groups, access to national resources and prolongation of conflict. However, debates over the impact of ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas and on armed group dynamics need more focus in order to understand the artisanal mining-combatant nexus in a comprehensive manner (Lundqvist 2010; UN Panel 2014). According to the UN Panel report on the looting of resources in the DRC (2014), all military forces or belligerents are involved in the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern DRC. At the same time, some studies on the war economy in the DRC (Autesserre 2012; De Koning 2011; de Koning and the Enough Team 2013) are of the view that keeping (ex-) combatants and unauthorised soldiers away from mining sites would be one of the solutions towards averting and solving the conflict-

[305] Moore (2013) and Autesserre's (2014) works have developed detailed definition and understanding on 'local ownership and authorship'.

mineral issue. This view is supported by a number of individuals interviewed on the issue of severing the artisanal mining-combatant relationship in the DRC. Overall, it could be assumed that they have been genuinely optimistic in the belief that severing the artisanal mining-combatant relationship would restore sustainable peace, and could pull the country out from its protracted unstable nature.[306] However, the basic question which might help to map out the context is; who has responsibility to demilitarise mining areas, to break down the artisanal mining-combatant relationship and how could this be done?

6.2.1 Severing the Artisanal Mining-Combatant-Recruitment Relationship

Armed groups and their supporters are aware of the fact that in the DRC, impunity is the norm. Strong men and violence or war entrepreneurs have been erected into a social cluster of individuals that are not law-abiding citizens, therefore are on top of the law. This is what this research coins as the theory of 'chaos-building' or 'disorder-organising', which, in Beswick and Jackson's (2011:25) findings, constitutes what is coined as 'state-unbuilding' or 'state-breaking' by. This approach has been significant in the destabilisation of the DRC since the 1960s. As indicated by the fieldwork's findings:

> "From 1960 to date, the 'chaos-building' theory, based on violence and crime has been a means to access resources and state office in a country where unlawful actions of a certain elites and strong men are not punished. Thus, the disorganisation of some targeted public institutions, such as justice, security and mining profits a group of individuals; politicians, high ranked army officers as well as armed groups and their supporters. To this regard, it is therefore important to underline that the theory of "chaos-building" goes hand in glove with that of "*terra nullius*" which is a neo-colonialist thought with roots in the 1884 Berlin General Act".[307]

A body of literature on the role of mineral resources conflict in the DRC (De Koning 2011; UN Experts 2012; 2013; 2014; Stearns *et al*. 2013) puts forward that efforts to breaking the link between mining and conflict in the eastern DRC have been thwarted by illegal

[306] Focus group, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[307] Fieldwork, Belgium, DRC, France and England, July-December 2013.

involvement of some members of the Congolese army in the trade of minerals, since the government is not doing much to deter individuals accountable for unlawful behaviours. As the Global Witness' research on artisanal mining in the Kivus indicates, these soldiers mine minerals, tax miners and traders, and facilitate the smuggling of ores – sometimes in the official vehicles of the army. Soldiers in the eastern DRC can earn thousands of dollars per week through undue mining levies,[308] despite the fact that the Mining Code prohibits the army to partake of mining activity (Mining Code 2012). One of the major challenges of the mining sector in the DRC today remains the mismanagement and lack of transparency in this sector, illegal exploitation of certain strategic minerals by belligerents and the easy access to resources by a cluster of privileged elites (Stearns *et al*. 2013). However, one of the major causes fuelling war in the DRC and underpinning the artisanal mining-combatant-(re-) recruitment nexus has been believed to be the fact that belligerents have easy access to minerals (De Koning 2011; UN Experts 2014). The particularity of the political economy of armed groups or rather of belligerents vis-à-vis the mining sector in the DRC has been that the mining zones give the opportunity to accessing strategic minerals, necessary to high-tech multinational corporations, at a cheaper price (De Koning 2010; 2011). Severing this relationship and demilitarising mining zones have been envisioned as a problem-solving path.

Different reports from the UN Panel of Experts on the involvement of armed groups and military officials in the unlawful mining of mineral resources in the eastern DRC (UN Experts 2012; 2013; 2014) argue that breaking mining-combatant nexus needs subsequent efforts towards disengaging armed groups and soldiers from mining zones. This has been defined as a key moment in the redefinition of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship. However, as a sovereign state, the DRC has the basic and vital right to plan and deliver the framework of actions under law in which armed movements and (ex-) fighters, be they national or international, should agree to leave mining areas illegally occupied (De Koning 2011; UN Experts 2014). This, however, is not exhaustive and leaves room to others – Congolese individuals and conflict analysts, to express their opinions on different actions towards keeping belligerents – the national army, armed movements and unauthorised army elements, from illegal exploitation of mineral resources.

[308] Global witness' statement before the opening of the international conference on conflict minerals, Kinshasa, October 2014.

A set of literature on the implication of armed groups in mining exploitation in the DRC found that unless mining zones are demilitarised and (ex-) combatants kept from accessing mineral resources, ending war and promoting peace in the eastern DRC would be a dream or a luxury process to achieve (De Koning 2011; Demmers 2012). This view is supported by the ongoing debate over the security situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa; particularly in the DRC (De Koning 2011; De Koning and The enough Team 2013). Boshoff *et al*. (2010) and De Koning (2013), for instance, are of the view that disengaging (ex-) combatants from exploring minerals would involve a firm political willingness from the Congolese authorities and the international community. From another point of view, in my research in Kinshasa when I interviewed a Congolese academic, he claimed that severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship within mining zones under armed groups' occupation means that armed movements should be demilitarised or expelled.[309] This stance got a great support from most interviewees and focus group participants during the fieldwork, and two possibilities towards disengaging combatants from exploring minerals are envisioned; either dislodging them militarily from mining areas or through dialogue – negotiations.[310]

However, the two decades of civil war have portrayed the DRC's army as inexistent, weak and inadequately equipped to eradicate armed group's phenomenon in the national territory (Stearns *et al*. 2013; UN Experts 2014). This view holds true as it concurs with that of Congolese journalists, academics and civil society members who are of the view that over the past ten years, it has been clearly proven that the DRC's army was disintegrated and unable to defeat armed groups or to win a war.[311] In the light of the recent victories of the FARDC backed up by the UN intervention brigade over the M23 rebellion, this argument however is still questionable, due to the recent change of the course of events on the ground.

From a different opinion nonetheless, a Congolese Member of Parliament has claimed that the DRC has military potential to defend the national territory as was the case during Mobutu's reign, but the problem is that there is an ongoing conspiracy and betrayal organised from the top of the state by national authorities given that instability gives leeway to illegal

[309] Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, 2013.
[310] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[311] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.

exploitation of minerals that profits them.[312] From a general perspective of the fieldwork though, many of the participants and respondents have been of the view that military actions towards eradicating armed groups operating in the eastern DRC would be one of the strongest options,[313] even though lessons learned from other African post-conflict situation (De Koning 2010) privilege political actions instead. However, it is important to bear in mind at this point that military actions are always of heavy and disastrous socio-economic consequences, for they involve irreparable costs concerned with the loss of human lives and socio-economic infrastructure. Thus they would not be advisable, if the ultimate aim is to set a sustainable peace within a zone which has experienced almost two decades of armed conflicts. In my interview in London with an expert familiar with the Kivus' conflict, it has been, for instance, claimed that it would be preferable if diplomatic option and national consultations could be used to dissolve the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship,[314] but this view is only from a representative of an international non-government organisation.

In the previous research on the DRC's resource-based conflict (De Koning 2011; Demmers 2012; Tschirgi 2013), it has been argued that the task of fragmenting the artisanal mining-combatant relationship is to unravel the multifaceted dynamics of combined processes of the previously mentioned phenomenon so as to explicate and/or to comprehend how and why (ex-) combatants resort to (re-) integrate armed groups operating in zones endowed with mineral resources. Doing such analysis is part of conducting social research. In essence, the artisanal mining combatant-recruitment relationship falls under the lens of the complexity of the potential bonds between natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding; which Jensen and Lonergan (2012) have coined as 'comprehensive assessments of the peacebuilding process.' For them, comprehensive assessments of the environment in which mineral-conflict-based occurred should start at the outset of peacebuilding, and have to be built around a trilogy basis. The first is based on ascertaining the link between natural resources and the environment in causing conflict outbreak, financing armed groups, sustaining the risk of combatant's (re-) recruitment reoccurring. The second is to deal with underlining the direct and indirect effects of conflicts on natural resources through highlighting any associated risks

[312] Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[313] Focus group, Kinshasa, September 20013.
[314] Interview conducted with a representative of the Global Witness, London, November 2013.

in regard to human development, livelihood and security. The third however, appraises the prospect of re-establishing and utilising natural resources so as to attain peacebuilding and sustainable development outcomes while reducing new grievance (Jensen and Lonergan 2012).

Muggah's (2010) explanation on stabilising fragile states and humanitarian space indicates that it is crucial to imagine a more complex and demanding set of actions towards stabilising zones which have faced conflict-mineral-based such as the DRC. Such actions may culminate in good results, but will barely yield enough sustainable solutions. Muggah's stance is closest to those of a few Congolese – interviewed during my field research on the issue of mineral-based conflict and the cycle of combatants' (re-) recruitment, in that the stabilisation of the DRC would only be possible through national dialogue which would need to take into account the paradigmatic change of the perception of the Congolese state management and operation.[315] As the fieldwork indicates, academics, political scientists and analysts and opponents strongly believe in this option, since it gives opportunity to people to be part of solutions to the state's problems. This, in my findings, is referred to as 'public participation' or 'community-based approach'[316] as discussed below. It is with this in mind that the Congo has held several peace conferences, but with no discernible progress. Hence, changing the operative paradigm would help avoid falling into the same patterns as in the past. However, as pointed out by Tschirgi (2013), the DRC's inability to police itself or to work with its neighbours in order to ensure regional security represents a real stumbling-block to carry on an effective process towards fragmenting artisanal mining-combatant relationship. Therefore, it seems to be urgent and more than important for the DRC to ensure that it is strong enough and well prepared to deal with this issue without other extra-states actors. The figure 6.1 encapsulates local ownership and authorship of community-based approach to the demilitarisation of the mining zones in the Kivus.

[315] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[316] Community-based approach, public participation, bottom-up approach or local ownership and authorship are interchangeably used in this research.



Figure 6.1: Local ownership and authorship of community-based approach to the demilitarisation of the mining zones in the Kivus (source: Own composition)

Although the recent victory of the FARDC over a few armed groups operating in the mining zones, a thorough analysis of various processes of peacebuilding and peacekeeping in the Kivus however has revealed the incapability of the DRC's government to plan and implement an effective combatants' DDR programme and to reform its security sector system (Tschirgi 2013; Vircoulon 2008), whereas the DDR and the reform of security system pave the way for the creation of a new security system, henceforth strengthening state-building process, in a post-conflict state. De Koning's (2011) survey on the demilitarisation of the DRC's mining sector found that there is an imperative condition prior to breaking artisanal mining-combatant relationship based on the restoration of the state's authority, the achievement of an effective (ex-) combatants' DDR and the reform of the security system. However, De Koning research is limited as to how demilitarised mining zones should be secured after they have been cleared of combatants. According to the fieldwork's findings, it has been claimed by an academic that the government should think about the security of mining zones after the departure of rebels on the one hand; and on the other, there is the need for using communities

as a way towards reinforcing all solutions with regard to severing artisanal mining-combatant relationship.[317] This leaves room to former Adviser at the Congolese Presidency and a consultant at the office of the Congolese Prime Minister to express the opinion that the efficiency of this process would be possible only if the state reforms its operating and management system by putting in place a state's proactive intelligence system or an anticipative and offensive intelligence system that aims to anticipate events.[318] It is, however, of note that severing artisanal mining-combatant nexus, as a peace process, would need to go along with security and safety of mining areas which implies the imperative process of demilitarising mining zones.

6.2.2 From Demilitarisation of Mining Zones to Militarisation of War-affected Zones Administration: Toward a Community-based Approach

Since the eruption of armed conflicts in 1996 up to 2012, all antagonists or armed forces have been abusing with impunity the civilian population in the eastern DRC (UN Experts 2014), even though the country is still home to the world largest United Nations peacekeeping missions ever deployed these abuses still continue. Supported programmes to disband (ex-) combatants and to form a unified national army have been limited only to treaties but not implemented to achieve the set objective (De Koning 2011). One of the particularities of human abuses in the Kivus is the connection between belligerents and the artisanal mining in mining war-torn-zones (UN Experts 2014).

From the past two decades of civil war in the eastern DRC, for instance, it has been reported that the human abuses are often connected to the economic exploitation of artisanal miners and other individuals involved in the possibly worthwhile mineral trade at the local level (Svensson 2011). As also argued by de Koning and the Enough Team (2013), the exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern DRC is regarded as a convoluted combination of formal and informal activities, wherein military units, police and other state agencies misuse their legal powers for economic advantage. This claim corroborates with the report of the UN Experts (2014) on the link between mining and organised armed groups in the eastern DRC;

[317] Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[318] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, October 2013.

which found an extensive militarisation of the mining sector in the eastern DRC. Although the UN report focused on the illegal exploitation of minerals by armed groups, nevertheless, it also acknowledged the prominent role played in this by elements of the FARDC.

In previous research, it appears both from the army and from the armed movements, exploitation of mineral resources is tacitly condoned as a way for soldiers and combatants to appendage their low and often unpaid salaries (De Koning 2009; UN Experts 2014). This concern raises additional problems in regard to combatants or soldiers that have not been properly (re-) integrated into the FARDC structure (De Koning 2013). Based on De Koning's (2009) research on the demilitarisation of the mining zones in Katanga and the Kivus, it might be argued that the government has been understandably disinclined to keep soldiers from mining zones due to some officers further up the chain of command, therefore profiting from illegal sources of revenue. In De Koning's (2011:2) words:

> "The militarisation of mining zones elongates and thrives on the informality of the mining sector, therefore impeding industrial mining interests, as well as those of civil society and development organisations. This has partially been due to the protraction of conflict, but also because of a lack of capacity of the state mining authorities to establish noteworthy presence in the often remote and rapidly shifting mining locations".

However, during the field research, it seems to be different. People have expressed the opinion that the Congolese government must learn from other post-conflict states that went through the same phenomenon, although not having the same realities.[319] According to an interview conducted with the Adviser at the Congolese Department of Foreign Affairs, how Colombia, for example, handled the situation of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; FARC] is worth analysing.[320] All respondents, however, seem to be of the consensus that the main cause of the recurrence of violence is the absence of the state's authority over the western part of the country – the

[319] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[320] Interview conducted with a Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kinshasa, August 2013.

evanescence of the state.[321] However, how can the state's authority be restored in an unstable situation? This leaves room to the current Senior Adviser at the Department of Security in Kinshasa to envisage the idea of militarising provincial administrations of affected-war zones.[322] From a contrary view, a few academics and political analysts made a point which argued against the one from the Senior Adviser at the Department of Security. To them, however, as the army is also involved in the mining activities, it ceases being an independent and sovereign institution that defends the state's interests. For one of these analysts, the army like political parties are a group of ambitious individuals and an organisation of businessmen disguised as soldiers or policemen and therefore they cannot ensure the collective interest.[323]

The militarisation of the administrations of war-affected zones has been supported by some individuals who believe that the Congo needs a dissuasive and organised army in order to deter any rebellion attempt, be it from inside or outside. A member of the presidential majority[324] is of the view that one possibility towards demilitarising mining areas is to 'militarise war-affected zones administrations' and then 'militarised administrations' will 'demilitarise former rebel militarisation' in mining areas for a 'new remilitarisation' whose aim is security of mining zones and stability; which can end with the improvement of the situation.[325] In this way, it bears stressing that fragmentation is very important in this case. As previously developed in Chapters Four and Five, each ethnic group in the Kivus has its militia based on the principle of 'ethnic rivalry' that all communities should be treated the same as none can be favoured over the others. Therefore, there is the need for reconditioning and recreating the sense of community that involve all communities in the decision-making of the whole community. To the above mentioned member of the presidential majority:

> "The process of recreating the sense of community means that all ethnic groups have to be at the heart of the decisions that involve their provinces. This process falls under the central administration lens, and should involve the national army bearing in mind

[321] General trend of the fieldwork's results conducted in Belgium, DRC, England and France, July-December 2013.
[322] Interview conducted with the Senior Adviser at the Department of Security and Defence, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[323] Interview conducted with an academic and political analyst, Kinshasa, July, 2013.
[324] Presidential Majority is the coalition of the ruling party.
[325] Interview conducted with a member of the Presidential Majority, Kinshasa, August 2013.

> that the process will require to undertake several reforms before it reaches a positive outcome. It should eventually go along with local communities, central government and international community. It is worth noting that it is all about reconditioning people and putting them at the centre of all decisions that involve their communities. In this context, the concept of poverty and marginalisation has to be addressed; otherwise it would be tough to allow ethnic groups to live together given the Balkanisation tendency. International community therefore should assist government not only in creating life conditions and in reforming other state's sectors, but also in creating environments whereby solutions to economic, political and social problems come from the bottom rather than the top; which is otherwise known as community-based approach or public participation".[326]

Demilitarising mining zones and breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus processes fall under the lens of peace interventions. As such, it should draw on local and thematic knowledge to be efficient (Anderson and Olson 2003; Mac Ginty 2008; Campbell 2010; CDA 2010b). As elements of peacebuilding process, acquaintance with the local environments is critical in demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link (Autesserre 2014) for some reasons; first, as peacebuilding approaches to changing the conditions that uphold and encourage violence, they imply thorough understanding of the root-causes of these conditions (Call and Cousens 2008). This is a vital prerequisite of any successful project initiative. Secondly, viewed from a purely perspective of sociology of conflicts, it is ascertainable that the dynamics of mineral-based conflicts are frequently localised and contextualised, they repeatedly differ tremendously from environment to environment (Autesserre 2010; Coyne and Pellillo 2012; Leonard 2013). So, of the above follows:

> "A nuanced understanding of the specific conditions in which demilitarising mining zones and breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus intervention – the motivations of each party, the patterns of alliance and conflict at play, the history of antagonisms, is essential for peacebuilders to determine who to

[326]Interview conducted with a member of the Presidential Majority, Kinshasa, August 2013.

> approach, which argument to use, and, ultimately, what strategy to adopt" (Autesserre 2014:70).

Against Autesserre's view, it argues that it is only local communities that could be able to provide in-depth knowledge of local histories, cultures, traditions, attitudes, and to some extent, worldviews that could enable peacekeepers to adjust foreign ideas to on-the-ground conditions during project initiation and design (Richmond 2005; Mac Ginty 2008). Indigenous expertise remains pivotal in designing projects and throughout project implementation, due to conflict and post-conflict environments being tremendously volatile, thus plans have to be continually updated (Huang and Harris 2006; Campbell 2010). Finally, cultural understanding is noteworthy for an effective demilitarisation of mining zones and the breaking down of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus processes, as it encourages and enables valuable communication between peacebuilders and target populations. Communities in war-torn-zones all over the world thus underline the significance of local knowledge – for national and international stakeholders) in planning and executing apposite and significant projects, communicating effectively, and as it has been discussed in Chapters Four and Five, ensuring that project funds do not divert to other ends than those set initially (CDA 2010b). This is a community-based approach, incorporating local ownership and authorship, referred to above. It also applies to other sections as discussed further in this chapter.

From the above, it might be adduced that a sustainable solution towards demilitarising mining areas and breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus would require a full involvement of local community in the process of peace at all levels. It is important in this regard to underline that the involvement of combatants in the mines like demilitarisation process are not happening in a vacuum; rather within a community where some members who believed to be grieved opted for violent means either to voice their concern or to access resources. Also, different alliances and networks that have emerged around mines created by belligerent have direct or indirect impacts on the local community. In either way, community is the victim of the conflict like it would be the beneficiary of peace. Therefore, dealing with demilitarisation process without public participation, according to the fieldwork, would be like secluding reintegration process from the DDR programme. According the findings from my fieldwork, it can be postulated that community-based approach or local perspective may

help to draw the line between 'good' and 'bad' militarisation. In the same vein of thinking, believe a group of respondents during a focus group in Kinshasa, and skype and phone interviewees in Beni, Butembo, Bukavu, Goma and Uvira, the participation of community's members to the community's issues, such as those in line with peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery may be a way towards addressing some challenges encountered both by stakeholders and the community itself.[327]

For instance, the 'nexus between artisanal mining and the combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle approach' with its focus on demilitarisation of mining zones would be a partial and coercive method without the participation of concerned communities. Researchers who have explored the conflict in the Kivus have also singled out the involvement of the FARDC in the illegal mining exploitation and trading (De Koning 2009; 2013; Global Witness 2013; UN Panel 2014). In this context, demilitarising mining areas could change military balance in favour of national and local authorities who have been involved in illegal mining exploitation and trading, therefore victimising and criminalising (ex-) combatants by dismissing any political grievances regardless of their legitimacy, legitimating and protecting state authorities despite their alliance with armed groups and their implication in violence.

The experience of post-conflict recovery in the eastern DRC suggests that peacebuilding approach is regarded as the *mundele*[328] or *muzungu*'s [foreigners] projects. Evidence from my fieldwork indicates that local authorities and populations frequently consider international peace initiatives as having been dictated by their foreign partners. Numerous community leaders and civil society members in the Kivus, for instance, complained about how the whole idea of conflict settlement between Banyarwanda and indigenous communities was imposed on them by the international community.[329] My research findings are closest to

[327] Interviews conducted in Kinshasa, July-October 2013.
Skype and phone interviews conducted in Beni, Butembo, Bukavu, Goma and Uvira, July-October 2013.

[328] In Congolese idioms (*Kikongo, Lingala and Swahili*), *Mundele* or *Muzungu* means white person. In the context of this research, local communities have used this term to designate a project made of, and managed by, white people mainly.

[329] Focus groups, Kinshasa, August, September and October 2013.
Interview conducted with an academic and political scientist, Paris, November 2013.
Skype interviews conducted with the Kivus' notables, Goma, Bukavu, Beni, uvira, July, august and September 2013.

Autesserre's (2014) work on conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention. In trying to understand the failure of the post-conflict recovery process in the DRC, she (Autesserre 2014: 97) unveils that "criticisms levied against peacebuilding approach in the Kivus show that peacebuilders were arrogant, condescending and paternalistic". To her, local communities were viewing peacebuilders as 'bossy' and 'preachy' ["*donneurs de leçons*"][330] because as soon as they arrive, they immediately tell people what to do (ibid: 97). Drawing on local leaders' perspective, it might be postulated that the post-conflict recovery based on a 'top-down approach' as is the case in the DRC (Autesserre 2014), has proved to have some limitations in understanding and addressing the phenomenon of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in the Kivus, because in such a conflict, where artisanal mining seems to be at the heart of the conflict, actors would be either below or beyond peace interest; and therefore, if peace occurs, it would be a transitory moment between transitional and recurrent phases of combatants' recruitment.

It has been demonstrated in Chapters One and Five that belligerents use proxies or themselves to convey their minerals to the selling points. These proxies are civil individuals and members of different communities affected by the war. This means; within communities, there are some people that are in connection with belligerents. These people are like jeopardising peace efforts because of conflict's dividends gleaned through their network with belligerents. Only by cooperating with local communities that such individuals could be denounced and exposed. In such a context, community-based approach would come up with a reconciliation solution which is useful not only to address issues that involve violent activities within a segmented society, but also to take actions against belligerents and civilians who are guilty, contended a group of respondents.[331]

Various scholars who have studied the conflict in the Kivus posit that the war in the eastern DRC encapsulates the nature of the state, governance, the state regime and leadership (Autesserre 2010; 2014; Dagne 2011; Kitenge N'Gambwa 2011). The trajectory and nature

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Interview conducted with a member of the EU, Brussels, December 2013.

[330] In French language like in Congolese culture the concept '*donneurs de leçons*' [preachy] carries a 'pejorative meaning'. It means somebody who pretends to be knower even if he/she does not know anything about what he/she thinks to know.

[331] Focus groups, Kinshasa, August; September; October 2013.

of the conflict in the DRC, as elaborated in Chapter Four, has among other roots ethnic identity, land access and citizenship as well as the 1884 Berlin General Charter creating the DRC. These factors need to be taken into account if any solutions to the conflict are envisioned. A few Congolese academics and analysts are of the consensus that the DDR programme, army and police reform and good governance approaches – or simply the DRC's state-building, would need communities' support, public participation, in order to reinforce the mechanism of demilitarising mining zones in the Kivus. To them, community-based approach could be envisioned as a sustainable demilitarisation and peace.[332] Public participation in this context would mean that all Kivus' communities have to come together and discuss on the cycle of crisis and the real problems of their community, they said. Herein is the importance to mention that the conflict in the Kivus has involved a 'top-down understanding which has also resulted in top-down solutions', something which kept local people away from decisions concerning their communities (Atesserre 2010; 2014).

Viewed as an automatic and intuitive approach, a 'top-down' analysis and understanding of violent conflict, as is the case of the Kivus, consists of peacebuilders locating the causes of continual violence in the regional and national realms. As a sideline to such a diagnostic, peacebuilders acquire inevitably a perfect sense to centre their efforts at the macro levels (Autesserre 2010). According to a 'top-down' framework, regional and national crisis or violent conflicts gave rise to the most protracted conflicts in the eastern DRC; therefore assuaging these conflicts would quench leaders' warlike appetites and end the persisting fighting. Also, due to resentments amid the belligerents being accounted for one of the major elements curbing the reunification of the state, the restructuring of security system and the enactment of essential legislation, reconciling these belligerents would bring sustainable peace. Furthermore, given the residual, grassroots violence was the result of the absence of authority, state building would stop it (ibid: 92-93). However, it has been 15 years now since peacekeepers – MONUSCO, are in the DRC. Despite the MONUSCO intervention, peace diagnostic in the eastern Congo is severe; the central government has never been able to exercise its authority all over this part of the country, violence in the Kivus is still a plague while the involvement of different conflict's actors in illegal exploitation of minerals has

[332] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.

never come to an end up till to date. Equally, DDR and SSR have never come to happen as it was set on the agreements, while communities are more torn than they were before. Summarily, the peacebuilders' "top-down framework" has created more problems than solving them.[333]

On the contrary, evidence from my fieldwork made a point which argues as follows; applying community-based approach would mean that the conflict in the Kivus may need a "bottom-up understanding which may result in bottom-up solutions". In this context local leaders – local civil society, traditional authorities, community's leaders, grassroots, etc., and stakeholders might be involved in the design and implementation of peace process.[334] Moore (2013:121) and Autesserre (2014:102) suggest:

> "Peacebuilding is more effective when it promotes both local 'authorship', meaning the constant solicitation of 'local input on how best to proceed with a given set of goal', and local 'ownership', which entails 'control over policy creation' and implantation".[335]

Moore and Autesserre's view adds to the general trend regarding the demilitarisation of the mining areas gleaned from the findings of my fieldwork. Community-based approach, according to my fieldwork findings, may be the keystone for peace and a progressive revision of governance which is based on local-based communities taking into account certain specificities mainly related to the existence of their nations – tribes, as a state.[336] This 'local ownership and authorship approach' could address the issue of the DR Congo being a '*terra nullius'* set by the 1884 Berlin General Act and endorsed during the 1885 Berlin Conference, claimed an analyst and civil society activist.[337] As a result, multinational corporations and powerful states still consider the DRC as a protected turf for their interests", he said.[338] This assertion corroborates with the resource appropriation principle – previously mentioned in

[333] Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.
Interview conducted with a Diplomat, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[334] Findings from fieldwork conducted in Belgium, DRC, France and UK, July-December 2013
[335] See Moore (2013:121) for detailed definitions.
[336] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[337] Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[338] Interview conducted with an academic and member of civil society, Paris, December 2013.

Chapters Two and Four, according to which war should be imposed to counter against any inclination towards affirming absolute sovereignty over natural resource-rich entities such as the Congolese territory.

Based on the background discussed above along with the trajectory and nature of conflict in the DRC reviewed in Chapter Four, community-based approach, as postulated by my participants, may possibly be a path towards not only escaping illegal militarisation of mining areas, but also contributing to peace process in the Kivus. In addition to above mentioned, public participation or local ownership and authorship could contribute to the development of a responsible leadership which stems from the people, something that lacks the state since its independence. It may also contribute to address the economic, political and social reintegration aspect which the 2002 and 2006 DDR programmes overlooked.[339] Finally, it possibly will reconfigure the nature of the state, its governance, political regime, and the state leadership through empowering communities; which would enhance the national cohesion given that the particularity of the Congo is that lands belong to the ethnic groups,[340] which manage them on behalf of the state.[341] In this case, the demilitarisation of mining zones could have a domino effect.[342]

Accordingly, a number of Congolese academics, conflict analysts and civil society representatives believe that beyond public participation approach, there is the need for the principle of militarisation which involves the military protection of the state's mining sites.[343] To them, the military protection of the state's mining sites is crucial for the state and its sovereignty as this is 'good militarisation' for it was part of the colonial administration, said a member of the government.[344] This view is supported by an expert of the Congolese Department of Security who believes that it is not by chance that during colonial period and Mobutu's reign there were important military bases such as Watsha and Kamina in the

[339] See the Section on the need of a new DDR programme for more details.
[340] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[341] See chapter 5 for more details on land issues in the DRC.
[342] In this context, the domino effect stands for that public participation incarnates the power to boost up peace ingredients as it involves a frank and fraternal dialogue between members of the same nation.
[343] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[344] Interview conducted with a member of the government, Kinshasa, August 2013.

eastern Congo. It happened because this zone covers great mining sites and Belgium was militarily protecting this territorial space through military bases.[345] To date, the principle based on 'military protection of mining area' stands true in the northern DRC where the current presence of commando troops trained by American and Belgian instructors respectively in Kisangani, Oriental Province and in Kindu, Maniema responds to the same reasons, claimed an academic very acquainted with the DRC's politics and intelligence service.[346] Although this may sound controversial, the reproduction of colonial patterns at this point may be envisaged for the survival of state in terms of the mining protection.

From the above argument emerges a fundamental prerequisite before demilitarising mining areas. This precondition is the imperative of the defence system to go along with the state politics, and to become a priority of the Congolese government. This imperative should be on the agenda and then switches into practice. In other words, the government of the DRC needs to carefully initiate a framework of the national military geopolitics which integrates military, social and economic interests. For this to be effective, there will be a need for avoiding the instrumental vision of the state based on using the state's office to have access to national resources. However, as long as the state is still fragile, demilitarising and securing mining sites will be difficult. Hence, the state must have a security sector reform and military plan towards militarily protecting these areas so as to obstruct unauthorised individuals to access resources. Unfortunately, said a Congolese academic and conflict analyst, from internal like from external, the planning for defence and security, alluded to above, has fallen victim to there being no such provisions.[347]

Lamb's (2012) survey on the DDR process in the DRC found that unless the DDR process and SSR have been effective in the DRC, security will still rely on the national force or national army composed of a blend of poorly trained and underpaid ex-government soldiers, ex-rebels and ex-militia. However, as mentioned earlier in this research, militarisation delays and enables the informality of the mining sector (De Koning 2011; De Koning and the Enough Team 2013). Drawn from De Koning's findings on the demilitarisation of Katanga

[345] Interview conducted with the senior advisor at the Department of Security and Defence, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[346] Interview conducted with an expert on the DRC's politics.
[347] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, September 2013.

and Kivu mining regions, it could be noted that DRC's national soldiers have been recurrently impeding legitimate mining authorities from accessing mineral resource such as coltan. On the other side, state institutions, both civil and military, tend to abuse their official powers to access artisanal mining for individual economic profit. Furthermore, it has been indicated that the profits raised from controlling mining zones are a disincentive to consent full integration into the new FARDC structures (De Koning 2010). Therefore, following De Koning's view and in light of the UN Experts' recommendations on the DRC (2014), condemning and punishing abuse and rewarding moderation would be one of the main components of the demilitarisation package.

Following the above, one could say that demilitarising mining areas, severing the mining-combatant relationship and ending the combatants' recruitment cycle which also leads to the unfolded nature of the combatants' DDR, henceforward culminating in state-breaking or state-unbuilding, would require a synergy work with the communities on the basis that security is a common heritage, and the DDR process links to integration, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding (Berdal and Ucko 2009; CIDDR 2009; Özerdem 2012); which in turn involves economic, political and social rehabilitation both for returnees and community's members (Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Thus, populations need to learn that everyone must contribute towards security.

From micro-level analysis, it might be postulated that 'top-down' approach failed to address the conflict issue in the Kivus, since it has been applying peacebuilders' view – international and regional solutions, to a local problem. Therefore, 'bottom-up' solutions based on 'community-based' approach or 'local community participation', as I was told by my respondents, may be the bedrock for not only breaking the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus and demilitarising the mining zones, but also for other processes – as elaborated below, pertaining to development and sustainable peace in the Kivus. But what we need to bear in mind is that 'bottom-up' approach would not be without challenges or could be of little solutions, especially in matter of security where we are dealing with strong men and combatants without borders, as well as with the emergence of some regional powers whose survival relies on the looting of the DRC's resources. 'Bottom-up' approach may be affected by challenges of armed bandits and hoodlums who desire to accomplish their ulterior motives in the community. In this case, the concept of policing, trust and collaboration may

be envisioned and would need to be effective in order to reach a higher security in implementing the 'bottom-up' approach for maximum results. Also, police force, such as the current national police totally militarised, might need to be banned. There is the need for the effective DDR programme and SSR.[348]

6.2.3 Need for New (Ex-) Combatants' DDR Programme: Reconceptualising Combatants' Reintegration in the DRC

Inactive or unemployed ex-combatants are always at the mercy of rebellion entrepreneurs and are well prepared to become fundamentalists. The cycle of (ex-) combatants' (re-) recruitment and the unfolded nature of the DDR programme in the DRC is linked to the state's economy. In other words, the precariousness of life and the lack of employment have exposed these individuals to earn their life through easy job such as urban violence and crime, illegal exploitation of resources or collusion with enemies against their own land. In this context, ending war, mitigating or eradicating armed conflict's inclinations would be difficult, unless a sharing economic prosperity zone with neighbours is created.

At the start of each DDR programme, it is crucial to raise the question as to whether there are parties to work with. (Ex-) combatants could undermine peacebuilding efforts. However, what should be avoided is the (ex-) combatants being attracted by terrorism and religious extremism due to the failure of their socio-economic reintegration (Özerdem 2012). Terrorism and religious fundamentalism have been one of the most dangerous repercussions of the unfolded DDR (Özerdem and Podder 2011) and the failure of the reform of security system in a post-conflict country (Dirk Salomons 2005; Sendra 2013). A DDR process badly planned and monitored ends up rising impervious to the logic of peace incentives in a war-torn-zone. A successful DDR process should start with a realistic political scenario. This scenario needs to rely upon breaking down internal and external supports of different belligerents (Kölln 2011), and on the capacity to recognise the significance of individual combatants as for what they would have and what would be their contribution to each aspect of social reintegration, which should be seen under the lens of their capacities and

[348] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.

weaknesses and the way they would connect to the overall objectives of social reintegration in a continuum (Özerdem 2012). Kölln (2011), for instance, suggests that when a government and a rebel group have reached an agreement, their access to external resources should absolutely be cut off through an agreement between different parties in conflicts and their funders. In the 1990s when the government of Mozambique and rebel movement Renamo reached the peace agreement their access to external resources were cut off through a signed agreement between Russia, United States and South Africa (ibid.).

Drawing on Özerdem's (2012) theories on a re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: social reintegration approach, it might be assumed that the new DDR programme of the ex-combatants should emphasis both on the community and the combatants in order to address comprehensively ex-combatants' needs and aspirations. From this perspective, the successful DDR process of ex-combatants would be the touchstone and the time of truth for the process of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is important to bear in mind however that when combatants surrender, they face a point of no return (Lamb 2012). Their only faith seems to be focused on the near future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war (Özerdem 2013). Failure in meeting that future vision, ex-combatants and their leaders would not confirm to the choice for peace; therefore would become a serious threat that might require complex solutions to solve than those ordinarily requested during the DDR programme.

The DRC government is mobilising external partners for a new DDR programme called Global and Unique DDR III. According to the Head of the Department of Defence and Security, this programme aims to address challenges in line with SSR. It has been reminded that the country has already implemented two DDR programmes respectively in 2002 and 2006, and the number of demobilised individuals was not left out. However, the Global and Unique DDR III apparently eluded to explain why the two previous programmes did not live up to the community's expectations; neither could the Head of the Department of Defence and Security tell how the Global and Unique DDR III is different from the previous. There is work to be done on this ambitious new combatants' DDR programme, if previous mistakes are to be avoided, otherwise history will repeat itself. Researchers who have looked at this subject are of the consensus that the failure of the DDR process in the Kivus suggests that the process was not viable, lacked security and development agendas and was not planned to help

the ex-combatants to speak to their grievances and build a livelihood without using violence (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). Marriage (2007) is of the view that this failure partially was conceptual and structural, while Wake (2008) believes the process was more instrumental and technical. Apart from conceptual, structural, instrumental and technical challenges (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008; Lamb 2012), experience from the field work has shown that the failure of DDR is also a result of a 'top-down understanding' of the conflict which entailed 'top-down solutions', with the programme aiming to change local culture instead of influencing economic, political and social environment of post-conflict communities.[349] As long as local communities incur decisions involving their communities rather than being part of it and as far as (ex-) combatants and soldiers continue to be acquainted with exploiting mineral resources with little difficulty, they will find the DDR process an unattractive option (Lamb 2012).

Based on the results from my fieldwork, it has been claimed by a few individuals that the DDR programmes as financially supported by bi-multi lateral partners aimed at the reintegration of ex-combatants. However, the reintegration component did not happen due to general poverty and lack of expertise. As a result, the process ceased mid-way because partners stopped funding.[350] This leaves room to Congolese academics to express the opinion that if the reintegration component were implemented, ex-combatants situation would have been sorted out.[351] From a similar view, a member of the DRC's government and a former adviser at the office of Prime Minister are of the view that a stable and sustainable reintegration process decreases the number of weapons and insecurity, and lures investors to buy into the country.[352] As a sideline to this, the post-conflict state starts taking off (DDR programme in the DRC 2012). Theoretically, possible interpretation of this includes that a successful DDR would be a domino effect which will automatically demilitarise all territory previously controlled by militias.[353] To this end, different partners involved in the new

[349] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[350] General trend emerging from the fieldwork's results conducted in Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 2013.
[351] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[352] Interview conducted with an official from the Congolese government, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[353] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.

programme would need clear strategy and internal and external communication system that are based on trust and empowerment. This will enable them to understand social structure and dynamic that could undermine peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict communities. Figure 6.2 summarises the management and understanding of such a new ex-combatants' DDR.



Figure 6.2: Understanding of structure and dynamic in a new DDR and SSR in the DRC (Source: Own composition).

In their research on how to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants, Bowd and Özerdem (2013:2) indicate:

> "DDR and reintegration programmes to date have generally been evaluated in terms of economic reintegration with output indicators such as levels of employment or enrolment on training".

Bowd and Özerdem's view concurs with the fieldwork's findings due to individuals saying that the new DDR programme should draw from a concrete and accurate planning that delineates the general development.[354] However, the fundamental equation that should be kept in mind is the issue of underdevelopment, misery and poverty. These issues however should be defined in terms of disarmament and training of former fighters. They are also useful for the nation as well as in terms of Security Sector Reform for ex-combatants yearning for military life. It means that ex-combatants need to do work that not only values them, but also lets them exercise some responsibilities with regard to the management of their new environment (Özerdem 2013). They need to be reintegrated into normal economy networks which hold them responsible. This implies that the programme should have a proactive policy which cares for ex-combatants and impedes any attempt towards excluding them from being developmental actors.[355]

The economic reintegration initiatives are still the principal method and applications worldwide accepted by the DDR process, and the process in itself links to the economy (Bowd and Özerdem 2013). It stands for that demobilised individuals need to be kept busy doing a job. It is not enough to demobilise and disarm combatants, but it is crucial to reintegrate them and value them through social responsibilities. For this purpose, as noted by the former Adviser at the Presidency, the DDR process should go along with the post-conflict economic reorganisation mainly based on the reinforcement or the creation of viable economic environment which is capable to eradicate unemployment and mitigate violence. During my fieldwork in the DRC, it has been claimed that most young individuals in the DRC join armed movements because of unemployment.[356] A number of individuals have therefore suggested that the new and successful DDR programme would need to rely on a sustainable employment policy that aims to employ ex-combatants and other unemployed individuals on the basis of their skills.[357]

[354] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Premier Minister office, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[355] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[356] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[357] Interviews conducted with academics, members of civil society and NGOs, Kinshasa, July-August 2013. Interview conducted with a member of the European Commission, Brussels, December 2013.

However, before starting this process, DDR managers need to evaluate and to know how demobilised individuals would socially, economically, politically even militarily – for those who are willing to return to military life, partake in the socio-economic development of their new environment (DDR programme in the DRC 2012; Özerdem 2013), as the understanding of the ways in which socio-economic reintegration happens will facilitate a comprehensive planning of the programme as a whole (Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Özerdem 2013). Debates centres on the issue of DDR suggest that authorities and stakeholders in charge with planning and managing the DDR programmes should design a DDR scheme that encompasses skills of different ex-combatants (Özerdem 2013) in order to rationally make use of their human potentiality or knowhow. Theoretically, this would solve the problem of the right man in the right place on the one side, and on the other communities and the new national army will be more empowered to assist returnees in their new life journey. Thus, the DDR programme will cease being a haphazard programme because the monitoring of the programme will be continual.[358]

In their research on how to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants, Bowd and Özerdem (2013) are of the view that the assessment of the former combatants' reintegration will fundamentally rely to a high degree, on the philosophy behind the DDR process and this will, to some extent, impact on the way in which they are planned. With this in mind, it might be anticipated that a development plan with ex-combatants as co-responsible (Özerdem 2013), a strong civil security system which promotes the free movement of goods and persons, the restoration of the state's authority over the whole territory need also to be provided into the overall DDR plan.[359] As claimed by an academic, here is the necessity to underline the importance of having a policy on the traceability of small arms and light weapons and on the stimulation of local leadership to work in synergy with the provincial military and political authorities so as to provide a vocational training policy that empowers ex-combatants economically.[360]

[358] Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[359] Ibid.
[360] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the office the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, October 2013.

According to the UN Integrated DDR standards' operational guide (2010), it is pointed out that although the range of activities or services surrounding the DDR programme differs in each case, it needs to incorporate at least five broad principles that lead a DDR programme influenced by the human security agenda. It would need to be people-centred, flexible, accountable and transparent, nationally owned and integrated and well planned. It might be drawn from this belief that everything should be done not only to disarm ex-combatants but also to create a reintegration process, just in the normal life of the country. As it has been claimed by the UN under Secretary in charge of Peacekeeping, the ex-combatants' DDR will not happen straight away but it is a process that should start straight away as it involves the whole security sector reform.[361] All armed conflicts do not end by victories; diplomatic actions could help end war. A diplomatic reorganisation coupled with the reform of security system would be a panacea to solving the issue of unfolded DDR and breaking the nexus between combatants and artisanal mining. However, it bears stressing that for the new DDR of ex-combatants to be different from the 2002 and 2006 ones and in order to avoid the recurrence of combatants without borders that seems to thrive in the post-conflict Kivus, there is the need to map out a systematic programme which will address the economic, political and social aspects of the reintegration process (Özerdem 2012; 2013). In this way, the process should speak to:

- Community and family needs in order to eradicate the major push and pull factors that ignite individual recruitment.
- Be considered and materialised beyond employment and education opportunities.
- The issue of local economy development in order to allow the post-conflict society to tackle with the problem of poverty and unemployment, which remains a major concern for both ex-combatants and other unemployed community members.
- Help ex-combatants to be economic, political and social actors for the future of their community.
- Structural root-causes of re-recruitment of combatants. It means that there will be the need for addressing it from the broad picture of macro-level economics, politics and international

[361] Interview conducted with the UN Under Secretary in charge of Peacekeeping, February 2014.

aspects. In doing so, the questions 'How and why' would be helpful in addressing the problem from the macro-level structural dynamics.

Overall, during the post-conflict recovery process, ex-combatants and community's members should not be regarded as needy people to be assisted, but as active participants whose requirements should be met. Failure to do so, they will find violence as alternative solution.

6.2.4 Restructuring of DRC's Security Sector

From 2003 up to 2012, the process of the DDR of (ex-) combatants and SSR has yielded much less results than expected. Former combatants who yearned for joining military life have never been properly incorporated into new army structures, while those who opted for civilian's one have been left half-way by the DDR programme (De Koning 2011). The concept of SSR is used for post-conflict states. On the basis of this principle, a post-conflict state is state whose army is made of several militias and/or armed forces that have opposed one another during a civil war. SSR is part of post-conflict situation; which emerges from a civil war (Sedra 2013).

Every country without peace and a good security system is doomed to a marginal existence due to potential investors being demure to buy into it. Consequently the vicious cycle of instability and poverty will tighten its grip. Here is the imperative issue of achieving the process of DDR in every post-conflict environment. There are strong debates (Pugh 2013; Ryan 2013; Steinberg 2013) over whether DDR should be or not substitute for a comprehensive peace process. However, there is a general consensus (Dirk Salomons 2005; Muggah 2010; Lamb 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Özerdem 2013) as to the DDR's fruition is linked to the former combatants being effectively reintegrated. Tschirgi (2013) believes that nonviolent and non-coercive security system has been the one absolute prerequisite to any effective recovery process after the intensity of armed conflict decreases. For her without security prospect, communities are hopeless; when communities are hopeless, they cannot commit to a common future. Security is a human right. Therefore, restructuring security system after a war stalemates has to be the heart of any post-conflict development debate.

Insecurity in a country emerging from armed conflict can be the result of different sources (Özerdem and Podder 2011; Özerdem 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Tschirgi 2013) among which military forces – be they under a central command or disseminated amid ragtag units; rebels and organised gangs working for the powerful war entrepreneurs and actors of war economies, ideological zealots, religious extremists, rogue police forces or armed non-combatants acting independently. However, it seems to be like responding to such threats requires flexible and broad political, military and economic tools. De Koning (2013), for instance, advises that those who seek to bring stability in a post-conflict state do not have time. De Koning's statement portends that security system cannot be created overnight. This view is shared by Sedra (2013) for whom reforming a national army – in terms of creating a new and disciplined army under state control, is a long-term task which requires years; and this would be much longer for the rebuilt of a component police force working in a context of law and order.

SSR consists on creating a professional and effective army which respects the standards of the rule of law and human rights. This reform relies on the DDR programme. As it has been claimed by a number of ex-combatants in Brussels and Paris, without a successful DDR, it is barely possible to undertake the army and police reform.[362] This opinion is closest to that of a member of the DRC's Department of Security and Defence, due to him making a stand arguing that it is only after a successful DDR programme that the objective criterion in connection with the eligibility of demobilised individuals who are longing to join the army can be set down. For this analyst and government's expert, the new army starts with ex-combatants who have been found worthy to belong to the national army after the eligibility criterion.[363] It is important to bear in mind that the reform of security system falls under governance lens, and it is a political choice to creating a different order from which that existed during conflict period.

The reform starts from different armed groups via a successful DDR (Hazen 2010; Sedra 2013). Hazen and Sedra's contribution is closest to that of a Congolese Member of Parliament for whom:

[362] Interviews conducted with ex-combatants, Brussels and Paris, December 2013.
[363] Interview conducted with a civil servant from Security and defence Department, Kinshasa, October 2013.

> "If the international community and Congolese authorities want to bring back hope in the DRC by supporting or nurturing a peaceable solution, they would have to pay exceptional attention to a long-term forecasts of the military and former combatants who are about to be deprived of their livelihoods".[364]

Therefore, taking care of demobilised individuals should not be seen as just a technical military issue, rather it encompasses a complex operation in line with political, socio-economic, security, humanitarian and development dimension (Kölln 2011; Özerdem 2012; 2013; Bowd and Özerdem 2013). This view concurs with that of the UN Under Secretary in charge of peacekeeping for whom disregarding one aspect of the pentagram above would unravel the entire fragile peace process.[365] However, Muggah (2010) and Lamb (2012) warn that whereas insecurity might have abated, the root-causes of conflict might last for ages to overcome. If support to former combatants does not live up to the efforts required to facilitate the entire process of peacebuilding, including communities and former combatants' recovery process, failure is again likely. Thus, the different responses cannot be half-hearted or piecemeal as it is usually.

SSR, through the lens of intelligence service, will improve civil-military rapport and the issue of the infiltration of foreign armies' elements within the state's security system. Reforming the Congolese army and police would be a piecemeal and would not bring peace at all if the state service of intelligence is left out. As claimed by an academic and political analyst, since 2006, the fundamental problem of the DRC is the reform of the security system; army, police, intelligence service and justice. The security system, taken as a military constituent of state-building, needs a reform that would contribute to the economic problems caused by the militarisation of mining zones and should respect human rights. The reform of the intelligence service however would need to be extended to the national component instead of being limited to military issues.[366] Based on the fieldwork's findings, a number of academic and civil society members are of the view that country where there is a deep rift between civilians and military, a mix intelligence service system that can bring civilians and military

[364] Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[365] Interview conducted with the UN Under Secretary in charge of Peacekeeping, February 2014.
[366] Interview conducted with an academic and political activist, Kinshasa, August 2013.

views closer would be a strong weapon against rebellion's inclinations. Therefore, the DRC needs a strong and powerful civilian-military intelligence service which goes along with police and the national army to deter any attempt towards destabilising law and order.[367] However, there is still no consensus as yet over whether military actions are necessarily the privileged path towards conflict settlements (Muggah 2010; Lamb 2012, Demmers 2012), so a joint diplomatic action among the Great Lakes countries is crucial in order to solve problems in synergy. Hence, as soon as war ends, as believed by a member of European commission and a former Adviser of the Prime Minister, there is the need for creating prosperity and sharing zones with neighbouring countries in order to mitigate the whims of mineral-based conflicts.[368]

By virtue of my findings from the fieldwork, it bears arguing that post-conflict and fragile states are beset by a vast array of security challenges of which the restructuring of the security system is perceived as the ultimate solution. Muggah (2010) and Lamb (2012), for instance, suggest that international community hyped the reform of the security sector as the answer to the exit strategy dilemma encountered in post-conflict communities. In theory, the concept of SSR does not matter, in practice however, what matters is the integrated approach it brings to police, justice and governance reform and national security planning (Jackson 2010; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Jackson and Albrecht 2011). One review of the UN missions on the DRC and Kosovo (Autesserre 2014) indicated that the security-development nexus within SSR means that post-conflict communities need assistance, with the aim of overcoming the challenges of insecurity and structural fragility that may have conflict's root-causes. In saying so, it is important to figure out the meaning and direction that the concept is taking, what lessons could be drawn from other experiences over the last decade and whether the concept, as it is currently understood in the DRC's case, is still relevant and useful.

Drawn from a scholarly set of papers (Jackson 2010; Sedra 2010; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Jackson and Albrecht 2011), SSR could be understood as follows:

- An armed wing of state-building.

[367] Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[368] Interview conducted with former Adviser of the Prime Minister, Kinshasa, July 2013.
Interview conducted with a member of European commission, Brussels, December 2013.

- Human security approach whereby security and justice are treated as public policy issues.
- An approach towards bringing together security and justice reform in all contexts and foremost a political process rather than exclusively a technical activity.
- A process which aims to re-balance aid to both the efficiency and the liability of security and justice services. It bears underlining at this effect that lessons learnt from the outcomes of increasing the efficiency of security players without ensuring sufficient liability were hard but valuable.
- A process acknowledging the close bonds between the security and justice sectors, aimed at reforming the police, the police force, actors who have policing functions and those who handle and supervise policing services.

Debate centres on the issue of state-building and SSR provide that restructuring police, justice, governance and planning for national security have long been at the heart of debates on how national governments have functioned. The main argument of the ongoing debate argues that SSR is far from being a recent discipline, though its approach to isolated activities has been believed to be new, technical, disconnected and without accountability (Downes and Muggah 2010; Jackson 2010). Rather than being about bringing together the above principles into on-going work, it is believed that SSR is a separate all-encompassing discipline; the universal remedy for all the challenges experienced by post-conflict or fragile states (Ebo and Powell 2010; Ball 2010; Sedra 2010). However, experience on the ground has shown that as an all-encompassing discipline, it is barely easy to find successful SSR models (Autesserre 2014). Sierra Leone, for instance, is one among rare examples of the successful application of SSR principles (Jackson and Albrecht 2011). Nonetheless, it is just not the SSR label; the existence of an effectual parliament oversight committee, an inclusive security white paper process, greater engagement of the police with civil society groups to identify needs played a very important role (Autesserre 2014). Having a model of all-inclusive straightforward successful process of SSR is much difficult to find.

In January 2010, the MONUSCO was established in the DRC. It replaced the MONUC created in 1999 of which SSR became part of its mandate from 2008. From then, the security system of the DRC was no longer a matter within the exclusive sovereignty of the state, since the MONUSCO has also had a security system which was working in parallel with the

DRC's one. This reveals the uninterrupted interference of external powers in the DRC up to 2003 and the focus from 2003 to 2007 on planning for and holding elections (Beswick and Jackson 2011). This means that the problem of restructuring security system in the DRC gave rise to the debate on regional and multilateral organisations approach to SSR. Two questions emerged from this debate; could regional or multilateral organisations target their assistance at the strategic or programmatic levels in a best way? Is SSR viewed as separate from other post-conflict recovery programme or does it play an integrating function? These two questions however challenge the way international community plans its approach to these issues, how it uses its limited capacity and whether it targets its engagement effectively. Amongst other issues that the SSR component is concerned with in the DRC are derelict part of national security architecture and strategy. This suggests that the SSR component is a more programmatic approach to restructuring a security system in the sense that it seems to endorse SSR as a separate discipline, rather than a process which aims at influencing and improving the restructuration of the police, justice, corrections, human rights and civil affairs sections. Without a more in-depth review, it is barely impossible to indicate which structure is more effective.

Owing to this new orientation which the concept has embarked on, the query to be asked would be; has SSR now broken the policy glass ceiling through?

Based on my fieldwork experience, it would be relevant to acknowledge that as a concept, SSR is still encountering some opposition. Confusion on where security sector reform ends and rule of law begins seems to be newsworthy in the DRC as it would be in any post-conflict recovery field. But all these discourses encapsulate policy debates than they are about substance or field realities. I would posit that if SSR as a policy concept has to be erased, what would be emerging are issues that the policy advocated for; acknowledging the political nature of reform, the necessity to balance effectiveness with governance, the importance of certifying the interconnected-nexuses nature of the system, and that individuals have to be at the centre of all reforms. This might be coined as an 'SSR-based approach to police reform'.

In a similar way, experience learned from the fieldwork depicts that SSR involves a large political elements as it is with anything that has to do with the public sector and even more so when it concerns state sanctioned use of force. The process is linked to a plethora of different

areas. From that experience, it emerges that the common mistakes made in applying SSR in the DRC like other post-conflict countries are concerned with insufficient technical resources allocated to the process and usually delusional timelines applied. These flaws frequently arise due to plans being designed by political individuals, while they are not sufficiently informed on the technical challenges in line with reforming huge organisations. The fieldwork's findings indicate that challenges occur exponentially in fragile states. To this regard, it might be postulated that the more fragile a state is, the bigger the multiplication factor. This entails a huge difference to be considered when dealing with SSR in Europe or Latin America than when doing so in the Middle East or Africa.[369] The view that a set of politicians and/or diplomats could reach a blurry agreement in a conference room and that peace and respect for human rights will be set thereafter have been a common mistake and the root of cyclical issues and constant disappointment at the results of peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission. From an interview with a field practitioner who has worked in SSR, DDR, human rights and political affairs on several different continents, it is noted that if no one can get troops to obey orders, then no matter what political processes have been agreed, it is all moot. If troops are not disciplined, then they will not obey orders. If soldiers are not paid in an orderly way, then disciplining them will be impossible. Paying and supplying troops in an orderly manner need a minimum of process and organisation.[370]

Challenges in reforming security system in the DRC arise from two sources: firstly, the colonial legacy in line with state-building process and secondly, the emergence of new sub-regional economic powers such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi; whose economic survival depends on illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources[371] and the rivalry of military power between Angola and South Africa in the SADC as well as the presence of inside and outside peace spoilers.[372]

With reference to the colonial legacy or first source, it might be posited that in the theories or paradigms of states, more focus is cast upon the legal status and management of the state,

[369] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 203.
[370] Interview conducted with an expert on security issues, Brussels, December 2013.
[371] See Chapter Five for more details.
[372] See Chapter Four for more details.

while less attention is provided as to what the state is useful for. According to a historian I interviewed in Kinshasa:

> "The current Congolese state is the great grandson of the International Association of the Congo – IAC; 1879-1884, conceived and created by Léopold II. In 1885, IAC became the Free State of Congo – FSC, which in turn gave birth to the Belgian-Congo colony in 1908. Almost within 28 years, Léopold II succeeded to build and establish at the heart of Africa an operating territory with roots in Belgian Crown. Up till to this level, the process of the Congolese state-building is ahistorical and alien to indigenous populations, since local people are not part of it. Léopold II almost single-handedly built up the Congo into one of the most astonishing operating and economic success colonies of the 19th century colonial times. He did so in the face of constant threats of his tiny state's security and indeed existence. In theory, the DRC is a Léopold-owned imagination; what he thought and understood about the state, its nature and functions. The Belgian-Congo tried to portrait the appearance of a modern state, in terms of required international standards; administration and legislation. However, things were contrary to what was being displayed to the world. Up till to 1950, the state system was streamlined to reproduce the projection and ideas of the 1885-1888 state's system. During this period raw materials were exploited and produced by paid workforces – that in reality were slaves of the operating companies, and all the colonial state's profit directed to the colonial master. From the Rounded Table Conference in 1960, through 1965 to 1967, we were not able to say whether we were a nation; we had a state, government and people – citizens, but in reality the colonial state's system continued to operate. The *Union Minières* of Katanga [a State-owned mining companies in the province of Katanga] was secluded from central government by colonial local feudal, while in the east of the country Jean Schramme and Bob Denard – mercenaries hired by Mobutu to fight against Marxist-Lumumbist uprising, were doing the same as what armed groups do today. Although it did not work at the same pace and scale as nowadays, it however looks nearly the same. Furthermore, many people have forgotten that following the mercenary adventures in the east of Congo, a mining company – OPRAG, with roots in Germany was created. OPRAG was granted almost the same rights as the *Union Minières* of Katanga. It was given a

> vast mining concession with full rights of exploitation. Actually it was the same modus operandi like the one which is still applied today. In view of the above, state-building and SSR, from the current DRC's configuration, would be difficult, because the state is run on the basis of predation principles; lack of transparency, non-accountability, politicisation of the security system and militarisation of political life. To Congolese people, state-building would mean that Congolese society as a whole require a state based on rule of law and on the understanding of what it stands for. The current DRC's shape is not at all in the perspective of building a state based on the rule of law principles. In the mind of most Congolese leaders and elites however, the state is a tool which enables to be empowered in order to get enriched. To this effect, state-building in the Congo will be on hold, since economic, political, social and structural conditions are far from being gathered".[373]

In line with the emergence of new sub-regional economic powers or second source, it might be postulated that the search of economic survival by new sub-regional economic powers, the rising of military hegemony in an unstable mineral-rich region and the consolidation of inside and outside violence entrepreneurs have impeded the built of a reliable and strong security system. It implies that all these factors have decisive impact on the failure or the success of SSR implementation in the DRC. It needs to be reminded that the SSR process in the DRC is closely tied to 'combatants' mixing and combatants' intermingling processes' as well as the illegal exploitation of minerals that gave rise to the phenomenon of 'combatants without borders'. Taken from this point, it arises that the DRC's government and the international community should have knowledge of the issue relating to the national interest of regional countries and the economic interests of the post-conflict communities before, during and after the implementation of the SSR process. This is closest to that of Former Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre. To him, there is still work to be done on the security system of the DRC, since the process of mixing and intermingling of combatants with the FARDC instead of a proper DDR programme was purposely planned by multinational corporations and countries that draw profits from the conflict in the DRC. Combatants' intermingling and mixing processes have led to the infiltration of foreign

[373] Interview conducted with a historian and academic, Kinshasa, August 2013.

armies' elements into the DRC's National Army, the phenomenon of combatants without borders and the rehabilitation of war criminals into the FARDC. For this expert:

> "Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi do not have interest in the DRC having a structured security system which would deter and nullify their territorial and economic ambitions into the DRC. Angola would like to see the DRC weak militarily in order to interfere militarily not only to ensure that Congolese territory would no longer be a rear base for the foes of Angolan government, but also to dissuade Congolese government in its attempt to claiming back oil dividends that Angola has been taking from the DRC's shelf for decades. A DRC hobbling militarily would be a good business for South Africa which would keep its military bases in the DRC to hinder Angolan inclinations of being asserted as regional military power. In whole, he said, a fragile/weak and inexistent/disorganised security system in the DRC, or rather 'state-breaking' or 'state-unbuilding', enables international community to fulfil the '1884 Berlin General Act'[374]".[375]

Therefore, the success or failure of the SSR process in this case would also be subject to the geopolitics of international community and the countries mentioned above.

The fieldwork experience has also revealed that private security companies, particularly South African, Jewish and Lebanese entrepreneurs have mushroomed in the DRC. As alluded to above, private security companies are nothing other than mercenaries (Beswick and Jackson 2011). These modern-day mercenaries (ibid:102), supported from inside by some high ranking political officials and senior military officers, are employing most ex-combatants who failed their socio-economic reintegration, something which further weakened the already fragile state's security system. In the absence of a reliable state's security system, these companies are selling their security service to those that can afford it, as they are not there for charity; neither are they there to protect state or for public security. To them, security is first a commodity, hence a source of enrichment. Restructuring the security system, to them, would hamper their interests and business. Therefore, believing that

[374] See Chapter Four for more details on the Berlin General Act.
[375] Interview conducted with former Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre, Paris, December 2013.

these companies could contribute to SSR would be a naivety. From an endogenous perspective purely, it bears noticing that those who are set to reform security system are actually themselves problems. It is worth noting that the failure of SSR is the result of the duplicity of Congolese authorities. The management of the DRC's security system lacks a structure which can anticipate events and strongly relies on foreign and mercenary customs. Also, Congolese authorities prefer foreign security architecture and plans than national and local initiatives, as the former enables them to raise funds that they have been using for self-enrichment. Herein may lie the importance of a 'local authorship and ownership', a 'bottom-up understanding' and 'bottom-up solutions', said above, for the issue of SSR in the DRC.

Summarily, building up processes and organisations is labour intensive. It involves both technical skills, changing cultures and mind sets that take time to achieve. Depending on the quality and amount of resources, it usually requires at least five years just to lay a foundation and further five years to bring things to some kind of stable state.[376] Nowadays, defence budgets keep shrinking and the habitual powers have less and less hunger to take this kind of work on, new patterns and agreements need to be reached. It bears stressing that what is vital is not the security sector reform as a concept, even if it is now widely accepted, mostly when it comes to engaging the donor community, rather the support and importance that different stakeholders provide to security and justice reform as a way that ensures efficient delivery of these services within a framework of good governance and accountability and with human security being its backbone. These principles are the groundwork of peacebuilding and contribute indispensably to development.

6.3 Arms and Finance Traceability: Avoiding History Repetition

Although there is not yet an internationally agreed definition of arms and finance traceability, it is however of the global view that tracing the origin of arms and finding of armed groups would deter combatants from violent actions. The traceability of small arms and light weapons as well as that of finance plays a crucial role in preventing and ending violence in a post-conflict country. Based on a topical debate on the unending armed conflict in the DRC

[376] Interview conducted with an expert on security issues, Brussels, December 2013.
Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013.

(Bertrand-Hardy 2011; Brook 2011; Maréchal 2011; Autesserre 2012; Mckay 2012), it has been found that easy access to minerals has been one of the causes that fuels war, and that consolidates the (re-) recruitment of combatants at the same time delaying the end of the DDR process and SSR. In July 2010, American Congress passed into law Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and consumer protection law, also known as 'Obama's Law'. According to this law, American companies have to publish the origin of their minerals in order to discourage the illegal mining and trade of minerals coming from the mining zones controlled by armed movements in the Kivu (Bokundu 2012).

Similarly, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas – OECD DDG (OECD 2011a: 52) recommends global responsible supply chains of minerals in order for companies to respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and practices. This document suggests that any company potentially sourcing minerals or metals from conflict-affected and high-risk zones – upstream and downstream, may use the Due Diligence Guidance in order to promote transparent, conflict-free supply chains and sustainable corporate engagement in the minerals sector. In Paragraph seven of Resolution 1896 (2009) in its November 2010 final report S/2010/596, the Group of Experts elaborated guidelines for the use of due diligence by the importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products regarding the purchase, sourcing, acquisition and processing of mineral products from the DRC. Instead of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas being applied in the Great Lakes Region and particularly in the DRC, a joint venture of mining mineral resources may be one way towards solving conflict-mineral in the DRC. It is with this in mind that the representative of the Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW,[377] in Kinshasa claimed:

> "The Dodd-Franck's principle would then ensure that minerals are not illegally exploited, the regional certificate of traceability will have to attest that minerals are from green sites, while the due diligence certification will need to assess that the

[377] The Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW, is a program of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. Its mission is to ensure that the mining of natural resources partakes in sustainable development in Southern African countries.

> process of minerals' exploitation and their development from the mining site to the processing stage meet the required standards".[378]

Control and commercialisation would ensure that minerals are not from armed groups. The opinion of SARW's representative concurs with that of the African Association for Human Right's chair for whom the traceability of minerals and other natural resources would discourage illicit exploitation and trade of minerals in the Region of Africa of Great Lakes, particularly in the eastern DRC, and would contribute in fighting against armed groups accessing funds from illegal minerals.[379]

It is, however, of note that only after three years of their application, Obama's Law and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance seem to not live up to the expected results in the DRC. The Congolese civil society is of the view that Obama's law was adopted without any upstream and downstream consultation with the members of the Kivu's civil society or with Congolese experts, and it is not reflecting truth on the ground (Bokundu 2012). As claimed by a member of the Kivu's civil society, Obama's Law like the OECD Due Diligence Guidance are criticised for being focused on minerals of conflict without taking into account Congolese perspectives on the issue.[380] In Radley's words (2014:1); "the Kivu's problems are much complex and cannot be narrowed down into the issue of minerals, without political implications of crisis being considered as a whole". It should be however noted that at the beginning of the Dodd-Frank Law, for example, there was not any traceability in the DRC. As a result, Obama's Law has unintentionally set an embargo on the Kivu's minerals. Several mineral *comptoirs*[381] have shut down, while at the same time lots of miners in search of survival with weapons in hands on the back of civilians, have joined local militia and armed groups (Bokundu 2012; Radley 2014). The view above is supported by a group of mining experts for whom, the Dodd-Frank Act has some weaknesses as it has prevented indigenes to come up with their own propositions of solution to the mining conflict. The Act has not yet brought out significant changes since most mining sites in the eastern DRC remain in the

[378] Interview conducted with the representative of the SARW, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[379] Interview conducted with the chair of the African Association for Human rights; Kinshasa, October 2013.
[380] Interview conducted with a member of Kivu's civil society, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[381] In the DRC, *comptoirs* is a coined name which means an appropriate location reserved for the mining sale – a mineral selling-point.

shadows, forced into illegality or decline. It needs to be revised by taking local communities, civil society and authorities' views into account, given the fact that the sole actors consulted before its elaboration were Dodd-Frank's supporters. As a consequence, there still exist supplementary tensions, with divergent voices at the local level. Congolese voice, particularly local communities' must be considered, local context and structures of power should be factored in the elaboration of principles in connection with minerals from war zones, they contended.[382] From another divergent view however, a diplomat argued:

> "It is of note that the first objective of the Dodd Frank Law was not to clean up the DRC's mining sector from its malfunction – which is government's responsibility, rather it aimed to reduce the role of minerals in fuelling the proliferation of armed groups. If warlords have found alternative which bypasses Dodd Frank Law as a means to funding their violent activities, blames are to be laid upon the Government which is in charge of following-up of the Law's effects and not the Law per se".[383]

On the basis of the above experts' considerations, one could argue that mining audit process, as suggested by Dodd Frank Act, is meant to improve the mining sector practices, rather than providing a façade solution. Thus, the idea that a control process and a statistical validation ensure mineral trade without conflict is not appropriate in the Kivus' context mired by instability and insecurity. Mining and foundries should be monitored regularly and the gap of time between inspection and certification should be reduced. New wars have developed diverse sources of funding (Duffield 2000; Kaldor 2007), including the levying of taxes in territory administrated by rebels, control of borders, drugs, arms trafficking, diasporas contribution, neighbouring countries support, to name a few – see Chapter Two. This means that armed groups are no longer relying entirely on minerals to survive, though mining, as one source among many others, still plays a crucial role in war economies.

In a post-conflict environment where insecurity and violence come from different sources, traceability of minerals alone would not be stronger to deter criminal activities and to stop

[382] Declaration of a group of Congolese mining experts in the Workshop on the outcomes of the Dodd-Frank Law, Kinshasa, August 2014.
[383] Interview conducted with an EU diplomat, Brussels, November 2013.

violence. There is need for minerals' traceability to be reinforced by weapons' traceability.[384] In this case, the traceability of weapons is imperative to achieve the peace and reconciliation process. It is crucial at this point to mention that from the fieldwork's result, it is indicated that at least two million weapons illegally pass through the eastern DRC, even though the country is supposed to be under arms embargo.[385] At the same time, it could be drawn from a few ex-combatants' discourse that the national army is accused of being at the centre of arms sales.[386] This suggests that there is an uncontrolled flow of weapons deliberately rooted in the country which, if is not meticulously handled and stopped, will keep causing a chaotic environment.

Findings related to my fieldwork suggest that weapons' traceability helps to retrace different processes related to the manufacture and detention of weapons. It also helps to track different chains of weapons traffic and acquisition. Weapons traceability expose those individuals who own guns illegally, shows where and how they were purchased and which ways they entered the country or region.[387] In the context of economic criminalisation, as is the case in the DRC, the traceability of weapons is a necessity as it helps set a benchmark of weapons used by the army and those that armed groups possess. In this case, as acknowledged by a military expert, the state will need a traceability policy which aims to minimize crime rate, given it would provide the state some mechanisms to know how weapons enter the region, and what their identification number is.[388] In one of Congolese army experts' words:

> "Weapons have DNA which helps to establish their trafficking process from the manufacturing industry. Using this method of identification could help decrease the rate of importation of small arms and light weapons".[389]

Therefore, there is the need for monitoring regularly state's borders in order to control the flows of economic exchanges between different neighbours, something that in turn would

[384] Interview conducted with the former Adviser at the office of the Prime Minister, Kinshasa, July 2013.
[385] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[386] Interviews conducted with ex-combatants, Brussels and Paris, November-December 2013.
[387] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[388] Interview conducted with a military expert, Adviser at the Department of National security and Defence, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[389] Interview conducted with a Senior Member of the FARDC in Charge of the ex-combatants DDR, Kinshasa, August 2013.

discourage any leeway to weapons trafficking, drugs and other products that uphold armed groups.

Based on the report on the extractive industries transparency initiative – EITI,[390] and the governance of natural resources (O'Sullivan 2013), the DRC has lost its EITI membership due to mismanagement and lack of transparency in the mining sector. Similarly, Africa Progress Panel Report[391] (2013) suggests that the DRC loses at least $ 5 billion each year as a cost of mismanagement and lack of transparency in state mining companies. Dearth of budget transparency and budget mismanagement could dent the public interest. In a few mineral producing countries such as Botswana and Namibia (Africa Progress Panel 2013; O'Sullivan 2013), finance traceability is mandatory, for the state's authorities are held accountable for the management of natural resources that belong to people. The DRC, however, does not have any finance traceability system. Like weapons traceability, there is the need for finance traceability which falls within transparency and good governance principles. One mining expert argued that finance traceability means that any state's expense should be clearly explained to people as to purpose, who the applicant is, how the process has been requested and what this money will be used for. For him, in countries where transparency has been set as a factor of economic governance, each citizen is able to check the process leading to the use of the national budget. It is otherwise called finance traceability or the official process of public good procurement.[392]

Corruption, fraud and embezzlement of public funds have plagued public administration in the DRC without anything being done to avoid the inevitable chaos which has ensued. Yet there is a strong debate over the DRC's management system (Bokundu 2012; Africa Progress Panel 2013; O'Sullivan 2013) where it has been believed that the country misses two things to underpin sustainable peace; lack of monitoring and the absence of penalty. Indeed, without monitoring, it is difficult to determine any performance indicators; neither would it be possible to use an appropriate working method and to conduct periodic evaluations

[390] The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative – EITI, is a global coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together to better openness and accountable management of revenues from natural resources.
[391] The Africa Panel Report is an observatory which advocates for more sustainable and equitable development in Africa.
[392] Interview conducted with a mining expert, Kinshasa, August 2013.

(O'Sullivan 2013). As noted by an academic; "it is not enough to plan, to decide and to expect results; it is imperative to follow more closely the process implementation in the best possible conditions".[393] Monitoring is in fact an enduring and systematic control of the works, activities and expected results. It aims mainly to ensure that the work and activities taking place have been following previous plotted plans, and to provide periodic reporting on how inputs are used.

According to a member of the UNDP in Kinshasa, the main objective of reporting, which would have a strong and positive impact on traceability policy, is to prevent the authorities from deviating the initial goals and desired impacts.[394] However, when it comes to the most common monitoring activity such as the execution of a project, monitoring would be understood as a set of activities that aim at assessing whether human resources, finances and materials allocated are well defined, managed and wisely used (O'Sullivan 2013). In this perspective, punishment has a very important role if the state needs to perform effectively; for discipline and punishment are the primary functions assigned to the criminal penalty to protect every society.[395]

Due to mismanagement and the paucity of transparency undermining the mining sector (Bokundu 2012; Africa Progress Panel 2013; O'Sullivan 2013), the traceability of finances in the DRC should go along with the signing of mining contracts. It means that the Bakajika Law has to be re-established and adapted – in its aspect of reinstating all mining concessions that have been unfairly apportioned to multinational corporations to the state. In this case, Congolese communities may be able to have a better control over all its mineral resources. Therefore, the authorities might not only become accountable to their actions, but also law abiding citizens like everyone. However, it is necessary to remember that the Bakajika Law does not cover all the aspects of the state sovereignty. According to proposed amendments to the revision of the mining code (2012), the act does not take into account the maritime space of the DRC, therefore neglecting some maritime resources such as oil, gas, diamonds etc. Thus, there is the need for bringing together the Bakajika Law with the Article 9 of the

[393] Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[394] Interview conducted with a member of the UNDP, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[395] Interview conducted with a member of the European Commission, Brussels, December 2013.

DRC's constitution. Although the latter decreases the states' economic prerogatives vis-à-vis multinational corporations,[396] it however invests the state with the power over all the national territory, including soil, subsoil and maritime spaces. This will need a visionary leadership to readjust carefully this aspect, since it is one of the state's internal and external geopolitics backbones.

6.4 Need for an Internal and External Mining-Development Geopolitics

Mining's support to social development, ex-combatants' DDR and sustainable peace in the DRC can range from improving poor communities livelihood to enhancing local economies. Yet, there is a growing opportunity for communities to partake in the success of the mine in a new way; encouraging local content in specifications and operational decisions, capable of erasing unemployment and impeding unemployed individuals from joining armed movements. This is significant because a big part of success in peace process in the DRC is to understand the risks that involve mining and how to manage them effectively.

According to De Koning (2011), some Congolese mining experts and academics,[397] one of the biggest risks facing mining sector in the DRC today has nothing to do with the geography of resources. Rather, the risk lies in mismanagement and lack of transparency in this sector, illegal exploitation of certain strategic minerals by belligerents and the easy access to resources of a cluster of privileged elites. To analysts above, Congolese people are unfairly and purposely deprived from developing socio-economic conditions that would respond not only to their desires, but also that correspond to the wealth of their country. Congolese people and communities like other people from the world are entitled to wellbeing in terms of resource enjoyment and poverty alleviation. One comprehensive and highly critical report (Africa Progress Panel 2013) asserts the right of all people to enjoy security and to live free from poverty and despair. This assertion principally speaks for resource-endowed countries where poverty and wars have become endemic. People, particularly vulnerable ones, should be freed not only from fear and want, but also should have an equal opportunity to enjoy all

[396] Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[397] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.

their rights over their resources; which would permit them to fully develop their human potential.

Drawn from King and Murray's (2000) development planning framework, a plan to develop internal and external mining-development geopolitics should consider among others:

- Acceleration of economic growth and 'Wealth Creation' and not just poverty reduction.
- Stabilisation of macro-economic, liberalisation of markets and prices, and private sector led-growth.
- On the external economic side;
    - Acquiring the profits from the irreversible process of globalisation which has to be made fair for all.
    - Pursuit of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.
    - Implementation of the Decent Work Agenda which lays emphasis on Workers' Rights, decent employment for all, social protection for all, and improved social dialogue.

The projections for success in attaining the development goals above depend on the practice of good governance – democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, transparency and accountability, the fight against corruption in government, the private sector and all sectors of human effort and society (Daniele 2011; Boshoff *et al*. 2010). However, it would be interesting to underline that behind internal and external mining-development geopolitics lays a governance responsibility. Boshoff *et al*. (2010:1), for instance, suggest:

> "At a time when the world is involved in a race to obtain raw materials, the problem of conflict minerals needs political and not technical solutions. No technical solution will stop the trade in minerals from promoting conflict. Only governance based on the rule of law will make the proposed technical solutions feasible. In the event of failure, there is a risk that one of the economic engines of the Great Lakes Region will quite simply grind to a halt".

Taking Boshoff *et al.*'s stance, it might be assumed that the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus, also coined as 'mining-identity' relationship[398] is first of all a Congolese issue. The former Adviser at the Presidency has, for instance, claimed that from a geopolitical perspective, it might be posited that Congolese territories endowed with mineral resources are not only coveted but are also subject to geopolitical agendas of Balkanisation and borders redefinition. In this context, the mining-recruitment nexus has swiftly switched to be associated with 'identity-resource relationship' and 'identity-powers inclinations' – potency and cogency, of countries that are keen to invade the DRC.[399] In this context, the problem of poverty and unemployment in a country that enriches the world turns to become an irrelevant debate. From the fieldwork's results, for example, it broadly arose that if other people from the world can get richer from the DRC, so would it also be possible for the Congolese government to grab the same wealth and use it rationally to tackle and alleviate poverty.[400] This is what a former Adviser at the office on the Prime Minister names 'anticipative governance' – which aims to build human prosperity and state's security by rebutting indignity through making accessible national richness for all.[401]

According to de Koning's (2009) research on the demilitarisation of mining zones in the DRC, it reflects that bad governance has been one of the cardinal factors of the protracted nature of the DRC and the recurrence of armed conflicts which may result in the Balkanisation of the country in the near future. The results from my fieldwork however have shown that the Congolese governance has been characterised by the ineffectiveness and inability to secure people and their goods and to cover people life's costs.[402] The same findings further indicate that state institutions' leaders are more business men than state managers.[403] It has also been noted by an academic and a member of civil society that growing poverty, generalised insecurity, undeveloped land, the non-exploitation of natural resources, weak administration, fragile and corrupted army and police and other state institutions are not only symptoms of the state's weakness, but also actuate neighbouring

[398] In the DRC the mining-combatant-recruitment is also called mining-identity nexus due to war entrepreneurs using identity issue as means towards recruiting combatants.
[399] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[400] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[401] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the office of the Prime Minister, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[402] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[403] Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013.

countries to conquer the Congo's spaces.[404] Therefore, it may request for developing an internal and external geopolitics based on the rational exploitation of mining and the development of local people. This may perhaps constitute a strong response to the pervasive weakness of the state.

In the words of a Member of Parliament:

> "The struggle for resources has exposed resources endowed countries to any kind of instability. However, building a strong and collective identity based on the groundswell of solidarity of people, the leverage of the organisational capacity of people and the sense of people's unity would be a strong arm for victimised people against every yoke."[405]

Possible interpretation of the statement above includes that in the context of the DRC's post-conflict environment where the historical memory was disoriented by collective and spiritual savageries based on a series of resource-based conflicts,[406] the building of a strong and collective identity grounded on the solidarity and organisational capacity of local-based communities could reorient people's collective destiny lost during violence and insecurity.

As noted from above background, it might be put forward that the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in the DRC is the result of the emergence of new regional powers in Africa,[407] and the fact that the DRC's control over its sovereignty's tools; army, police, economy and industry has been lost (De Koning 2010; 2011). Hence, an organic dialectic based on bad governance and the DRC's state of weakness on the one hand; and on the other the rising of new powers that can only survive politically and economically by destabilising the DRC, have arisen. The Congo's authorities therefore have to be mindful that modern states rely on violence and/or wealth in the pursuit and conduct of their affairs. For it to be effective there will be the need for a strong, serious and responsible dynamic leadership to lead the state.

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[404] Interviews conducted with an academic and a member of civil society, Kinshasa, July-August 2013.
[405] Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[406] Interview conducted with a Congolese academic, Paris, December 2013.
[407] Interview conducted with an academic and political analyst, Kinshasa, October 2013
Interview conducted with an academic and member of the opposition, Kinshasa, October 2013.

6.5 Conclusions

The analysis of data in this chapter relates to breaking the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants. It has actually presented and examined the findings collected from interviews conducted on the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the DRC. The main argument of this chapter is that the political economy of military forces vis-à-vis mineral resources is characterised by the unlawful economic exploitation of mineral resources. Continued militarisation of mining areas is a hindrance to the combatant's DDR programme, security system reform and thwarts the mining sector from contributing to post-conflict rebuilding efforts. Therefore, demilitarising mining areas and breaking the relationship between mining and (ex-) combatants will need political will and determination.

The first section presented the results on some possibilities in line with solving the artisanal mining-combatant relationship. It explored different ways towards severing the artisanal mining-combatant relationship, demilitarising mining zones, the new (ex-) combatant DDR and restructuring the security sector system. The second section dealt with the traceability of arms and finance. It elaborated on the capacity of traceability process to strengthen peace efforts by tracing back different processes related to the manufacture and detention of weapons, to the chain of mineral supply and to the finance. The third section looked at internal and external mining-development geopolitics. It showed the rationale of developing a national and international politics based on anticipative system of governance that will take care for human wellbeing and identity and state's security through using rationally national richness for all.

Overall, the discussions in this chapter have shown that the particularity of the political economy of armed groups or rather of belligerents vis-à-vis mining sector in the DRC has been that mining zones, under rebel administration, lend the opportunity to accessing strategic minerals at a very cheaper price. Therefore, demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus have been envisioned as a problem-solving path. In whole, the findings have established that understanding the relationship between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants would need the involvement of local communities in core issue in line with conflict resolution and the post-conflict recovery, as this is one of the most critical aspects towards breaking the link between armed groups and

minerals in a post-conflict country. However less attention has been devoted to exploring the impact of ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group dynamics. The process of demilitarising mining areas and severing the artisanal mining-combatant nexus needs political solutions rather than technical. This process is meant to create urgency and to form a powerful coalition between local communities and all stakeholders. In so doing, it creates and communicates a vision for change and removes obstacles that impeded the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It also creates short-term wins built on the change and anchors the changes in corporate culture. Only governance based on the rule of law may be able to put forward the proposed technical solutions feasible.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Introduction

This research was conducted to explore and to establish the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants, and to investigate the likely impact of such a link on the prolongation of the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. It equally focused on the demilitarisation of the mining zones as a way of enhancing and promoting sustainable development, peace and security in the Kivus, DRC. To achieve these aims, the research used a case study approach, supported by qualitative data to analyse the following; the background to the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the DRC, the likely impact of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage in sustaining and driving insecurity and instability in the post-conflict DRC as well as approaches towards severing such a relationship. Drawing on this aspect and using the data gleaned from primary and secondary sources, this thesis contributes to extend our understanding of the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants in the Kivus, DRC. The overarching research question that this thesis has addressed is; how and in what ways could demilitarisation of mining zones consolidate peace in the Kivus?

The research has addressed the following specific research questions:

1. To what extent can natural resources be characterising the trajectory of the unfolded nature of the combatants' DDR process in the Kivus, the state failure and protracted armed conflicts in the DRC?

2. How does the nexus between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants' recruitment and the reintegration impede the achievements of the DDR process and feed the cycle of the (ex-) combatants' (re-) recruitment in the Kivus?

3. How can the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage be broken down? What would the relevance of the new DDR process be to the demilitarisation process and the security of the demilitarised mining zones?

4. How can the process of severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link be strengthened in order to prevent and stop violence in the Kivus? What are the opportunities and challenges of breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus?

This chapter encapsulates the key findings of this research and assesses the attainment of the research to wind up its discussions and analyses.

7.2 Main Research Findings

The research started with a review of the 'absurdity of abundance theory' – otherwise known as the paradox of plenty, resource curse or adverse effect of resource abundance theory, and 'the combatants push and pull' factors, respectively in Chapters Two and Three, to shed light on how resource-based conflict and the cycle of (ex-) combatants' (re-) recruitment and reintegration are linked and feed on each other. The review of resource curse theory in Chapter Two suggested that the economic motivations and opportunity created by abundance of natural resources and weak governance fuel armed conflict, while dismissing grievance as an incentive of armed conflict. The exploration of the 'combatants pull and push factors' theory in Chapter Three however found that combatants' recruitment and/or re-recruitment are motivated by the same root-causes understood under the lens of greed and grievance. Nonetheless, the mere difference between combatant's recruitment and re-recruitment is that the latter deals with an 'ex-combatant' who possesses military skills and is a valuable instigator of violence; thereby becoming valuable commodities for conflict entrepreneurs and agencies. Overall, the recruitment-reintegration-re/recruitment relationship remains a cumulative interaction that requires considering both the motivations behind re-recruitment. It is generally regarded as the failure of reintegration programmes and how it can worsen and fuel the existing root-causes that triggered recruitment in a particular society. When the outcomes of failure of reintegration tie in with the combatants' existing push and pull factors, the likelihood of the combatants' re-recruitment cycle is higher. However, this seems to be more complex in the case of the Kivus, where the phenomenon of 'combatants without borders' had emerged neither from the failure of the DDR process or pull and push factors, but from the rising of some new regional powers whose survival relies in the insecurity and illegal exploitation of minerals in the DRC.

The analysis of the background to the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship in the Kivus' conflict in Chapter Four established the significance of the domestic environment in which state failure and protracted armed conflict occurred. This situation led to the militarisation of the region, particularly the mining zones which motivated regional insecurity. The conflict-mining-combatant's recruitment cycle and the unfolded nature of the DDR process have been a corollary of the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. It extended to the domestic environment characterised by a significant economic downturn, an involvement of multinational corporations in signing unfair mining contracts, implication of belligerents in the illegal mining of mineral resources, perceptible institutional crumble and the loss of customary authority which were provoked by the application of the Bakajika Law – land rights of 1966, the end of the Cold War superpowers support in the early 1990s and the new geography of resources – which implies the principles of resource globalisation or resource appropriation. The effects of all these together were substantial; the population was living at survival level as the country's economy and infrastructure collapsed, the informal sector lengthened significantly by prevailing over the formal economy – which ended up giving easy access to mineral resources, therefore giving rise to the cycle of combatants recruitment and the failure of the DDR and SSR processes. At the same time, insecurity and violence became the ultimate route to accessing resources. As a result, the state capacity was further shrunk. These domestic conditions occurred in an environment of poor leadership in the country and the interference by the international community.

The other conflict context which is not of short is that the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle has been instigated from the eastern DRC. For decades, this mineral-rich part of the country has been home to migrants including Hutu *génocidaires* having fled political hostility in neighbouring countries; Rwanda and Burundi. These migrants have arrived all the way through history, politicising ethnic identity by the manipulation of nationality and land access, therefore fuelling marginalisation, inequality, insecurity and violence. Within this context, the Bakajika Law of 1966 or the laws governing land tenure, and citizenship law became the key tools. The Bakajika law brought back the full authority of the state over the lands. In 1973, land – which is the most vital domestic asset in the densely populated and sparse land region, was commoditised. The Bakajika Law impelled the purchase of land by

the Banyarwanda who have no right to accessing land through customary rights for they were regarded as foreigners.

The commodification of land altered the social configuration thoroughly and paved the way for marginalisation, discrimination and violence. Likewise, the introduction of the consecutive citizenship laws in 1972, 1981 and 1991 was politically manoeuvred by the Zaïre government in order to be in command of the Banyarwanda ethnic minority. The insecurity and violence resulted from marginalisation and discrimination above had led to an ethnic crisis in the eastern DRC before the arrival of the refugees into the Kivu provinces as a repercussion of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The creation of armed Hutu refugee camps under the supervision of Zaïre and France in the zone increased the militarisation of the area including mining zones and worsened the ethnic anxieties in the area. This has been the evidence which Tutsi Banyarwanda and the governments supporting them – Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, have used as security threats alibi to trigger finally the 1996 Congo War. Although ethnic concerns and security threats were used by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the Multinational Corporations as the reasons for interfering with the DRC's sovereignty, it had hidden ambitions of territorial expansion and easy access to the DRC's rich natural resources. The pseudo anti-Tutsi feelings manoeuvred by these countries in fact was a discontent over the non-application of mining agreements signed during the 1996 war between Laurent-D Kabila and his former allies; which led to the 1998 Congo war. In these armed conflicts, peace agreements have been carrying some predicaments and traps which have led to the recurrence of armed groups. This situation purposely created by neighbouring governments enabled a favourable environment for foreign armies' elements to infiltrate the DRC's security system, something which enabled (ex-) combatants (re-) recruitment cycle, the development of the phenomenon of combatants without borders, the illegal exploitation of mining, the unfolded nature of the DDR process and the failure of SSR in the aftermath of conflicts. These conflict impacts have resulted in a militarisation of the region and mining zones.

Given the multi-layered nature of armed conflicts at local, national and regional levels, marginalisation, inequality, insecurity and poverty emerged as conflict-fuelling factors. Concomitantly, the issue of natural resources – seen as the main cause of armed conflict and the cycle of combatants' recruitment, was neglected. Therefore, the root-causes of conflicts

could not be addressed during the peace settlements through a mere mechanism of power-sharing at a national level or by the DDR and SSR process or the democratic elections. Hence, the (re-) recruitment of (ex-) combatants and the long-drawn-out conflict in the mining area largely involve the RCD or CNDP or M23 against the FDLR and local militia against non-local ones.

The M23 is a metamorphosis of the CNDP, which itself derives from the RCD. The RCD stemmed from the 1998 non-respect of unfair mining contracts between Laurent-D Kabila and his Allies. The CNDP emerged from alleged criticism over poor conditions in the army and the government's unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal formulated against the DRC's government. It occurred when the Banyamulenge alleged to defend their ethnic minority after failing drastically in the local and national legislative elections in 2006. For the CNDP or M23 and their supporters, Banyamulenge are politically excluded from a majority-vote representative democratic system. Besides, there is still a great rift between Banyamulenge and the rest of indigenous people aggravated by the wars. The FDLR – who consist largely of the Hutu refugees – *génocidaires*, require political dialogue with the anti-democratic Rwandan government supported by the international community. Although they are only left the option of surrendering, demobilising and being repatriated as they are singled out as a negative force, the FDLR are often colluding with the local Mai-Mai militia and the national army – FARDC, to fight against the RCD, CNDP or M23.

In Chapter Five, the analysis of the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment of (ex-) combatants indicated that the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkages emanate from the control of resources and resource-zones by combatants, whether by monitoring the mining pits or by confiscation of ores from miners or by taxing mining dealers and miners operating in the mining zones under their control. On the other hand, artisanal mining bestows combatants with the right to partake in decision-making and benefit-sharing in mining zones under the armed group's administration. Combatants therefore have developed the mechanisms to secure mining assets and personnel in mining zones under their control. As a repercussion, combatants became responsible for social and environment impacts created by the mining of natural resources during the period covering their administration. Armed groups like the national army exploited different natural resources not only to sustain their various military campaigns, but also for self-enrichment of rebel, military officers and

political leaders. The artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus signified that mineral exploitation is a lucrative business which generates financial supports for combatants who became suppliers to the neighbouring countries and the multinational corporations that buy illegally from them. The current scholarly knowledge of conflict literature and analyses focus on the relationship between armed groups and natural resources with very limited analysis on motivations behind the ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group dynamics. However, the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus should be seen under the lens of the broader informal economy, which draws its roots from the 1980s economic meltdown mentioned earlier and the current resource globalisation which originated from the 1884 Berlin General Act, approved and substantiated by the 1885 Berlin Conference. The 1980s economic crisis like the current resource globalisation still leave great socio-economic scars and a negative legacy on the DRC mining sector; the shutdown of industrial mining gave rise to artisanal mining in the 1980s and 1990s, with the state being unable to regulate mining activities within the informal sector. At the same time, resource globalisation paves the way for multinational to have free exploitation of the DRC's resources.

Informal mining and cross-border trade have served as a means of survival for a great number of local communities living amid poverty, lacking livelihoods alternatives, despaired by the ruin of the infrastructures, and incurring insecurity caused by the conflicts. Concomitantly, the state of informality also resourced the conflicts by creating confusions and squabbles over mining ownerships. The quarrels over mining ownerships originated from a number of problems; the inconsistency of the mining code and the juxtaposition of two different legal systems in its provisions and enforcement, the blurring created by the legislations governing land and mining rights, the acknowledgement of a parallel authorities ruling land access and ownership by the national land law and customary law, the duplicated authorities of the central government and the control of a portion of the land by armed groups. As the state is unable to provide an efficient legal system option to settle litigations and quarrels over mining ownerships, violent approach appeared to be an important mechanism of conflict resolution within an environment where the DDR process did not address properly the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Therefore, within the widespread system of the informal sector, drawing the line between the war economy and the existing informal sector

has become incredibly difficult due to ex-combatants being released in the environment without employment, but where intra-borders illegal guns traffic set in as a flourishing and easy commercial activity. Moreover, the mining code failed to regulate the huge vested interest within the artisanal mining, therefore hampering reforms and decreasing the state controlling capacity.

However, it is too simplistic to attribute the failure of the combatants' socio-economic reintegration aspect only to unemployment without a thorough analysis of the impact of the ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group dynamics. The analysis in Chapter Five underscores the fact that natural resource wealth also exposed the DRC to conflict, although it has been established that the geographical concentration of resources and unequal sharing of richness provide inducements for rebellions. The struggle for the control over mineral resources by domestic and foreign armed groups also ignited the risk of war in the 1990s and 2000s. There are significant factors that should formally be accounted for in the existing models of resource plundering or globalisation that are very critical in explaining the nexus between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants' (re-) recruitment as well as the risk of war in the Congo. On the contrary, based on the difficulty of determining with accuracy the physical presence of combatants within the mining zones, it is challenging to assess exactly to what extent mineral resources exploitation encourages combatants' recruitment in the eastern DRC. Therefore, how and whether curtailing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship needs a clear understanding of other factors driving the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. Without having established understanding of these nexuses, demilitarising the mining sector and severing the said relationship cannot be predicted.

The perspectives expressed by different experts in Chapter Six support the above interaction of these complex factors. These individuals have been of the view that the particularity of the political economy of armed groups – including all belligerents, vis-à-vis mining sector, particularly artisanal mining, in the DRC has been that mining zones give the opportunity to access minerals at a cheaper price. Therefore, demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus have been envisioned as a problem-solving path. In addition, the local perspectives have demonstrated that understanding the relationship between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants is one of the aspects towards breaking down

the link between armed groups and minerals in a post-conflict country. The process of demilitarising mining areas and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus needs political solutions rather than technical ones. Only governance based on the rule of law may be able to make the proposed political solutions feasible. In the protracted armed conflict in the Kivus, all protagonists therefore continue to draw lucrative dividends from mineral exploitation and from their varied sources of endowment. Although there seems to be a consensus on the fact that minerals financially sustain the armed movements operating in the eastern DRC, the analysis of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage has established that the empirical analysis of what constitutes the link between combatant and minerals and how it could be severed continues to be a challenge for both academics and practitioners. Hence, the analysis on the motivation behind the ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group and combatants' recruitment dynamics is extremely limited. Despite this limited analysis, some researchers who have looked at this subject are of the view that mineral resources are the fuelling-factor for the cycle of recruitment and the unfolded nature of the combatants DDR process. Other scholars believe that mineral resources are the major incentives for the armed conflict, while few others are in agreement with mineral resources upholding the conflict or the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link being the result of insecurity and governance mismanagement or failure in the DRC.

With reference to the scholarly knowledge of the absurdity of abundance and the combatants' push and pull factors reviewed respectively in Chapters Two and Three, the political economy of armed movements vis-à-vis the mining sector appears to be limited if regarded as the prime cause behind most armed conflicts, even if it is difficult to draw clearly the line between economic reasons from other factors such as ethnic identity, partially given that conflict dynamics vary over time. Without any consensus on a set of conflict motivations, opportunities lent by the easy access to abundant natural resources and the effect of mismanagement are largely regarded as triggering armed conflicts, both by the rebel greed hypothesis and the political economy of armed groups vis-à-vis mining sector. The aforementioned stance has been prominent and determined the responses, leading to the mineral-based conflict approach in particular. The responses then focus on the mechanism concerned with keeping rebel groups from financial resources with the aim of stopping and

preventing violent conflict. There are also concerned with the issue of governance improvement as the paradox of plenty hypothesis indicates that weak governance is a critical variable in triggering war in countries endowed with natural resources. At the same time, the economic, political and social reintegration of ex-combatants has been considered to be the most important aspect of the DDR process as it aims to rebuild trust between ex-offenders and victim communities. Failing to do so, victim could rebut ex-offenders, which in turn may resolve in radicalising themselves.

On top of the overarching research question, my main conclusions for sub-questions are:

1. The DRC's economy is highly reliable on natural resources. It is more susceptible to violent conflict since it is less likely to be diversified and thus offers fewer opportunities to accumulate wealth and evenly distribute incomes, or to achieve equitable and inclusive development. In the same vein of thoughts, this research argued that the DRC's low-levels of development links to weak governance capacity to exercise authority over its territory. Likewise, the lack of infrastructure and effective security system restricts the government's capabilities to control and manage natural resources in the East; neither has it been capable to share proceeds from natural resources in an equitable manner. Hence, insurgents and armed groups are more likely to happen. This becomes a particular security concern, essentially in the Kivus where economically valuable natural resources are opened to individuals without any restriction; easily accessible and lootable by anyone. Subsequently, these resources and their supply chains are fairly captured and utilised to uphold belligerent activities by armed movements. Concomitantly, non-lootable natural resources are either scrambled for or informally taxed along the value chain; this, in my findings, constitutes a source of revenue for armed groups. As a repercussion, despite a few DDR initiatives having been implemented in the Kivus due to the continuous resurgence of violence in recent past and a lack of a comprehensive peace agreement solution, it is clear that natural resources – especially artisanal mining, play a crucial role in delaying peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, particularly in the failure of the ex-combatants' DDR. This means that the (ex-) combatants' acquaintance with the mineral wealth of the eastern DRC, coupled with the evanescence of the state in this territorial part of the state play a key role in

livelihoods and community recovery overall, such as the overall context in which DDR processes have been implemented. In view of that, the governance of the mining sector and the implementation of mineral supply chain certification schemes back up the outspread nature of the combatants' DDR process in the Kivus, the state evanescence and long-drawn-out armed conflicts in the DRC.

2. The reintegration component of DDR programmes is highly influenced by the surrounding context, including the absorption capacity of communities, social relations and the economic climate of the area. On the other side, this research has proved that the nexus between combatant-recruitment and artisanal mining-armed groups is feeding each other. With respect to artisanal mining, this study has pointed out three areas that are of interest to DDR practitioners; issues of land rights, engagement of private sector actors and sustainable value chain development working in the mining sector. In view of these three elements, it is arguable that the management of mining sector lends different entry points for sustaining temporary income generation activities and sustainable employment creation during reintegration and recovery process. However, in the case of the Kivus, the easy access to mineral resources by combatants have delayed and impeded the stabilisation of income generation, emergency employment, local economic recovery and sustainable employment creation. In clear, the (ex-) combatants' reintegration process implemented in the Kivus was neither 'ex-combatant-centred' nor 'community-centred' approach. It was a process – which aimed to get rid of a post-conflict requirement considered as a recommendation from the international community, rather than a peacebuilding process whose purpose is to tackle down issues that have led to grievance, hence to militancy of a few individuals. In the Kivus, easy access to minerals promotes violence through enabling the formation of insurgent armed groups in short-term, while at the same time provides opportunities to access public institutions – army, police, government etc., in long-term. This often accommodates the capacities of conflict entrepreneurs to spoil peace efforts.

3. Reintegration processes are often linked to natural resource sectors, such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry and protected area management. However it is to be

ensured that artisanal mining is sustainably used to support peacebuilding and development. This could significantly strengthen the outcomes of DDR and could have positive multiplier effects on wider recovery efforts. Reinsertion activities fall within the short-term stabilisation activities of emergency employment. Nevertheless, the reintegration activities could start as the reinsertion activities above, but are a stronger focus of employment opportunities. This leads to long-term employment generation efforts that occur during reintegration and beyond. The artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage would be broken down, if all the activities above start as early as possible in a peacebuilding phase, even if they will have different intensities over time. The particularity of the political economy of armed groups and belligerents vis-à-vis mining sector in the DRC is that mining zones offers the opportunity to accessing strategic minerals at a very cheaper price. Henceforth, delinking (ex-) combatants from artisanal mining would need the restoration of the state's authority, the achievement of an effective (ex-) combatants' DDR and the reform of the security system. In this context, conceptualising a new DDR framework, which hinges around individual-centred and community-centred reintegration, seems to be the bedrock of the demilitarisation process and the security of the demilitarised mining zones. This, therefore, would not only address returnees' concerns, but also the community's.

4. The analysis of the recurrence of combatants' (re-) recruitment and reintegration in the mining zones in the Kivus shows that the failure of the peacebuilding efforts in the Kivus is one of the results of the deficiency of reliable security system by the state. This involves the state's incapability to extend legitimate violence over its mining-endow territories under the squatters control and its inability to use its attributes of sovereignty. Therefore, reinforcing the process of severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link, and preventing and breaking violence in the Kivus would require a 'militarisation of war-affected zones administrations'. Then 'militarised administrations' will 'demilitarise former rebel militarisation' in mining areas for a 'new remilitarisation', whose aim is security of mining zones and stability. This process can end up with the improvement of security stabilisation. This implies that all belligerents must be kept away from mining zones, while mining activities that aim

at feeding violence in the Kivus should be banned. In this context, economic, political and social rehabilitation of ex-combatants and their home community should go hand in glove during the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. This also includes the creation of natural resources management system which will factor into local, national and regional interests, if the processes of demilitarisation and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link are envisioned to be strengthened. Conversely, given that reconditioning fragmented communities – that have developed mistrusted relationship based on ethnic tensions, with each of them maintaining ethnic military wing, is part of peacebuilding processes, local community participation in this context may be envisaged as a path to reinforcing all solutions with regard to severing artisanal mining-combatant relationship. The efficiency of these processes would be possible only if the state is able to reform the management of its security system based on a state's proactive intelligence system or an anticipative and offensive intelligence system capable to forestall events.

On the basis of the above, the thesis analysed how demilitarising mining zones can contribute to ending the cycle of the combatants' (re-) recruitment, the unfolded nature of the combatants' DDR process, illegal exploitation and trade of mineral resources, and enhance peace and security in the Kivus, DRC. While breaking the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus, as a new form of demilitarising mining zones, is seen to be a path towards curtailing and preventing armed movements and war entrepreneurs from resources, the research has found that there is the need for the local communities to participate in the processes of the demilitarisation of mining zones as their contribution may form the cornerstone of the process. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, each every ethnic group in the Kivus has created its tribal militia and all tribes require being treated as equal when it comes to addressing economic, political and social issues concerning their communities. In this regard, the reliance on the top-down understanding of, and top-down solutions to the conflict that have overlooked local perspectives and favoured some ethnic groups over others – as is the case with Tutsi and Hutu, the ex-combatants' DDR processes and SSR, have been largely driven by the agendas of external stakeholders like the specialised agencies of United Nations. This situation has led to the infiltration of foreign armies' elements – particularly Rwandan and Ugandan even Burundian soldiers into the FARDC and the DRC's security

system, to the phenomenon of ‘combatants without borders’ and to the conflict resolution based on the ‘blend of belligerents’, ‘intermingling and mixing of combatants’ rather than a ‘proper DDR process’ approach.

In social sciences, facts are all-inclusive, with their perspective being contextualised and specific, to the extent that the analysis of their aetiology cannot be approached in an isolated manner. The ‘nexus between artisanal mining and the combatant’s recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle’ approach has been able to bring into light the ‘artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus’ although it was barely possible to physically locate the presence of combatants within the mining sites since they use proxies or intermediaries to hide their trading activities. The recruitment of combatants like the war economy is deeply networked and well integrated to the point that it has changed the existing widespread informal economy. This can be detected in the nuanced perspectives of the local stakeholders. Demilitarising mining zones therefore would not significantly improve security issues without understanding the informal sector in the DRC. Neither would it contribute to end or prevent the conflicts unless communities are reconditioned and their opinions included. Based on the conflict aetiology, it has been established that the causes of the conflicts in the Kivus include many factors among others; militarisation of mining zones, access of belligerents to natural resources, mismanagement of the mining sector and poor quality state leadership as well as the 1884 Charter creating the DRC. In addition to this, the emergence of other new regional powers within an environment characterised by an unbalanced geography of resources, has all played roles in creating marginalisation, inequality and insecurity that have allowed gunmen, strongmen and a group of elites from within and outside of the country to have access to resources. The situation ignited grievance and conflict as resources were not distributed fairly. There is no concrete evidence and assurance as to what would thwart (ex-) combatants from accessing revenues from illegal exploitation of mineral resources after they have gone through the DDR process. Furthermore, the ‘nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants approach’, which focuses on the ‘demilitarisation of mining zones’, is partial and coercive method for the following main reason; demilitarising mining areas may switch military balance in favour of the government therefore victimising and criminalising (ex-) combatants by dismissing any political

grievances regardless of their legitimacy, legitimating and protecting state authorities despite their implication in violence, and getting rid of prospects for diplomatic negotiation.

In addressing the research question, overall we can conclude that this research has endeavoured to shed light on the issue regarding how and why ending and preventing the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants in the eastern DRC. 'Demilitarisation of mining zones' has been used as the theoretical concept. For the purpose of this research, demilitarising mining zones is conceptualised as a social condition that emerges when change and transformation occur at local and community levels. This study has examined local level changes, particularly from a 'severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus' perspective which involves the participation of the whole community to the process and how could local ownership and authorship influence not only a new conflict understanding and new solutions, but also create a new social identity through communities recondition. In precise, these are my main findings; the community-based approach or local communities' participation, which is a major short-coming of the 'demilitarisation of the mining zones' approach examined in this research, highlights the challenges in breaking the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus by only including a wide range of military operations, due to the nature of the conflict in question. In this regard, the research has suggested that military actions against illegal exploitation of mining may be ineffective owing to the army which is supposed to lead military actions is itself involved in the illegal exploitation and the minerals trade. Due to this conflict of interest, this is the challenge for the army which normally should not be involved in the demilitarisation of mining zones. However, it is important to bear in mind that the army as a whole but just portion of officers and soldiers that are in acquaintance with illegal mining exploitation and trading. There still is a way to demilitarise mining zones with the army and with the support of the Kivus' communities.

Considered at the heart of the demilitarisation process, community-based approach may shift the analysis and comprehension of the conflict in the Kivus from the 'top-down understanding' to the 'bottom-up understanding'. As a repercussion, solutions to the conflict would switch from 'top-down solutions' to 'bottom-up solutions'. This is what this thesis has called 'local ownership and authorship', which could form the groundwork for sustainable peace in the Kivus. Local ownership and authorship can enable communities' recondition

which is indispensable for a new DDR process following the demilitarisation of mining zones. However, due to armed groups in the Kivus being supplied from various sources – including neighbouring countries, and due to insecurity dividends gleaned by strong men, combatants without borders and other peace spoilers – such as armed bandits, hoodlums etc. who want to achieve their ulterior motives in the community through insecurity and resource pillage, community-based approach might yield less hope than expected. Therefore, the traceability of minerals, weapons and finance needs to go along not only with the control of the borders, but also with the development of internal and external mining-development geopolitics that hinge on both local and regional economic interests. This divergence is all within an environment characterised by bad governance and poor leadership leading the state on one hand, and on the other by armed conflicts and an army made of businessmen involved in illegal mining exploitation. The concept of community-based approach requires reconsideration in terms of necessary economic, political and social change to make it more practical in order to elucidate the extent to which military actions and the participation of local communities is sought. In addition, the arguments presented in this thesis have contributed to ongoing academic debates on conflict analyses, the absurdity of abundance hypothesis, the political economy of armed groups vis-à-vis mining sector, and the combatants' socio-economic insertion in particular. This is the point in which the thesis contributes to knowledge by shedding light on the theoretical contention of applying the demilitarisation of mining zones as a means of breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus.

As a social fact, the analysis of economic motivations cannot be isolated from other factors for they can be regarded as a symptom of underlying insecurity and grievance. The thesis investigated the challenges of country-based reductionist approaches and their over-emphasis on the economic dimensions of armed movements throughout my analysis with regard to the conflicts in the Kivus. Such analyses are limited as to the multi-layered complex nature of the conflicts. The research came up with 'demilitarisation of artisanal mining zones' as one of the solutions towards breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus. According to the demilitarisation theory administrations of war-torn zones need to be militarised – good militarisation, in order to demilitarise mining zones – bad militarisation. Such a process will require a strong and visionary leadership which drives the understanding

of the course of events in which the country was, is and could be involved. This further will contribute to the development of a viable national framework for resource management, with a focus on mineral and finance traceability and to the initiation of a new combatants DDR process that takes into account both Security Sector Reform and economic, political and social reintegration aspects. It will eventually consider creating a mechanism of dialogue between different ethnic groups in the Kivus, whereby communities would be given opportunity to voice their concern and contribute to their development instead of using violence as a means towards attaining their objectives. This is the point in which the thesis contributes to practice.

This research was significant because it has achieved the research objectives set at the introduction by offering empirical analysis and data on the combatants' recruitment and the DDR process and the artisanal mining sector with regard to the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. It has demonstrated how combatants contribute to offering the opportunity to access mineral resources at a cheaper price, which context requires a solution such as the involvement of the above mentioned elements as a backbone of the demilitarisation of the mining zones and the severing of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus. Although it is difficult to ascertain the physical presence of combatants in mining sites, the nexus between combatant-recruitment and artisanal mining-armed groups is feeding each other. Curbing financial resources accrued from small arms and light weapons derived from mineral resources for the combatants would end and prevent violence. However, the distinctly different perspectives amongst local communities could be incorporated into the military activities towards demilitarising mining zones, as it provided an insight into how and why the local communities may be needed concretely to partake fully in ending and preventing the armed conflicts in the eastern DRC.

It should be highlighted that a recent claim from a group of mining experts in the DRC indicates that Dodd-Frank Law did not live up to the local communities' expectations. This law has not only been a blow to the local communities – who depend on artisanal mining, but did not completely help close criminal networks that have crystallised around illegal exploitation of minerals. They further claim that neither local communities nor civil society's view has been taken into account in drafting this legislation. This claim is closest to that of the main finding of my research in that bottom-up understanding and bottom-up solutions

that factor in communities recondition, local ownership and authorship, a new DDR process, finance and mineral traceability, the need of internal and external mining-development geopolitics may be included in the process of demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus. Having concluded, the following section presents a set of recommendations.

7.3 Key Recommendations

Since the end of the Cold War, a general belief and optimism based on peace and development thrived from the developing world, also known as the reservoir of natural resources and conflicts. Contrary to the above, however, the hope of the developing world has given rise to an increase of local conflicts based on the problem of geography of resources, which has become rooted within resource-rich countries such as the DRC. These conflicts result from identity, land access, governance, insecurity issues to name a few, which in turn have become the conflict 'push factors' once tied in with economic concerns. Owing to the total comprehensiveness and the specific contextualisation of social facts in their analysis, military actions to be taken against unauthorised armed groups occupying illegally mining zones would be effective, if they are associated with tackling with issues and needs concerned with the local communities.

The local community-based approach would not only be a path towards escaping illegal militarisation of mining areas, but also may reconfigure the nature of the state, its governance, political regime, and the state leadership through empowering communities. In this case, the demilitarisation of mining zones could have a domino effect, thus resource curse could turn into resource blessing. For this to be effective, there is the need for collecting ideas about how to address these issues and needs, and what has been obstructing the progress of the situations on ground. Such approach could contribute to developing policies and decisions for conflict resolutions that could encourage the establishment and the consolidation of a national civil structure capable of controlling the main mining activities, and managing equitably the extraction and trade of natural resources in the eastern DRC. This will enhance sustainable peace and security by incorporating these issues and the views of critical local communities whose concerns and perspectives have not been factored in.

As for the government, the first thing to bear in mind is that mineral-based conflict in the DRC is limited within a territorial area bordering countries that are harbouring territorial ambitions and hegemony to secure their future in natural resources and in land access. The economic survival of these countries relies on the pillage of the DRC's natural resources. For these countries – Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, the rich provinces of the Kivu is their hinterland and needs to be kept under perpetual insecurity in order to control their resources. It is up to the DRC's government to stop these neighbouring inclinations, either through military actions or by developing a common policy of natural resources management. This means that, the DRC's government may need to account for the interest of the neighbours in the analysis of the exploitation of the DRC's mineral resources.

As the country is entering the third phase of DDR, the government and all stakeholders should be aware that the access of armed groups to minerals is one major reason which fuels and sustains war in the eastern DRC. Severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus and preventing rebels from financial sources could require DDR and SSR that align corporate strategy, delivery mechanisms for change and business-as-usual environment. All this might be possible only if the programme has real picture of the future capability, if there is a clearly defined or communicated vision, if the organisation is able to change its culture and if there is a sufficient engagement of stakeholders.

The multi-layered and hybrid nature of the conflict in the Kivus involves local, national and regional levels of analysis since it encompasses several players. This is where lies in the importance of responsible and visionary leadership capable to handle local, national and regional interests through privileging the state's security independence. In politics, leadership is about being able to work collectively and co-operatively in order to achieve community's desire, and yield effective and satisfactory – popular, results. Leadership always goes along with history remembrance and anticipated actions and results. It has been more than 50 years since the DRC's independence; however, the country is still lacking a resource of good state managers and a responsible and effective leadership (Kitenge N'Gambwa 2011).

Debate centres on the issue of the resource-based conflicts and rebellions in the DRC (Dagne 2011; Kitenge N'Gambwa 2011) depict that since 1960 up to date the country's leadership has been missing out three attributes to obtain the utmost for the country's welfare. These

attributes can be summarised as the lack of a real vision for the DRC's future, skills and capacity to achieve the vision, and the desirable character to safeguard the realisation of the vision with sound judgment, integrity and equity (Kitenge N'Gambwa 2011). To date, the DRC's Diaspora lays blames on the DRC's government of managing the state under the influence of Rwandan leadership,[408] to the extent that it is believed that the Congolese institutions are infiltrated at all levels by Rwandans.[409] This view is closest to that of a member of the north Kivu's civil society for whom, this type of Rwandan leadership is territorially circumscribed and only pretends to control the DRC's territories-rich in natural resources but not the whole state.[410] Breaking from the DRC's past shapes of poor governance, it is arguable that the government needs a clear and practical vision for the country's future; which has to be articulated and applied. This vision will however require determined effort from a new leadership (Dagne 2011). This type of leadership should come from the Congolese people both living in the country and those who are part of its far-flung Diaspora. Opportunities and avenues for reform include revamping democratic governance and electoral reform, promoting economic growth by moving beyond aid and creating a favourable environment for investment, reforming the mining sector, improving the health and education systems, and strengthening the DRC's judiciary. A well-organised and invigorated Congolese Diaspora can join with Congolese living in the DRC to work towards the reforms. The upcoming elections in December 2016 offer a chance to step up these organisational and advocacy efforts. There is still work to be done on this issue.

Nowadays there is a survival problem, in terms of demography and geography of resources, in Rwanda and Uganda which triggers insecurity and violence in the Region of Great Lakes (Burnley 2011; Nabishaka 2011). This situation would linger for a while if not addressed properly. It happens to be important to initiate a regional and common policy framework on mining activities; which guarantees regional and common interests. This needs not only a political willingness but also a strong leadership to remember history and to anticipate events.[411] Yet, taking a look at the first and second World Wars, it looks to be like the

[408] Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[409] Interview conducted with former Governor of the Kivu province, Kinshasa, August 2013.
[410] Interview conducted with a member of the north Kivu's civil society, Kinshasa, September 2013.
[411] Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013.

Congolese crisis is not worse than the one Europe went through. With its valuable human and natural resources, associated with the geostrategic and geo-economical position of the country at the heart of Africa, the DRC is capable to build a strong, stable and prosperous state which could serve as a kick-off point for the development of other countries in Africa. This leaves room to former Adviser at the office of the Prime Minister to acknowledge that issues relating to governance, strong leadership and regional cooperation need to be looked into.[412]

Precisely seeing through an endogenous lens, the artisanal mining-combatants-recruitment cycle can be explained with a simple reason; the emergence of the mining sector from rentier economy. Mining has created a temporary wealth and is the backbone of a rentier economy in the Congo, only accessible to a category of elites (De Koning 2010; 2011). Severing this relationship requires surpassing it by using mineral income to create other important sectors of prosperity such as agriculture, new technology, etc. in order to reduce poverty and the likelihood of social conflict.[413] Poverty has been proved to be the catalytic element of violence and conflict in all human societies (Tschirgi 2013). It leads to violence and becomes the roots of violence (Özerdem and Podder 2011) in all states that rely on rentier economy and where poverty is severe.

As my fieldwork's findings indicate, when a country shifts from rentier economy to an integrated economy – based on intra and extra-border exchanges, people become less poor and less aggressive. An integrated economy alleviates violence and conflict. However, any society facing economic hardship, conflict becomes endemic. Countries that have solved the problem of geography of resources encounter less conflict. Resource blessing will occur only if resources are rationally used as a starting point to accumulate investment capital in order to get rid of rentier economy. Mining is the hub of the economy and part of national sovereignty; therefore actions towards demilitarising mining sites occupied illegally are needed.[414]

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[412] Interview conducted with former Adviser at the office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, October 2013.
[413] Ibid.
[414] Interviews conducted with a number of academics, Kinshasa, July 2013.

7.4 Future Research

There are a number of thematic clusters that merit further research. Firstly, army "intermingling and mixing" was a central agenda element with respect to the management of ex-combatants. Yet, in order to keep the research focused on the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus; this issue is barely included in this study. This issue is worthy of a separate research project, mostly from a security sector reform and state-building perspective.

Secondly, the nature of public participation was briefly discussed in Chapter Six. As the country is entering the third phase of DDR, a further study focusing on public participation, but concurrently taking into account potential effects and applications of the social, political and economic reintegration of ex-combatants, could be more helpful in understanding peacebuilding in the eastern DRC. Another set of researches on the local content or corporate social responsibility in line with how best local communities' suggestions can be conveyed on to the authorities and stakeholders is needed. The future research should consider how and why the community-based approach can reinforce the perceptions of good militarisation based on the military protection of strategic mining zones. For this research, an applied research study, facilitating dialogue with wider national and international actors as well as local communities in particular would be desirable.

Thirdly, there was no scope to concentrate on how the emergence of new regional powers impacts on the unfolded nature of the DDR and on the (re-) recruitment of (ex-) combatants in the mining zones. There is a need to explore the link between new regional powers and the ongoing instability in the eastern DRC focusing on the unfolding nature of the DDR and the cycle of combatants' recruitment emerging in the Kivus should be turned into sustainable peace and development process.

Fourthly, as an aftermath of the ongoing conflict in the DRC, combatants are constantly involved in various forms of violence and unlawful exploitation of mining, since the DDR processes have been piecemeal. The involvement of combatants in violent conflicts in mining zones in the eastern DRC suggests forcibly recruited and voluntary combatants from different armed groups take part in the perpetration of violence. A multivariate analysis of variance revealed that voluntary combatants are likely to perpetrate more violent acts and are inclined

to higher appetitive aggression. Forcibly recruited combatants however commit less violence, but are much more exposed to the PTSD. Further studies might consider assessing the combatant's perception of committing violent acts as a means towards accessing resources.

Fifth, artisanal mining has a significant impact on economic development and poverty reduction in certain mining producer-countries. However, in the DRC, it is prone to conflict and generates benefits for armed groups and their supporters instead of producing profits for both local communities – artisanal miners, and government. In the DRC's artisanal mining zones, particularly in the Kivus, the key issue is that most mining concessions are declared artisanal mining zones, opened to artisanal miners. Yet artisanal activities operate outside the regulatory framework of the state. Hence, there is the need for researching on how to formalise the artisanal mining sector and on how to embody this informal sector into a standardised legal framework which is registered in and governed by a central state system. This research may further explore the current artisanal mining top-down formalisation policy and the bureaucratic and technical measure that compound but do not address different problems associated with this sector; in particular conflict, informality, poverty, illegality, state control.

Sixth, the state-building process in the DRC needs the understanding of political process and the challenges associated with the colonial legacy. This is key to understanding the achievements, or lack thereof, of SSR. Different trajectories of the Congo's power struggle went through three phases; foreign occupation and stalled SSR efforts; transition period where former enemy forces were merged under a single umbrella; and a post-electoral phase where competing strategic agendas were settled. All of these have severely constrained available options in terms of SSR. It also paved the way for the Congolese army to be composed of a hodgepodge of experienced soldiers, former self-defence units, more or less efficient armed groups and ex-religious zealots. This issue is worthy of a separate research project, mostly from the exploration of the interdependence between the political process and the de-politicisation of security apparatus in a post-conflict state.

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Appendix

Appendix One: Chronology of key events

Adapted from “Time line: Democratic Republic of Congo” (BBC 2010c; http://www.timelinesdb.com).

Appendix Two: Synopsis of Different Civil Wars/Rebellions and Mineral-based Conflicts in the DRC

Civil wars

	Prominent Leaders	Recruitment Ideology & Political Objectives	Ethnic Base	Size & Area Controlled	Financing Sources	Foreign Support		Death Toll
						Support to Rebels	Support to Government	
Katanga Secession 9/1960 –1/1963	Moise Tshombe	Alleged federalist; secessionist in practice	Lunda-Yeke; Luba; Bemba	Katanga Province	Mineral resources; Belgium	Belgium; S. Africa	UN forces	80,000-110,000
Kasai Secession: 8/1960 –2/1962	Albert Kalonji	Anti-Lumumba	Luba-Kasai; Kuba	Kasai province	Diamonds; agricultural Resources	None	None	2,000-5,000
Kwilu Rebellion: 1/1964-12/1965	Pierre Mulele (Ethnic: Mumbunda) Louis kafungu (Ethnic Mumbunda)	Pro-Marxist; against imperialism and foreign control of the economy	Bambunda and Bapenda	Ex-Kwilu Province	Fully supported by Villagers	None	None	3,000-6,500
Eastern Rebellion: 4/1964-7/1966	Gaston Soumialot; Christophe Gbenye;	Against US-Belgian Military invasion and economic	Diverse ethnic base; predominance of Bakusu and Batetela	South Kivu and North Katanga; Army = Simba	-Own production ofgrenades and land mines; -Smuggling of	- Burundi (refuge for rebels;	USA, Belgium	200 whites; Over 46,000 nationals

	Nicholas Olenga; Laurent Kabila (section commander)	exploitation			minerals	Commanding centre); - Algeria, Sudan, Egypt		
Moba/Shaba I: 3/1977-5/1977	FLNC	Anti-Mobutu; Anti-imperialism	Lunda-Yeke, Luba; Bemba	Shaba region (Katanga province)	Mineral resources	Angola	Morocco, France	850-1,200
Moba/Shaba II: 7/1978-6/1978	FLNC	Anti-Mobutu; Anti-imperialism	Lunda-Yeke, Luba; Bemba	Shaba region (Katanga Province)	Mineral resources	Angola	France, Belgium, USA	1,000-3,500
Anti-Mobutu rebellion: 10/1996-5/1997	Laurent Kabila (with AFDL)	Opposition to Mobutu regime	Banyamulenge; Mai-Mai	Large army; conquered the country	Mineral resources; Rwanda, Uganda	Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Burundi, Zimbabwe…	None	234,000-237,000
Anti-Kabila rebellion: 8/1998-/2002	E.W.D. Wamba; J.P. Ondekane; Ruberwa, J.P. Bemba	Anti- L.D. Kabila	Many groups	Kivu; Equateur; Katanga; Kasai	Mineral and Agricultural resources	Rwanda, Uganda	Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe	450,000-700,000
Tutsi rebellion: 12/2006-12/2013	Nkundabatware (with CNDP), B. Bisimwa, JM Runiga, Makenga (with M23)	-Ugandan and Rwandan security -Ethnic rededications -Strategic interests	Banyamulenge	North and South Kivus	Mineral resources Taxes	Rwanda, Uganda	MONUC/MONUSCO	

Mineral-based Conflicts

Name & Date of Creation	Prominent Leader	Recruitment Ideology & Political Objectives	Ethnic Base	Size & Area Controlled	Financing Sources	Foreign Support	
						Support to Rebels	Support to Gov.
RCD, 1998	E. Wamba Dia Wamba; Jean Pierre Ondekane	Unpaid soldiers in the east; Ethnic representation in government Ugandan and Rwandan interests	Banyamulenge; former AFDL fighters	- Large part of the eastern region - Army base: 11,000 troops in 2002	Mineral resources	Rwanda and Uganda	Angola, Chad, Lybia, Namibia, Zimbabwe
MLC, 1998	Jean-Pierre Bemba	- Anti Kabila - Ugandan and Rwandan security - Strategic interests	Army base : former Mobutu presidential guard + members of Equateur ethnic groups	- Equateur Province; - Army base: 5,000-10,000 in 2002	-Diamonds, gold, timber -Tax on diamond trade	Uganda	Angola, Chad, Lybia, Namibia, Zimbabwe
RCD-Kisangani, 1999	E.W.D Wamba	- Anti Kabila -Ugandan and Rwandan security - Strategic interests	Multiple groups	- Kisangani, Central-eastern Province - Army base: 15,000 in 2002	- Mineral resources; -Foreign financial support	Uganda	Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe

Appendix

RCD-Goma, 1999	Emile Ilunga; Déo Bugera; Adolphe Onusumba	- Anti Kabila - Ugandan and Rwandan security - Strategic interests	Multiple groups	- North and South Kivus, parts of the North Katanga - Army base: 17,000 in 2002	-Mineral resources; -Foreign financial support	Rwanda	Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe
CNDP, 2006	L. Nkundabatware	-Ugandan and Rwandan security - Strategic interests	Tutsi	North and South Kivus	-Mineral resources; -Foreign financial support	Rwanda & Uganda	-
M23, 2012	B. Bisimwa, JM Runiga, Makenga	-Ugandan and Rwandan security - Strategic interests	Tutsi	North and South Kivus	-Mineral resources; -Foreign financial support	Rwanda & Uganda	MONUSCO

Source: Own Composition.

Appendix Three: Fieldwork schedule and the categories of participants

Interviewees

Name	Gender	Organization	Location	Date	Background
This item has been removed due to Data Protection. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.	M	Private sector	Kinshasa	15.08.2013	This item has been removed due to Data Protection. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
	M	Political	Brussels	23.11.2013	
	M	Political	Masisi/ telephone interview	22.08.2013	
	M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	25.07.2013	
	M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	08.08.2013	
	M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	06.09.2013	
	M		Brussels	26.11.2013	
	M	Civil society	Paris	07.12.2013	
	M	Mining Sector	Kinshasa	25.07.2013	
	M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	22.07.2013	
	F	Mining Sector	Beni/ telephone interview	18.07.2013	
	M	Political	Butembo/ telephone interview	18.09.2013	
	M	Civil Society	Brussels	29.07.2013	
	F	Private Sector	Goma/ skype interview	06.09.2013	
	M	Mining Sector	Uvira/ telephone interview	15.07.2013	
	F	Private Sector	Butembo/ skype interview	16.08.2013	
	M		Paris	09.12.2013	
	F	Private Sector	Bukavu/ email interview	21.08.2013	
	M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	22.08.2013	
	M	Political	Kinshasa	17.08.2013	
	F	Political	Beni/ telephone	27.07.2013	

This item has been removed due to Data Protection. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.

		interview	
F	Private Sector	Kinshasa	07.08.2013
M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	15.08.2015
M	Civil Society	Bukavu/ skype interview	29.08.2013
M		Kinshasa	11.09.2013
M	Political	Kinshasa	25.07.2013
M	Political	Paris	13.12.2013
M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	12.08.2013
M	Political	Kinshasa	17.09.2013
M		Kinshasa	28.09.2013
M	Private Sector	Paris	11.12.2013
	Political	Kinshasa	29.07.2013
M		Kinshasa	19.07.2013
F		Brussels	22.11.2013
M	Political	Brussels	18.11.2013
F	Mining Sector	London	10.11.2013
F	Mining Sector	Coventry	06.11.2013
M	Civil Society	Kinshasa	29.07.2013
M	Civil Society	Bukavu/ skype interview	12.08.2013
M		Kinshasa	21.07.2013

*Respondent's names withheld.

Focus Group Discussions

Participants FGD 1	Gender		Organisation	Title	Location	Date	Background
	F	M					
7	1	6	Political (Opposition and Ruling Parties) & Civil Society	Members of the Parliament & opposition shadow government, civil society's spokesperson Kivus' Union chair	Kinshasa Wallonia Centre	26.07.2013	All participants were from the Provinces of the Kivu,

Participants FGD 2	Gender		Organisation	Title	Location	Date	Background
	F	M					
7	2	5	Civil society and private sector	Academics and analyst researchers	Kinshasa, CEP meeting room, University of Kinshasa	19.08.2013	Participants' field of research aligns with the Kivu's conflict. They were also very active in peace process in the DRC

Participants FGD 3	Gender		Organisation	Title	Location	Date	Background
	F	M					
10	3	7	Civil society, political and private & mining sector	Journalists, politicians, academics, Kivus' traditional chiefs, diplomats	Kinshasa, SARW training centre	23.09.2013	Participants were from different social clusters, but with interesting conflict analysis of the DRC

FGD: Focus group discussion.

Appendix Four: Interview semi-structured questions

Interview Questions

Theme I:

The relationship between Mining and the Recruitment of Combatants

1. As the Global Witness has just published some high rank military officials of both Congo and neighbouring countries are involved in mining exploitation in the DRC. Can you comment on this?
2. Could you tell me a bit about what happened in the mining zones controlled by armed group as far as the recruitment of combatants are concerned?

   - Which areas are particularly affected by this phenomenon?
   - Which armed groups target such zones?
   - What particular tactics they use in their recruitment?
   - How do they mine mineral resources in the zones they control?
   - What do they do with these mined minerals?

3. Can you explain how and why this relationship is recurrent after ex-combatants have been demobilised, disarmed and reintegrated?
4. What are the consequences of this relationship?
5. As we know the close relationship between mining and recruitment of combatants is a huge challenge for the DRC, therefore could you tell me how can such a relationship be broken down?

Theme II:

Demilitarisation of the Mining Zones

1. Can you tell me what state security provision there are in mining zones, and who is in charge of it?
2. As we understand some mining zones are controlled by armed groups. Could you tell me how can they be demilitarised?
3. How can the mining areas be safe and secured after being demilitarised?
4. What can the impact of reintegration be on demilitarising the mining areas?
5. What needs to be done so that they (reintegration outcomes) can be effective to prevent the re-recruitment of combatants in mining zones?

Theme III:

Political Economy of the Congolese Mining Sector

1. Based on the extant code of mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, how is the mining sector regulated and organised?
2. Based on doing business and EITI, the DRC is performing badly, while the Kimberley control is regarding diamond control is failing to reach the target. Can you comment on this?
3. What are strengths and weaknesses of the existing code of mining, and that of mining investment?
4. Can you explain whether these weaknesses are linked to the inadequacy of existing laws or to their application?
5. How do armed groups profit from this situation?
6. What roles mining companies and traders play in strengthening the existing rebel groups?
7. What roles are there do you think for mining companies in promoting good governance in the mining sector?
8. How can mining sector contribute to good governance and social peace?

Appendix Five: Ethics Approval Authorisation

REGISTRY RESEARCH UNIT
ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM

(Review feedback should be completed within 10 working days)
Name of applicant: Magha Gimba……

Faculty/School/Department: [Business, Environment and Society] BES International Studies and Social Science……
Research project title: The Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-recruitment of Combatants in the Kivus, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Comments by the reviewer

Evaluation of the ethics of the proposal: Dear Charles This application is almost complete, but you still have to deal with a couple of things. In particular, you still need to include some information on the consent form (see my previous comments) - you still have not included a sentence to give permission for interviews to be recorded. If you are taping participants you must have this on the consent form.
Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form: 1) can you include Alp's contact details on the participant information sheet (his name and email are enough) 2) The consent form could also do with a little more detail. If you look at the examples of consent forms on the CU Ethics system under the documentation tab you will see what I mean. In particular you need to get your interview candidates to consent to being tape recorded.
Recommendation: (Please indicate as appropriate and advise on any conditions. If there any conditions, the applicant will be required to resubmit his/her application and this will be sent to the same reviewer). [X] Approved - no conditions attached [ ] Approved with minor conditions (no need to re-submit) [ ] Conditional upon the following – please use additional sheets if necessary (please re-submit application) [ ] Rejected for the following reason(s) – please use other side if necessary [ ] Not required

Name of reviewer: Anonymous

Date: 24/01/2013

Appendix Six: Interview briefing sheet

Study title:

The Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-recruitment Cycle of Combatants in the DR Congo.

What is the purpose of the study?

The aim of this study is to develop reflexions from peacebuilders within international and local non-governmental Organisations in the DR Congo and theorise about their experiences so as to get a greater grasping of how best to build sustainable peace in a post-conflict country with natural resources endowment from the political economy of mining in the DRC and other similar settings.

Why have I been chosen?

For the purpose of this study I need to interview a large number of those individuals who have been most involved in peacebuilding and mining sector in the DRC through their work in local and international NGOs.

Do I have to take part?

No. Participation is entirely voluntary. Even having completed the interview you may request for your comments to be excluded from the study. You can withdraw by contacting me by email and providing me with your participant information number. If you decide to withdraw all your data will be destroyed and will not be used in the study. There are no consequences to deciding that you no longer wish to participate in the study.

What will happen to me if I take part?

I will carry out a short interview (30 minutes – 1 hour) which I will record on a digital audio devise. After the interview I may contact you again by email or phone to clarify certain points or to invite you to take part in a second interview.

What are the possible disadvantages of taking part?

I will aim to keep the interview as short as possible. If however you feel that you have a lot to share I may invite you to spend more time discussing this with me, which would involve you dedicating a longer period of time to the study.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Your insights could make a significant contribution to deepening our understanding of the role of natural resources in conflicts recurrence in the east of the DRC and peacebuilding work that has taken place in there. It is only through studies such as this that those of us working within this field have the opportunity to share our knowledge with a wider audience and to learn from each other's' experiences for the future.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

Yes. The information you share will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. I will not name you or the organisation you belong to in the final publication. The interview data will be kept private and will be destroyed on completion of the study. I will not discuss the comments you make during the interview with any third person.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The information collected will be written up and included in my final PhD thesis. There is the possibility that all or extracts of this thesis will be published (for example, in peer reviewed academic journals) or presented at conferences.

Who is organising and funding the research?

The research is organised by Charles Gimba Magha and is a PhD research project based at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) at Coventry University.

Who has reviewed the study?

This study has been through the University Peer Review process and been approved by the Chair of UARC/RDS-C.

If you have any questions or queries Charles Gimba Magha will be happy to answer them via e-mail: gimbam@uni.coventry.ac.uk. If I cannot help you, you can speak to Professor Alpaslan Ozerdem, the Director of studies.

Phone: +44 (24) 659069

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant or feel you have been placed at risk you can contact the Director of the studies, Prof Alpalan Ozerdem via e-mail: aa8681@coventry.ac.uk.

Contact for Further Information.

Charles Gimba Magha-A-Ngimba

Appendix Seven: Interview consent form

Introduction

My name is Charles Gimba Magha and I am currently undertaking research for my PhD studies at Coventry University. This interview is to help create an understanding of the nexus between mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatant cycle in the DRC.

The interview aims to collect data and information towards the completion of this research. The research aim is to inquire and fill the gap in previous research as to what is the role of natural resources in the armed conflicts' recurrence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The main purpose of the research is to establish and examine the nexus between mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants, and investigate the likely impact of such a link on the prolongation of the armed conflict in the DRC.

The information gathered is for academic purposes which would help to increase knowledge and highlight ways of improvement for peacemakers, policymakers and other organisations, with your permission, I may digitally record your interview, and then it will be written out so that I have a record of what was said in the interview. Your views will be treated in-strictest confidence.

Thank you for your cooperation.

- The participant signature must be witnessed by the researcher
- A signed copy of consent form must be given to the participant for their record

The consent Statement

Participant Reference Code: _____

I have read and understand the attached participant information sheet and by signing below I consent to participate in this study.

I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study without giving a reason at any time during the study itself.

I understand that I also have the right to change my mind about participating in the study for two weeks after my participation in the study.

Signed: _____
Print Name: _____

Witnessed by: _____
Print Name: _____

Researcher's Signature: Charles Gimba Magha
Date_____

Appendix Eight: Coventry University's Letter

Coventry University
Priory Street
Coventry CV1 5FB

Professor Denise Skinner
Dean of Faculty of BES

19 July 2013

Dear Sir or Madam

Re: Charles Magha GIMBA

I write to confirm that Mr GIMBA is a full-time registered PhD candidate at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, UK. He is conducting research on the nexus between mining and combatants' recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The purpose of the research is to contribute towards post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention in the DRC, and to derive theoretical understandings that may be helpful in other contexts of protracted conflcits.

Mr GIMBA is authorized by us to conduct interviews with relevant persons, and we would be grateful if you could kindly offer him permission and opportunities to do so.

Sincerely,

Alan Hunter

Dr Alan Hunter, Professor of Asian Studies
Associate Director, Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies
Coventry University
Tel: +447974984103
Email: a.hunter@coventry.ac.uk

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